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International Conference on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Accomplishments and Future Endeavours (CN-295)

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

    • Opening Session
      • 1
        Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi
        Speaker: Mr Rafael Mariano Grossi (IAEA-Director General)
      • 2
        Ms Nathalie Semblat
        Speaker: Ms Nathalie Semblat (Global Affairs Canada)
      • 3
        Mr Luis Pedro Huerta
        Speaker: Mr Luis Pedro Huerta (Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission)
    • 12:30 PM
      Lunch Break
    • Side Event 1: IAEA Legislative Assistance Programme: Addressing Member states´ Needs Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Judit SILYE
    • Side Event 2: Reflections on the Road Ahead for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radioactive Sources M5 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Reflections on the Road Ahead for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Alternatives to High-Activity Radioactive Sources

      Convener: Timothy Hayes (IAEA)
    • Side Event 3: IAEA Hiring Process Board Room A (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room A

      IAEA Headquarters

      IAEA Hiring Process

      Convener: Domenico Taverna
    • Side Event 4: Removals of Disused Category 1 and 2 Sealed Radioactive Sources: Reflections and challenges from the past and present, then looking to the future solutions. M2 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Removals of Disused Category 1 and 2 Sealed Radioactive Sources: Reflections and Challenges from the past and present, then looking to the future solutions

    • Scenario-based Policy Discussion Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Scenario-based Policy Discussion

      Convener: Ms Leeza Duval
    • 4:00 PM
      Coffee Break

      Coffee Break

    • 6:00 PM
      Reception: Director General Welcoming Reception

      Director General Welcoming Reception

    • 10:30 AM
      Coffee Break M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Coffee Break

    • Interactive Content Presentations M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Interactive Content Presentations

      • 4
        A smart underwater sensor for localizing radioactive sources

        A medium resolution spectrometer is developed for smart operations in areas close to the coasts providing rapid radioactivity maps of key natural and artificial; radionuclides. The system operates using a CeBr3 crystal, appropriate electronics for saving the sequential spectra in special memories as well as a self power unit for long term measurements. The system integrates a mini GPS system for rapid mapping after the survey and site characterization. A tool is also developed to support (near) real-time applications in areas with high concentrated radioactive sources. The system offers activity concentrations of all detected gamma-ray emitters in absolute units by combining simulation code. Two experimental points were used for validating the theoretical estimation along with gamma-ray energy. The tool (system and method) is tested in a region where low level radioactive sources were buried at a depth of 5cm and a first estimation of true and false alarm is given.

        Speaker: Christos Tsamparis (Hellenic Center for Marine Research)
      • 5
        Gamma/Neutron detection and identification systems for tracking and inspection of radioactive sources

        The availability of monitoring and inspection tools is a critical asset for a distributed tracking, inspection, and control of radioactive sources. Since more than 10 years our group is actively involved in the development of innovative tools and techniques aimed at supporting on-field operators for preventing and detecting illicit trafficking of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and other radioactive sources. This activity has been carried out with different approaches in various EU funded projects, such as MODES_SNM and C-BORD, within FP7 and H2020 programs respectively. We will give an overview of what have been developed within these frameworks so far, deepening on the SNIPER-GN technology which is now the state-of-the-art for gamma/neutron sources detection and identification and which is the key technology for SNM detection in “SILENTBORDER”, a new H2020 project focused on non-intrusive inspection of cargos passing through European borders.

        Speaker: Mr Alessandro Iovene (CAEN SpA)
      • 6
        The use of Monte Carlo Simulation in Safe and secure management of disused sealed radioactive sources: end-of-life-cycle management options

        The management option of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources (DSRS) is one of the challenging issues as the growth of activities with radioactive sources is undeniable in the world. At the end-of-life cycle of a radioactive source either previously used in industrial or research applications, the resulted DSRS is vulnerable because of being nonprofitable to the end-users. Their management is foremost important to assure that safety and security measures are in place at the management facility. Usually, when DSRS becomes waste, the management options in place and internationally recommended are made of administrative controls and the implementations of technical measures in terms of “return to supplier”, borehole implementation, long-term storage, and disposal. Different studies have been carried on the safety and security of each option, especially while a certain quantity of DSRS is to be stored. The present study discusses the implementation of Monte Carlo simulation in managing the DSRS for the long-term storage option.
        Monte Carlo-based Particle and Heavy Ion Transport code System (PHITS) is used to evaluating the safety measures in interim storage containing 241Am/Be and 137Cs sources. After the collection of the DSRS, Monte Carlo methods are used to simulate the effective dose rate in and around the interim storage facility. The calculations are done prior to the dismantling operations to be done on Truslers, the reassembly of all dismantled DSRS into a special P60 capsule form, and their storage into the long-term storage facility. The first computation was done on a waste drum in which the P60 special form capsule containing many disassembled 241Am/Be or 137Cs was loaded (Figure 1). The dose rate at contact and 1 m away, horizontal and vertical profiles show enough safety to plan the dismantled operation. The second computation was done for the entire long-term storage facility where several drums would be stored later, to evaluate the country storage capability based on the up-to-date inventory of the DSRS.

        Figure 1. Geometry of the simulation designed for DSRSs waste management optimization and the vertical dose profile

        Figure 2: Tank/drums for waste conditioning using concrete Different cross-section views for PHITS Calculations in the long-term storage facility

        Reference: AIP Advances 11, 000000 (2021)

    • 12:30 PM
      Lunch Break

      Lunch Break

    • Side Event 5: Safety and Security of Radiotherapy Sources(NAHU) Board Room A (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room A

      IAEA Headquarters

      Safety and Security of Radiotherapy Sources(NAHU)

    • Side Event 6: Introduction of New Regulatory Authority Information System(RAIS+) M5 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Introduction of New Regulatory Authority Information System

    • Side Event 7: Gender Gaps throughout the Generations: Perspectives from Radiological Security Experts Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Leeza Duval
    • Side Event 8: learning from the past radiological incidents and emergencies supporting member states´needs in EPR M2 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Muzna ASSI
    • 4:00 PM
      Coffee Break

      Coffee Break

    • Poster Session 1: Poster Presentations M 01( first floor M Building) (IAEA Headquarters)

      M 01( first floor M Building)

      IAEA Headquarters

      Poster Session

      • 7

        Nowadays radioactive sources are one of the most used technique to destroy tumor cells in patient by megavoltage or kilovoltage photon beam. Klaipeda university hospital in Lithuania uses sealed 60Co source of ionizing radiation and a linear accelerator (linacs) in its activities. In this field radiation protection and physical security plays a very important role in safety of ionizing radiation sources. The main goal is to ensure that ionizing radiation sources are secured and used safely to provide an appropriate level of protection for people, animals and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation exposure. The consequences of incidents with radioactive sources can be severe.
        However, high-energy photons (>8 MeV – 10 MeV) generated by a linear accelerator may induce photonuclear reactions and activate linac‘s parts. Materials activated in a linac can cause issues to arise during decommissioning of the machine as workers or additional dose to staff may be exposed to radiation from the activation products. Activation products are subject of radiological regulation which means that activated linac‘s parts must be disposed in accordance with national standards after decommissioning of the equipment.
        This research aims to quantify the amount of neutron activation induced radioactivity in the components of an 18 MeV Siemens Oncor Impresion 3D medical linac head, disscus decommissioning experience and assessed the adequacy of the quality of security measures. The activated isotopes were identified and their activities determined.
        Before the linac decomissiong main objects were:
        1. Preparing final decommissioning plan of the facility which is activating with sources of ionizing radiation according national legislation,
        2. Supplement radiation protection programme and physical security description.
        3. Review assessment of the quality and effectiveness of the measures to ensure the physical security system
        Dismantling work was carried out by engineers, which had electronic digital individual dosimeters. Radiation background was measured continously in the working area 0,15 μsv/h. Linac head parts ware measured with dose rate meter. According meter data, activated linac parts was vacuum window of the accelerating wave-guide, bending magnet core, x-ray target and the flattening filter. A maximum gamma dose rate of 6.1 μsv/h and 2,58 μsv/h beta dose rate were measured 5 cm distance.
        To ensure safety and security activated linac parts were placed in several a steel box, marked with a sign of ionizing radiation and temporary storage in the department specific room with a security alarm, video surveillance system and limited access. Dose rate measurements were performed on storage-assisted radioactive packages.
        A Canberra falcon 5000 high purity portable germanium (HPGe) detector was used to detect gamma rays emitted from the activated isotopes. Gamma spectroscopic analysis was undertaken using Genie2k software. Data analysis showed a wide spectrum of radioisotopes. 57Co, 54Mn, 58Co, 60Co, 51Cr, 196Au, 181W , 124Sb radioisotopes activity were higest. Results are shown in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Table 1, Table 2.
        Finally the radioactive materials were transported to Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant for radioactive waste management.

        Figure 1. Radioisotopes spectrum of bending magnet core

        Figure 2. Radioisotopes spectrum of accelerating wave-guide vacuum window, x-ray target and the flattening filter

        Table 1. Radioisotopes activity results of bending magnet core
        Radioisotope Activity, MBq Uncertainty, MBq

        Table 2. Radioisotopes activity results of accelerating wave-guide vacuum window, x-ray target and the flattening filter

        Speaker: Aurimas Krauleidis
      • 8
        A new type of 75Se gamma radiography design with enhanced inherent safety

        The use of γ-rays for industrial flaw detection is one of the important means of non-destructive testing technology. However, due to the inherent safety of the traditional gamma radiography that cannot accurately identify the location of the radioactive source, the interlock system between the shielded exposure device and the guide tube has some inherent flaws in use, etc. Gamma radiography industry becomes the most risky industry in Nuclear Technology Application, because flaws can easily cause radioactive sources decontrolled and cause radiation accidents.
        In order to enhance the inherent safety of gamma radiography, A new type of 75Se gamma radiography, which includes mechanical identification of the pigtail, a new interlock system between the shielded exposure device and the guide tube, the self-locking mechanism of the quick connector of the guide tube, dovetail type directional shutter, miniature motor remote control, satellite positioning system, etc. is newly designed. The new type of 75Se gamma radiography has the following advantages:
        1. Compared with similar equipment, the weight is reduced by more than two kilograms.
        2. The supervised areas can be greatly reduced (from the original radius of more than 200 meters to less than 10 meters) with appropriate shield.
        3. The personal dose of the operator and the radiation levels on the site can be reduced by more than ten times at least.
        This new type device has made some breakthroughs in safety supervision, radiation protection, accident prevention, and operational safety, and truly enhanced the inherent safety of gamma radiography.

        Speakers: hang li (China Institute of Atomic Energy), ronghua he (China Institute of Atomic Energy)
      • 9
        Advantages of Installing a Storage Center for Disused Sources in a Military Installation for Poor or Developing Countries

        Taking the Code of Conduct on Technological and Physical Safety of Radioactive Sources, States have the obligation to protect people, society and the environment from sources that are in disuse, which is why they must create various systems for the control of these sources. However, there are nations that have abandoned sources in spaces where civilians can enter without permission and with the intention of stealing materials that are economically useful to them in the black market of merchandise, they can generate accidental irradiations and produce an emergency at the territorial level.

        The use of a Military installation can offer extensive advantages in terms of Physical security.The first advantage is that an installation will have two barrier systems, the first being the Military zone where the passage of civilians is limited and the second being the system itself. of the installation of the bunker for the protection of these disused sources. The second is defense in depth: the authorities can act in the event of an alarm 24 hours a day without moving from one place to another, the third is the passage restricted only to persons authorized to handle these sources, transport of radioactive sources and National authorities in legislative matters. The fourth is the economic ease of a facility as it could save installation costs and it is not necessary to mobilize security personnel.

        Another advantage is the possibility of protecting the radioactive sources of the five categories and ordering them by date of entry, disuse, nation where the source is produced and its possible repatriation of the source without the need for cumbersome locations of these power sources in the various places sheltered outside these facilities.

        Speaker: Walter Felipe Sabalza (Hospital Universitario de Caracas)
      • 10
        CNESTEN's experience and current practices related to safety and security of radioactive sources

        The National Center for Energy, Science and Nuclear Techniques (CNESTEN) has Implemented safety and security measures. For the use and import of radioactive sources, throughout their life cycle. These measures are applicable from their import to their final disposal, and they include:
        -The importation of radioactive sources, after obtaining the import authorization issued by the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security (AMSSNuR);
        -The transport of radioactive sources is carried out in accordance with national regulations to ensure safety and security during transport;
        -During usage of the radioactive sources, Restriction of access to the storage area prevents unauthorized access or damage to, and loss, theft, or unauthorized transfer of, radioactive sources, so as to reduce the likelihood of accidental harmful exposure to such sources. A register controls daily movements and use of radioactive sources, and every year the inventory is updated with all the history of the source and crucial information about the radioactive source, in addition to physical verification of its existence in the location of the sources. Among the future projects is the establishment of a computer database for registers and inventory;
        -The Center is designated as the organization responsible for the management of radioactive waste generated at the national level by the various socio-economic operators working in the health sectors, the industry, the agriculture, mines and scientific research;
        -The center provides technical support to the state on expertise and response for regaining control over orphan sources and searching for missing sources and securing found sources.

        Speaker: mohamed EL OULKI (CNESTEN)
      • 11
        Comparison of measured and simulated by numerical simulation dose rates of DRMs during storage and irradiation period of radioactive sources in work places of gamma facility.

        To follow the radiation safety rules depending on generated actual radiation power i.e. exposition dose rate (EDR) in different locations of source work places is an assessment of its side effects on the environment, especially on human health.
        The observation and investigations were provided on radioactive sources of Panoramic Gamma Irradiator of Gamma Sterilization Complex of National Nuclear Research Center of Azerbaijan. The current activity of the Co60 source of our gamma facility is 245000 Ci. Maximum throughput 5160 liters/h, 123 m3/day at l MCi, 30 kGy.
        Radiation level control in the facility is actually performed as follows: 7 dose rate monitors (DRMs) were installed in each area of the working zone, which were placed in irradiation, operation, water deionization, ventilation rooms according to which the radiation safety regulations are monitored.
        - Comparative analysis of 7 DRM indicator parameters were registered during storage under the water pool and during the irradiation process.
        In other words, the actual parameters of DRMs in the maze actual parameters of other (in the operation room, water deionization room, ventilation room) DRMs were observed and compared.
        - EDR distribution depending on the distance.
        Analyzes of the distribution of EDR depending on the distance between the radioactive source and DRM parameters were analyzed.
        - Registration and comparative analysis of the actual performance of DRMs during the operation of the ventilation system.
        If there are any negative effects on the DRMs during the operation of the ventilation system, this is also the indicator of side effects of air in the work area. That is the indicator of dispersion of radioactive dust or high levels of ionization of air.
        Depending on the activity of radioactive source usage, its half-life and gamma stability is important to calculate radiation distribution in all work places of the facility and comparing the results of simulation with the parameters of DRMs in the working area gives us an opportunity to monitor and manage of the radiation safety.
        Numerical simulation of dose rate in the points where are DRM located was made by using software toolkit GEANT4 (CERN). Comparison of measured and simulated results shows good agreement. The accuracy of calculated dose rate values did not exceed 15%.

        Speaker: Mr Zaur Khalilov
      • 12
        Disposal of Cobalt-60 (Co-60) Teletherapy System in Medical Institution: Involvement of Stakeholders in Ensuring the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

        The Cobalt‑60 (Co-60) teletherapy machine was invented by University of Saskatchewan medical physicist; Harald E. Johns in 1951 in Saskatoon, Canada and has been used widely for cancer treatment. Commonly applied for external beam radiotherapy procedure, this machine uses Co-60 with high specific activity that emits high-energy gamma rays to kill cancer cells. Based on the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Source, Co-60 assigned to Category 1, corresponding to security Level A and IAEA Nuclear Security Series. Once Cobalt‑60 decays and the teletherapy are no longer functional, the unwanted teletherapy units and sources need to be properly disposed to prevent any radiological theft or accidents. During the disposal process of Co-60 teletherapy system at Queen Elizabeth Hospital II at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. There are three main processing categories which is before, during and after disposal. A dedicated committee are established to coordinate and identify the role of each government department or agency involved during this disposal activities to ensure the process are executed more efficiently, cost effectively, and align with current government policies as well as international practices. To dispose Co-60 teletherapy machine, advance approval are required to ensure the disposal process are complied with all requirements under Section 26 Control of Disposal of Radioactive Waste, Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) and others legislation in force. All the process involved during the disposal also must adhere with established Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This inclusive disposal units and sources, packaging, transfer and transportation. After the disposal process completed, the information are requires to be updated inside government asset disposal records plus radioactive materials and licensing directory. In conclusion, the disposal process of Co-60 teletherapy machine at Queen Elizabeth Hospital II has successfully executed with the cooperation of all stakeholders and Co-60 radioactive waste was well disposed at National Radioactive Waste Management Center, Malaysia.

      • 13
        Establishing Standard X-ray Narrow-beam Radiation Qualities for CNESTEN Calibration Laboratory

        For radiation protection purposes, the narrow-beam series (N-series) radiation qualities are of great importance, for the definition of the reference fields which are standardized for all secondary calibration laboratories by the ISO 4037 standard, indeed this beams qualities are defined by their photon energy distributions. Determining this energy distribution usually requires complicated spectrometry procedures, that’s why it is more convenient to define radiation qualities by using the X-ray tube voltage and the first and second half-value layer (HVL).
        in this work, the validation of different beams qualities is based on HVL measurements performed with X80- 225kV X-ray generator at CNESTEN calibration laboratory (National Centre for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology)
        The experiments were performed using the reference chamber used is PTW TN320058, positioned at 100 cm from the ‎focal point of the X-ray tube and connected to an electrometer SUPERMAX, the values of the HVL measured by applying the attenuation law, including their uncertainties. The experimental obtained values were compared with the HVL values defined by ISO 4037 standard, by checking the maximum absolute deviation.

        Speaker: TAIBI ZIDOUZ
      • 14
        Financial Provisions for the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources in Cuba

        The supplementary guidance under the Code of Conduct, Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, advises that regulatory provisions should be established for acquisition and use of a radioactive source, that include adequate financial provisions to cover the costs of management once the radioactive source becomes disused. The financial resources for the management of disused radioactive sources (DSRS) in Cuba are mainly provided by the users. The Decree Law 207 "On the Use of Nuclear Energy" establishes that the users have to pay the costs associated with the management of radioactive waste generated, including the DSRS. Financial provisions are also provided by the State to the Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR), the waste management organization in Cuba. These financial resources are mainly allocated for the physical protection, maintenance and other expenses at the centralized waste storage facility. In addition, significant contribution has been received from the IAEA for improving the safety and security of DSRS in Cuba, by providing radiation protection equipment, source storage containers and training the personnel.

        The management of disused radioactive sources is a technical service provided by the CPHR at the national level. In order to ensure that the user will fund the management of DSRS, prepaid agreements are established between the users and the CPHR. The cost-based pricing method is used to determine the price for this technical service. Direct and indirect components that influence in the cost of each stage of the management of disused radioactive sources are identified and evaluated. General overheads (indirect expenses generated at the organization level) are also considered in the cost.

        The cost card based on costs plus a profit margin is prepared when using this methodology. The cost cards are developed for each stage of the management of DSRS carried out by the CPHR. For the categories 3 to 5 DSRS this includes:

        • Collection and transport,
        • Recovering of the DSRS from devices, characterization and conditioning,
        • Storage of the conditioned package.

        Categories 1 and 2 DSRS at present are not being removed from the devices, so the stages of collection, transport and safe storage are considered to estimate the management price. Cost cards have to be approved by the Ministry of Science Technology and Environment.

        Economic considerations regarding costs incurred for the management of DSRS are provided in the paper. Financial provisions are essential to guarantee safety and security of the disused radioactive sources.

        Speaker: Mrs Maleidy Muñoz Escobar (Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene)
      • 15
        Iris Cryptosystem Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

        The possibility that radioactive sources could be used for malicious purposes cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. Today, there is a growing concern that terrorist or criminal groups could gain access to high activity radioactive sources and use the sources maliciously. Then, security of radioactive sources has long been a matter of national and international concern. States have agreed to strengthen existing and have established new international legal instruments to enhance nuclear security worldwide.
        Based on the basic IAEA guidance, one of the main security pillars for radioactive sources, is that the operator should provide a means of physically controlling access that effectively restrict access to authorized persons only to radioactive sources location, generally by allowing such individuals to temporarily disable physical barriers such as a locked door upon identification of the individual and access authorization.
        Biometric technologies become best practice as a sophisticated technology for the identification and authorization of an individual seeking access, that can be used in a standalone or in combination with other traditional identification systems that relay on passwords, ID cards, or personal identification numbers (PINs), attributed to its enhanced accuracy, improved accountability, and a reduction in opportunities for misuse, compared to the traditional identification systems.
        However, conventional unprotected biometric schemes are highly vulnerable to numerous privacy and security attacks. To overcome this problem, this paper presents a high-secure biometric authentication system using elliptical curve cryptography (EEC) to protect users’ biometric data during storage and transmission. This method guarantees a high degree of privacy/security protection without affecting the performance accuracy compared to unprotected conventional biometric system.
        This research mainly will focus on iris authentication as a model but the concepts and solutions can be extended for other biometric authentication methods. Comprehensive experiments on CASIA Iris Image Database V3.0 demonstrate the same performance accuracy with respect to its original counterparts yet which present robust protection against several major privacy/security attacks.

        Speaker: ahmed Asaker (Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority)
      • 16
        New Security system for Irradiation Facility at the Vinča Institute, Belgrade - Serbia (second phase)

        The Radiation unit, a gamma sterilization facility at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, is one of over 200 gamma irradiators operating worldwide. Gamma radiation is used for a variety of products: syringes, surgical gloves, gowns, masks, adhesive patches, dressings, ‘tetrapacks’, pacifiers for premature babies, artificial joints, food packaging, raw materials for pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, and even wine. the gamma plugs are sterilized. The gamma sterilization process at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences uses Cobalt 60 radiation to kill microorganisms on various products. Gamma ray processing gives fast processing time, easily penetrates the packaging and the product and is economical.
        Risks associated with the use of radioactive materials are numerous. Legislation in Serbia strictly prescribes the conditions of use of radioactive material to protect the exposed personnel, the population, and the environment. There is also a threat of nuclear terrorism in all plants with radioactive sources. Therefore, in 2016, in the Radiation Unit of the Vinca Institute, a new innovative security system was established in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Department of Energy USA, (DOE), and Vinca Institute.
        In this project the palm vein cameras were placed at the entrance to the control room. Also, the system provides video surveillance of the entire plant. As part of the project, armored security doors, and the new radiation detector at the entrance to the labyrinth were installed.
        In the second phase of the project, which started last year, the main task was the introduction of a new central alarm station within the Institute, as well as connecting individual facilities with this station. Facilities containing radioactive or nuclear material will be connected to the new central alarm station.
        In this paper, most attention is paid to the description of the new central alarm station, the way the station works, and the problems we encounter during the realization of this crucial project. Also, some future possibilities for improving the system are presented.

        Speaker: Slobodan Masic
      • 17
        Optimizing Maintenance of Handheld Detection Equipment for Front Line Officers in Ghana: A Systems Engineering Perspective

        1 Introduction
        The Ghana Revenue Authority, Customs division is recognized as one of the key Front Line Officers who play a significant role in detecting radioactive materials at border entry points. These officers use handheld nuclear security detection equipment as a secondary detection strategy, though X-ray scanners are the primary equipment used to inspect cargo shipments at the country's borders and ports of entry and exit. However, due to the extensive work shift conditions, some officers have found it quite challenging to maintain these equipment effectively. These handheld equipment help tremendously with detection; nevertheless, if they have functionality defects, they can lead to inadequate detection of radioactive sources. In response to an ongoing IAEA Coordinated Research Project on Advancing Maintenance, Repair, and Calibration of Radiation Detection Equipment, Ghana's Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) believes it is critical to properly implement technical measures to enhance nuclear security practices pertaining to equipment maintenance optimization among the country's FLOs.

        2 Objective of Work
        This research is intended to devise optimal technical measures to provide relevant information for developing a Standard Maintenance Procedure (SMP) for optimizing the maintenance procedures of nuclear security handheld detection equipment.

        3 Systems Engineering Approach
        As part of the CRP's positive impacts to member states, the NRA's nuclear security staff, proposed using a systems engineering approach to guide the optimization process of maintaining these handheld security detection equipment used by FLOs at the country’s borders. A systems engineering (V-Model) approach is adopted towards the implementation of the project goal. This method includes a detailed project definition, the project development process, and project testing and integration. Figure 1 depicts the approach's development process.

        Figure 1 SMP Development Process (V-Model)

        4 Detection Equipment assessment findings based on field experience
        As part of the project activities, a visit was made to two ports in the country; a sea and land ports. Elubo, Takoradi in the Western Region and Aflao in the Volta Region where the custom officers facilities were visited. The status of equipment functionality and performance was assessed, and the data collected is currently being analyzed; however, a significant amount of data remains to be collected; thus, more technical visits will be made to other stakeholder sites in the country where nuclear security detection equipment is used, as well as other border crossings.

        5 Conclusion
        It is critical that FLOs in Ghana recognize the functional purpose of these handheld detection equipment in the field, as well as how to properly maintain them. Prior to enhancing Ghana’s nuclear security practices pertaining to equipment maintenance optimization among the country's Front Line Officers, a standard maintenance procedure is necessary to be developed using systems engineering approach. In addition, Ghana seeks to improve its nuclear security regime by considering effective monitoring of nuclear security detection systems used for detecting nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as sustaining coordination among its stakeholders to address all its national and international nuclear safeguards, safety, and security obligations.

        Speaker: Mr philip Gyan (NUCLEAR REGULATORY AUTHORITY)
      • 18
        Progress of the Republic of Moldova in establishment of the nuclear security system

        The approving of UNSCR-1540 (2004) and new international tools in nuclear security area, shows that the world community has embarked on a long-term campaign to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using weapon of mass destruction and related materials. The protection against the theft or sabotage of nuclear/radioactive materials and facilities is a major focus for Republic of Moldova, which has some experience fortification of national nuclear security capabilities and in combating of illicit traffic of nuclear materials. One of the important needs challenge for young, independent countries is to develop efficient interagency activities, all players coordination for many-side implementation of UNSCR-1540 and other relevant international acts.
        Since 2007 NARNRA - as single and independent Regulatory Body, begun the process of drafting of legislative and normative framework in the field of nuclear/radiological activities and fulfilling international obligations arising from international treaties to which Republic of Moldova is a party. In this context has been elaborate and approved high importance legislative acts in nuclear security area and combating of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.
        With large support of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS), Department of Energy and Department of Defense of USA, European Commission and Swedish Radiation Safety Authority - SMM, since 2008 in Moldova has been launched and implemented many projects of strengthening nuclear security capacities and combating illicit traffic of radioactive/nuclear materials.
        As result, Moldovan authorities and stakeholders have benefited from the international donors the technical assistance over 1000 000 US Dollars for establishing, upgrading, staff training and sustainability of the nuclear security infrastructure during 2008-2021 years.

        Speaker: Dr Ionel Balan (Regulatory Body NARNRA)
      • 19

        Risks are generally approached intuitively with the sole objective of minimizing its consequences. However, the mechanisms for achieving it are often unknown. Although the actions to reach this main goal are apparently simple, in this study some relevant complexities are analyzed. As an initial premise, it must be remembered that all human activities, including life itself, carry some type and degree of implicit risk. Consequently, risk is also a ubiquitous factor in radiation and nuclear applications. Exposed workers perceive the risk according the types and activities of the radiation sources existing at their workplaces, as well as the processes and operations they have to carry out. On the other hand, members of the public can only estimate the level of risk from the information provided by the operators. However, the various modalities under which radiological risk may arise necessarily converge on a given radiation dose. A systematic approach involves characterizing the exposure scenarios in order to quantify the related risks. Subsequent analysis will eventually allow a protective methodology to manage and minimize the risks through technical solutions. Also, given the transversality of principles and objectives, this study proposes to apply similar methods in the fields of Nuclear Safety (including Radiation Protection) and Security (also called Physical Protection) with the aim of unifying concepts, criteria and solutions.

        Speaker: Mr Hugo A. BRISO (Comisión Chilena de Energía Nuclear)
      • 20
        Reflection of the implementation guides on the Sudanese regulations for the security of radioactive materials

        Implementation Guides provided guidance on the means by which states can implement and take the actions set forth in the Nuclear Security Recommendations. In this way, we will be able to know the reflection and compare the procedures required in the implementation manual for the safety of transporting, storing and using radioactive materials under category (A) and the mandatory procedures in the Sudanese regulation for the safety of transport, storage and use of radioactive materials in category (A).
        Poster will comparison between recommendations of IAEA Nuclear Security series No.9And No.11 ,and which are is recommended guide and security of radioactive material regulations published by Sudanese government ,and requirements of Sudanese regulations with considered group A as case studie during used , storage and transport of radioactive material ,with State responsibility , operation and security measures taken in account in the regulations and recommendations.

        Speaker: Mrs sherin abdalwahab mohmed (sea ports corporation - sudan)
      • 21
        Regulatory experience and improvement efforts for high-risk radiation sources

        Korea revised the regulatory requirements for high-risk radioisotopes in 2015 to reflect IAEA security standards.
        Sealed radioactive isotopes above the level of regulatory exemption under the BSS are subject to graded regulations under the Nuclear Safety Act, and additional security requirements such as designation, access control, detection, confirmation, and response are applied to IAEA class 1 & 2 radioactive sources. Based on this, periodic inspections to the facilities are conducted to maintain safety and security for isotopes.
        In recent years, Korea is improving national capabilities through;
        - monitoring of reporting management data from user has been strengthened in order to aware of bankruptcy or the occurrence of orphan sources in advance
        - joint inspection with other state agencies responsible for responding to terrorism

        Speakers: Ms MIN KYUNG KIM (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety), Ms JI YOUNG LEE (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety)
      • 22


        It is of a great concern to countries regarding Illicit trafficking of radioactive sources across country’s borders; this has become a problem from radiological hazard point of view. The regulations and procedures set to ensure the control of radioactive sources is to prevent and detect illicit trafficking of radioactive sources. Preventive and detective measures should be taken into consideration in ensuring that radioactive sources do not become the subject of unauthorized use leading to illicit trafficking. The following measures should be adopted to achieve the goals of prevention and detection of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The measures are accounting for, control of radioactive sources and physical protection of such materials should be adopted. Act 895 of the Republic of Ghana which establishes the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) as an independent regulatory body has the duty to control all activities using radioactive materials. The NRA is mandated to provide regulations and guides to control activities and practices involving peaceful use of radioactive materials to ensure protection of persons and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation hazards. To achieve the goal of ensuring adequate protection of the public health and the environment in the peaceful uses of radioactive materials in Ghana, the following principal regulatory functions are considered, these are; establish regulations and guides, issuance of authorization, inspection of facilities, import and export control, maintaining effective inventory accounting and controls and training of frontline officers and other security agencies. Establishing regulations and guides defines the capabilities and activities that need to be satisfied by facility operators to protect against theft which could lead to illicit trafficking. An individual or organization intending to utilize radioactive materials shall apply for and obtain license from the nuclear regulatory authority. The NRA staff reviews the submittals to ensure that the applicant's assumptions are technically correct that the proposed activities will not adversely affect the environment. Any utilization of radioactive sources shall maintain physical protection program or security plans to prevent unauthorized access or illegal transfer. Authorization is granted if all criteria for physical protection for radioactive sources and facilities are met. Another component of the regulatory function is inspection. To ensure that licensees comply with NRA’s regulations and the conditions of their licenses, NRA periodically inspects licensed facilities. Inspections can be announced or unannounced, and varies in scope and frequency according to the authorized activities. Some illicit trafficking of radioactive sources can be detected during inspections. This detection leads to prompt information to NRA in order to reclaim lost material and to inform the public of any potential dangers. Security in the import and export of radioactive materials is further guaranteed by a close working relationship between the NRA and Customs Division of Ghana to inspect the radioactive sources before it is exported or when it is imported. The NRA has also put in place a system of effective inventory, accounting and controls of radioactive materials called the Regulatory Authority Information System (RAIS) to improve the control of radioactive materials and to provide information concerning their actual location at any time. To ensure prevention and detection of illicit trafficking of radioactive sources across borders, the NRA closely co-operate with Customs by providing them with pagers and identifinders which was donated by IAEA. The NRA occasionally provides training for frontline officers and other security agencies on the use of detection instruments and how to communicate such incidents if a radioactive source is detected.

        Speaker: Obed Agbenorku (Nuclear Regulatory Authority)
      • 23
        Safety plan as a mandatory document for obtaining a license to perform radiation activities

        The Law on Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Security of the Republic of Serbia [1] regulate activities of radiation and nuclear safety and security, conditions for performing activities with radiation sources, acting in the situation of planned, existing, and emergency exposure to ionizing radiation to protect individuals, population and environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.
        The Radiation Unit, Gamma radiation facility in the Vinča Institute, Belgrade – Serbia, provides commercial services to industry mainly in the fields of sterilization of medical devices, food irradiation, and modification of polymer insulators. The facility has a maximum capacity of 25.000 m3 irradiated products per year. The facility core is cobalt–60 gamma irradiator with wet storage working in batch mode. The current activity of the source is around 100 kCi. The facility is designed for the maximum activity of 1MCi.
        Radiation activities performed in the Radiation Unit are industrial sterilization and conservation; and scientific research. The radiation Unit must have licenses to perform both of these radiation activities. This license is issued by the Serbian Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Security Directorate.
        One of the necessary documents for issuing a license is the Safety Plan. Safety Plan is a plan that defines the scope, objectives, and safety activities of radiation sources and associated facilities, based on risk assessment. Based on the Law on Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Security of Serbia, the Security Plan must contain:
        1) description of security rates;
        2) project of the system of physical and technical protection;
        3) description of the area, plant, and other facilities in the area and the protected material with the attached categorization of materials;
        4) list of internal documents related to security;
        5) persons responsible for security;
        6) action plan in case of a security event;
        7) manner and plan for evaluating the efficiency of the security system.
        This paper describes the challenges in the development of the Security Plan encountered by institutions that perform radiation activities. A different approach to the development of the Plan for industrial sterilization and scientific research is presented. The aim is to describe the coordination between the radiation facility and the national competent authorities for the safety and security of radioactive sources; as well as the exchange of experiences in the development of legislative and regulatory frameworks (especially Safety Plan) for radioactive sources between conference participants.

        [1] The Law on Radiation and Nuclear Safety and Security, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 95/2018 and 10/2019

        Speaker: Ivica Vujcic (Vinca Institute for Nuclear Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia)
      • 24
        Safety Systems of Radioactive Sources in Atomic Energy Centre Dhaka, Bangladesh and its Implication on Public Health

        Radioactive sources are being extensively used in medicine, agriculture, industry, research & education and other sectors in Bangladesh. The usage of radioactive sources is rising day by day with the socio-economic development of the country. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Act-2012 (Chapter IV, vide 29-31) & Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997 of Bangladesh (vide 17-19) mentioned that radioactive sources to be managed during usage or storage at the facility in such a way that minimize the harmful effects from ionizing radiation on radiation worker, public and the environment. The purpose of safe handling or storage of the radioactive sources in a facility is to protect the people and the environment from unnecessary radiation hazard. Atomic Energy Centre Dhaka (AECD) is a multi-disciplinary research & development (R&D) institute which is situated in the busiest place of the capital city. AECD was established within the Dhaka University campus in 1964. At that time, AECD was the only nuclear R & D institute in the then East Pakistan where various types of theoretical and experimental nuclear research had been conducted. AECD has various types of low and high activity radioactive sources which are required for rendering services, training and education & research purposes. The low activity radioactive sources used for equipment calibration and high activity radioactive sources (192Ir) used for industrial radiography purposes. AECD also has disused radioactive sources storage room. Radioactive sources of AECD were kept in the lead & concrete shielding structures for minimizing hazard to radiation worker, public and the environment. AECD personnel also send to other institutes of the country for ensuring safety of the radioactive sources on demand. Emergency preparedness and response of AECD has been developed and implemented. Proper fire protection systems (smoke detectors, fire extinguishers) have been installed at various locations of the AECD campus. Safety report has to submit to the regulatory body in order to renew the license of the AECD in every year. Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) of AECD (two personnel) have been approved from the regulatory body in order to ensure the safety of the radiation worker, public & the environment while operating radiation generating equipments, handling radioactive sources and disused radioactive sources storage room. RPOs have adequate knowledge on radiation safety and they used to train the workers of AECD through training courses, seminars, on the job training for creating radiation awareness and for improving knowledge on radiation safety. Security and access control has been maintained at radioactive source rooms and disused radioactive sources storage room to avoid the unauthorized access of workers, public and the unauthorized removal of radioactive sources. Continuous indoor radiation monitoring of AECD campus is being conducted using the Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) for ensuring the safety of the radiation worker, public and the environment from unnecessary radiation hazard (if any) releasing from the radioactive sources of the AECD. Real-time radiation monitoring is also being carried out using digital portable radiation monitoring devices in & around the AECD campus for detection of any unusual event arising from the radioactive sources. The estimated mean annual effective dose to the public in & around the AECD campus was 0.256 ± 0.042 mSv, which is lower than the annual dose limit (1 mSv) set by the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997 of Bangladesh and recommendation from the International Commission on Radiological Protection. The real-time radiation dose rate in & around the AECD campus is comparable to the other parts of the Dhaka city. Excess life-time cancer risk (ELCR) on public around the AECD campus was estimated based on the real-time radiation monitoring data and mean was 1.060 Χ 10-3.

        Speaker: Mohammad sohelur Rahman (Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission)
      • 25

        An effective self-assessment is a great tool to measure the strengths and flaws of security culture in an organization. A strong security culture in the organization can identify the obstacles and incentives for enhancement of security performance. This is considered as one of the main approaches in reducing the threats, especially coming from the insider. Recognized as the pioneer country to introduce the security culture self-assessment to the medical facilities, Malaysia has taken some initiatives as the future endeavors in enhancing and sustaining the achievement.

        As the first step towards the sustainability of the culture, a survey will be conducted by the Ministry of Health Malaysia (MOH) by the end of this year, December 2021 at both pioneer medical facilities which is Hospital Ampang and National Blood Center to evaluate the current level of the culture. The main objective of this survey is to monitor the performance for each facility during these 5 years, starting from 2016. Based on the findings from the survey, important information can be assessed such as the effectiveness of the security culture programme conducted, commitment level from top management and the staff also other needs including fund and technical support. The analysis of the survey is estimated to be finalized by the end of January 2021.

        To enhance the security culture programme in Malaysia, MOH has planned the second cycle to introduce and promote the programme to the other Category 1 medical facilities including from the private sector. The implementation of the programme is based on the findings from the pioneer facilities and also the latest IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications which are NSS-28T and NSS-38T. The findings will be interesting as we can monitor the differences and make a comparison between the government and private sector in a few aspects - human resource, effectiveness of the programme, awareness, commitment and financial factors

        With great support from the IAEA, MOH is really thankful to be granted an expert mission which will be held this November 2021 that will focus not only for conducting self-assessment programme, but on the whole enhancement process especially after the Self-Assessment. The main objectives for this mission are introduction to the latest IAEA NSS publications related to nuclear security culture; support for the enhancement and sustainability of the nuclear security culture at the pilot medical facilities; and plan and introduce the second cycle for the nuclear security culture self-assessment at medical facilities.

        We are really looking forward to this mission as it will be the main inspiration for the MOH. Currently, we are developing and drafting the Guidance Booklet on Security Culture Self-Assessment Survey Questions for Medical Facilities in Malaysia that can be used as a main reference by the facilities in conducting a security culture self-assessment programme in near future. Towards the implementation of self-regulation among our licensee and operator, this is also an opportunity to develop a checklist or reference document in conducting performance audits or periodical reviews.

        Lastly, to establish a culture, this is a time-consuming journey and a great commitment from all sides is a must. However, to sustain the culture is even more challenging and double efforts are needed. All the strategies and ideas that had been planned totally cannot be accomplished without the support from the stakeholders and also related agencies, internally and externally. Way forward, Malaysia is not only known to become the country that actively promotes security culture, but also become the model country and center of excellence in establishing the security culture at medical facilities.

        Speaker: Farhana Aziera Badrul Hisham (Ministry of Health Malaysia)
      • 26

        The safety of a predisposal radioactive waste management facility is required to be ensured through the application of good engineering practice and the implementation of a management system. The description of the waste management facility or activity about the facility is recorded and the activities were carried out and providing the basis for facility safety assessments. Site conditions and the associated events, both natural and human-induced, that could influence safety, and thus could impose demands on the facility or activities and the facility’s equipment and components should be identified and described. External natural factors such as landslides and erosion have been identified during slope investigation works. These slope hazard mapping findings may be leading to accident conditions where further detailed investigation and mitigation should be done.

        Speaker: Nazran Harun (Malaysian Nuclear Agency)
      • 27

        Nuclear safety and security of radioactive materials is ultimately dependant on individuals, policy makers, regulators, employees and to some extent members of the public. Nuclear security culture, its promotion, enhancement is refined with a view of establishing international guidance and raising the level of awareness of all concerned parties. The nuclear industry is a broad and diverse sector that includes a wide variety of organisations that use radioactive materials for applications in medicine, research, education, agriculture, power generation, mining and industry.
        It’s however important to note that effective and balanced public reporting and communication on key nuclear security information about the regulatory oversight create resilient nuclear security culture and sustainable national nuclear regimes. It promotes awareness, safety of the people and the environment, enhances compliance and service delivery, promotes accountability and public acceptance.
        Effective communication with stakeholders ultimately determines the fate of the nuclear sector not perhaps when measured over short term but certainly in the long term as the publics make their own assessment. The question is; Do politicians, the public, stakeholders believe nuclear energy is safe, secure and necessary or they are more concerned about whether they trust the nuclear sector and associated government departments and regulators and the information they openly provide?
        For the sustainability and effectiveness of national regimes, all key stakeholders need to report on their strategic objectives and reflect on how they impact on the public and environment with a clear oversight of nuclear safety and security performance. They also need to provide information to inform discussions on the wellbeing of their people, society and environment and lastly ensure effective internal communication with internal stakeholders to ensure that such personnel understand the organisations objectives, policies and procedures clearly. This degree of openness in communication influences the organisations security culture, develops the state’s reputation as a socially responsible actor and contributes to the sustainability of all nuclear enterprises through improved transparency but while protecting the sensitive nuclear information like technical data, blue prints, designs and security procedures.
        Uganda possesses an interim radioactive sources store that became operational in 2019. The community first rejected it due to lack of enough public awareness and community involvement during the initial stages of the project. The approach used in communication was a top down approach which completely failed at that time. The regulatory body however improved on public awareness, changed the communications strategy and involved the key stakeholders in planning and there is definitely a positive change and public acceptance.
        By law in Uganda, The Atomic Energy Act No 24 of 2008(AEA,2008) 9(n) authorises the regulator to establish appropriate mechanisms to inform the public about the regulatory processes and the radiation safety aspects of regulated practises. Atomic Energy Council Uganda carries out public awareness activities through; Publications on safety and security of radioactive sources, Stakeholder engagements and trainings, talk shows and Social media radiation safety campaigns. This has improved stakeholder communication, increased trust, credibility, reduced risk and led to improved transparency.
        The presentation will give an overview of the role of public awareness in sustainability and effectiveness of national nuclear regimes highlighting the success story in Uganda, challenges, tactics used and lessons learnt.

        Speaker: Lydia Khalayi (Atomic Energy Council)
      • 28
        The Container for Storage and Disposal of Disused Sealed Radiation Sources

        The majority of sealed radiation sources are gamma and beta emission sources based onshort-lived radionuclides such as Cs-137, Sr-90, Co-60 and others. Been disused these sources aren’t suitable for reproduction and should be disposal. Since 1960-th in Soviet Union and some Eastern Europe countries such sources were collected in special well-type storage facilities. This storage facility consists of 200-liters drum made of stainless steel placed on the bottom of 4 meters depth concrete well. The curved loading pipe 108 mm diameter leads from the surface to the drum in order to load sources into the storage facility from special transport containers with bottom unloading. The loading funnel placed on the surface to place transport container into it. All free space in the well is filled with concrete or sand.
        According to the project about 20 000 Ci of sources may be load into this storage facility. The main limitation factors were temperature in the drum and dose rate on the surface. In 1980-th the technology of encapsulation of sources in the storage facility into metal matrix was developed by specialists of Radon. This technology was able to increase the activity loaded into the storage facility up to five times without overheating of the sources. Additionally the metal matrix protected the sources from environment, such as ground water that may be collected in the drum.
        In 2011 the Federal Law of radioactive waste was issued. According this law all new radioactive waste, including disused sources must be transferred to national operator of radioactive waste management for final disposal. Therefore, useof the well-type storage facilities for DSRS storage became out of law because of big technical problem of safe unloading sources from the storage facility.
        In order to solve the problem of collect, interim storage and transportation to final disposal of SRS the storage container was developed at Radon. This container consists ofmetal vessel 80 liters volume for sources surrounded by radiation shield made of lead. The loading pipe covered with protection lid leads into the vessel for SRS loading. Whole this module is placed in a protective metal container, the external dimensions of which are the same as the widely used container for radioactive waste, which simplifies the rigging work with it.
        The radiation shield of the storage container was designed to ensure that the dose rate on the surface of the container is not more than 2 mSv/h when loaded into the container at least 100000 Ci of sources based on Co-60. It was calculated and tested that the temperature in the vessel is not more than 100 degrees when 100 000 Ci of Co-60 sources loaded. Also the sources may be included into metal matrix in the container as in the well-type storage facilities.
        The storage container ensures safety and security of storage and disposal sources in it.
        The set of tools and instruments was designed with the container for DSRS safe loading from the same transport containers with bottom unloading that use for well-type storage facilities.
        Now these storage containers are in use at Radon and some other organizations in Russia for radioactive waste management.

        Speaker: Mr Mikhail Diordiy
      • 29

        Samples of borosilicate glass-matrix were obtained by preliminary melting of a mixture of a calcined solution-simulator of LRW of NPP with WWER-1000 reactors with addition of glass-forming silicon oxide, in the form of sand, and 10 wt. % lead oxide or calcium fluoride, followed by glass-melting and pouring glass into metal molds.
        Simulated γ-irradiation of borosilicate glass-matrix samples was carried out on a linear electron accelerator LU-10 (NSC KIPT) using bremsstrahlung radiation. The average energy of photons is equal to 10.4 MeV. The rate of the absorbed dose is equal to 1.09 kGy per hour.
        The calculations of absorbed doses and dose maps in borosilicate glass-matrices were made by using software toolkit GEANT4. The calculated absorbed dose for 300 years of storage borosilicate glass-matrices with isotopes of 137Cs, 134Cs and 60Co is equal to 332.46 Gy.
        No changes were observed in the structure, mechanical strength and corrosion resistance of the irradiated samples of borosilicate glass matrices.

        Speaker: Dr Volodymyr Victorovich Morgunov (V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University)
      • 30

        Définition :
        Radiographie industrielle : C’est une méthode de contrôle non destructif par émission des rayonnements gamma ou X.
        Objet et raison :
        Le plan a pour but d’alerter, de protéger et de secourir la population en cas d’urgence radiologique ou nucléaire, il est périodiquement mis à jour et testé à intervalles réguliers pour en vérifier l’efficacité.
        L’ANR est chargée de :
        - élaborer, en collaboration avec d’autres institutions nationales concernées un Plan national d’intervention pour faire face à toute situation d’urgence radiologique ou nucléaire ;
        - participer à la gestion des situations d’urgence radiologique et nucléaire survenant sur le territoire national ou susceptibles de l’affecter.
        Base juridique :
        En vertu de :
         la Loi n°06-031 du 27 septembre 2006
         décret n°10.319 du 26 novembre 2010 et
         la loi sur la sûreté radiologique, la sécurité nucléaire et l’application des garanties en cours de finalisation.
        L’Agence Nationale de Radioprotection (ANR) réglemente l’utilisation de l’énergie et des matières nucléaires d’assurer la sûreté, de préserver la santé et la sécurité des personnes, de protéger l’environnement et de respecter les engagements internationaux de la RCA à l’égard de l’utilisation pacifique de l’énergie nucléaire.
        Le mandat de l’ANR concerne les aspects suivants :
         l’organisation et les moyens destinés à faire face aux différentes situations accidentelles envisageables ;
         les mesures de prise en charge des urgences médicales résultant de situations d’urgence radiologique ou nucléaire.
         les mesures d’information du public sur la situation de l’urgence radiologique ou nucléaire ainsi que, le cas échéant, sur la conduite à tenir ;
         l’évaluation des risques de situations d’urgence radiologiques ou nucléaires pouvant survenir dans des installations ou dans le cadre d’activités autorisés, ou susceptibles de résulter d’accidents nucléaires transfrontières ;
         La cartographie des sites ou des installations potentiellement dangereux.
        Description :
        La radiographie industrielle vise à détecter les éventuels défauts des pièces industrielles et ouvrages, en particulier des cordons de soudures, lors de leurs fabrications ou lors des opérations de maintenance. Elle est employée dans des secteurs industriels variés : Chaudronnerie, pétrochimie, aéronautique, installations nucléaire, travaux publics, armement…
        La radiographie industrielle utilise une technologie des appareils appelée projecteurs et classifiés suivant leur mobilité en trois classe qui sont : P, M et F
        Risque :
        Bien que la pratique de la radiographie industrielle utilise une méthode de contrôle non destructif, celle-ci pourrait dans certains cas représentée pour les travailleurs ainsi que pour le public un risque majeur : par le nombre de tirs réalisés chaque année et par la puissance des sources manipulées.
        Les obstacles, tirs nocturnes, manque d’éclairage : Les conditions d’intervention sur chantier sont particulièrement accentogènes.
        Intervention :
        Le Gouvernement est responsable de la gestion des urgences à travers la mise en place d’un comité interministériel dans lequel chaque organisme à un rôle spécifique à jouer pour contrer les risques sanitaires associés à une urgence radiologique ou nucléaire. Il s’agit de :
        • Exploitant
        • Coordonnateur des ressources
        • Protection civile
        • Service médical d’urgence
        • Equipe de maintien de l’ordre/Sécurité
        • Equipe de gestion des preuves médico-légales (EGPML)
        • Attaché/équipe d’information
        • Hôpital local
        • Centre des opérations d’urgence (COU) national
        • Intervenant chargé du contrôle radiologique initial
        • Organe de réglementation
        Conclusion :
        La radiographie industrielle constitue un enjeu prioritaire en matière de radioprotection, au regard de la dangerosité des procédés, des conditions difficiles d’intervention sur les chantiers où une mauvaise manipulation des appareils est susceptible de conduire très rapidement à des conséquences économiques et sanitaire importantes.

        En tout état de cause, toute intervention doit répondre aux principes de justification et d’optimisation définis par la loi en vigueur

        Speaker: Mr Privàt BHE-OUHARIOT (Agence Nationale de Radioprotection)
      • 31
        security of radioactive sources throughout their lifecycle

        security of radioactive sources throughout their lifecycle
        A. Chetaine1, A. saidi1, O. kabbach1 and H. AMSIL2
        1 : university Mohammed V in Rabat, faculty of sciences energy center Rabat Morocco
        2; center national de l’Energie et des sciences nucléaires Morocco

        Abstract: the use of radioactive sources is widespread in hospitals, education and industry. in several establishments, this use is accompanied by incidents and catastrophes. to avoid any incident, a certain number of rules and plan of conduct are necessary to allow a use in conformity with the standards of safety and security which are indicated in the guides of the IAEA. each source must be controlled from its reception of the manufacturer until in storage with waste after exhaustion of its radioactivity. in this document we will present the types of sources and their follow-up during the use, the storage and this according to their categories.
        a security plan is necessary which is based on the radioactivity and the type of radiation following a graduated approach.

      • 32
        Sudan Radioactive Sources Safety and Security, Status and Future Prospectus
        • Radioactive Sources Availability in Sudan
        • Existing situation of the radioactive sources mining in Sudan
        • The Safety Standards of the dealing with radioactive sources in Sudan.
        • The Security of handling of radioactive sources in Sudan.
        • The proposed safety measures and enhancements for future usage of radioactive sources.
        • etc.
        Speaker: Mr ABBAS BASHIR (Nuclear Power General Directorate - Sudan)
      • 33
        Tracking system for radioactive isotope casing

        Episode 2018 : Lost and stolen of radioactive Isotope Iridium 192, was a big impact to Malaysian Government as it couldn’t be found. The paper is to discuss prevention of lost and stole of the radioisotope using QR code, GPS tracking and GLSS. This system can be implemented in the minimum charges so suits the application for each radioisotope production. And the system can be access through mobile application so it is easy monitored with highly secured by the mobile system itself either android or apple system. The trial not been test because this paper was made overnight.

        Speaker: ADZLIN HANA BINTI MOHD SARI (Ministry of Health)
    • Technical Session 3G: Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources

      Convener: Juan Carlos Benitez Navarro
      • 34
        Safety and security interface within the Cameroon centralized storage facility

        According to the section 5(3) of the law N° 2019/012 of 19 July 2019 to lay down the general framework for radiological and nuclear safety, nuclear security, civil liability and safeguards enforcement, which states that: “the State shall establish the following nuclear policy principles …recognition of the urgent need to manage radioactive waste in order to protect current and future generations against excessive impacts…”, the Republic of Cameroon has established with the support of the Departement of Energy of United States of America (DOE/USA) the centralized storage facility for safe and secure management of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS). The installation consists of a 40 feet container and a 20 ft container. Safety measures plan to be taken will allow to dismantle and to load category 3 to 5 DSRS in the P-60 capsule and to transfer the capsule to the lead shield and then the whole will be transferred to the 200l drum for the safe and secure storage. The 200l drum packages will be locked, sealed and labelled according to the measured dose rates at 1 meter. Security measures are in place and take into account delay and detection measures as well as the response procedure. It can be mentioned that, the planned safety measures will contribute to improve security through the use of adequate seals and lock mechanisms. In addition, the robust and heavy 200l drum used also increase the difficulty for an adversary to remove or sabotage the packages.

        Speaker: Dr Jean Félix BEYALA ATEBA (National Radiation Protection Agency (NRPA))
      • 35
        The establishment and maintenance of effective safety and security systems for disused sealed radioactive sources in Ghana: accomplishments, knowledge management, challenges and future projections

        Ghana has benefited immensely from the application of radioactive sources. The establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority by Parliamentary Act 895 in 2015 has brought clarity and collaboration between key stakeholders namely, ministry of interior and national security, regulator and operator for safe and secure management of radioactive sources. This paper highlights the accomplishments and challenges in establishing and maintaining secure and safe systems for radioactive sources in Ghana. Ghana as an oasis of peace has deployed sound radiation safety principles, requisite physical infrastructure and multi-barrier security systems for constant protection and control of radioactive sources. With the IAEA playing a pivotal role, a centralized storage has been established for disused sealed radioactive sources. Though there are challenges that need to be addressed, Ghana is poised to be the country of excellence in the safe and secure management of sources based on sound knowledge management and allocation of requisite resources.

        Speaker: Dr Gustav Gbeddy (Ghana Atomic Energy Commission)
      • 36
        Twenty Years of Experience in the Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Cuba

        Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are widely used in Cuba in industry, medicine and research. The national regulations establish that when the SRS are declared disused they have to be returned to the provider. The reuse of the sources by other Licensee is also authorized. When these options are not available, the disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are transferred to the Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene (CPHR), the organization responsible for the management of radioactive waste in Cuba. DSRS are collected by the CPHR and transported to the Waste Management Facilities, for characterization, conditioning and safe storage. The first national collections of DSRS were carried out at the beginning of nineties, when the centralized waste storage facility was put in operation. At the beginning, the DSRS were stored in the facility as received. Around the year 2000 the characterization and conditioning of the DSRS started, by placing the devices with the DSRS inside pre-cemented 200-litre drums. They were not immobilized to allow retrievability for future conditioning and disposal.

        Later on, and following the IAEA recommendations, the DSRS started to be conditioned by encapsulation. The conditioning process consists of removing the sources from the devices, characterizing and placing in stainless steel capsules. The conditioning plan is previously prepared, containing the devices to be dismantled and the sources to be placed in each capsule, depending on the radionuclide, activity and dimensions of the sources, as well as the limits established in the safety assessment. The capsules are sealed by welding the lid. After checking that the capsules are leak-tight, they are placed in suitable containers. The conditioning process results in waste packages, suitable for safe and secure storage and does not preclude subsequent preparation for disposal. These operations are authorized by the National Regulatory Body in the current License for the radioactive waste management practice.

        Radium-226 sources were the first to be conditioned, in 2007, following this methodology. The conditioning of other DSRS of categories 3-5 continued in 2015. Forty four (44) neutron sources and seventy four (74) Cs-137 radioactive sources were removed (from nuclear gauges, calibration and teaching devices) and conditioned between 2015 and 2016. One hundred eighty eight (188) radioactive lightning conductors, 183 of them containing Am-241 sources and 5 containing C-14 sources, were dismantled between 2019 and 2020. The recovered DSRS were encapsulated.

        Cuban experts have provided support to several other Member States around the world in the safe management of their disused sealed radioactive sources. Expert Missions through different IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects have been carried out to assist in their capacity building, the development of operational procedures, safety assessment and licensing of the field operations, including removal of DSRS from devices, characterization, encapsulation and safe storage.

        The paper illustrates the progress of Cuba in the safe management of DSRS in the last 20 years.

        Speaker: Milagros de las Mercedes Salgado Mojena (Centre for Radiation Protection and Hygiene)
      • 37
        Zimbabwe experience in the management of disused sealed radioactive sources

        Amos Muzongomerwa1
        Innocent Mayida, Nyengerai Manjeru

        Radiation protection Authority of Zimbabwe1,,

        Sealed radioactive sources have been used in medical, research and industrial applications in Zimbabwe for socioeconomic development. The country has a return to supplier policy as a requirement for all import of sources. When they become disused, sources are stored at respective facilities pending return to manufacturer or repatriation where return to supplier is not possible. To date the country has over 200 disused sources stored within the licensed holders. Though these are still under regulatory control, most of the sources have continued to be temporarily stored at licensed holders. They could not be returned to supplier because they are either legacy sources that were imported before existence of the regulatory body, damaged sources, or high cost of sending them back. The sources are therefore left vulnerable to theft, loss, or inappropriate management.

        Government set out to strengthen the management of disused sealed radioactive sources from facility to national level as set out by the IAEA Supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Sources and the Radiation Protection Act (Chapter 15:15) [1]. This paper outlines deliberate actions taken to improve the safety and security of disused sources and storage of sources that could not be sent back to supplier.

        An interim facility to manage disused radioactive sources have been stored at facilities for long term was established with appropriate security. This consisted of 3 ISO containers, one for source recovery from devices, and another for encapsulation and conditioning of recovered sources and the third for final storage of the sources. The interim facility has managed to house up to 40 vulnerable disused sources.

        To manage damaged and legacy sources Zimbabwe in collaboration with IAEA undertook a demonstration exercise as part of a conditioning operation. It resulted in the recovery of 66 sources and conditioning them according to international requirements. The sources have been encapsulated to produce Special Form Capsules and package them as Type A package that were stored in the interim radioactive waste management facility. The packaging met the IAEA safety standard on Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material [2].

        In the long term, the country is developing a national centralised radioactive waste management facility to recover, process and store radioactive waste and disused sealed radioactive sources for long term. This has been developed with IAEA expert support and using reference design for a centralized spent sealed sources facility [3] and funding from central government. The facility will receive radioactive waste from licensed holders to ensure their proper handling and storage prior to return to supplier or for long term. Capability to handle high activity sources has also been incorporated.

        In conclusion the provisions for strengthening management of disused sealed radioactive sources in Zimbabwe allowed for the development of adequate infrastructure for receiving, recovery, processing, and storage of disused sources. The interim storage facility allowed for immediate arrangements for improving safety and security of sources while the centralised radioactive waste management facility presents long term measures for management of radioactive waste and disused sources. The implementation of provisions in the supplementary guidance on the management of disused sources have been essential.

        1. Radiation Protection Act [Chapter 15:15] of 2004, Zimbabwe
        2. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, Specific Safety Requirements, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6, IAEA, Vienna 2012 Edition.
        3. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Reference design for a centralized spent sealed sources facility, IAEA-TECDOC-806, IAEA, Vienna (1995).

        Speaker: Mr amos Muzongomerwa (Radiation Protection Authority of Zimbabwe)
      • 38
        US/IAEA Transuranic (TRU) Source Repatriation: Accomplishments 2010-2021

        In response to a US domestic need for TRU sealed source disposition, DOE/NNSA initiated a project in 1998 called the Off-site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The need was in fact worldwide, since many countries did not have process, regulations, or personnel to accomplish TRU source repatriation. From 2005 to 2010 the NNSA/OSRP had recovered 422 sealed sources in 14 countries . By 2021 an additional 754 TRU sources had been recovered in 17 IAEA Member States. The purpose of this paper is to high light the work that has been done and to emphasize what made this success possible.

        In 2005 the IAEA and NNSA/GTRI worked together on a pilot project to collect obsolete TRU sources and at NECSA in South Africa. This work was a regional effort involving IAEA, NNSA/OSRP, AFRA, and NECSA to collect a regional group of sources and package them for repatriation and final disposition in a geologic repository in the US. This effort was highly successful and laid the groundwork for further efforts.
        The requirements for a successful repatriation effort were multifaceted and followed many of the precepts of IAEA Pub. 1657, “The Management of Disused Radioactive Sources” No. NW-T-1.3 (2014). The need for a regulatory authority in country, a central storage facility, a current inventory, approved packaging, proper source characterization in line with a pathway and facility for final disposition, and a willing Member State to receive the repatriated sources. The IAEA has worked very hard to help member states establish regulatory authority in each state. IAEA has used its Technical Cooperation programs to help countries create inventories with sufficient information to allow potential repatriation of US origin TRU sealed sources. The advent of LANL-OSRP with a proven track record in US domestic TRU source recoveries provided a process, tools, personnel, and funding to allow this work to move forward.

        The accomplishments of NNSA/OSRP are obvious as these efforts expanded between 2010 and 2021, as more IAEA Member States became involved. The need became clearer as Member State inventories identified specific types of source-containing devices that were unlikely to be eligible for disposition in most Member States. The work of IAEA to create a separate disposition pathway for beta/gamma sources via the Bore Hole project additionally emphasizes that long lived radioisotopes may continue to need TRU source repatriation and disposition well into the future.

        Speaker: Joseph Tompkins (CRCPD)
      • 39
        Designed for Safety: 380-B Type B(U) Packaging for Disused Sealed Radioactive Source Recovery

        Without proper end-of-life management, disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) become increasingly vulnerable to loss, theft, and sabotage that can result in accidents and incidents, including loss of life. Type B quantities of radioactive material can be particularly hard to manage due to complexity and costs associated with their compliant shipment from user’s facilities to sites for final disposition or secure long-term storage. Historically, a major part of this issue stems from the lack of certified Type B packaging for safe, secure, and legally compliant shipments.
        To help address this issue and enhance safety and security of high-activity DSRS transport, in 2009 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) directed Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to design, test, certify, and fabricate Type B packaging for domestic and international use. Through these efforts, the NNSA Model 380-B Type B (USA/9370/B(U)-96) packaging was developed. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) certified the 380-B in 2017, and since then, one unit has been fabricated and brought into operation.
        The 380-B is a heavy (25,000 kg empty), lead shielded container designed primarily for domestic (US) transportation of Type B quantities of Cs-137 and Co-60 sealed sources in devices used for medical, industrial, and research purposes. Maximum activities of Cs-137 and Co-60 payloads are 285 TBq and 1505 TBq respectively. The 380-B is mounted on a dedicated trailer, outfitted with custom designed safety and operational features. The dedicated trailer has work platforms with railings to allow operation of the container without ladders. The trailer also has onboard stands for the cask’s lid and upper impact limiter. These stands increase the safety of surveys and inspections of these items, eliminating the need to work under or near a suspended load. After confirmation that the payload has been loaded in accordance with requirements, it is transported to a secure storage facility in the US until arrangements can be made for final disposition of the sources. This last step represents permanent risk reduction.
        Over a decade after first being conceptualized, the 380-B was put into service on May 1, 2021. This was a major achievement for ORS/LANL after putting years of effort into design, certification, and fabrication of the 380-B, and subsequent development of operational infrastructure and processes. The source recovery, which occurred at a hospital in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, was that of a blood irradiator containing ~62 TBq of Cs-137 sealed sources. LANL subcontracted a licensed and experienced vendor to prepare the device for shipment, after which LANL personnel loaded the irradiator shield into the 380-B cavity and closed it in accordance with approved procedures. Loading and closure of the 380-B in Albuquerque went smoothly and as anticipated. After approximately seven hours on site, the field crew completed loading of the 380-B and it departed in-route to the interim storage facility.

        Speaker: Mr Mark Wald-Hopkins (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
      • 40
        Authorization of Radioactive Waste Management Facility in Supporting the Management of Radioactive Sources Waste

        Abstract. Radioactive waste management faces challenges in Indonesia. Despite various uses of radioactive sources all over the country, Indonesia only has one radioactive waste management facility. Especially on the use of radioactive sources, there are wide use of these sources for medic and industry. Radioactive sources for medical purposes are usually used for radiotherapy in mostly major city hospitals. In industry, radioactive sources are used for non-destructive testing and gauging. Used radioactive sources from medic and industry are collected and sent to waste management center. Nevertheles, problem arise lately as the bankruptcies hit some industries owning some radioactive sources, such as paper industries. Therefore, those sources are orphan sources that threaten safety and security. It is estimated many souces left in industrial area needs to be collected and sent to waste management center. Bapeten as regulatory body is involved to solve this problem. For the waste management facility, it should prepare to accept those orphan sources to be managed properly. In the near future, the facility has a plan to improve the effectivity of souce management by developing cathegory 1 and 2 sources dismantling hotcell. As the license of facility has not covered this improvement, it will need adjustment. Government Regulation No. 29 Year 2008 on the Licensing of Ionizing Radiation Source and Nuclear Material regulates waste management facility to have license starting from siting stage, construction, commissioning, operation, until decommissioning. The revision of operational license will also follow regulation on this government regulation.

        Speaker: Ms Evin Yuliati (Bapeten)
    • 6:00 PM
      NS Reception on Cooperation with Partners

      NS Reception on Cooperation with Partners

    • Panel Session 4: Collaboration and Cooperation to Strengthen Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Collaboration and Cooperation to Strengthen Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

    • 10:30 AM
      Coffee Break M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Coffee Break

    • Interactive Content Presentations M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Interactive Content Presentations

      • 49
        Lessons learned from a recent nuclear forensic investigation of an orphan sealed source

        The German Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) can support other national and international authorities, when requested, in the response to nuclear security events, including when radioactive sources are missing, stolen or found outside of regulatory control [1]. The BfS also supports radiological crime scene management and nuclear forensics when sealed or unsealed radioactive sources are present. A case involving Iodine-125 has been presented previously [2].

        A recent example of a Co-60 source found outside of regulatory control (see Figure 1) demonstrates the support the BfS can provide. In January 2019 a radiation portal monitor in the German city of Hamburg alarmed. The source of the alarm was a scrap metal container. After further measurement and the involvement of the local competent authority, the source capsule was separated from the shipment and transported to a storage facility under the control of the regulatory authority. The necessary coordination within Germany was extensive, as was the international coordination and reporting, including to the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) of the IAEA.


        Figure 1: Co-60 source (10 mm x 10 mm squares)

        The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and BfS launched a project to examine the source forensically at the Radiochemistry Munich (RCM). Some important considerations included maintaining the chain of custody and preparing the laboratory to receive the source. The possibilities and limitations of nuclear forensics on a highly active sealed source will be highlighted in this contribution. Importantly, it was found that standard operating procedures for forensically investigating orphan sources are required. The lessons learned from the nuclear forensic examination will be shared to contribute to international best practice.

        The BfS oversees research projects, funded by BMU, on the topic of the detection of radioactive sources in scrap metal shipments. A completed project focussing on detection via radiation portal monitors [3] is currently being extended to include the detection of radioactive sources in scrap via handheld instruments. The results of the research will be used to improve the response to future incidents.

        BfS can offer expert support alone, as mentioned above, or as part of the German CBRN response capabilities on the federal level (UnterstützungsverBund CBRN, “UVB-CBRN”) under the leadership of the Federal Police (BPOL) [4]. Experts from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the BPOL and the BfS cooperate to respond to events involving the misuse of RN materials. Further cooperation partners to respond to events involving chemical and/or biological substances are the CBRN-Protection Unit of the Bundeswehr, the Robert-Koch-Institute and the Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and CBRN Protection. The new structure will be shared in order to contribute to best practice.

        The wider range of cooperation partners in the UVB-CBRN allows the police to receive timely and effective expert support, including during the forensic examination. For example, during crime scene work where radioactive sources (sealed or unsealed) are present, police experts require practical support and advice on radiation protection at the scene and nuclear forensics. Simultaneously, all deployed forces may need additional practical support and advice on additional chemical and/or biological threats at the scene. The grouping of CBRN cooperation partners at the federal level in Germany improves the safety of the deployed forces and the public and aims to reduce the spread of CBRN material into the environment.

        [2] „Misuse of a medical isotope: 125I labeled playing cards in Germany, a case study“, E.A. Kroeger, A. Rupp, J. Gregor, Health Physics, Vol. 119, No.1, July 2020, p128-132

        Speaker: Dr Jens-Tarek Eisheh (German Federal Office for Radiation Protection)
      • 50
        Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security

        Responding to a real need, IAEA, through the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, established the “Advisory Mission on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS)” Service, to advise and where appropriate, provide support to States in their efforts to establish or improve national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security. Radiation safety refers to the safety of radiation sources (generators and radioactive material), whereas nuclear security refers to the security of radioactive material.
        States might request a RISS when they identify a need for advice, assistance and support in one or more areas of regulatory infrastructure. A RISS might be an agreed task within an IAEA assistance programme.
        RISS are conducted in countries where significant actions are necessary for the country’s regulatory infrastructure to meet the provisions of the IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance. A RISS might be conducted in States with essentially no regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety or nuclear security.
        As the establishment and development of a national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security requires a long term commitment of national resources and an exercise of government control over previously unregulated activities, awareness and support from the highest levels of government are desirable.
        The scope of each advisory mission is adjusted according to the specific needs and interests of the requesting State and aims to support the establishment and improvement of its national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and/or nuclear security. The scope of a RISS can be tailored to cover safety or security or both. Regulatory requirements for radiological emergency preparedness and response (as indicated in the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources) may be included in the scope of the mission in addition, upon request by the host country.
        A RISS provides the opportunity for discussion of regulatory technical issues within the agreed scope, together with advice for supporting the establishment or improvement of a national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security by:
        (a) Evaluating the status of the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security against IAEA safety standards, nuclear security guidance and other relevant IAEA publications;
        (b) Providing advice on any identified needs for improvement;
        (c) Preparing a report that includes observations, recommendations, and an action plan for strengthening the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security in line with IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance. The action plan describes those activities considered fundamental for strengthening the national regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and nuclear security in the host country.
        A RISS is performed by an international team that includes IAEA staff and senior regulatory and technical experts with knowledge and extensive experience in the areas to be addressed during the mission.

        The RISS process is described in the figure below.

        To encourage consistency and comprehensiveness in the preparation and conduct of a RISS, by both, the advisory mission team, and the host country, RISS Guideline [1], pre-mission questionnaires to be answered by the host country, and a mission report template have been prepared.
        RISS supersedes the Advisory Mission on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety Advisory (AMRAS), previously offered by IAEA.

        INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Advisory Mission on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security - Guidelines, IAEA Service Series, to be published.

        Speaker: Vasiliki KAMENOPOULOU (IAEA)
      • 51
        Challenges of the Inspection Program related to Activities and Facilities with Radiation Sources

        Inspection of facilities and activities with radiation sources is one of the core functions of a regulatory body (RB) as given in IAEA GSR Part 1 and 3 as well as GSG-13. Inspections are one of the most visible activities of RB and RB stakeholders often build their trust on outcome of inspections. Experiences from several IAEA missions revel that although other core functions, e.g. authorization, pose a challenge, inspection process poses a specific challenge.
        There is no particular education for radiation safety inspectors and RBs try to cope with this lack by recruitment of persons with technical background, e.g. physicist and other engineers, very often with MSc and PhDs. Training of recruited staff follows. IAEA SSG-44 addresses the issue.
        Even in countries where an inspection program is conducted for decades, this program might be challenged, e.g. when a new radiation related technology is introduced such as industrial irradiators and recruitment of inspectors with an appropriate technical background is difficult. As facilities and activities are becoming more complex, the safety standards are becoming more complex. Therefore, it is highly advisable that inspectors are specialised when inspecting high risk activities, e.g. some inspectors are dedicated to radiotherapy and other to industrial radiography.
        It is important to note that an inspector shall not have only good understanding of technology related to radiation sources and radiation protection but he or she must link this knowledge with legal requirements which are country specific. Two examples are given, e.g. definition of a controlled area might be country specific and while in one country inspection report is made public in other country its distribution might be restricted. Regarding safety and security, countries also apply different arrangements, e.g. several regulatory authorities might be involved in such arrangements. Therefore, an inspector should have understanding of inspector’s rights and obligations as well as understanding of an overall country specific regulatory framework.
        Technical complexity of facilities and activities and extensive legislation contribute to complexity of inspections. This challenge can be overcome by systematic approach to building inspection program which includes at least:
        1. Country specific Annual Inspection Programme based on graded approach as given in IAEA TECDOC-1526.
        2. Strong cooperation of inspection and authorization units in particular during preparation of an inspection.
        3. Briefing an inspector or inspector’s team before going on site about specific goals of an inspections and methods to be used as well as briefing about enforcement steps to be taken when coming back to the office.
        4. Cooperation with other experts accompanying an inspector, e.g. experts from TSOs as noted in IAEA TECDOC-1835.
        5. Implementation of inspection campaigns allowing inspectors to gain experience in a specific area, e.g. industrial radiography and nuclear gauges.
        6. Preparation of procedures with technical guidance how to conduct regular and reactive on-site inspections of specific activity with radiation sources, e.g. visual observations and measurements, as well as prioritization of observations.
        7. Preparation of procedure related to enforcement, follow-up activities and involvement of legal advisers.
        8. Manging documentation related to inspection and enforcement.
        9. Mentoring of newcomers withing specific training programme including the use of video materials related to specific facilities and activities with radiation sources.
        10. Implementation of positive and negative feedback from inspections to all core processes.
        The inspection process shall be documented as one of core processes in integrated management system of a regulatory body. The areas mentioned above shall to be addressed in one or several procedures as appropriate. Only systematic approach to inspection programme addressing at least areas mentioned above is going to enhance the implementation of safety standards related to inspections in a country.

        Speaker: Dr Helena Janzekovic (Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration)
    • 12:30 PM
      lunch Break

      lunch Break

    • Side Event 10:: Gender Parity Board Room A (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room A

      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Luisa Betancourt Hernandez (NSNS/MAFA)
    • Side Event 11: World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) M5 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Margaret Cervera
    • Side Event 12: Coordination, Cooperation and Communication: A Canada-US Study in the Export and Import of Radioactive Sources Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      Coordination, Cooperation and Communication: A Canada-US Study in the Export and Import of Radioactive Sources

      Convener: Timothy Hayes (IAEA)
    • Side Event 9: RadSecLEXIS: Understanding the National Legal Measures that Support International Radiological Security M2 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Convener: Bouchra Boustani (IAEA)
    • 4:00 PM
      Coffee Break M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Coffee Break

    • Poster Session 2: Poster Presentations 2 M 01( first floor M Building) (IAEA Headquarters)

      M 01( first floor M Building)

      IAEA Headquarters

      • 52
        Promoting international cooperation to strengthen safety and security of radioactive sources

        Disused sealed radioactive sources are used in many fields such as industry, medicine, civil engineering, agriculture, research and educational applications. However they must be controlled from manufacturing to disposition, which requires a big deal of awareness, commitment and mobilization of all the necessary resources in order to be managed safely and securely in line with the IAEA standards and recommendations.
        Morocco as one of the member states committed to the joint convention utilizes every mean possible to act in accordance with these standards in each step throughout the lifecycle of the source: characterization, transport, dismantling, conditioning and storage.
        At the international level, Morocco never ceases to help and assist regional and interregional member states in the management of disused sealed radioactive sources through training courses under the technical cooperation projects organized by the IAEA in both languages English and French, almost every year since 2015.These events are hands-on trainings which allow the attendees from different nationalities and different backgrounds to work together and contribute to the capacity building of member states.
        Thanks to AFRA Training Courses, I had the chance to participate in two demonstration operations on conditioning and storage of neutron and low activity sources hosted by Senegal in 2018 and Uganda 2019. These events gathered operators and regulators from African member states; our mission was to prepare the adequate working plan to dismantle both gamma emitting sources and neutron sources, then putting them in special form capsules that were sealed definitely at the end of the operation, these capsules were emplaced in their proper drum after being engraved in order to mention the containing element, the activity inside the capsule and also the serial number which is written already on an original from provided by the manufacturer.
        Even if these countries didn’t build facilities for the management of radioactive waste, they used a cheap, affordable and very useful method to manage their disused sources. Two ISO containers were designed to serve as treatment and storage areas while respecting safety and security measures. This concept can help many other countries with limited budget to deal with their own inventory.
        Working in harmony together, made us believe that maybe in the future there will be a possibility to build a qualified African team specialized in dismantling, conditioning and storage of DSRS. This team will have the opportunity to travel through Africa in order to ensure that radioactive sources are managed in a safe and secure manner under the supervision of experts from the IAEA.
        At last, maintaining a high level of safety and security of radioactive sources from cradle to grave requires promoting cooperation and exchange of experiences and aspirations between member states.

        Speaker: Abdellah OUNIB (CNESTEN)
      • 53
        A rapid nuclide identification method for nuclear security

        In response to the demand for rapid detection technology for nuclear security, a rapid radionuclide identification method is developed to improve the ability of rapid identification on site.

        A progressive hybrid multivariate iterative algorithm is developed. It adopts improved second-order difference and is a second-order difference mode of multivariate calculation. There are both improvements on external noise filtering algorithm and iterative calculation of threshold coefficient. By mixing of optimization methods, our proposed algorithm is realized based on modular development. And more important thing is to be continuous improvement. It has the ability to mix multiple technical means and finally form a multi-echelon algorithm.

        A method to achieve this is to set a weight factor w for recognition process. Its function is to calculate the confidence level of the confounding nuclides with each other according to information of energy calibration and nuclide branch ratio when the algorithm is hard to identify the radionuclide since their characteristic peak energy or branch ratio energy are close.

        The identification tests are conducted within sources such as Am-241、Cs-137、Co-60、Ba-133、Eu-152. At an ambient dose equivalent rate of 0.15 µSv/h above background, perform 10 identifications for each source or combined sources. All the averaged recognition integration time are less than 10s.

        Speaker: Yong Li (China Institute of Atomic Energy)
      • 54

        A study to estimate the Annual Effective Dose Equivalent (AEDE) and Excess Lifetime Cancer Risk (ELCR) due to the existence of the artificial cobalt-60 radioactive source producing ionizing radiation levels within the radiotherapy facility in Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital (KATH), Ghana. The study was conducted using a portable OD-01 Ionization Chamber Survey Meter. Varying measurement of absorbed dose rate (ADR) in the air between 5 m and 40 m was carried out within the cobalt 60 bunker around the radioactive source and fifteen locations within the radiotherapy facility. The estimated Absorbed Dose Rate in the air within the cobalt-60 bunker from 5 m to 40 m around the Cobalt-60 source was 0.299 ± 0.001 to 0.977 ± 0.005 μSv/h with an average of 0.498 ± 0.005 μSv/h. The estimated annual effective dose equivalent within the Co-60 bunker ranged 1.100 mSv/yr to 3.595 mSv/yr around the cobalt-60 source. Radiation dose levels of 0.268 ± 0.008 μSv/h to 0.678 ± 0.005 μSv/h with an average of 0.440 ± 0.004 μSv/h was measured around the selected fifteen locations. Comparably, values of 3.85 10-3 to 12.58 10-3 and 3.45 × 10-3 to 8.73 × 10-3 for Excess Lifetime Cancer Risks were estimated within the cobalt and the fifteen locations within the facility respectively. The absorbed dose values at 5 m, 10 m, and 15 m within the Co-60 bunker and the location Co-60 bunker as part of the locations in the facility exceeded the permissible limit of 0.57 as recommended by ICRP. The AEDE and ELCR values were within the permissible limits as recommended by ICRP. The implication of the AEDE and ELCR data obtained is that the Cobalt-60 unit and its surrounding is radiation safe but the probability of staff within occupational exposure developing cancer from the Absorbed dose and background ionizing radiation is high over a lifetime. It is nonetheless suggested that absorbed dose level monitoring and assessment of the Radiation Therapy Technologist (RTT) and other staff around the unit be checked from time to time. It is also suggested the Occupational Staff such as RTTs spend minimal time in the bunker.
        This research verified the safety of the cobalt-60 radioactive sources and the concept of the determination of the Annual Effective Dose Equivalent (AEDE) and Excess Lifetime Cancer Risk (ELCR) contributing to checking the occupational and public exposures within the facility.

        Speaker: Eric Clement Desmond Kotei Addison (Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology)
      • 55
        Challenges in implementation of security of radioactive sources & possible solutions.

        My paper is about the impact of human and operational system established on the safety and security of radioactive source.

        Speaker: Ms Bogalech Tiefu Kejala (Government Employee)
      • 56
        Ensuring safety and security of radiation sources use in the Oil and Gas Industry in Ghana

        The use of radiation sources has over the years increased exponentially due to technological advancement over decades; these material are being subjected to the requirement that, the use should overall do more good than harm. Application of these sources can be found in medicine, agriculture, industry (mining, oil and gas, breweries and other bottling companies), education and research and many more. The application in the Oil and gas and petrochemical industries starts from non-destructive testing/radiography testing during construction phase of a project to use of radioactive source instruments for level indication, density measurement etc. during Industrial operations. The techniques such as radiotracers as well as radiological techniques known as Non-Destructive Test can effectively contribute to the reduction in cost of drilling and production operations as well as effective means to determine leakage and defects in the pipes and connection. Despite its numerous beneficial uses, it is associated with hazard. The hazard from radiation exposure is an increased risk of cancer and the amount of risk depends on the radiation dose received, the time over which the dose is received, and the body parts exposed. However, the risks can be minimised when the radiation source is handled and managed properly. To maximize benefits and minimize hazards associated with utilization of radiation-based technologies, national radiation protection standards are implemented. Utilize of radiation sources is controlled by international and national rules and regulations. The use of radiation sources needs regular services. The oil and gas companies themselves are not experts in every aspect of the technology applied in their industry. Frequently the necessary expertise is provided to the industry by specialized support organizations. Obviously it is in the interests of the oil and gas industry to demonstrate an appropriate standard of basic radiation safety, environmental protection and waste management and to have a common understanding of requirements and controls to establish efficient and safe operations. In general Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Ghana requires operators to obtain permits prior to transport, use and storage of radioactive source, use appropriate personnel protective and radiation monitoring equipment. The Authority also requires operators to provide training and create awareness for safe handling and use of radioactive materials and radiation producing devices. They ensure proper controls are put in place to protect life, health, property and the environment from the harmful effects of ionising radiation, while allowing beneficial practices involving exposure to ionising radiation. One major challenge identified in this area is the movement of the sources from a company to a sister company. Another challenge is that apart from the sources which are offshore, some sources are sent onshore during operation hence the regulators do not get the chance to see all the sources during their routine inspection. These issues pose both safety and security concerns which need to be addressed. The paper identifies three fundamentals challenges for safety and security of radioactive sources use in oil and gas industries in Ghana which are; developing an appropriate regulatory system, implementing the regulatory system at the facility level and establishment of measures to address the potential loss of control of radioactive sources.

        Speaker: kwame appiah (nuclear regulatory authority)
      • 57

        Social networks have become a useful tool for exchanging experience and resolve technical consultations on various issues in very short times average.
        Today Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and other options are used to view and share videos, presentations and photos that help the specialist to upgrade, improve their work and deepen their knowledge. In addition, social networks also allow personal and professional relationships increase.
        Social networks are part of our reality, are forms of social interaction with dynamic exchange between people and institutions that allow the participation of groups that are identified with the same needs and problems and that are organized to leverage their resources.
        A good example is the use of interest groups in Facebook as in the case of the "Radiation Protection" ( with 21700 members who are mostly from medical field and from several countries , mostly Spanish speaking. Here, almost every day of the year information on topics of the specialty and related spreads, announcements of technical events is made, rules and technical documents are distributed, the activities of various national and international organizations are broadcast, it mentions links Interest on videos, presentations, photos and publications.
        Special attention is paid to the news that routinely appear on the Internet and deserve to be disseminated for information and comments from stakeholders.
        Subscribers working in medical institutions, regulatory agencies, universities, radioactive and nuclear facilities, and in general, both national and international public and private entities in different countries.
        Through the group it has been achieved that people interested in courses are trained, receive updated information on radiological protection in medicine, participate in videoconferences and webinar, have access to publications without cost, review articles of interest, etc.
        The network is util also to disseminate information on safety and security of radioactive sources
        This group was created on July 8, 2013 and since that time is contributing to improve the conditions of radiological protection by updating the knowledge of its members.

        Speaker: Eduardo Medina Gironzini (IPEN)
      • 58
        Gadolinium Based Scintillators for Thermal Neutron Detection

        Neutron detectors are used in various applications in nuclear security and nuclear safety. Most efficient neutron detection systems used in nuclear security and nuclear safety are based on the 3He technology. The growing demand for it already exceeds production in the next few years leading to an exponential increase of the price. The last decade has been driven by the quest for finding competitive alternative technologies to replace 3He base detectors. Gadolinium (Gd) is a promising rare earth element processes the largest thermal neutron absorption cross section of all the stable elements. Scintillator material based on Gd shows a high potential for the deployment of efficient and cost-effective detectors for thermal neutron detection. This poster describes the investigation and fabrication of Gd2O3:Eu3+ and GdBO3:Eu3+phosphors as thin scintillator layers for thermal neutron detection. Performances of laboratory samples were tested using photoluminescence, Gamma and X-ray sensitivity.

        Speaker: Nadeera Hemamali Gunaratna Mudiyanselage (Brunel university London)
      • 59
        Growth of National Inventory of Sealed Radioactive Sources in Tanzania

        Abstract: A sealed radioactive source, typically called a sealed source, refers to radioactive material that has been sealed inside a capsule or is permanently bonded in a solid form. Sealed Sources within devices are commonly used to deliver a defined Dose of radiation, such as that used in cancer therapy or in irradiators that sterilize food and medical equipment. In Tanzania the use of Sealed Radioactive Sources was realized after establishment of radiotherapy department at Ocean Road Cancer Institute for cancer treatment, as well as the inauguration of the insectary of the tsetse mass-rearing facility in Tanga for the Tsetse Eradication Project using SIT. The use of technology in the country has been growing in recent years and marks the highest national inventory in 2021. The number was established through the importation licenses issued to the road Construction Companies, Mining and Oil/Gas Exploration Companies as well as the national inventory of the Sealed Radioactive Sources conducted by Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC) through Regulatory Authorization Information System (RAIS). This work therefore presenting the growth trends, regulatory control system and the management of disused radioactive sources.

        Speaker: Mikidadi Salehe GURISHA (KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School (KINGS))
      • 60
        Human Capacity Development in Radiological Security: Ghana’s model

        In Ghana, radioactive sources are used daily and widely in medicine for both diagnosis and treatment such as radiotherapy, in the mining, oil and gas and in agriculture for human prosperity and wellbeing. Radioactive sources are also applied in research and education, industry and the military and are found throughout the world. Due to the widespread use of these sources, there is emphasis to manage them safely and secure them. The 1998 International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Material noted the need to prevent both theft and accidents. It is important to note that when radioactive sources are safely managed and securely protected, the risks to workers and the public are minimized. However, if a radioactive source gets out of control and unshielded or its radioactive material is dispersed as a result of either an accident or a malicious act, the danger of radiation exposure becomes very real. There is high probability that these sources can be smuggled, lost, stolen, abandoned, or even used for malevolent actions. The risk of radioactive sources being outside of regulatory control can be minimized by ensuring that safety and security principles are efficiently integrated through the staff by training them and ensuring that the staff adheres to both safety and security requirements. The fundamental goal of radiological security is to prevent radiological terrorism thereby focusing on deliberate acts that are intended to cause harm. Radiation science and technology programs that offer training and capacity-building opportunities to practitioners working in radioactive sources and associated facilities play a central role in strengthening the global radiological security regime. The school of Nuclear and Allied Sciences of the University of Ghana has trained a number of students in the area of radiation protection and safety. The school has recently introduced Nuclear and Radiological Security in the existing Masters and Phd programmes. Ghana has participated in a number of International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) trainings, workshops and fellowships on radiological safety and security held locally and internationally. Ghana has maintained a close collaboration with all stakeholders at the national level to facilitate the development of human capacity in the area of nuclear safety and security. Ghana extended its full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of nuclear security educational networks, such as the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), and the Nuclear Security Support Centers (NSSC) Network which has been able to establish strong collaborations with other institutions within and outside Ghana. This paper focuses on radiological security capacity building in Ghana through education and training. It aims to provide a model overview of how radiological security human capacity development is carried out in Ghana. This paper is an opportunity to share Ghana’s experience and lessons learned.

        Speaker: Ms Jecinta Sekyere (SNAS)
      • 61
        Modeling and simulation of polarization potential in a planar gamma-ray detector

        Gamma spectrometry is an efficient method of identifying and quantifying radioactivity. The ionizing radiation emitted by radionuclides is invisible and untouchable. Detectors are then used to “observe” them. When a gamma photon interacts inside the semiconductor of a detector, charge carriers are created and then carried to electrodes by an applied potential difference. The charge transport ensures the creation of an electrical signal which is collected by electrodes linked to a preamplifier. The latter is responsible for transmitting the analog signal to an amplifier where it will be put in Gaussian form in order to allow its subsequent analysis. The Gaussian signal is then sent to the analog to digital converter (ADC) to be converted into a digital signal. From this moment, each signal is associated with a numerical value. All of these values ​​are sent to the Multichannel Analyzer (MCA) for classification. This gives the number of signals as a function of their amplitude and the graphic representation of these data represents the gamma spectrum. To obtain a reliable spectrum, it is essential to ensure the correct collection of charge carriers, which is partly ensured by the applied potential difference. In this study, we developed a numerical method of calculating the polarization potential in order to determine its distribution along a planar gamma detector. For this, we first calculated the potential prevailing in a first detector configuration by a numerical method based on finite difference discretization. The same model is used to determine the potential by an analytical method. The results obtained by these two methods are compared and the numerical method has been validated. Secondly, we modeled a second detector configuration in order to know the distribution of the polarization potential on its surface. This allowed us not only to see the influence of the position of the electrodes on the transport of charge carriers, but also to be able to choose the best detector in terms of transport. The standard model of the gamma detector then has a better configuration of the electrodes compared to the first model.

        Speaker: Dr Cedric Elisee BEOGO (University center of Dori)
      • 62
        Monte Carlo Safety Assessment of Yittrium-90 Bremsstrahlung Radiation from Radiation Shield

        Selective internal radiation therapy using Yttrium-90 labelled microsphere is increasingly used to treat hepatocellular carcinoma. Based on its properties, Yttrium-90 can produce bremsstrahlung radiation which is essential for post treatment localisation and dosimetry. However, bremsstrahlung radiation could lead to increase of radiation exposure to radiation workers. The aim of this work was to determine the Yttrium-90 bremsstrahlung radiation produced from the polymethyl methacrylate radiation shielding apparatus using Monte Carlo simulation. Scintillation detector with Cesium-137 standard source was used to validate the Monte Carlo simulation. After validation, Yttrium-90 bremsstrahlung photons spectrum produced from radiation shielding apparatus was simulated. The radiation equivalent dose rates to head, neck, body, lower extremities at distance of 30 centimeters, and finger (contact the knob) were estimated to be 4.89 ± 0.57, 6.16 ± 0.11, 18.88 ± 0.39, 13.05 ± 0.60 and 3896.61 ± 44.26 µSv/h respectively. The corresponding annual doses were exceeded the limit when radiation workers performed 2631, 1563, 769 and 515 cases per year with contract the knob 3, 5, 10 and 15 minutes per case respectively. The simulation result showed that radiation exposure to radiation workers and the number of selective internal radiation therapy procedures performed should be considered.

        Speaker: Phiphat Phruksarojanakun (Office of Atoms for Peace)
      • 63
        Nuclear gauge application in a road Construction industry in Ethiopia


        The application of ionizing radiation is an important technique for a wide variety of industries in many cases. One of these applications is portable density/moisture gauges. Portable density gauge has been used in industries such as construction, civil engineering, agriculture, and the like areas to perform in-situ measurements such as soil moisture or asphalt density. Moisture/density gauging is a form of non-destructive testing that eliminates the need to take core samples. Effective control of compaction of soil and stone layers is an important factor in the construction of roads and other types of foundations for civil engineering structures. The knowledge of materials density and moisture is very important for the evaluation of the degree of compactness. The other alternative methods to perform the same tasks have their own limitations and problems. To solve these problems, a nuclear technique has been introduced as a quicker and easier way of measuring the density and moisture of construction materials. The technique can determine both the density and moisture of materials for construction control at the worksite. The simplicity, speed, and nondestructive nature offer a great advantage for quality control. However, ensuring safety in the use of nuclear gauge and security of the gauge is of paramount importance for the protection of people and the environment from any associated radiation risks. This paper provides an overview of nuclear gauge application in road construction and the challenge of safety and security measures that exists at the companies using this source in Ethiopia.

        Speaker: Mr Birhanu Tolawak (ERPA)
      • 64

        In Chile, the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials has been regulated since 1985 [1]. However, the physical security of radioactive materials was established as a requirement, with the publication of the regulation for the physical protection of radioactive materials, in July 2020 [2].
        The new regulation establishes requirements for the protection of radioactive materials when the activity of radioactive materials in the radioactive facility exceeds a reference value. Three levels of physical protection are established in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [3].
        The authorized party must carry out a documented safety assessment and a physical protection plan. This plan should include detection, delay and response measures in accordance with the level of physical protection. Annually, the authorized party must evaluate the effectiveness of the physical protection measures, and the result of the evaluation must be communicated to the regulatory authority.
        The Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission is the regulatory body for the radiation safety and nuclear security of radioactive materials. During 2021, the regulator has modified its management system procedures to include nuclear security aspects in the review and assessment, and inspection. In addition, checklists have been generated and specific safety inspections have been planned.
        For effective implementation of the regulation's requirements, the regulator has conducted workshops, with authorized parties, on the new requirements. Workshops on safety culture and nuclear security have also been conducted, in accordance with the recommendations of the Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies [4].
        In order to strengthen national capabilities to respond to a nuclear security event, the regulatory body coordinates with other competent government agencies through the Radiological Emergency Safety Commission (CONSER) [5].
        [1] Regulations for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material. Decree 87 of 1985, Ministry of Mining, Chile.
        [2] Regulations for the physical protection of radioactive materials in first category radioactive facilities. Decree 82 of 2020, Ministry of Energy, Chile.
        [3] Code of conduct on the safety and secure of radioactive sources. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2004.
        [4] Safety and security culture in organizations, facilities and activities with radiation sources. Ibero-American Forum of Radiological and Nuclear Regulatory Agencies, 2015.

        Speaker: Cristian Sepulveda (Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission)
      • 65

        Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency of the National Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan (NRSA NAST) is the state regulatory body, drives state unified policy in the field of radiation safety.
        The primary task of the safety and security of radioactive sources is their state accounting and control in the Republic of Tajikistan, which is subject to:
        - ionizing radiation sources (IRS) (open and closed radiation sources, the number and activity of which exceed the level of removal and devices for generating radiation, the energy of which is more than 5 keV);
        - new manufactured IRS upon arrival at the finished products storage;
        - radiopharmaceuticals, kits for immunological analysis, radioisotope generators for medical purposes, compounds labeled with radionuclides, as well as radioisotope drugs and solutions based on short-lived radionuclides with a half-life of up to sixty (60) days.
        The State System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material at State is performing by NRSA NAST, the State nuclear regulatory authority of Tajikistan which is an independent Governmental authority and has the right to elaborate and approve regulations and guidance documents, issue licenses for relevant activities, carry out inspections and independently perform its regulatory decisions.
        Decree of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan “on Organization of the State systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials and ionizing radiation sources” approved by the Government Decree No. 499, 4th of October 2013 foresees that an operating organization performs annual physical inventory taking.
        Tajikistan was one of the first among the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics, adopted a law on the State control of export of arms, military equipment and dual-use goods (in 1997).
        There are about 340 organizations using IRS in Tajikistan, of which:
        - about 40 users of IRS;
        - about 300 users of generating IRS.
        NRSA NANT, within its competence, provides:
        a) creation and operation of systems for accounting and control of IRS;
        b) physical protection of IRS;
        c) management of collection and storage of information on accounting and control of IRS;
        d) conducting inspections to check the state of security systems, accounting and control of IRS in the operating organization;
        e) submission to state bodies of information on the presence and movement of IRS, as well as export and import in accordance with their requests;
        f) cooperation within the framework of international agreements and programs (projects) on the security, accounting and control of IRS, in accordance with the current legislation;
        g) compliance with the confidentiality regime of information about IRS to prevent unauthorized access to them.
        Within the framework of the state system of accounting and control of IRS, the State Database of Nuclear Materials and the State Register of IRS are being created.
        A joint project of NRSA NAST and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission was completed with an inventory and creation of a database of radioactive sources. The aim of this project was to conduct an inventory of all available IRS (closed, open, generators and related equipment) and stored them to the database. Under this project, an inventory of all sources was completed in all regions of Tajikistan.
        All collected data by source were entered into the database. This database is called ARIS and it an information system that allows user to introduce, store and process data about the IRS, designed for radiation safety regulators. The uniqueness of the ARIS program is the automatic determination of current activities and categorization of sources (the classification is carried out in accordance with the IAEA and the Safety Guide - No. RS-G-1.9, - Recommended source categories used in general practice) and easy user interface on data processing.

        Speaker: Ulmas Mirsaidov (Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency)
      • 66

        The Albanian National Radioactive Waste Storage Facility (RWSF) constructed in 1999 consists of an interim waste storage facility for very low level waste (VLLW), low level waste (LLW), intermediate level waste (ILW) and disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) coming from research institutions, agriculture and industrial activities and from applications in nuclear medicine in Albania.
        The safety assessment of this facility is performed considering its impact to workers, public and environment. In 2018 Albania started a new National project Alb 9010 titled “Upgrading the Radioactive Waste Storage Building According to International Standards”. The two fundamental objectives are to ensure the protection of the public, workers and the environment and to ensure retrievability of waste packages for final disposal.
        The project focuses on ensuring the safety of the treatment, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste and DSRS. Under this project has been done the improvement of the safety of the RWSF and upgrading of the existing building infrastructure. In the end of the project the objective is to improve the safety of the personnel in the RWSF, protection of public and environment, Upgrade the Equipment's used in the RW Management Activities, Upgrade the existing Infrastructure of the RWSF Building and also ensure retrievability of waste packages for final disposal.

        Speaker: Dr Dritan Prifti (Institute of Applied Nuclear Physics)
      • 67
        Strategic Trade Risk Assessment Matrix: Philippine Approach on Licensing Review and Evaluation

        Pursuant to the risk assessment criteria stipulated under Rule IV, Section 6 of the Strategic Trade Management Act Implementing Rules and Regulations (STMA IRR), the Registration and Authorization Division (RAD) of the Department of Trade and Industry - Strategic Trade Management Office (DTISTMO) formulated its own Risk Assessment Matrix, which aims to increase efficiency and provide a uniform method of evaluation of an authorization application. It integrates different licensing criteria/ parameters and defines the likelihood of a risk happening vis-à-vis consequence severity. This applies not only to nuclear materials, equipment and technology, but also other dual-use and military goods.

        The six criteria and their brief description are provided below:
        Criteria Description
        (1) Commodity Assessment - looks into the appropriateness of stated specification and quantity
        (2) End-Use: Sensitivity of Goods - tiering of National Strategic Goods List (NSGL) items, Philippines' control list based on EU Control List
        (3) End-Use: Proliferation Concern - consistency of stated end-use and end-user activity (new or old items, expansions, etc.)
        (4) Diversion to unauthorized end-user (connections/ involvement with entities of concern) - involvement and connection to restricted persons, proximity to sanctioned countries, shipment routes, the port of destination
        (5) Risk of illegal end-use by end-user and its customers/ intermediaries, and parties to the transaction - confirmation of the existence of the end-user (address, business activity, etc.), operational capacity, technological capacity, history of involvement
        (6) Country of Destination - tiering of countries based on strategic trade elements

        Each criterion consists of a qualitative/ descriptive rubric or the scoring guide. The risk level is consistent with all the assessment criteria, ranging from the lowest (1 - very unlikely) to highest (5 - definite) risk. Each level has its unique descriptors to allow evaluators to determine the scale of risk. Some criteria are further divided into elements with different descriptors.

        While the risk assessment matrix has its limitation and requires careful considerations of other factors, the tool aids STMO licensing officers in objectively reviewing applications and providing appropriate conditions in carrying out strategic trade activities.

        Speakers: ALETHEA BRAVO (Department of Trade and Industry - Strategic Trade Management Office), Ms Domina Pia Salazar (Department of Trade and Industry - Strategic Trade Management Office)
      • 68

        The current technological advancement in nuclear science and technology has led to the application of tens of thousands of radioactive sources worldwide throughout medicine, industry, agriculture, academia, and government facilities for a variety of purposes. These materials are stored in thousands of facilities of which many are poorly secured and vulnerable to theft as well as safety. These sources pose a serious safety risk and security threat and could be readily employed by adversary for malicious intent. Radiological terrorism is an increasing threat and states as well as the private sector must do more to secure these dangerous materials and keep them out of the hands of terrorists. The international basic safety standards for protection against ionizing radiation and for the safety of radiation sources (BSS) require the establishment and implementation of security measures of radioactive sources to ensure that protection and safety requirements are met. The IAEA has engaged in an extensive effort to establish and/or strengthen national radiation protection and radiological safety infrastructure, including legislation and regulation, a regulatory authority empowered to authorize and inspect regulated activities, an adequate number of trained personnel and technical services that are beyond the capabilities required of the authorized legal persons of which Ghana has benefited in diverse ways. In Ghana, effort is made to strengthen safety and security of these materials through national and international engagement. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Ghana established by Act of Parliament, NRA Act 895 has made steady efforts to strengthen national radiation safety and security infrastructure by participating in IAEA model project for upgrading radiation protection infrastructure by implementing the code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources and the guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources. Ghana has adopted the code and conduct on safety and security of radioactive sources. Ghana is also participating in a number of TC and interregional and regional projects such as Technical Cooperation (TC) project GHA/9/004 Radiation Protection Services, Interregional Project INT/9/143 Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure, RAF/0/048 Establishing adequate national legal frameworks for the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy, which complies with the relevant international legal instruments and IAEA standards assisted in the development of a National Regulatory System (Procedures for notification, authorization, licensing, inspection and enforcement), AFRA Projects RAF9051 and RAF9045: Strengthening the regulatory framework and national infrastructure for safe management of radioactive waste and protection of the public and the environment, trained personnel and developed guidance document needed for radioactive waste management, INT 9/182 Sustaining Cradle – to-Grave Control of Radioactive Sources- Human resource development, GHA9008: Sustaining Regulatory Infrastructure for the Control of Radiation Sources and Nuclear Materials – procurement of Regulatory inspection equipment, RAF9058 (2017): Improving the Regulatory Framework for the Control of Radiation Sources in Member States and INT9180 (2012): Sustaining the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material by Promoting the Harmonization of Transport Regulations and Building Regulatory Capacity and Outreach to the Transport Community to Address Global Issues Including Denial of Shipment. The Paper will identify the progress and the challenges faced in implementing these projects to enhance safety and security of radiation sources in Ghana.

        Speaker: Ms Lilian Atta Agyemang (Ghana Atomic Energy Commission)
      • 70
        Tackling Potential Insider Threat in Nuclear and Radiological Facilities and Nigeria's Nuclear Security Architecture: Tools, Preventive and Protective Measures

        As radiological and nuclear material find increasing civilian applications in industry, agriculture, medicine, research and education. However, the risk that nuclear or radioactive material could be used in criminal and terrorist acts remains a matter of serious concern to all stakeholders around the world. Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges nuclear security systems face globally, this is because some of the cases of theft of nuclear and radioactive materials or sabotage of facilities where the circumstances are known were perpetrated by insiders or with the help of insiders [7, 9]. Therefore, in the nuclear sector, there are no boundaries; hence whatever is the nuclear threat is by extension a threat to Nigeria's national security. In addition, potential insider attack to facilities is likely in Nigeria because of the manifestation of threat indicators such as: terrorist and criminal organizations, past nuclear facilities incidents, drug production, drugs and arms smuggling and social insecurity respectively [3, 13]. Thus, insider threat has potential impact on Nigeria’s nuclear security architecture (NSA). Consequently, the study examined potential Insider Threat and Nigeria’s NSA, with a view to articulating appropriate risk mitigating strategies. The study employed descriptive research design. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected using questionnaire and in-depth interview as research instruments. Two Hundred (200) questionnaires were administered to staff working in the nuclear sector and Two (2) in-depth interviews with Directors of DSS and NNRA respectively. The quantitative data collected were analyzed using SPSS version 22. The research findings revealed that the level of awareness on potential insider threat is low and Nigeria’s NSA is not robust and effective. Also, financial and ideological factors are core factors in Nigeria for an employee to become a threat. Some of the identified challenges in combating insider threat include: lack of security education, competencies of regulatory agencies, lack of training, willingness of senior management to implement reforms, improper integration of safety, security and safeguards, lack of data management amongst others. The study recommended that Human Reliability Program (HRP) should be developed and implemented in the nuclear sector, Nigeria’s nuclear security architecture should be reviewed, updated and implemented and awareness should be created on insider threat and Nigeria’s nuclear security architecture.

        Speaker: Dr Isa SAMBO (Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA))
      • 71
        The Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in Niger

        In Niger, the use of radioactive sources, both in the medical and industrial fields, is increasing year by year. In order to comply with international standards, the country has set up a nuclear regulatory and safety authority (ARSN) by law n ° 2016-45 of 06 December 2016 to supervise nuclear and radiological activities in order to guarantee the safety, security and protection of people and the environment against the effects of ionizing radiation throughout the national territory.
        Indeed, the use of radioactive sources constitutes an essential lever for the socio-economic development of the country; they are used in the field of health, mining, agriculture, industry, etc. However, they also present risks of radiation accidents, malicious acts or terrorism if we are not taking carefully. This is why awareness is necessary in order to be on constant watch to protect people, property and the environment against the harmful effects involving radioactive materials.
        These involve a variety of elements, including:
        - the authorization, inventory and categorization of radioactive source
        - the transport of radioactive sources,
        - dose values for occupational, public and environmental exposure,
        - Control of compliance with regulations and follow-up actions,
        - key data for periodic reports of user activities and the state of safety and security in the country etc;

        Speaker: Mr Ali DJIBO (ARSN Cab PM)
      • 72
        Tips and Tools for Developing a Sustainability Culture for Radioactive Source Security

        Security system sustainability is a constant challenge requiring continuous direct technical, administrative, and maintenance actions. To foster sustainability over generations of staffing changes and various stages of the business/facility evolution, it is important to consider the indirect actions that are required to support and maintain system sustainability. This paper will overview the Office of Radiological Security’s experience-based lessons learned regarding useful indirect actions that have proven successful including maintaining staff attitude towards security, ensuring staff development and knowledge transfer, and updating documentation as tangential aspects change, management from a system lifecycle perspective, and user experience.

        Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525

        Speakers: Mark Ekman (SNL), Mark Ekman (Sandia National Laboratories)
      • 73
        Unmanned Radiation Monitoring System via the Internet of Drone

        This work aims to solve the problem inherent in the current ionizing radiation monitoring practices, which is unsafe, labor intensive and lack of valuable information to allow decision making at the operational level. The IoD solution is expected to automate the monitoring at these facilities, which allow rapid decision making and reliable communication to avoid radioactive leakage, which may pose a risk towards nationwide disaster. The prototype involves several research concepts; start from the use of the latest wireless technology to relay sensor data from the Gieger Muller (GM) sensor integrated on the drone. The drone also will collect several data from the sensor nodes that measure the atmospheric and structure data surround the nuclear facilities. The drone will relay the real-time sensors data into an online dashboard for monitoring and automate decision making based on several safety levels. The prototype will be developed using two novel concepts: a stand-alone wireless charging station for the drone and an energy-efficient wireless transmission technique. Both research novelty expected to prolong the lifetime and reliability of the drone power supply for future unmanned IoD deployment. This proposal is in collaboration with two partners. The first is Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB), an agency that will help with the licensing and the use of radioactive materials, thus responsible in coordinating nationwide nuclear security measures. The second collaborator is from Aerodyne Group, a drone-based industry that will contribute in terms of drone development and later push towards potential commercialization of the prototype. The prototype is expected to revolutionize the radiation monitoring towards safe and reliable practices via the Internet of Drone technology. The Internet of Drones (IoD) has started to emerge in various other applications. However, there is a lack of push towards the IoD solution in the area of radiation monitoring, especially in Malaysia and the rest other Asia region. The conventional radiation detection system requires on-site physical inspection and detection, which poses a risk and impact from radioactive exposure towards the inspector or regulator. The accurate and fast unmanned detector will allow monitoring of hard to reach and high-risk site (i.e. land borders, nuclear facilities) conducted in a more efficient and effective manner. The radiation exposure to the workers inside the buildings of nuclear facilities like research reactor and medical cyclotron during a routine inspection is a critical issue. In addition, contamination level measurements for a wide area using conventional survey meters is time-consuming, and locally existing radiation hotspots or leakage is overlooked. Therefore, there is a distinct need for a device that can automatically measure the radioactive contamination for a wide area quickly and easily. The combination of an ionizing radiation detector and remote equipment is a useful way to remotely measure the radioactive contamination under high-dose-rate environments. Recently, small unmanned helicopters with multiple rotors known as drones or multicopters have been attracting attention worldwide. Owing to the development of automatic control technology, it is possible to control drone flights relatively easily. In addition, drones are compact and inexpensive. A drone system with directional radiation detectors can be used to measure detailed radiation distributions in narrow areas, which have been difficult to measure with conventional monitoring. Applications: Land border control, major public event, nuclear facilities, research reactor, nuclear medicine facilities, environmental monitoring in mining areas. etc.

        Speaker: Dr Faizal Mohamed (Nuclear Science Programme, Faculty of Science and Technology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia)
      • 74
        Virtual Execution of Security System Design, Implementation, and Assurance for Radioactive Sources: Lessons Learned From COVID-19 Global Pandemic

        During the COVID-19 pandemic, the main method of interaction shifted away from in-person and towards virtual meetings. This paradigm shift fundamentally changed many aspects of how business was done during the pandemic and potentially how business will be done after the pandemic restrictions have been eased. This paper will overview the obstacles to radioactive source security presented by the COVID-19 global pandemic including communication, documentation, and execution, and then present several strategies for analyzing the system, implementing optimization, and introducing agility. Additionally, this paper includes actionable strategies that can be incorporated into operations for sustained resilience against future uncertainties.

        Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525

        Speaker: Martin Sandoval (Sandia National Laboratories )
      • 75
        Challenges and Good Practices in Implementation of Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources throughout their Life Cycle

        The application of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes contributes to the developmental activities in various sectors world over. In applying nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, radioactive sources are widely used. However, the use of radioactive sources poses a risk of exposing the workers, the general public and the environment to ionizing radiation which can cause harmful effects. This, therefore, calls for the implementation of safety and security of the radioactive sources throughout their life cycle to ensure that the people and the environment are protected from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. In implementation of safety and security of the radioactive sources, challenges are encountered. On the other hand, best practices are adopted and implemented to ensure safety and security of the radioactive sources.

        This paper, therefore aims at exploring the challenges that are associated with ensuring the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. The paper also highlights the good practices associated with ensuring the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle.

        Speaker: Chimwemwe Gamulani (Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority)
      • 76
        Paths interfaces control during transport of radioactive materials in Mauritania

        In Mauritania thousands (Is it realistic??) of packages with radioactive materials have been arriving and starting all the year.

        There are three main entrance points: The ports of…., the borders with morocco, Mali……, the airport.

        Every point of entrance has monitoring protocols and procedures and there is a need to verify their interface to ensure both safety and security.

        Ship transport are usually started abroad and they should abide to the international regulations but as long as the ship is disembarking, also national procedures have to be applied. The same applies for flight transportation. These interfaces: maritime/land, aerial/land are to be studied and to be included in the safety and security plan. Suitable communication protocols should also be considered along these interfaces as well as language and taxonomy to be used.

        There is a need of knowledge and information transfer and cross training for persons in charge of the control in the land, in the ports and airport and this is something that should be discussed by the regulatory body.

        The Pandemic CoVID-19 has carried other obstacles in this complex mechanism, because the movement of technical experts has been restricted and limited and also the exchange of information has been difficult cause to the communication disruption. In these emergencial situation specific procedures have to be developed in order to not loose control of radioactive materials.

        Speaker: Dr Mohamed Mahmoud MOUNJA (National Authority of Radiation protection, Safety and Nuclear Security (ARSN); Prime Ministry)
      • 77
        Radiation dose from NORM-added Paint Products

        The present study investigates commercially available ion paint, evaluation being made using gamma-ray spectroscopy and Geant4 Monte Carlo simulations. A particular concern being the daily inhalation exposure dose. Organ doses have been simulated using the MIRD5 mathematical phantom, with incorporation of dose conversion factors. Sample code IP04 was found to contain the greatest activity, at 4.45, 31.9, and 2.96 Bq g-1, for 238U, 232Th, and 40K respectively, while the sample code NP18 recorded the least activity, at 16 and 30, Bq kg-1 for 238U and 232Th, respectively. Accordingly, code IP04 paint offered the greatest concentration, with mean percentages of 0.81, 0.026 and 0.06 for Th, U and Pb, respectively. Its use in a room designated room 1 is shown to give rise to an annual effective dose of 1.53 mSv y-1 given the assumption of exposure for a period of 8 h day-1. In brief, using these ion paints doses can exceed the annual public dose limit of 1 mSv.

        Speaker: Prof. Suhairul Hashim (Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Johor, 81310 UTM, Skudai, Malaysia)
      • 78
        Radiation protection standards on medical devices in sub-Saharan developing countries

        The prescriptions of radiation protection standards ensure the protection of users and medical personnel. They are applicable in all IAEA member countries, developed as well as non-developed. But the conditions of compliance are easier in developed countries than in developing countries because of the difficulties in the latter, linked to insufficient resources causing organizational problems.
        Certain standards application problems are linked to medical devices whose prescriptions are not unanimously respected in the design phases. The repercussions in non-developed countries are unknown and are not reassuring.
        Analyzing some of these standards with regard to underdeveloped countries can raise questions that are useful for the production of standards.
        These are the risks associated with technological innovations in radiotherapy (I), and Conditions for an evaluation of medical devices in developing countries (II).

        I- Risks associated with technological innovations in nuclear medicine
        Medical technology is advancing rapidly and this leads to a need for training health professionals specializing in nuclear medicine. The training recommendations for healthcare professionals do not create any liability in the event of a failure. In underdeveloped countries, the training of professionals in radiotherapy at the rate of innovations is timid and specialties are scarce.
        Recommendation: to ensure effective training of nuclear medicine professionals, it is necessary to master the data relating to the design and use of medical devices and to involve civil electrical engineering organizations in the training process
        II- Conditions for an evaluation of medical devices in developing countries

        …The evaluation of medical devices is a prescription that is not standardized with regard to the different manufacturers. Yet it could play an important role in the protection of users of nuclear medicine because more quality medical devices lead to less risk of error. But especially in developing countries, errors should be known and mastered in real time. Likewise, nuclear medicine professionals must have a mastery controlled by technicians specializing in electrotechnology in order to assess the quality of medical devices with the electrotechnical organizations and the organization for regulating errors in radiotherapy systematically recorded.
        Recommendation: to create the conditions for a better assessment of the quality of medical devices in developing countries, the errors encountered in radiotherapy should be known and shared in a platform shared with the various actors, involving national civil organizations in the field of electrical engineering and regulatory organization in the same work.

        Speaker: Mr Ibra TOURE (Ministry of health regional hospital of Fatick)
      • 79
        Radiological safety and source security in the cobaltotherapy center of the CHU JRA hospital

        Madagascar has an external radiotherapy center which uses a source of cobalt-60. Since this source of cobalt is Category One, extremely hazardous, joint safety and security measures have been implemented to ensure the safe and secure use of said source. The safety component covers the personal monitoring of workers under ionizing radiation, the zoning of work areas, the periodic monitoring of work areas and the radiation protection training. Regarding security, a security assessment project has been developed to enhance the security of the source. It has been established that the areas of safety and security must be dealt with at the same time to ensure the proper functioning of the service. Keywords: safety, security, radiotherapy

        Speaker: Dr Mbolatiana Anjarasoa luc RALAIVELO (INSTN-Madagascar)
    • 10:30 AM
      Coffee Break M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Coffee Break

    • Interactive Content Presentations M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Interactive Content Presentations

      • 80
        Assessment of Nuclear Security and Safety Culture at Radiological Facilities across the United States.

        The greatest challenge to guarding against radiological threats is the sheer prevalence and use of radioactive materials in facilities like academic institutions and medical centers. Securing these materials can be a daunting challenge given that these facilities are necessarily accessible to the general public, tend to emphasize safety over security, and possibly have less security than nuclear facilities. Cultivating and promoting a robust facility radiological security culture, combined with other physical protection systems can assist in the prevention of malicious acts using radioactive materials. This promotion is highly dependent on a relevant self-assessment tool that would assess and correct deficiencies in organizational security culture. In addition, assessing safety culture and gaining an understanding of the difference between safety and security is integral for reducing overall radiological risk. This study investigates a series of culture indicators by assessing more than 25 medical centers and academic institutions across the United States. The study uses a quantitative method of online surveys to measure current perceptions and identify areas of strengths and weakness in particular aspects of both safety and security culture. Respondents to the survey include technicians, nurses, and other authorized users of radioactive materials at medical centers and radiation safety staff and students from academic institutions. The study attempts to examine the influence of human factors in the current state of emergency preparedness, security violations, preventive education and training, policy, and management oversight. The study also analyzes the differences in response based on demographic information. Overall, the institutions showed good safety and security culture traits. There was an obvious lack of understanding of all the indicators, indicating that additional awareness training is needed to understand the differences between safety and security. The resulting outcome of the analysis outlines appropriate recommendations for facility-based radiological security and safety culture development, provides a process for awareness of radiological risk, and promotes the sharing of best practices.

        Speaker: Mr Jason Harris (Purdue University)
      • 81
        Nonprofits Roles in Strengthening Radiological Security in Africa: Lessons and prospects

        Dear Evaluation Committee,

        I would like to propose a presentation entitled "Nonprofit Roles in Strengthening Radiological Security in Africa: Lessons and prospects" for the "International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – Accomplishments and Future Endeavours" planned for 20–24 June 2022, Vienna, Austria. I have attached the abstract for this presentation. I look forward to hearing from you regarding my proposal. If you need any further information, please feel free to contact me at


        Hubert Foy

        Speaker: Mr Hubert Foy (African Centre for Science and International Security)
    • 12:30 PM
      Lunch Break

      Lunch Break

    • Side Event 13: The Incident and Trafficking Database: Perspectives on Materials outside of Regulatory Control. Board Room B/M1 (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room B/M1

      IAEA Headquarters

      The Incident and Trafficking Database: Perspectives on Materials outside of Regulatory Control.

    • Side Event 14: Creating and Environment for Expanded Access to Peaceful Uses: Fostering Supportive Nuclear Safety and Security Cultures. Board Room A (IAEA Headquarters)

      Board Room A

      IAEA Headquarters

      Creating and Environment for Expanded Access to Peaceful Uses:
      Fostering Supportive Nuclear Safety and Security Cultures.

      Convener: Vasiliki KAMENOPOULOU (IAEA)
    • Side Event 15: Radiological Security Response: Promoting Law Enforcement Awareness to Facilitate Effective Response for Material Containment. M5 (IAEA Headquarters)


      IAEA Headquarters

      Radiological Security Response: Promoting Law Enforcement Awareness to Facilitate Effective Response for Material Containment.

    • 4:00 PM
      Coffee Break

      Coffee Break

    • Poster Session 3: Poster Presentation 3 M 01( first floor M Building) (IAEA Headquarters)

      M 01( first floor M Building)

      IAEA Headquarters

      • 82
        Safe and secure management of sealed radioactive sources at the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology

        Radioactive sources have been in use at North-West University (NWU) for the last four decades in various applications such as in research and teaching. Uncontrolled and unsecured storage of sealed radioactive sources pose significant radiological risk to human health and the environment. The Department of Health is the national regulatory authority in South Africa on radiation issues. The South African Hazardous Substances Act, 1973 (Act No. 15 of 1973) provides for the control of Group IV hazardous substances (radioactive material not at nuclear installations or not part of the nuclear fuel cycle). The Department of Health’s Directorate of Radiation Control acts as the national competent authority in connection with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. The Centre for Applies Radiation Science and Technology (CARST) at North-West University (NWU) is the only centre authorized to carry out safe management of all radioactive waste materials generated at NWU Mafikeng Campus. The centre operates a centralized radioactive waste processing and storage facility. The inventory of radioactive waste materials in storage is made up of mainly disused sealed sources.

        Speaker: Ms Kgabo Seemla
      • 83
        A device for monitoring changes in the radiation situation in places where radioactive sources are stored

        To ensure reliable storage of radioactive sources, various physical protection systems are used, including mechanical devices, video surveillance systems, and access control systems. This paper describes a system designed to perform automated monitoring of changes in the radiation environment in real time at the locations of the devices that are part of the system. The system provides visualization of measurement results, generation of an "ALARM" signal and notification of the monitoring network operator in the event of a change in the radiation situation at the location of the detection devices.
        There are four types of devices used in the system structure:
         Device for collecting and processing information;
         Radon radiometer;
         Dosimetric device;
         Mixed radiation detector.
        Each kit includes one device for collecting and processing information, one radon radiometer, one dosimetric device and from 1 to 10 mixed radiation detectors. Device for collecting and processing information is the head unit of the system that collects information from detection devices (radiometers and detectors), and also serves as a power source for them. All detection devices within the same room are connected to the same power supply and communication line using junction boxes.
        The radon radiometer periodically automatically measures the radon concentration in the room, the dosimetric device transmits data on the dose rate of gamma radiation.
        A gamma-neutron radiometer is used in the mixed radiation detectors device to monitor the radiation situation. The sensitive element of the detector is a polystyrene scintillator for registration of gamma quanta, one plane of which is optically connected to a photomultiplier, and five other planes are surrounded by scintillation plates based on 6LiF:ZnS(Ag) for neutron detection. To increase the detector sensitivity to neutrons, the polystyrene-6LiF:ZnS(Ag) assembly is placed in a polyethylene moderator. A built-in gamma spectrometer is used to monitor changes in the spectral composition of gamma radiation.
        The main task of the mixed radiation detectors is to analyze the count rates corresponding to the registration of gamma radiation and neutrons in the control mode and generate an alarm signal when the recorded value goes beyond the permissible upper and lower limits. This ensures the prevention of unauthorized movement of stored radioactive sources.

        Speaker: Sergey Chuvaev (SEC "YAFI")
      • 84
        Accident Analysis of the Process of Transferring Teletherapy Machine Cobalt-60 Radioactive Waste into the Transport Container with Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Method

        The use of technology in the medical world has multiplied. One modality that uses a nuclear source is a teletherapy machine. The most widely used source of teletherapy today is cobalt-60. When the teletherapy machine does not meet the standards for use in external radiotherapy, it must be discarded, or approximately every 5 to 7 years of use must be replaced with a new source. Based on the regulation of the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia Number 6 of 2015, radioactive waste from teletherapy machines is classified as Category 1 Radioactive Sources or Spent High Activity Radioactive Sources (SHARS) according to the IAEA it has high activity. The cobalt-60 waste must be sent to the Center of Radioactive Waste Management Organization (PTLR) of Indonesia, which legally manages the radioactive waste in Indonesia. Currently, each of the spent radioactive waste sources of cobalt-60 in Indonesia uses a teletherapy head as a container. The head teletherapy as a container requires a larger storage space than the existing storage area in PTLR. Therefore, it is necessary to design a container transportation design to design a new transport container. It is crucial to do an accident analysis first. One of the well-known analytical methods is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
        In this study, an analysis of the causes of accidents that may occur while transferring the spent radioactive source from the teletherapy cobalt-60 machine into the transport container was carried out. The research was conducted first by determining two different scenarios. These two different scenarios were conducted to compare each other. The first scenario was by removing teletherapy cobalt-60 source waste with the process that already exists. The second scenario was removing teletherapy cobalt-60 source waste with a new design based on the researcher’s opinion. The analysis was carried out using the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method. The method used in this study was to determine undesired events (top events) that could cause radiation exposure over the limits for both workers and the environment. The next was to determine intermediate events connected with logic gates and then proceed to obtain primary events. All events that had been obtained were then graphically described to form a fault tree using the software. The next step was to determine the failure rate of each primary event based on published generic data. It was followed by determining the minimum cut set of every top event, sequence of events, probability, and the most significant factors that cause accidents in transferring spent radioactive source from teletherapy machine to transport container.
        The research shows that two undesired events were the same for each scenario. The first one was failing the source drawer, and the second one was container leakage. The principal causes for the source drawer to occur were because the container was not correctly installed on the teletherapy head, the t-rod used was not appropriate, and human error. The main causes of container leakage were due to container body malfunction and container door malfunction. In addition, it was also expected that the probability of causing an accident from transferring the cobalt-60 radioactive waste from the teletherapy machine into the transport container was still below 5% and could still meet the safety standards

        Speaker: Laksmi Citra Wahyuni
      • 85
        Addressing the Human Element of Security at Radioactive Source Facility: Preventative Measures and Strengthening Security Culture

        Radioactive materials have significantly enhanced the economy of many nations including Nigeria. These materials have found various applications in medicine, industry, agriculture, and many others and are widely distributed in Hundreds of Thousands globally. In Nigeria, they are used extensively in the Oil and Gas industry for non-destructive techniques, Medicine for diagnosis, and for Sterilization and food preservation. The contribution of radioactive materials in agriculture cannot be overemphasized, playing an important role in food production thereby reducing hunger and poverty in a fast-growing global population. As important as it may be to the national economy, radioactive materials pose a grave danger if not used safely and securely. These materials face numerous risks from adversaries who may steal the material or sabotage facility for various motives. Insider threat pose a unique and severe threat to radiological facility because such adversaries can exploit their advantages of having access, authority, and knowledge to betray trust and bypass security measures. Countering or defeating such threats to radioactive sources will involve early detection and characterization, especially before actual hostile actions against radioactive sources or facilities commence. In this paper, we discuss our approach to addressing the human element of security to mitigate the insider threats. Security culture plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, and organizations remain vigilant and that sustainable measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or use of radioactive sources in malicious acts. Therefore, strengthening organizational culture toward developing the desired attitudes and behaviors to serve as a means to support and enhance the security of radioactive sources is also discussed.

        Speaker: Yakubu Viva Ibrahim (Ahmadu Bello University)
      • 86
        Analysis of The Utilization of Depleted Uranium as Shielding Material for the Storage Container of Disused Teletherapy Source

        The need for storage containers for radioactive waste is increasing along with the increasing use of radioactive sources in various fields, both industrial and medical. A shielding material is needed to keep the radiation exposure as small as possible so as not to harm living things. There are several choices of materials as radiation shields for storage containers, one of them are depleted uranium.
        This study aims to analyze the relationship between the rate of exposure on the surface of the package to the thickness of the radiation shield of the radioactive waste storage container of teletheraphy source. The reference material used as a radiation shield is depleted uranium. This analysis was performed using MCNPX software version 2.7.E. which has been licensed by Department of Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Physics, Gadjah Mada University. The results obtained are compared with simulation results using other materials such as tungsten and lead.
        Based on the simulation results, it is known that the use of depleted uranium as a radiation shield for storage requires a smaller thickness than tungsten and lead. This value is based on assuming the activities contained have the same value for each simulation. This value is considered safe because the exposure rate on the surface of the container is still below the requirements written in the Perka BAPETEN which stipulates the maximum exposure rate on the container is 5 μSv/hour or 0.5 mrem/hour for activities below 3000 Ci.

        Speaker: Rinaldi Hadisaputra
      • 87
        Challenges associated with ensuring the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle

        Radioactive sources as source of energy have inevitable uses in medical, agriculture, industry, research etc. However, radioactive sources are potential health hazard to human if control measures are not put in place. To avoid the health hazards, it is important to ensure that safety and security of radioactive sources are maintained throughout the life cycle. Ensuring safety and security of radioactive sources requires a state commitment i.e regulatory infrastructure, manpower and technical capability, resources, stakeholder’s involvement and regional cooperation. Challenges are expected on maintaining the safety and security of radioactive sources in the life cycle. The first challenge is lack of management policy for radioactive materials; management and control of radioactive sources starts from the moment a source is produced until its disposal. This means a state should have a policy in place to address on how a source will be managed from importation, before use a licensee has to state clearly how to handle disused sources whether to return them to supplier or send them to a disposal site. The return to supplier is a good option to avoid accumulation of sources in the country in the absence of disposal option. The only problem is to control sources during transportation. The second challenge is lack of regulatory framework. Laws and regulations are very important in ensuring safety and security of radiation sources. Absence of laws and regulatory body to address and enforce safety and security of radioactive sources hinders an effective control of sources. The third challenge is illicit trafficking. This is contributed much by absence of control mechanism at entry or exit points. The fourth challenge is porous borders. In practice, countries with large extended borders have many borders which are not controlled and this makes it difficult to manage movement of radiation sources even in the presence of the regulatory infrastructure. Therefore the presence of porous borders contributes to the problem of illicit trafficking. The fifth challenge is the presence of unregistered sources. Legacy sources whish were imported in a country before a formal registration put the safety and security of those radiation sources at a risk because they are not easily controlled. The sixth challenge is lack of disposal option. Accumulation of sources in the country even with good storage infrastructure is a big problem because it will reach a time when the storage facilities may not be able to accommodate all disused sources that would be generated. Moreover, accumulations of disused sources in a single facility increase a security risk as target for terrorists and cost for maintaining of facility. Other challenges include the problem of increased exposure dose in vicinity of the facility. Therefore, in order to address the aforesaid challenges a joint effort by the international community is required.

        Speakers: Mr Mujuni Rweyemamu (Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission), Dr Firmi Banzi (Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission)
      • 88
        Development of psychosocial model for detecting the insider threat in trustworthiness programme

        Insider adversaries are one of the most potential threats to nuclear facility which is difficult to identify and mitigate. One of the security preventive measures against insider threats is established trustworthiness assessment of the employees. National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN) of Indonesia has trustworthiness programme such as supervisor review, medical appraisal, management decision and trust official review. Currently, expert’s opinion play an important role to analyze those information for detecting the malicious insider threats. This method is time consumable and too subjective. Therefore, it is necessary to have a tool to accomplish those analysis. This study proposes the psychosocial model for detecting the insider threat. Lists of trustworthiness dimensions and indicators have been investigated and scored based on its contribution to trustworthiness degrees. Then, the operational definition of each dimensions and indicators have to be defined for obtaining the same perception of the manner. Finally, the information from the responders have been collected by using sets of psychometric scale questionnaire. The questionnaire results of psychosocial model are expected can predict the malicious behavior of responders

        Speaker: alim Mardhi (BATAN)
      • 89
        Enhancing Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in Bangladesh: Recent Achievements and Future Plans

        Bangladesh is committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the socioeconomic development of the country and has signed necessary protocols and additional protocols of IAEA. The first use of radioactive materials in Bangladesh was started in early sixties of the last century for the treatment purposes in hospitals. Since then, sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) have found diversified and incremental uses in the country in the field of medicine, industry, agriculture, food irradiation, research and education etc. The increased usage of radioactive sources has resulted in a significant increase of disused radioactive sources (DSRSs) [1]. The inventory contains category 1 to category 5 sources with both short- and long-lived radionuclides [2]. Owing to various difficulties and absence of any national policy for reuse/recycle, the number of DSRSs is increasing day by day. Therefore, immobilization of the DSRSs has been essential for minimizing the volume and making space for accepting more DSRSs from the users as well as for the safety of sources.

        The SRSs used in different fields are now under regulatory control but sources used in smoke and lightning detectors are still to take under control. Bangladesh has basic regulatory infrastructure including Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Act, 1993 (NSRC Act-1993) and Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules 1997, (NSRC Rules-1997) forming the basis of nuclear regulatory infrastructure in the country [3]. However, detail regulation is under progress.

        An option for the predisposal management as well as disposal of DSRSs is needed to be found out as the eventual solution of the problem. Moreover, for a reliable and efficient management of SRSs and DSRSs capacity building in human resources, physical infrastructure, national policy, legal framework and record-keeping system of the sources is a prerequisite.

        In order to address the abovementioned challenges, various activities are underway with the assistance of IAEA and other bilateral partners. Accordingly, development of relevant supplemental legal infrastructure, building up human capabilities as well as physical infrastructure is going on which will facilitate an effective, efficient, safe and reliable management of SRSs and DSRSs in the country.

        Regarding development of regulatory framework a national policy document addressing the management of SRSs and DSRSs has been developed and approved by the Government. Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Act-2012 (BAER Act-2012) had been passed in the parliament in 2012 replacing the NSRC Act 1993 under which an independent regulatory authority named Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA) had been established in 2013.

        Proper management of DSRSs recently, a semi-pilot-scale centralized radioactive waste processing and storage facility (CWPSF) has been established with the support of IAEA for the predisposal management and interim storage of radioactive wastes including DSRSs as shown in Fig. 1. This is a licensed facility from BAERA for transportation and management of RWs and DSRSs including interim-storage.

        Software-based Radioactive Waste Management Registry (RWMR) system developed by IAEA has been installed for a reliable management of sources as shown in Fig. 2. Qualified and competent human resources are prerequisite for the efficient management of SRSs and DSRSs and now is under active consideration. Besides, in order to enhance the safety of the SRSs all category 3-5 sources were conditioned and stored safely at the CWPSF with the IAEA expert assistance. Conditioning operation, storage capsules for sources and conditioned sources in 200L drums are shown Fig. 3. A formidable challenge regarding RWM is mounting in future. Therefore, enhancement of legal, infrastructural and human resources must be planned and achieved within a stipulated time along with ancillary new regulations for the successful solution of problems with SRSs and DSRSs.

        Speaker: MD. IDRIS ALI (Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC))
      • 90
        Enhancing the Security at Radioactive Source Facility through the upgrade of the Physical Protection System

        There are several reasons why the security of radioactive sources is important in Nigeria. Radioactive sources have since played an important role in the Nigerian economy from its application for diagnosis, teletherapy and brachytherapy in Medicine to Non-destructive testing, sterilization and Food preservation in industry and Research and Education. Hundreds of thousands of high-activity radioactive sources are in use around the world for industrial and medical applications. The Oil and Gas sector in Nigeria remains the major source of revenue and radioactive sources play a major role from exploration to production. The non-destructive technique using radioactive material facilitates many of the activities in the Oil and Gas. Additionally, the use of radioactive sources in Agriculture have demonstrated its potential to fight hunger and poverty achieving one of the sustainable development goals in a growing world population. These and many others require effective security of radioactive sources for continued socio-economic development of every society. These benefits from the use of radioactive sources are not without some risks. Moreover, the international community’s assessment concluded that terrorist have indicated the ambition to acquire and possible use Radiological Dispersive Device (RDD), Radiological Exposure Device (RED), or sabotage radiological facilities for the purpose of revenge, terror, or intimidation against a government or institution, causing severe economic or environmental damage, receive a financial reward, either for stealing radioactive source or for carrying out an attack for hire. Radioactive material has been used to kill a former Russian secret service agent having absorbed a lethal dose. The changing security landscape in Nigeria requires an upgrade of physical security systems at its high-risk radiological facilities to mitigate the changing threat. In this paper, we highlight the processes for enhancing physical security at our facilities in Nigeria.

        Speaker: Yakubu Viva Ibrahim (Ahmadu Bello University)
      • 91
        Goal Programming with application to budgetary planning towards sustainable radiation safety

        In today’s fast paced and competitive era of radiation protection, optimal allocation of budgeted expenditure poses a critical concern for facilitation of radiation safety programs worldwide. Reliable methods for budgetary planning towards sustainable radiation safety programs are crucial in order to cater for planning, establishment and maintenance of radioactive sources in facilities. Kunwoo, Tatsuhito et al [1] gave historical challenges during which time funding has fluctuated widely in some countries. The authors provide a brief overview of the current situations in education and training in this field; and conclude the urgency for funding to facilitate radiation research. In a related development, Gardner and Cormello[2] explain how technologists quality of care and radiation safety are at risk and how examination productivity can be affected. The budget negatively affect technologist’s occupational attitude and job satisfaction because of budget cuts. Rosenblatt [3] stress the importance of realistic budgetary and cost considerations in order to foster long-term planning of radiotherapy services at the national level; taking into account the regulatory infrastructure for radiation protection and sustainability aspects. In a related article by Rosano [4], policies standards and guidance that support implementation of radiation protection are given. This can help the public and environment by providing training, tools, bio data as well as operational guidelines.

        In this study, we present a weighted goal programming model that can assist radiation facilities to optimally allocate funds for radioactive safety programs.

        In this study, a weighted goal programming model was developed to allocate budgetary expenditure for radiation safety. The relevant cost components under consideration included stages of planning, maintenance and establishment. The weighted goal programming model proposed initially defines the objective function. The model seeks to minimize the deviation variables from actual expenditure; subject to the goal values of budgeted expenditure for radiation safety program. The sum of weighted deviations is minimized so that actual expenditure on planning, maintenance and establishment costs meets the budgeted expenditure. The simplex method is used to solve the goal programming model; and a numerical example is presented to determine the overachievement or underachievement of budgetary priorities.

        The results obtained from the model developed aim to provide empirical evidence and insights to decision makers and policy analysts to maintain cost effective budgetary planning towards sustainable radiation safety programs. Certain goals on planning, establishment, and maintenance can be fully, partially or not achieved at all. This however; depends upon the priority levels and cost targets set in line with budgeted expenditure of a particular radiation safety program. Results also indicate that the priority-based goal programming solution for budgetary radiation safety is more sensitive to the highest priority objective function. The significance of lower priority budgets is lower; and thus their impact on the overall result of the optimization problem is not significant.

        The weighted goal programming approach for budgeting radiation safety programs can be effective; where relevant cost components can be prioritized if necessary. This can ensure cost effectiveness for radiation facilities; a critical path towards sustainable radiation safety programs.

        [1] Kunwoo C, Tatsuhiko I, Dmitry K, Tatjana P,Sisko B, Antone L, Hei T, Toshiyasu I, Tetsuya O, Kazuo S, Andrzej W, Grayle E,Yutaka Y, Nobuyuki H Funding for radiation research: Past, present and future , International Journal of Radiation Biology, 19(7):2019
        [2] Gardner K, Cormello R, Watta L How budget issues affect technologists Journal of medical imaging and radiation sciences, vol.45, issue 3, June 2014 ,115-118.
        [3] Rosenblatt E Planning national radiotherapy services, Frontiers in oncology, 2014, 4:315
        [4]Rosano D Office of Environment, Health, Safety and security, Radiation protection of the public and the environment

      • 92
        National Efforts in Securing Orphan and Legacy Sources: Lessons Learnt and Challenges

        The use of radioactive material predates the establishment of the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA), hence the concern for orphan radioactive sources in the country. Some of the radioactive sources used in various sectors of the economy became vulnerable due to bankruptcy and other economic realities. During the early days of the NNRA, Nigeria recorded loss of control incidences involving radiological material. For instance, in 2003 two sources belonging to a multinational oil servicing company got missing, sequel to this incidence, the IAEA sent an Emergency Mission to Nigeria in 2003. The recommendations of the Emergency Mission led to the IAEA Integrated Nuclear Security Service (INSServ) Mission to Nigeria in 2004. The primary objective of the Mission was to survey the comprehensive security needs related to nuclear activities in Nigeria and develop a work plan to improve the overall nuclear security in the country with particular emphasis on providing assistance in locating and securing orphan sources throughout Nigeria among others. The recommendations of this Mission led to other Missions to Nigeria such as the IAEA Verified Inventory and Orphan Source Mission which was conducted in August 2007 and one of the objectives of this mission was to discuss any knowledge of possible orphan sources in the country.

        Based on the recommendations of these missions, the IAEA and US-DOE provided some training on search and secure and radiation detection equipment to Nigeria to aid detection capabilities for orphan sources in the country.

        Consequently, Nigeria has developed a programme for search and secure for orphan and legacy radioactive sources since 2010. This programme aims at searching, recovering and securing orphan and legacy sources across the country. The last search and secure was conducted in December 2020. This programme has significantly improved the safety and security of vulnerable radioactive sources in the country because during each search and secure activity, orphan sources are discovered and appropriately secured.

        Additionally, dues to the several losses of control incidences in early 2000, Nigeria developed the Nigeria Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources Regulations in 2006 which is currently being reviewed.

        This presentation therefore will give insight on some of the achievements recorded so far in searching for and securing orphan sources in the country. It will also discuss some of the challenges and lessons learnt.

      • 93
        Nuclear Forensics Capability Development for Nuclear Security in China
        1. Introduction
          The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington in 2010, and the participants have announced the construction of a national nuclear forensics library to develop national nuclear forensics capabilities. China was one of the summit participants which with a large number of nuclear applications in both military and civilian industries. This research focuses on the nuclear forensics working systems of China and domestic measures and international cooperation that China has conducted to improve its nuclear forensics capability for nuclear security.

        2. Nuclear Forensics Working Systems in China
          2.1 Working systems, regulations and laws for nuclear forensics in China
          There are four different government sectors are responsible for the regulation of nuclear and radioactive materials to handle accidents and combat crimes in China. In order to improve nuclear forensics ability for nuclear security, China has implemented several regulations for radioactive sources and facilities security management.

        2.2 Technology agencies support nuclear forensics work systems in China
        The State Nuclear Security Technology Centre (SNSTC) was founded in November 2011 has advanced technical equipment for the experiment of nuclear material analysis which was designed as a testbed for detecting the smuggling nuclear or radioactive materials.
        2.3 Nuclear forensics library development in China
        In order to improve the capacity of nuclear forensics analysis in the accidents and crimes related nuclear or other radioactive materials, the China Institute of Atomic Energy has conducted technology cooperation with the IAEA in developing the nuclear forensics database and analysis ability.

        1. Nuclear Forensics for Nuclear Security: the International Cooperation China Has Joined in
          3.1 International multiple cooperation China has participated in
          In order to advance its nuclear forensics capability to combat these crimes, China has participated in many international multiple organizations and ratified several international conventions or regulations for nuclear security and control and export of nuclear materials.

        3.2 China-US bilateral cooperation on nuclear forensics for nuclear security
        It was in 1995, leaders from nuclear weapons laboratories of the US and China established a Lab-to-Lab program to reduce nuclear risks in both countries by sharing technical information. This kind of cooperation can help China establish comprehensive signature databases for nuclear and other radioactive materials, particularly for high-risk nuclear materials.

        1. Conclusion: Key Findings in China’s Nuclear Forensics Capability Development Process
          4.1 Achievements of Nuclear Forensics Capability Development in China
          In domestic, China has built a reliable working system for nuclear forensics analysis in the past years. In addition, China has established a complete legal system for nuclear and radioactive materials regulatory control, which is favoring for nuclear forensics analysis procedure. With construction and operation of the State Nuclear Security Technology Centre in 2011.

        4.2 Shortcomings of Nuclear Forensics Capability Development in China
        China still does not have an individual sector which is authoritative and professional enough to conduct the whole procedure of nuclear forensics analysis to support the prosecution of nuclear and radioactive material related crime. China has not yet established an intact radioactive materials database.

        4.3 What China can do more to develop nuclear forensics capability?
        Firstly, China should advance its nuclear forensics working system by establishing a unique and professional administration to undertake all the works in nuclear forensics analysis procedure.
        Secondly, China should finish the construction of a national nuclear forensics library as soon as possible and then let it be open for researchers and experts work on nuclear security policy and technology research.
        Last but not least, China should remember that the higher level of being open and transparent in nuclear forensics technology and database, the greater improvement it can get in nuclear forensics capability development.

        Speaker: JIA Chen
      • 94
        Nuclear Security Pocketbook for Indonesia's Security Officer

        Since 2018, the Department of Nuclear Engineering and Engineering Physics of Universitas Gadjah Mada has been conducted three days of the Introduction to Nuclear Security training for security officers, especially those on duty in Yogyakarta Special Province. The Police Chief of Yogyakarta Special Province fully supported the event to enhance their staff's knowledge because he just realized that there are some places in his work area that are utilizing the radioactive material. He sent more than fifteen persons every year to the training.
        But, in 2020, classical training could not be done due to the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia. For facing up the problem, the department arranged a nuclear security pocketbook. It is a 32 pages book containing a few words and graphic that explains the nuclear security in brief. The deficiency of this book compared to classical training is that it does not have practical activities, such as table-top exercise and radiation source detection practice. On the other hand, it can be read not only by Yogyakarta's security officer but also by the staff in the entire country.
        The book was sent to the education and training center of the Republic of Indonesia's Police as well as to their forensic laboratory center and their special troops. They looked enthusiastic when they received the pocketbook because the contents are closely related to their duty. Therefore, we could conclude that the pocketbook has fulfilled their present need.

        Speaker: Susetyo Hario Putero (Universitas Gadjah Mada)
      • 95
        Radiation Safety Documentation for Design of Radiation Facilities

        Design of radiation facilities in Belarus involves stakeholders represented by the Ministry of Emergency Situations – MES (the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety), Ministry of Healthcare (MOH) and Ministry of Architecture and Construction (MAC).
        According to the Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus of June 5, 2019 No. 217 “On building codes and regulations” the requirements in the field of architectural, urban planning and construction activities must be established in the building codes and rules, developed by the MAC with participation of stakeholders. Before the named Decree such requirements were included in the technical normative documents of MES, MOH, MAC.
        As the Decree entered into force at the time before the approval of the new Law of Belarus “On Radiation Safety” of 18 June 2019, MES managed to include into the named Law the right of the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to supervise the compliance of the documents issued by MAC. After that the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety actively took part in the development of the Building Code 3.02.13-2020 “Radiation Facilities”, approved by the Resolution of MAC dated November 27, 2020 No. 95.
        The Building Code 3.02.13-2020 “Radiation Facilities” entered into force since June, 1, 2021.
        As the next step the other building codes and regulations, including the building regulations “Composition and content of design documentation”, are being appropriately amended.
        The current edition of the building regulations “Composition and content of design documentation” contain no information about radiation safety issues, and in practice information concerning ensuring radiation safety is included by design organizations to different parts of design documentation.
        In order to cover the radiation safety issues the following proposals have been developed to include into the requirements for design documentation of radiation facilities:
        — design of systems and elements important to safety (alarm and radiation warning system, interlocking system, physical barriers system, power supply system, ventilation system, special sewerage system);
        — calculations of shielding (protection against ionizing radiation), allowing to ensure the reduction of doses to personnel and the public to permissible levels;
        — organization of the radiation monitoring system (including the types, scope and procedure for radiation monitoring, a list of necessary instruments, auxiliary equipment, placement of stationary instruments and points of constant and periodic monitoring);
        — organizational and technical measures to prevent a specific list of possible radiation accidents and to limit their consequences;
        — organizational and technical measures to prevent errors and unauthorized actions of personnel, which can lead to a violation of the conditions for the safe operation of sources of ionizing radiation or to aggravate the consequences of a failure of any system (element);
        — organizational and technical measures for radioactive waste management.
        Also the educational program for managers and specialists on radiation safety issues in the design of radiation facilities at the Belarusian National Technical University was implemented, and the Department for Nuclear and Radiation Safety issued the appropriate permit to implement this program.
        Communication of all the stakeholders is continuing in comprehensive and transparent manner to enhance safety culture and ensure radiation safety from the stage of design of radiation facility to the further stages of it’s life-cycle.

        Speaker: Iryna Tkachonak
      • 96
        Regulation for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in Azerbaijan

        In this paper, the infrastructure for control of radioactive sources in Azerbaijan is discussed. Especially the current system of regulatory control including legislation, authorization and inspection of radioactive sources is analyzed. Here also presents recent work and future plans in Azerbaijan related to increasing radioactive source safety and security.

        Speaker: Akbar Guliyev (State Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Activity Regulation under Ministry of Emergency Situations of Azerbaijan Republic)
      • 97


        de la Fuente Puch A.1, Pacheco Jiménez R.2, Florentín Cano, R.3, Gavidia Valle, O.4,
        Lopes Quadros, A.5, Munive Sanchez. M6

        (1) Dirección de Seguridad Nuclear, DSN-ORSA, Cuba
        (2) International Atomic Energy Agency, Viena, Austria
        (3) Autoridad Reguladora Radiológica y Nuclear, Paraguay
        (4) Dirección de Protección Radiológica, El Salvador
        (5) Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
        (6) Instituto Peruano de Energía Nuclear, Perú


        The regulatory body (RB) acts as an essential barrier to guarantee the safety of radiation sources. It is an important component among all the institutions involved in a strategy of defense in depth (INSAG 27).

        Most of the accidents occurred were result of inadequate safety culture and human issues, either due to lack of education and training or incomplete staff that generate stress and lack of attention. People make mistakes; it is unrealistic to believe that they can be completely avoided. Nevertheless, errors can be reduced and measures adopted in order to prevent that unadverted events develop into accidents. The availability of sufficient staff in the RB, contributes to reinforce the defense in depth. Additionally, it is important that the RB embodies and displays a safety culture that guarantees the necessary impact of its regulatory mission. This will serve as an example to the licensee organizations among which it promotes a solid safety culture.

        This work provides an unpublished methodology that guides governments and regulatory bodies in estimating the staff needed in the RB to fulfill its roles and responsibilities and therefore allowing to accomplishing with requirement 18, Staffing and competence of the regulatory body, GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1). The methodology is based on the number of facilities and activities to be regulated, and takes into account the maturity of the regulatory control in each country. Its application is recommended whenever the number of facilities and activities changes or the functions and responsibilities of the RB are modified, or because there have been substantial changes in the staff of the RB without the application of a proper staff renewal policy.

        The methodology is based on estimating the staff needed to perform the regulatory functions assigned to the RB by estimating the number of man-days per year needed to perform the regulatory functions assigned to the RB, which will depend on the education and training of the staff. Once the number of man-days per year needed to accomplish all functions is estimated, it is divided by the number of working days per year, which depends on each country, thus obtaining the number of people needed in the RB. The number of man-days per year required to perform the regulatory functions is estimated from two components: (1) The number of man-days per year required to fulfil the basic and support functions of the RB that depend on the inventory of existing radiation sources in the country and; (2) the number of man-days per year required to fulfil the rest of the functions. All regulatory functions should be subject to a graded approach so that, while the descriptions of these functions are generic, the degree of application will differ according to the types of facility or activity, the degree of compliance of the users and the available resources of the RB.

        The methodology was developed in the framework of the IAEA Technical Cooperation project RLA9084: Strengthening the Regulatory and Radiation Safety Infrastructure (TSA1).

        Keywords: Regulatory body staff.

        Thematic area: Regulatory aspects.

        Speaker: Andrés de la Fuente (DSN-ORSA)
      • 98
        Safety Analysis on Land Transportation of Cobalt-60 Radioactive Waste Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

        Cobalt-60 teletherapy usages for cancer treatment produce radioactive waste. This radioactive waste must be transported from the hospital to nuclear waste repository within the country or can also be re-exported to the country of origin. This radioactive waste produce by the hospital can bring negative impact to the environment, therefore radioactive waste transportation safety analysis is needed to ensure that the transportation process can be done safely. This paper analysis causes of the radioactive transportation accident by the land route using fault tree analysis. The main accident to be analysed is defined first as the top event, then this top event is analyzed to gain primary event. Furthermore, the probability of the top event is calculated based on the probability of each primary event. From the research, it was found that the waste transport truck accident is the top event, and the primary are accidents that occur due to human error, vehicle factors, road factors, and environmental factors. The probability of this top event is below 5%, this system meets the safety standards for the transportation of radioactive waste.

        Speaker: Juandi Antonius
      • 99
        Safety Analysis On The Process of Cobalt-60 Teletherapy Sources Displacement From The Transport Container to The Storage Container Using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Method

        Based on the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency data, there are 37 hospitals using radiotherapy technology modalities until 2018, including Cobalt-60 teletherapy. The waste from the teletherapy machine is the disused source of Cobalt-60. Based on Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency Regulation No. 6 of 2015 on the Security of Radioactive Sources, management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Substances (DSRS) is divided into two types. For managing DSRS categories 1 and 2, the source is stored in a head or transport container and placed in pallets and metal shelves. For categories 3-5 are carried out by grouping the heads and placing them in a concrete shell, then releasing the source or dismantling. Furthermore, it is encapsulated in a capsule and stored in the High Activity Waste Temporary Storage. The disused source Cobalt-60 teletherapy must manage by following category 1 procedures. It requires a larger storage area and a non-reusable head that makes the storage room of BATAN full rapidly. To overcome this problem, the disused source is transported using a transport container and then be transferred into a storage container in the storage room. Accidents during the transfer must be minimized by the proper safety analysis. The purpose of this study was to analyze the causal factors and probability values of accidents that occur in the transfer process. Thus, the results of this study can be considered for the safety aspect in designing storage containers to facilitate the storage of Cobalt-60 teletherapy source waste.
        The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method was used to analyze some possible failures. FTA is a deductive analysis that focuses on one undesired event and provides a method for determining the cause of the event. The initial stage of constructing a failure tree was to determine the peak event or undesired event. To determine the factors causing the failure, some scenarios were made from the displacement of the source of Cobalt-60 teletherapy. In this study, two failure scenarios obtained were moving the transport container from the carrier car and removal the source from the transport container to the storage container. In the first scenario, to move the transport container from the transport car, a forklift was used. Meanwhile, in the second scenario, we used a T-rod tool.
        It is found that the undesired event from the first scenario is the falling container, and the second scenario is the falling source drawer. The root causes that lead to the undesired events from the two scenarios are operator negligence in complying with work safety rules and equipment maintenance, as well as the failure of the used equipment.

        Speaker: Wahyu Amalia Nurbaiti
      • 100

        In Nepal, radioactive sources are mainly used in the medical field. Small quantities of low-activity radioactive sources are used in research and education. In 2005, 2006, 2010, 2016 and 2017 Ministry of Education, Science & Technology has completed five projects and on inventory of radioactive sources being used in Nepal. Similarly, in 2020, Department of Health Services, Ministry of Health & Population has completed one project on inventory of radiation sources being used in Kathmandu and Bhartpur, Chittwon. A study was designed to determine the actual number of radioactive sources including country of origin, date of installation, source number, activity etc. After becoming a member country of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the responsibility of Nepal has increased many folds. The United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, which is binding on all member states, contains obligations regarding accounting and physical protection on nuclear materials as well as commitments to prevent trafficking in weapons-related material and their delivery systems. Radioisotopes in hospitals, academic institutions, research laboratories etc. in Nepal are categorized per IAEA Technical Document TECDOC-1344. While some significant steps have been taken to secure high activity radioisotopes in Nepal, with the help of the United States Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security (ORS), many challenges lie ahead in securing Nepal’s radioactive sources. Despite all the impending challenges, Radioactive Substances (Utilization and Regulation) Act 2020 has materialized effective as of July 2020. This has created a path for establishment of regulatory body which ultimately pave the way for rules and regulations for safety and security of radioactive materials in Nepal. In security of radioactive sources, previous Nuclear Materials Regulatory Directive, 2015 and the newly enacted Radioactive Substances (Utilization and Regulation) Act 2020 contain provisions for the establishment of requirements and standards for the security of radioactive material, based on the IAEA’s Safety Standard. For developing regulations, committee has been constituted for drafting of standards including security of radioactive sources. Recently, final draft has been completed and submitted to concerned minister’s office for further procedure.

        Key words: act, radioactive materials, radiation, radiological security, regulations

        Speaker: Dr Kanchan Adhikari (National Academy of Medical Sciences, Bir Hospital)
      • 101
        Security Analysis of Unused Teletherapy Cobalt-60 Sources Transport Container Using Attack Tree Analysis Method

        The utilization of sealed radioactive sources, including the Cobalt-60 sealed sources for teletherapy activities, will generates a radioactive waste. According to the IAEA Nuclear Safety Standart Series No. GSG-1, the activity of disused Teletherapy Cobalt-60 sealed sources is about 100 TBq categorized as intermediate level waste (ILW). Several events in the world have shown that waste with such a high activity has the potential to be misused. Radioactive materials controlled by parties with malicious purposes can be used as dirty bomb, radiological dispersal device (RDD), radiological emission device (RED) or just sell it for economic profit. There were 189 incidents reported by 36 countries to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and recorded in the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). This indicates that the threat to the security of radioactive material, including incidents to be connected with trafficking or malicious use, is real. The total number of nuclear security events according to ITDB from 1993 to 31 December 2019 was 3,686 incidents. One method to anticipate a threats against radioactive materials during transport is by implementing a physical protection system in the Transport Security Plan (TSP). Physical protection systems can be implemented in the design of the transport container. This study was conducted to analyze what threats might occur to the disused Teletherapy Cobalt-60 sealed sources during the transportation process and the steps to anticipate it with container security.
        The analysis in this study was carried out in accordance with the security of radioactive material transport model in IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9-G. There were 5 main steps in analysis consisting of characterization of radioactive sources to determine the security level; threat assessment; target identification; determination of security goals; and container security analysis. The characterization of radioactive sources was divided into two steps, which consist of determining the sources category and determining the security level of the transporting sources. Attack Tree Analysis is one method that is often used in security analysis. In its development, the method developed into an Attack-Defense Tree (ADTree) which is used not only for threat modeling but also for anticipating steps. Analysis using the ADTree method can be done in various ways, both quantitative and qualitative. Qualitative analysis can be done by calculating the success rate of the threat by the enemy. The results of the container security analysis were evaluated using the ADTree method to determine the level of success of the threat. The evaluation was carried out with the assumption that the enemy has started the action so that the initial probability is 100%. Then the probability was be lowered by the presence of security measures. The evaluation in this study was carried out using the ADTool software.
        Disused Cobalt-60 sealed sources is categorized into level 1. According to BAPETEN’s Chairman Regulation Number 6 Year 2015, the security level applied to the category is enhanced security level with additional security measures. The potential action that can be a threat to the transportation of such waste is theft that can be done through 2 different scenarios, that is take the sources from the container or take along the container. Delay function of the transport container can reduce the success rate of theft to 0.24% that is categorized as very low level.

        Speaker: Harkamaya Nursetya Putra (Universitas Gadjah Mada)
      • 102
        Stakeholders Awareness Raising Programs on the safety and security of radioactive sources: Challenges and Opportunities A case Review of Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority stakeholder Communication and Consultation Practices

        I have taken this to be an opportunity for me as I am a communicator in charge of awareness raising programs activities in the Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority. The research I want to study is very critical in that it adds much to the communication and consultation works the regulatory body undertakes. It is believed that the significance of having informed stakeholders and public and the challenges and opportunities that come through awareness raising campaigns will help design future safety and security measures or radioactive sources. I hope my department in particular will have chances to redesign its communication strategies, tools and identify potential stakeholders for good

        Speaker: Mr Awoke Awoke Tiruneh (Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority)
      • 103
        Strengthening the South African Network for Nuclear Education, Science and Technology through Postgraduate Training

        In 2016, South Africa established its Network for Nuclear Education, Science and Technology called SAN-NEST, which is aimed at strengthening the nuclear science and technology education programs in the country to better meet future demands in terms of quality, capacity and relevancy; sustaining the national radiation safety and nuclear security regimes for radioactive sources in various Institutions of the Country and prepare the nation for the approved new Modular Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP). To date SAN-NEST has seven academic Institutions and four Nuclear Industry Stakeholder Partners. The North-West University (NWU) is one of the members of SAN-NEST, which falls under the umbrella of AFRA-NEST. At the NWU, is the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology (CARST), in SAN-NEST. CARST was established in 2009 by the nuclear Industry with a mandate to train Postgraduate students in nuclear technologies (e.g. GEN IV Reactors for modular power plants).
        One of the deliverables from SAN-NEST is acquiring a Teaching/Research Reactor that will be used for training of Nuclear scientists and Postgraduate students in order to meet the nuclear demand recently approved by the Parliament (to include nuclear energy in the Energy mix of South Africa). The other deliverable is to provide a mechanism to advice (Government, e.g. within the GEN IV Forum) on research priorities in the form of research focus.
        The nuclear modular nuclear build, announcement has raised the stakes even higher for a nuclear industry feeder like the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology and the Nuclear Engineering Entity both at the North-West University. Both of these Entities are responsible for training Postgraduates for employment in any of the country’s nuclear industry, in particular after the new MNPP is commissioned. South Africa has also been sending most of its students outside (e.g. to JINR, in Dubna, Russia) for Masters and Doctorate training in nuclear science and technology.
        This paper aims at assessing the milestones, pitfalls and challenges faced by SAN-NEST in its goal of being a platform where Nuclear Industry (Academic & Partners), exchange information among themselves and more importantly with the Government, concerning the:
         Planning for the new proposed NPP Module,
         establishment, maintenance and sustainability of national radiation safety and nuclear security regimes for radioactive sources,
         safety and security systems for research and nuclear power facilities (e.g. for the Teaching/Research Reactor and the proposed modular NPP)
         education and training of enough nuclear scientist to be employed in the MNPP facility after commissioning.
        In particular, we will present the major role to be played and achievements by the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology (CARST), in SAN-NEST. To date the Centre has produced 2 PhD graduates in Nuclear forensics (a nuclear security tool to combat illicit trafficking of radiological materials) while at the same time increasing national preparedness to respond to radiological incidents and emergencies involving radioactive sources. Two more are graduating in May 2022. The centre through one of its PhD candidates is currently participating in the IAEA CRP J023100 and the new CRP (K42013).

        It is envisaged that the paper will highlight these successes gained- and any challenges- to the end of December 2021, and explore what kind of help and advice could be required from the IAEA. Thus the knowledge to be gained from this Conference will be vital to the continuity of SAN-NEST.

        Speaker: Ms Kgabo Seemla
      • 104

        THE REUSE OF OUTER CAPSULE AND PIGTAIL FROM OBSOLETE SEALED SOURCES OF IR-192 GAMMA MAT TYPE. In the product of obsolete sealed sources of the Iridium-192 type Gamma Mat, there are two important components that can be reused to assemble new products, namely the outer capsule and pigtail/source holder. From an economical perspective, reusing these two components will be beneficial due to the asking price of one-third below the overall product price. With the issuance of the Indonesian Government Regulation Number 61 of 2013 concerning Management of Radioactive Waste, it opens legal opportunities for BATAN to recycle the radioactive substances that have not been used which come from waste producers, including the sealed source products in the Gamma Mat type Iridium-192. The dismantling process of Gamma Mat type Iridium-192 sealed sources products in order to reuse the outer capsule and pigtail/source holder components is also a form of implementation for the Regulation of the Head of BATAN Number 7 of 2017 concerning Reuse and Recycle of Unused Sealed Radioactive Substances. To be able to reuse the outer capsule and pigtail/source holder components; first, the obsolete sealed source product in the Gamma Mat type Iridium-192 must be identified. After measuring the radioactivity in the obsolete sealed sources products of Iridium-92 Gamma Mat, the Inner Capsule will be separated from the outer capsule by removing the locking pin of the outer capsule and pigtail/source holder. The outer capsule and pigtail/source holder components that have been removed are examined for surface contamination and its physical conditions. These two components are declared to be reusable if the surface contamination level is less than 3.7 Bq / cm2 and there are no defects or cracks. The outer capsule and pigtail/source holder components that are declared eligible for reuse can be offered to distributors or producers so that they can be used as a source of non-tax state revenue (PNBP) for BATAN.

        Keywords: reuse, sealed source, Iridium-192

        Speaker: Mrs Slamet Wiyuniati (Batan-BRIN)
      • 105
        Virtual Testing: Checking the Physical Protection System of the CCHEN Facilities in the Pandemic Time

        In the framework of the continuous cooperation and support among the Department of Energy of the United States (DOE-US) and their Laboratories associated, and the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN), was carried out a “Virtual Testing” to check the physical protection system (PPS) in the Lo Aguirre Nuclear Center of CCHEN. This kind of activity was planned, due to several international and national restrictions for the COVID-19 pandemic.

        The program of this Virtual Testing was developed between personal of Sandia National Laboratories and CCHEN, to check the PPS in the following facilities: waste storage, military guard, center of alarms (CAS), reactor, irradiator, fabrication of fuel elements and conversion. For this purpose we used a platform for virtual conference, facilitated for Sandia.

        The Virtual Testing was carried out in May 2021, in two days, to get check all the components of the PPS. Every day started with an initial meeting to introduce the day activities and to arrange details, and then we went visiting to the facilities to test each physical protection components, the interface with the CAS and response for nuclear security events. At the end of the day, we had a final meeting to debrief the job. Finally, we had a meeting with professionals of Sandia and the Executive Director and Authorities of CCHEN, to present the results and establish a statement of work, SOW. This SOW is running.

        The virtual testing was a good way to keep our system in evaluation and improvement, at this pandemic time, however, should be considered a complement and not a replacement of the revision activities face to face.

        Speakers: Mr Herman Zarate (Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission), Mr Sergio Díaz (CCHEN)
      • 106
        “Methodology for the Systematic Assessment of the Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN) for Regulatory Bodies of Radiation Facilities and Activities”

        A regulatory body’s competence is dependent on, among other things, the competence of its staff. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a regulatory body to be competent is that its staff can perform the tasks related to its functions.
        The IAEA has introduced a methodology and an assessment tool —Systematic Assessment of Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN) — for analysing the training and development needs of a regulatory body and, through a gap analysis, provides guidance on establishing and meeting competence needs.
        IAEA TECDOC-1860 “Methodology for the Systematic Assessment of the Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN) for Regulatory Bodies of Radiation Facilities and Activities”, published in 2019, provides guidance on analysis of required and existing competences to identify those required by a regulatory body regulating radiation facilities and activities in order to perform its functions, and therefore the associated needs for acquiring those competences. It is expected that this technical document will also support the Member States in the implementation of paras 20-22 of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Article 8 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) and Modules 3 and 4 of the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) for radiation facilities and activities.
        IAEA TECDOC 1860 is complemented by the SARCoN software and is to be used in conjunction with IAEA Safety Reports Series No. 79 “Managing Regulatory Body Competence”, which provides generic guidance, based on IAEA Safety Requirements, for the development of a competence management system within a regulatory body’s integrated management system. Accordingly, the proposed competence model is based on a quadrant structure. Each quadrant comprises a set of quadrant competence areas (QA), as illustrated in Figure 1, with each of the quadrant competence areas comprising a set of specific competences referred to as knowledge, skills and attitudes (KSAs).

        The quadrant model described is generally applicable to all regulatory bodies. However, the specific KSAs associated with the quadrant competence areas need to be tailored to the individual characteristics of each regulatory body and the types of facilities and activities that it regulates. This means each regulatory body needs to establish its own set of competences, assessment criteria (levels of competence) and standards for evaluation.
        TECDOC 1860 can also be used, in conjunction with IAEA-TECDOC-1757 “Methodology for the Systematic Assessment of the Regulatory Competence Needs (SARCoN) for Regulatory Bodies of Nuclear Installations, by regulatory bodies regulating both radiation and nuclear facilities.”

        Speaker: Ms Vasiliki KAMENOPOULOU (IAEA)
      • 107
        The future of nuclear security in Cambodia: the collaboration among national stakeholders

        Cambodia is fully committed to the non-proliferation of the nuclear program and takes part to ensure safety, security and safeguards at national, regional level and throughout the world. Cambodia has no nuclear facilities (no nuclear power reactors, no research reactors, and no fuel cycle facilities). Anyway, Cambodia has a small quantity of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials to be used and storage. The use of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials in some sectors: Medical (Oncology Center in Cambodia), Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital, Kalamet Hospital (new), Industrial gauges used in brewery and beverage companies, Research (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries and Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology). The establishment of a future nuclear regulatory body after the nuclear law will be promulgated in near future. The Ministry of Mines and Energy is finalizing the draft nuclear law and implementing the action plans from INSSP (Legal framework, prevention, detection, response, and human resources development), utilizing IAEA NUSIMS to improve Safety and Security and finally implementing the revised SQP and the AP with the collaboration among not only with national stakeholders but also with IAEA and other international organizations.

        Speaker: Thon Mao
      • 108
        The improved deign for the mobile hot cell for the conditioning of spent high activity radioactive sources

        The stumbling block on the international level was the management of Spent high activity radioactive sources (SHARS) because of its high potential radiological risk. Since 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), cooperated with its Member States, has developed several mobile technologies and facilities for the conditioning of SHARS. In 2009, IAEA cooperated with China Institute for Radiation Protection(CIRP) to develop a Mobile Hot Cell(MHC) specifically to deal with SHARS. A pilot conditioning operation with an activity of an around 1000 Ci Co-60 irradiator sources had been carried out in September, 2010 that the sources were handled and conditioned very successfully. In 2017, the same MHC hasl been used to realize the conditioning of Co-60 medical source. The performance testes conducted by the team from China Institute for Radiation Protection (CIRP) showed that the mobile hot cell meets all performance requirements.
        However, MHC adopt inner and outer carbon steel plates filled with river sand as the shields. It would require about one week to assemble or dismantle, but the actual conditioning operations may only take one to two days, which has severely impacted the popularization and application of MHC.
        From the perspective of the structural design of MHC, a design scheme of the combination of fixed concrete wall and metal plate is proposed, which can greatly improve the assemble and dismantle efficiency. After the conditioning is completed, the concrete part can be filled and reserved for other purposes, such as being used as a radwaste receiving and temporary storage warehouse.

        Speaker: Gao Chao (China Institute for Radiation Protection )
    • 6:00 PM
      Reception Reception Sponsored by the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association(ISSPA) M Building (IAEA Headquarters)

      M Building

      IAEA Headquarters

      Reception Sponsored by the International Source Suppliers and Producers Association(ISSPA)

    • 10:30 AM


    • 12:30 PM
      Coffee Break

      Coffee Break

    • Closing Session

      Closing Session