Since 18 of December 2019 uses Nucleus credentials. Visit our help pages for information on how to Register and Sign-in using Nucleus.

International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics - IAEA CN-218



Vienna International Centre, 1400 Vienna, Austria
International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics
— Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive
Material out of Regulatory Control


Nuclear forensics is an essential component of national nuclear security infrastructure which can help to address the threat of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control as well as to assess nuclear security vulnerabilities.

Recognizing the benefits of nuclear forensics in the establishment and maintenance of national nuclear security regimes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized, in October 2002, the International Conference on Advances in Destructive and Non-Destructive Analysis for Environmental Monitoring and Nuclear Forensics in Karlsruhe, Germany. The conference was a useful starting event for including nuclear forensics support activities in IAEA nuclear security plans and projects.

IAEA General Conference resolutions on nuclear security emphasize the importance of nuclear forensics as a component of a Member State’s nuclear security infrastructure. The 2012 General Conference resolution on nuclear security noted the IAEA’s work in nuclear forensics to include activities in training and development of guidance to aid in a nuclear forensics examination. Nuclear forensics was also featured in the President’s Summary of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, 1 – 5 July 2013. This conference included a technical session on nuclear forensics where 15 oral and poster presentations and an expert panel described the important role of nuclear forensics in support of law enforcement and nuclear security vulnerability assessments.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017, which the IAEA is currently working on, will reflect the importance of nuclear forensics for the effectiveness and sustainability of national nuclear security measures. Recognizing the importance of international collaboration in nuclear forensics, the IAEA cooperates with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the ITWG in providing various forms of assistance, including enhancement of awareness, guidance and training.

The international community increasingly recognizes the role of nuclear forensics as a deterrent and as a support tool in the response to nuclear security events. Through this international conference on nuclear forensics, the IAEA seeks to facilitate a comprehensive exchange of information on relevant new technologies and techniques, as well as to address other achievements in the application of nuclear forensics.

Objectives of the Conference:

  • To review the role of nuclear forensics as an essential element of a national nuclear security infrastructure;
  • To present recent scientific achievements and to exchange experience and lessons learned related to the application of nuclear forensics;
  • To review current practices in nuclear forensics and identify advances in analytical tools;
  • To discuss ways of strengthening nuclear forensics capabilities and capacity building in order to ensure the implementation and sustainability of national nuclear forensics programmes; and
  • To propose and discuss mechanisms for achieving further international and regional cooperation and the IAEA’s support functions, upon request, in the area of nuclear forensics.

Persons who wish to present a paper or poster at the conference must submit a synopsis in electronic format (no paper copies) directly to the IAEA. The synopses must be submitted through this system.
    • Opening Plenary Session
      Convener: Ms S. J. Le Jeune d'Allegeershecque (UK - Ambassador)
      • 1
        Opening Address - IAEA Director General
        Speaker: Mr Y. Amano (IAEA, Director General)
      • 2
        Opening Remarks: President of the Conference
        Speaker: Ms Susan Jane Le Jeune d'Allegeershecque (United Kingdom - Ambassador)
      • 3
        Opening Remarks: Director NSNS
        Speaker: Mr Khammar Mrabit (IAEA, Director NSNS)
      • 4
        Opening Remarks: GCINT
        Speakers: Mr G Berdennikov (Russian Federation, Ambassador) , Mr S. Limage (United States of America)
      • 5
        Opening Remarks: INTERPOL
        Speaker: Mr A. King (INTERPOL)
      • 6
        Opening Remarks: ITWG
        Speaker: Mr K. Mayer (EU)
    • 12:00 PM
      Lunch break
    • Main Plenary Session 1a: Historical Evolution of Nuclear Forensics
      Conveners: Mr H. Yoo (Korea, Republic of) , Mr M Caspers (Germany)
      • 7
        Historical Evolution: A Technical Viewpoint
        This paper presents the personal perspectives of the authors on the early development of nuclear forensics, beginning with the early 1990s. Independently, we started to work on nuclear forensics, recognizing that we were addressing a new set of questions. In 1995 an “International Conference on Nuclear Smuggling Forensics Analysis” was held at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which ended by forming a International Technical Working Group (ITWG) as a forum for international technical cooperation on nuclear forensics. This conference also marked the start of our working relationship. Some of the early work of the ITWG is highlighted, notably the development of a “model action plan” and the execution of exercises in which scientists learned from one another. In the 2000s a number of countries and organizations started programs to make technical progress in developing nuclear forensics. Signatures are at the heart of the technical development, as they are crucially important for drawing technical interpretations from measurements. Some examples of cooperative research projects that include multiple countries will be described. Finally, based on our experience in the early evolution of nuclear forensics, we present some lessons learned regarding the development of a new field like nuclear forensics.
        Speaker: Mr S. Niemeyer (United States of America)
      • 8
        Development of Nuclear Forensics in Russia
        Speaker: Mr V. Kuchinov (Russian Federation)
      • 9
        Historical Evolution: A Political Viewpoint
        Speaker: Mr K. Nederlof (Netherlands)
      • 10
        20 Years of Nuclear Forensics: Between R & D and Case Work
        The first illicit trafficking incidents involving nuclear material were reported in 1992 in Europe and raised significant concerns with regard to nuclear security in the country where the incident occurred, in the (suspected) country of origin and in the states the material may have transited. With little or no circumstantial information on the provenance of the illicit material, it became clear that information inherent to nuclear material needed to be exploited in order to identify possible origin and pathways of the material. Nuclear material has either been subject to technological processing or is entirely of anthropogenic origin. Consequently, nuclear material carries signatures of the process it was subjected to. Signatures are to be understood as measureable parameters or a combination of parameters that allow drawing conclusions. Nuclear forensic science emerged as a new discipline, aiming at providing clues on the intended use of the material and on its history, providing investigative leads and possibly leading to a source attribution. To this end, research and development needed to be carried out in order to validate and further perfect the analytical tool-set. In parallel, the repeated seizures of nuclear material called for rapid analysis of the samples and for reliable interpretation of the data. Significant research and development work has been carried out and a systematic and efficient methodology for analyzing seized material has been implemented. The paper will illuminate the parameters to be measured (such as isotopic and elemental composition, macroscopic and microscopic appearance) as well as the methodology and analytical techniques applied. Examples of case work of a 20 years track record in nuclear forensic investigations will be given to demonstrate the opportunities and limitations associated with nuclear forensics. Moreover, the interaction with other competent national and international authorities involved in nuclear security incidents and the associated training activities will be discussed.
        Speaker: Dr K. Mayer (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements)
    • 3:00 PM
      Coffee break:
    • Main Plenary Session 1b: Nuclear Forensics Resources in the Legal and Nuclear Security Context
      Conveners: Mr A. Pavlenishvili (Georgia) , Mr W. I. Zidan (Egypt)
      • 11
        Nuclear Forensics Awareness and Understanding
        Nuclear forensics is a relatively new and certainly a fascinating discipline in science gaining its attractiveness from the exploration of the unknown. As stated in the Communique of the Nuclear Security Summit held 2012 in Seoul “nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses.” It also resolved that “States are encouraged to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities.” In order to respond effectively in case of a nuclear security event States should possess nuclear forensics capabilities as integral part of their national response plan. Nuclear forensic capabilities are not limited to analytical means; they include the legal and regulatory framework, technical infrastructure and human capital. Based on a sound understanding of the opportunities offered by nuclear forensic investigations and its limitations, policy makers can establish the basis for implementing nuclear forensic capabilities at national level. Decision makers of different authorities and organizations need to cooperate in order to ensure the integration of available resources in an efficient response mechanism with appropriate technical nuclear forensics required by measurement experts and law enforcement. Each State should seek to acquire nuclear forensic capabilities enabling to provide competent authorities with relevant information on the nature of the nuclear security event and on the main characteristics of the interdicted material. Such capabilities are often referred to as nuclear forensics core capabilities. The information obtained by core capabilities has typically immediate relevance to the law enforcement investigations. They might, for instance, give answers to following basic questions: What is the material? Is it ours? Besides conducting the preliminary assessment of the material and determining if national laws have been broken, the core capabilities help in larger scale to strengthen overarching nuclear security controls, enable rapid and appropriate response, and in case advanced nuclear forensic analyses are desired, enable States to request and receive international assistance. This paper will also highlight how to achieve global awareness in nuclear forensics through capacity building and various international co-operation projects.
        Speaker: Dr M.S. Wallenius (EU)
      • 13
        Analysis of Incidents Reported during 2007-2012 to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database
        An analysis of incidents reported by States to the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) during 2007-2012 has recently been completed by the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. During this period, over 1200 incidents – approximately half of incidents reported to the ITDB since its establishment in 1995 - were reported to the ITDB. Approximately 50% of these incidents involved radioactive sources, 35% involved radioactively contaminated material, 10% involved nuclear material and the remainder comprised mostly scams. About 20% of the total incidents involved unauthorized possession of nuclear and other radioactive material and related criminal activities (including theft, sales, movement, transactions and attempts thereof) – several of which involved criminal groups in possession of gram-level amounts of high enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (as plutonium-beryllium neutron sources) and raise the possibility that more such material may still be out of regulatory control. The analysis also draws attention to the detection of many incidents at international borders, and highlights the growth in incidents that involve other radioactive material, particularly radioactively contaminated material. Regional variations in the frequency of reporting were also noted. It was further noted that States may benefit from measures that enhance their capabilities in nuclear forensics as a tool for providing hints on possible originating facilities (or for excluding facilities) of nuclear or other radioactive material.
        Speaker: Mr M. Nicholas (IAEA)
      • 14
        Nuclear Security Legislation in Hungary – Overview of the National Response Plan to Events with Nuclear or other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control
        A governmental decree titled ‘Physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive sources and radioactive waste and the related licensing and control system’ came into force on 4th of October 2011 regulating the process of developing physical protection systems of a nuclear facility, physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive materials during storage, application and transport, as well as the preparation of the physical protection plan. The aim of the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, radioactive sources and the radioactive wastes in Hungary is to deter, detect and respond to • the sabotage resulting unacceptable radiological consequences; • unauthorized removal of the nuclear material, radioactive sources and radioactive waste; • the unauthorized acquisition of classified data and information in the nuclear facilities and during the use, storage and transport of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and radioactive waste. During the use, storage and transport of nuclear material, radioactive sources and radioactive waste the physical protection system ensures the prevention of approach or unauthorized removal (A-level), minimizing reasonably the possibility of approach or unauthorized removal (B level), reducing the possibility of unauthorized removal (C-level) or applying prudent security measures (D-level). The physical protection system must ensure the effective cooperation of deterrence, detection, delay and response as physical protection functions. The detailed requirements for deterrence, detection, delay and response measures according to the security levels (A, B, C, D) is prescribed in the new decree. The above described governmental decree based on the recommendation of Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and No. 14. Additionally, the National Response Plan to event with nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control has been reviewed according to the Nuclear Security Series No. 15 ("NUCLEAR SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL”). The new regulation will be issued in 2014 as a governmental decree. The regulation applies the recommendation of “graded approach” through the application of the levels of response to a nuclear security event, as follows: • Strategic level: In case of radiological emergency the response is determined in the National Emergency Preparedness Plan, which defines the role and responsibility of all competent authorities. • Tactical level: If the incident doesn’t cause a radiological emergency the response is defined in the governmental decree. • Operational level: In case of an incident within the territory of a site the response is the responsibility of the licensee, upon request the competent authority could support the response. Moreover, the response to an event with nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control may differ based on the categories e.g. • Missing: Incidents involving the disappearance of material including theft or loss. • Discovery: Incidents involving discovery/detection of any type or quantity of material which is out of regulatory control (uncontrolled, e.g. orphan source) inside or outside of a site. • Seizure: As a last step of discovery the material can be seized by the competent authority. • Confiscation: In case of unauthorized possession the material can be confiscated by the competent authority. In the presentation the main and relevant features of the Hungarian nuclear security regulatory system the details of the relevant legislation and the role of nuclear forensics will be discussed including the experiences collected during the licensing period from 4th of October 2011. Special attention will be paid to the introduction of the details of the National Response Plan to an illicit trafficking event regulated by the new governmental decree.
        Speaker: Dr Z. Stefanka (Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority)
    • 4:50 PM
      Information Session Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      IAEA HQ

      Vienna International Centre, 1400 Vienna, Austria

      Explanation of an interactive exercise that provides participant input for Panel Session 3H ‘Nuclear Forensic Science: The Next 5 Years’.

    • Main Plenary Session 1C: Nuclear Forensic Capabilities within a National Nuclear Security Infrastructure
      Conveners: Mr G. Emi-Reynolds (Ghana) , Mr M. Senzaki (Japan)
      • 15
        The Role of Nuclear Forensics
        Speakers: Mr J. Sarkis (Brazil) , Mr K. Mrabit (IAEA - Director NSNS) , Ms L. Paredes-Gutierrez (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares) , Mr R. Floyd (Australia) , Mr S. Limage (USA)
        • a) Mexico: New national research laboratory in nuclear forensic
          H. Hernández-Mendoza, L. Paredes-Gutiérrez Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares Departamento de Química Nuclear Ocoyoacac, Mex., Mexico Abstract. According to recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mexico is taking steps to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear material. The creation of a National Research Laboratory in Nuclear Forensic (LANAFONU its acronym in Spanish; Laboratorio Nacional de Investigaciones en Forense Nuclear) has been assigned to Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares (ININ). The aims of this laboratory is to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear material, optimize the scientific processes and techniques used to analyze nuclear material (orphan radioactive sources), measure the effect of ionizing radiation of possible exposure –acute or chronic- as consequence of manipulation, management, transport, and final storage. LANAFONU facility will be able to analyze and optimize protocols for emergency and routine to measure alpha, gamma and beta emitters in environmental and biological samples from nuclear sources, using analytical methodology in Nuclear Forensic and address situations of radiological emergencies from a nuclear chemist viewpoint, where occupationally exposed personnel were involved (POE) and population. Among the activities programmed, The National Laboratory will have in 2014-2016 the following facilities: i) an infrastructure project for the acquisition of highly sensitive equipment to measure radionuclides with long half-life, ii) new preparative laboratories and measurements, iii) development of radiochemical methods using mass spectrometry and radiometric for routine situations and nuclear emergencies, iv) participation in scientific technical committee on nuclear forensics, v) participation in international inter-comparison exercises to optimize and validate methods vi) nuclear forensic knowledge and contribute to the formation of nuclear forensic experts to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear material, and vii) consolidation of LANAFONU at the IAEA. Finally, the laboratory has the challenge to establish collaborations in nuclear forensic investigations with other countries and to acquire international standard parameters to perform this type of analysis.
          Speaker: Ms L. Paredes-Gutierrez (Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares)
    • Reception
    • Technical Session 2A: Nuclear Forensic Capabilities as an Element of a National Response Plan
      1. Implementing Nuclear Forensics in support of investigations: Model action plan (3 contributed papers) 60 min.
      2. Radiological crime scene management – Alan King (Interpol), C. Nogueira de Oliveira (IAEA) 20 min.
        3 contributed papers (60 min)
      Conveners: Ms I. Balan (Republic of Moldova) , Mrs M. Kostor (Malaysia)
      • 16
        Overview of Nuclear Forensics in Support of Investigations
        In recognition of the benefits of nuclear forensics to the implementation of national nuclear security infrastructures, the IAEA published in 2006 as part of its Nuclear Security Series, “Nuclear Forensics Support (Nuclear Security Series No. 2),” which was based on a document entitled “Model Action Plan for Nuclear Forensics and Nuclear Attribution,” developed by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG). The Model Action Plan outlined a generalized approach to the conduct of a nuclear forensic examination. Since the original publication, there have been further advances in nuclear forensics. Nuclear forensic examinations have been successfully applied to a number of reported cases involving the illicit trafficking of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, as well as other events involving nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control. Techniques, similar to those used in nuclear forensics, are also used to support nuclear counter-terrorism and compliance with various international legal instruments. As a result, the IAEA is revising the 2006 document which will be titled “Nuclear Forensics in Support of Investigations.” The objective of the revised publication is to describe the role of nuclear forensics in support of investigations of a nuclear security event and provide a context for nuclear forensics within a national nuclear security infrastructure. Additionally, the publication promotes international cooperation by encouraging States to seek or provide assistance, where appropriate, with regard to developing capabilities or during an investigation of a nuclear security event. An overview of the revised publication will be presented.
        Speaker: Dr F. Wong (US Department of Homeland Security)
      • 17
        United Republic of Tanzania National Response Plan for Nuclear Security Events toward utilizing nuclear Forensic to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials
        In the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) there are wider peaceful application of ionizing radiation in the fields of medicine, Industry, research and teaching. This have leads to importation and exportation of a number of the radioactive source within Tanzania. It is well know that radioactive sources can result to severe radiological risks if they are not well controlled. Recognizing this potential risk and being aware of the Global occurrence of malicious intent, The Government of Tanzania made commitment to implement international nuclear safeguard protocol. Tanzania has experience 13 events which involved illicit trafficking cases of radioactive materials between the years 1996 to 2007 which have been reported to the IAEA-Illicit Trafficking Data Base programme (ITDB). These incidents include the illegal possession and sale of radioactive materials of which the country of origin is not yet known. During this period Tanzania has been facing number of limitation and challenges which includes lack of proper identification of key problem that result to theft or illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. As a result of this, Tanzania needs to formulate proper strategies for maintain the security of radioactive materials and preventing theft or illicit trafficking. It is also clear that Tanzania is a having a long sea shore and having boarder with many landlocked country, a situation making her more vulnerable of illicit trafficking. These papers will assess the existing National Response Plan for Nuclear Security Event in Tanzania in order to utilize nuclear forensic in the prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism in combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material.
        Speaker: Mr A. Muhulo (Republic of Tanzania)
      • 18
        South Africa's Nuclear Forensics Response Plan Step 1 - In Support of Nuclear Security Investigations
        In South Africa, the nuclear forensics approach and its functions as hosted and managed by Necsa, in support of any nuclear security investigations, start from the incident scene when the nuclear or radioactive material (that is out of regulatory control) is being handled and handed over to Necsa Emergency Control Centre by the South African law enforcement Agencies in the presence of NOMS Department official. The main objective for this approach is to increase the credibility status of the chain of custody on the handling of the material during incident (crime) scene management process (for both nuclear forensics and traditional forensic evidence collection) and its transportation from the scene to the suitable storage facility at Necsa. Aspects to be looked into during the response process include interactions between law enforcement agencies, Necsa relevant departments and the National Nuclear Regulator of South Africa. This paper focuses on the entire whole response process and associated prior arrangements in order to show and provide a set of requirements attached to the material and also the scope of critical relevant technical and law enforcement information to be acquired by all parties involved and participating in the nuclear/radiological incident or event response process before the material is authorized for storage at a suitably qualified Necsa’s nuclear forensics’ dedicated storage facility on Pelindaba site.
        Speaker: Mr P.R. Mogafe (South Africa)
      • 19
        Lessons Learned from the Muleta Incident
        Muleta is a small region in Upper Nile State in South of Sudan, very close to the Palouge oil base, with distance about more than 300 Km from the capital “Khartoum”. A projector that contains radioactive source (Ir- 192) of about 1.9 TBq (51.35 Ci), belongs to a Sudanese NDT company was stolen due to poor security measures. Mobile Experts Team (MET) from the regulatory body flew to the region after one day from the case, immediate meeting was held with security and HSE personnel of Palouge and Muleta regions, as a result an action plan was planned to manage the situation and mitigate the consequences, the plan depends on surveying using detection instruments, informing the public through their local language (Dennka), beside dissemination of posters contain other source photo (similar to the stolen source ), more over FM Miraya Radio was used to inform the public about the case, in addition to that the people movement was supervised in the exist and entry to the region beside that the doctor in the main hospital was been informed about the symptoms of radiation . After five searching days the source was found by truck driver not far from Moleta region. Based on the recommendation from the MET, more physical protection barriers was implemented to enhance the security levels around the radioactive sources storage. another round of field works was conducted by the MET to collect the posters around the region in order to get the public confident, safe and secure. The MET does not include expert from criminal evidence directorate in order to supervise the crime scene area to take the finger prints. Currently, effort, time and resources are made available in order to build the human resources in the field of nuclear forensic with national and international assistance through IAEA/ AFRA TC-project .
        Speaker: Mr M. ABUISSA (Sudan)
      • 20
        Opportunity and Challenge of Nuclear Forensics in Indonesia
        Indonesia concerned with the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear installations, nuclear material accountancy, detection and response to illicit nuclear trafficking, the security and safety of radioactive sources, emergency response measures, including pre-emergency, and the promotion of adherence to relevant international instruments. It is important for Indonesia to prevent, detect and response to incidents involving the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Indonesia itself is the victim of several terrorist bombings, and certainly it is unthinkable if the terrorist have had the access to such dangerous materials, such as nuclear material. Currently, Indonesia operates 9 international airports and 20 international seaports. it is necessary for us to ensure that we can effectively reduce the risk of the smuggling of nuclear materials and radioactive sources in these international gateways. More importantly, Indonesia is a part of the global community in combating nuclear terrorism. As our president mentioned during the Second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul early 2012, Indonesia fully supports international cooperation to enhance peace and security in the world. Indonesia, in this case BAPETEN other relevan institutions have the responsibility for combating illicit trafficking and the inadvertent movements of radioactive material. Nuclear forensics is one element of nuclear security regime that should be viewed as the opportunity and challenge for BAPETEN and/or Indonesia. Objectives: to overview the opportunity and challenge of nuclear forensics in Indonesia Results: Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution. The goal of nuclear analysis is to identify forensic indicators in interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding environment, e.g. the container or transport vehicle. These indicators arise from known relationships between material characteristics and process history [1]. Thus, nuclear forensic analysis includes the characterization of the material and correlation with its production history. Opportunity of Nuclear Forensics are discipline between science, law enforcement; uses systematic approach for analysis and attribution; benefits from reference data; provides clues on the origin of the material; assures sustainability in combating illicit trafficking; calls for International cooperation; and methodology applicable in other areas. There is an important difference between nuclear forensics as it is practiced today and the analysis of foreign nuclear test as it was practiced during cold war and for some time thereafter, eventhough both rest on the same scientific base. Nuclear forensics for attribution involves comparing data and analysis samples from identified sources. Forensics analysis for attribution therefore reqiures that data concerning foreign origin material be available. Therefore, nuclear forensics analysis would benefit from as much international cooperation as possible. The challenge of nuclear forensics are: (1) the methods safeguards inspectors use to verify compliance with treaty obligations is "environmental sampling", i.e. the collection of particles within (or outside) nuclear facilities using swipe sampling. (2) The need for laboratory analysis facilities and new technology; including field equipment and numerical modelling, software of code. (3) The need for quality of human resources with relevan capabilities and competencies. (4) Nuclear forensics remains a technically complex challenge for the scientific and law enforcement communities. The difficulty in kin succesful forensics work, especially an attribution process, should not be underestimated. (5) Knowledge management: the future problem of declining pool of technically competent scientists. The underlying scientific disciplines, radiochemistry, nuclear physics, and others are understood adequately for the purpose of forensics. (6) Indonesia has National Legislation Implementation Kit for Nuclear Security to deal with the threat of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, namely illicit trafficking, orphan sources and major public event. (7) Experience on inspection and law enforcement [2] are the ways of controlling and enforcing nuclear security implementation in Indonesia as parts of nuclear security infrastructure has to be manage at the best and maintained their qualities . Conclusions: Nuclear forensics to be one of nuclear security infrastructure that has to be planned and strengthened in order to respond to nuclear security events in Indonesia. References [1]. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2. Technical Guidance. Nuclear Forensics Support, Reference Manual. Vienna (2006). [2]. Beta,WPD. Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Challenge on Inspection of Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Indonesia Experience. Books of Synopsis on International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Maintaining the Continuous Global Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle. Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates 27–31 October 2013. Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), hosted by the Government of the United Arab Emirates through the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR).
        Speaker: Mr W. P. Daeng Beta (Indonesia)
    • Technical Session 2B: Nuclear Forensic Science: Signatures of Nuclear Material I
      Conveners: Mr J. De Souza Sarkis (Brazil) , T. Hinton (Canada)
      • 21
        Investigating Macro- and Micro-scale Material Provenancing Signatures in Uranium Ore Concentrates/Yellowcake
        Nuclear Forensics is a developing discipline pivotal to dealing with nuclear security events. Still in its comparative infancy, the current goal is to develop material signatures which are capable of identifying seized materials with the greatest degree of confidence and determine the origin/provenance of such materials. Australia possesses the world’s largest resources of uranium bearing ore, and consequently it is of interest to ensure the safe extraction and export of this high value fungible commodity. Currently, no singular analysis technique has been capable of elucidating the origins of all materials. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation’s Nuclear Forensics Research Facility (ANSTO-NFRF) is in the process of examining diffuse reflectance spectroscopy of yellowcake materials in the range of the far-infrared (700-20 cm-1) to the near-infrared wavelengths (800-2500 cm-1). Investigations using DRS of the far-infra-red to measure UO2, U3O8 and γ-UO3 began as early as 1989[1], but it is only relatively recently that the Vis/NIR region was examined by Klunder et al.[2]. We seek to investigate IR to distinguish between UOC of known ore/mining/extraction age containing different species and polymorphs of uranium (confirmation of uranium structure will be achieved by XRD). The data will then be interrogated with chemometric/multivariate data analysis. Such analyses at the macro-scale have been shown[2] to proffer a methodology which achieves a high degree of class distinction, requires minimal sample preparation and is non-destructive. UV-VIS-NIR spectroscopy almost uniquely provides chemical speciation information without consuming or contaminating the sample, and could be used to inform uncompromised, subsequent and supplemental destructive analyses. A second stage of this work involves the provenance characterisation of micro-particulates of blended uranium ore concentrates via a high flux-infra-red beam of synchrotron radiation at the Australian Synchrotron (AS). The Australian synchrotron and the Infrared Microspectroscopy (IRM) beamline combines the high brilliance and high collimation of the synchrotron beam with a Bruker V80v Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectrometer and a Hyperion 2000 IR microscope to reach high signal-to-noise ratios at diffraction limited spatial resolutions; between 3-8 μm. This makes the beamline ideally suited to the analysis of microscopic samples e.g. small particles and thin layers within complex matrices, or thin coatings on surfaces. In addition, a Hyperion 3000 Focal Plane Array (FPA) FTIR microscope is also installed offline at the beamline. This allows users to collect large area overview IR images from their samples prior to high resolution mapping using the beamline instrument. 1. Yu BZ, Hansen WN, Ward J (1989) The Far-Infrared Spectra of UO2, Alpha-U3O8, and Gamma-UO3 Using the Light Pipe Reflection Method. Appl Spectrosc 43 (1):113-117 2. Klunder GL, Plaue JW, Spackman PE, Grant PM, Lindvall RE, Hutcheon ID (2013) Application of Visible/Near-Infrared Reflectance Spectroscopy to Uranium Ore Concentrates for Nuclear Forensic Analysis and Attribution. Appl Spectrosc 67 (9):1049-1056
        Speaker: Dr A. Wotherspoon (Australia)
      • 22
        Exploring Spectroscopic and Morphological Data as New Signatures for Uranium Ore Concentrates
        Nuclear Forensics is a relatively new discipline that emerged as a response to illicit nuclear material trafficking. From measurable parameters such as chemical and isotopic composition of major and minor elements, the aim of the analysis is to determine the origin of the 'lost' or 'found' nuclear material. The task of attributing materials remains to be multi-faceted and the search for new signatures (i.e. measurable parameters) continues. In this study, the material of interest is a class of uranium compounds known as uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) or colloquially termed as yellow cakes. These are pre-cursors of nuclear fuel and various chemical compositions are available industrially due to the use of different precipitating reagents upon mining and milling of uranium deposits. The first part of the study involves the use of Raman spectroscopy for measuring these samples. The technique is of interest as it is capable of providing fast analysis without destruction of the samples and henceforth samples can be further preserved for other analysis. The applicability of Raman spectroscopy to UOCs for nuclear forensics purposes has been demonstrated1. Upon the Raman measurement of the samples, principal component analysis (PCA) would be used to analyze the data. Primarily a pattern recognition/data reduction technique, PCA is a form of chemometrics that has gained importance in the analysis of huge dataset. It is useful in data such as spectroscopy which has typically a few thousand variables. In essence, PCA finds the correlation between variables (in this context, the variables are the wavenumbers) and presents the data using principal components (PCs). Normally, only a handful of PCs suffice to explain most of the variance in a dataset, therefore PCA also leads to data reduction while at the same time, it reveals the relationship between the samples (known as 'score plot') as well as that among the variables (known as 'loadings plot'). Similar samples will thus be located close to each other in a score plot and hence groups or clusters are concurrently highlighted. On the other hand, outliers can also be readily identified. PCA was successfully applied to the Raman spectra after some pre-processing was carried out. The usefulness of Raman spectroscopy in the analysis of UOCs shall be discussed in details along with its complementary nature to Infrared spectroscopy (IR)2. In the second part of the study, the morphology expressed in terms of particle sizes or particle size distributions of the different compositions of UOCs was investigated. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) is used to obtain images of dispersed particles while characterization is done with image processing software. While at its infancy, the particle size analysis using SEM poses challenges. A reliable and reproducible method of dispersal is currently under development. It is necessary to disperse the particles such that their sizes and shapes could be properly evaluated or characterized. It is subsequently envisaged that the SEM images of well dispersed samples be evaluated with image processing software.
        Speaker: Ms D. Ho (Singapore)
      • 23
        Attribution of Uranium Ore Concentrates by Rare-Earth Element Signature
        Identifying the source of uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) has become a research hotspot in nuclear forensics. In the present study, the applicability of rare-earth element (REE) signature for attribution of UOCs has been investigated. The REE patterns have geographical signatures, and hardly change during the leaching processes. With the help of statistical analysis, UOCs from different sources, which have different REE signatures, can be distinguished. In this paper, the database was established by 89 uranium ores REE concentrations data from 9 countries (including Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Russia and Zambia), which was cited from published articles to ensure the reliability. REE concentrations of uranium ores were transformed to REE ratios that showed a stronger indication. Different statistical analysis methods (PCA, PLS-DA, OPLS-DA) were tested and the results showed that only OPLS-DA could distinguish samples from a certain source to the others by several iterations, because OPLS-DA has a pre-treatment before PLS-DA, which can eliminate the impact of within-group variance (such as samples from certain country have different types, etc) to out-group variance (such as samples from different countries). Basing on the results of iterative OPLS-DA, uranium ores from certain country contained a distinct REE composition and an decision tree of attribution was generated. Four UOC samples were measured by ICP-MS and attributed to their country according to the decision tree .The method of attribution was demonstrated. The study verified that REE signature is an indicator when identifying the source of UOCs, and the result of experiments showed OLPS-DA has better potential in nuclear forensics comparing to PCA and PLS-DA. The study will provide a support to the fighting against nuclear trafficking.
        Speaker: Prof. Y-G. Zhao (China Institute of Atomic Energy)
      • 24
        143Nd/144Nd Ratio – a Powerful Signature for Origin Assessment of Natural Uranium Products
        Since the early 1990s illegal possession, transfer and other unauthorised acts involving nuclear materials have taken place. In order to identify the hazard, intended use and origin of the illicitly trafficked nuclear materials, various analytical methods using including radiometry, mass spectrometry and electron microscopy have been developed for nuclear forensics during the last years/decades. Among the characteristic parameters that can be determined by the above-mentioned methods, the concentration and isotopic composition certain impurities of uranium materials have been found highly indicative of the feed material, production facility and its location as well as the last chemical processing date of the nuclear material (1). Up to now the isotopic patterns of O, Pb, Sr, S, Th, and U have been investigated (2,3). Also the pattern of the rare-earth elements (REE) has been studied and found characteristic to the geological formation of the uranium deposit and their nuclear products. Due to the similarity in chemical properties, the relative abundances of REE remain mainly unaltered through the processing in the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle (4). Besides the REE pattern, the 143Nd/144Nd isotope ratio is widely used in geology for chronometry and provenance measurements. The 143Nd amount varies in nature due to the 147Sm decay (T1/2=1.06 * 1011 a) to 143Nd. As 144Nd is neither radioactive nor radiogenic, the number of 144Nd amounts does not change with time due to radioactive decay, making it suitable as a reference isotope. Therefore, the 143Nd/144Nd ratio is indicative of the geological condition, hence together with the other characteristics of the material in question, the Nd isotope ratio can be a promising signature for nuclear forensics. The measurement of 143Nd/144Nd isotope ratio in uranium samples is, however, an analytically challenging task, as the concentration of Nd is very low in nuclear samples (< ppb level) due to the effective purification processes. Therefore, pre-concentration of REE prior the measurement by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) is required (5). In the present paper the possibility of 143Nd/144Nd isotope ratio for provenance assessment in nuclear forensics is evaluated. For this purpose a novel procedure has been developed for the determination of the 143Nd/144Nd isotope ratio and the Nd/Sm ratio in various uranium-bearing materials, such as uranium ores, ore concentrates (yellow cakes) and high-purity uranium oxides (UO3, UO2). The procedure comprises pre-concentration of REE from the uranium matrix, Nd/Sm separation and further concentration by extraction chromatography. Subsequently, the REE were measured by double focusing inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and the Nd isotope ratio was determined by multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (MC-ICP-MS). The results of uranium sample analysis of world-wide origin are shown and correlations between the determined 143Nd/144Nd ratio, Nd/Sm ratio and deposit type are presented. References: 1. K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, and T. Fanghänel, Journal of Alloys and Compounds, 2007, 444-445, 50–56. 2. K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, and Z. Varga, Chemical reviews, 2013, 113, 884–900. 3. S.-H. Han, Z. Varga, J. Krajkó, M. Wallenius, K. Song, and K. Mayer, Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, 2013, 28, 1919. 4. Z. Varga, R. Katona, Z. Stefánka, M. Wallenius, K. Mayer, and A. Nicholl, Talanta, 2010, 80, 1744–1749. 5. W. M. White, in Geochemistry, Wiley-Blackwell, 1st edn., 2013, pp. 313–360.
        Speaker: J. Krajkó (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements)
      • 25
        Measurement of Sulphur Isotopic Ratio for the Nuclear Forensic Investigation of Uranium Ore Concentrates (Yellow cakes)
        As an answer to the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in the 1990s a new scientific topic has emerged, commonly referred to now as nuclear forensics (1). The aim of the nuclear forensic investigations is to identify the hazard and origin of the confiscated or found nuclear materials and ultimately strengthen security measures and prevent nuclear terrorism thereafter. Over the last few years several signatures of nuclear materials have been investigated and developed to establish the links between the measurable parameters of the unknown material in question and the source of the nuclear materials. These measurable parameters or signatures include e.g. elemental or anionic impurities, isotopic composition, structural analysis, morphology and age determination. This complex dataset can give information about the source of uranium ore or feed materials, process and the production facility. Uranium ore concentrate (commonly known as yellow cake) has a special role among the investigated nuclear materials, as it is the first purified industrial product of nuclear fuel fabrication, and thus it is highly useful to identify the source and propagation of various applicable signatures. The sulphur isotope abundance shows relatively high variation in nature due to the large relative mass difference between its isotopes, the variety of chemical forms and the widespread occurrences in nature (2). Typically, natural materials with oxidized sulphur have d34S values between +5 ‰ and +25 ‰, while for materials with reduced sulphur it ranges between -5 ‰ and +15 ‰. The sulphur isotope ratio in uranium ore deposits is also reported to exhibit large variation, such as in the sandstone-type uranium deposits of the Colorado Plateau and Wyoming (-20.5 to -17.8 ‰) or in the uranium roll-type deposit in South Texas, USA (-25 to -40 ‰). However, as the sulphur content in the nuclear material derives not only from the feedstock (ore), but is also introduced into the process stream as process chemical (e.g. as H2SO4 with an approximate d34S value of -5 to +15 ‰), its contribution to the final d34S value in the product has to be considered. Therefore, it is expected that sulphur isotopic composition can be indicative both for the process (chemicals used) and the ore type depending on the hydrometallurgical production route. In order to investigate if the sulphur isotopic composition is a meaningful signature in nuclear forensics, a novel method has been developed and validated for the measurement of 34S/32S isotope ratio in uranium ore concentrates (yellow cakes) (3). The developed ion exchange separation method effectively separates and pre-concentrates sulphate from uranium and the possibly interfering matrix components, such as cations. The measurement was performed by multi-collector inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Determination of 34S/32S ratio in uranium ore concentrates of world-wide origin showed significant differences between the samples (3). This variation can be exploited to differentiate samples of different origin, for instance to verify or exclude an assumed origin. Moreover, as the 34S/32S ratio can be indicative of the feed ore used for the production in several instances, the uranium ore deposit type can be identified, which can make this signature highly valuable to provide clue on the provenance of unknown nuclear materials, thus trace it back to its source. Further studies are on-going to reveal the dominant source of sulphur in the uranium ore concentrate (ore vs. process chemicals), to investigate the sulphur isotope ratio in the course of the industrial processes and to find further correlations between the d34S value in the ore concentrate and the deposit type (geolocation). References [1] K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, Z. Varga (2013). Nuclear Forensic Science: Correlating Measurable Material Parameters to the History of Nuclear Material, Chemical Reviews, 113, 884-900. [2] H. G. Thode, in Stable Isotopes in the Assessment of Natural and Anthropogenic Sulphur in the Environment, ed. H. R. Krouse and V. A. Grinenko, John Wiley & Sons, New York. 1991. [3] S-H. Han, Z. Varga, J. Krajko, M. Wallenius, K. Song, K. Mayer (2013). Measurement of the sulphur isotope ratio (34S/32S) in uranium ore concentrates (yellow cakes) for origin assessment, Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, 28, 1919-1925.
        Speaker: Dr Z. Varga (EU)
    • 10:40 AM
      Coffee break
    • Technical Session 2C: Approaches to Nuclear Forensic Examinations
      1. Nuclear Forensics Laboratory - UK, Japan, Armenia (20 min)
      2. Interpretation and attribution – 2 contributed papers (40 min)
      3. Utilization of a National Nuclear Forensics Library – ITWG & IAEA (20 min)
        2 contributed papers (40 min)
      Conveners: Mr B. Sandstrom (Sweden) , Mr V. Stebelkov (Russian Federation)
      • 26
        Radiological Crime Scene Management
        Radiological Crime Scene Management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective, and efficient conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene. Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event. Evidence collection at a radiological crime scene may share a wide range of characteristics with that of conventional crime scenes, such as evidence search patterns, geographical scene modelling and evidence recording, whether or not explosives are involved. In order to increase awareness of relevant Member States’ representatives on the challenges imposed on the management of crime scenes where nuclear and other radioactive material and/or evidence contaminated with these materials are known to be or suspected of being present, the IAEA has developed under its Nuclear Security Series of publications an Implementing Guide on Radiological Crime Scene Management. The objective of this publication is to provide law enforcement officials, national policy makers, decision makers, local authorities and technical support personnel with guidance on the framework and the main functional elements for radiological crime scene management so that it may be adopted or adapted to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions and competent authorities within each Member State. This implementing guide addresses the actions needed at a radiological crime scene in order to collect and preserve evidence, but does not cover other aspects of a criminal investigation. It focuses on the framework and functional elements for managing a radiological crime scene that are distinct from any other crime scene. Additionally, it provides guidance on the interface of this topic with the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material, the initiation of response procedures to confirm discovery of material, the declaration of a nuclear security event activating the national response system and on the use of nuclear forensic examinations in support of investigations. However, the guide does not address any of these topics in detail. Furthermore, this publication promotes international cooperation by encouraging States to seek or provide assistance, where appropriate, with regard to developing capabilities or during an investigation of a nuclear security event. On the basis of this Implementing Guide on Radiological Crime Scene Management, a training curriculum was developed. The training programme aims to acquaint participants with the issues that will likely arise in the course of a criminal investigation involving nuclear and other radioactive material and to enable them to handle such situations in an efficient and effective manner. An overview of the publication as well as of the training curriculum will be presented.
        Speaker: Mr C. Nogueira (IAEA)
      • 27
        Developing Traditional Forensic Science Exploitation of Contaminated Exhibits Recovered from a Nuclear Security Event
        Previous investigations of materials recovered from illicit trafficking events have highlighted the benefit of encompassing both nuclear forensic science and traditional forensic science studies to maximise exploitation and interpretation [1]. While nuclear forensic science focuses on the characterisation of the recovered unknown radionuclide material, traditional forensic science provides classical law enforcement with investigative, associative and reconstruction links. The ability to perform traditional forensic science examinations can prove to be challenging due to the specialist instrumentation required, which is rarely housed in the laboratories which support nuclear forensic science studies. In response to this challenge, the UK funded the construction of a dedicated laboratory at a nuclear licenced site to enable the safe handling of exhibits contaminated with radionuclides [2]. The laboratory is well equipped with modern instrumentation enabling a broad range of examinations to be performed on exhibits contaminated with radionuclides. Forensic scientists from the traditional disciplines have been, and are being, trained to work within the dedicated laboratory under the supervision of technical experts from the nuclear licenced site, thus enabling them to perform the studies and examinations they would routinely perform in their "home" laboratories. Whilst traditional forensic science techniques are well established in the normal laboratory environment, undertaking them within a glovebox can provide unique challenges and difficulties not usually experienced by the traditional forensic scientist. This paper discusses the recent example of the ongoing method development and validation studies within the CFAC (Conventional Forensic Analysis Capability) laboratory at AWE. These studies ensure that, if required to support a nuclear security event, the traditional forensic science examinations to be performed in the CFAC laboratory are to the current good practice required by the international forensic science community. References [1] K.J. Moody, Grant P.M. and I.D. Hutcheon (2005). Forensic investigation of a highly enriched uranium sample interdicted in Bulgaria. In Nuclear Forensic Analysis, CRC Press, p401-420. [2] G.A. Graham and D.W. Thomas (2013). Enabling law enforcement organisations to perform traditional forensics on contaminated evidence recovered from a crime scene involving the use of radiological / nuclear materials outside of regulatory control. In book of extended synopses, IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing global efforts (CN 203), IAEA-203/111, p223. © British Crown Owned Copyright [2013]/AWE
        Speaker: Dr G. A. Graham (United Kingdom)
      • 28
        Strategies for DNA Analysis from Contaminated Forensic Samples
        Crime scene management and the analysis of forensic evidence get significantly more complex if radioactive contamination is present. For analysis of classical forensic evidence, different strategies can be chosen such as establishment of a forensic laboratory which is licensed and equipped to handle radioactive materials or decontamination of evidence for subsequent analysis in a classical forensic laboratory. In this work, the capability of a standard forensic DNA purification kit (Charge Switch Forensic DNA Purification Kit, Invitrogen, USA) to decontaminate DNA samples from radionuclides typical for nuclear security scenarios (e.g. 90Sr, 137Cs, 192Ir, 241Am, 232Th, Pu, U) was investigated with the aim to achieve sufficient decontamination for further processing the purified DNA sample in a standard forensic laboratory. A practical challenge for releasing the purified samples to a forensic laboratory is to prove the absence of contamination in a small amount of DNA eluate after separation with the purification kit. The legal limits for the unconditional release of radioactively contaminated items after decontamination may differ from country to country. We used the limits defined in the German Radiation Protection Act (Strahlenschutzverordnung) as guidance for our investigations. In our investigations we established the decontamination factors for the above mentioned radionuclides and could show that the radionuclides mostly remain in the solvents during processing. In consequence, the separated DNA contains only negligible amounts of the initial activity. In many cases a direct radioactivity measurement of the DNA eluate sample would not be feasible as the required detection limits are difficult to achieve or destructive methods such as LSC would be necessary. To provide a method for indirect assessment of the DNA eluate, the radionuclide concentrations in the different solutions during lysis, washing and elution steps with the DNA purification kit were determined and decontamination factors were established. It could be shown that measurement of the radionuclide in the initial lysis solution in combination with the decontamination factor for the investigated radionuclide allows to demonstrate compliance with the necessary release limits for the purified DNA samples. Thus, we propose a strategy for analysing DNA samples that are contaminated with radioisotopes that involves the extraction and separation of DNA using the well-established Charge Switch method in a nuclear laboratory and then transfer the DNA to a classical forensic laboratory for further treatment.
        Speaker: Dr E. Hrnecek (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements)
      • 29
        Translating Research Findings into Operational Capabilities in Nuclear Forensics: The Australian Experience
        The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is home to the Nuclear Forensic Research Facility (NFRF), which was commissioned in 2009. The NFRF is the central hub for nuclear forensics in Australia and possesses the unique capabilities required to undertake nuclear forensic analyses in support of investigations. Such capabilities include; facilities for handling radioactive material, access to a broad range of analytical services, staff with training and experience in fields ranging from radiochemistry to forensic science, and subject matter expertise for data interpretation. Over a number of years, the NFRF has undertaken research to explore the effects of ionising radiation on forensic evidence and the handling of exhibits contaminated with radioactive material [1, 2, 3]. This research has demonstrated that some evidence types, such as DNA and fingermarks, may yield valuable information in spite of radiation exposure yet are not amenable to decontamination. Thus, the development of protocols for the safe handling of forensic evidence contaminated with radioactive material is an important step in preparing to respond to and investigate a nuclear security incident. It was recognised that relationships between the NFRF and law enforcement needed to be supported and procedures implemented in anticipation of a nuclear security event - not in response to one. This approach will enable key forensic practitioners to undertake a more effective, safer, and skilled investigation of a nuclear security event. The role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is the enforcement of Commonwealth criminal law in Australia and the protection of Commonwealth and national interests from crime in Australia and overseas. ANSTO and the AFP have a long-standing relationship which includes research collaborations, training and development and exercise facilitation. This relationship has been formalised by a Memorandum of Understanding, under the auspices of which a project is being undertaken to translate research findings into operational capabilities in nuclear forensics. Given the routine operational demands on organisational resources, it may not be possible for law enforcement forensic laboratories to maintain capabilities for the handing of evidence contaminated with radioactive material, as this would require a diverse range of supporting capabilities including regulatory compliance, health physics and waste management. Equally, although these support capabilities are in place for a nuclear or radiological facility, it may not be economically viable for these laboratories to establish full forensic capabilities. In Australia, ANSTO and the AFP elected to deploy existing resources in a collaborative manner, with AFP forensic scientists undertaking examination of evidence in the NFRF. NFRF staff, who have experience in both forensic science and nuclear science, form a key part of the analytical team by serving as the ‘interface’ between these disciplines – a role which is further enhanced by participation by NFRF staff in AFP training to gain a greater understanding of organisation-specific needs. Evidence types and examination techniques selected for inclusion in this project were those most likely to yield operational intelligence and/or highly probative evidence for court proceedings. Facilities and techniques are amended or developed where required to suit the constraints inherent to radioactive material handling whilst still meeting the requirements of law enforcement, such as sample/source preservation, the avoidance of cross-contamination and maintenance of chain of custody. The centrepiece of this project is the fit-out of two custom-designed glove boxes within the NFRF for the safe handling of evidence contaminated with radioactive material. Through this project, ANSTO and the AFP have developed capabilities unique just not in Australia but within the broader Asia-Pacific region for the handling of forensic evidence contaminated with radioactive material. It is anticipated that this capability will be a key component of the nuclear forensic response in support of the investigation of a nuclear security event. This presentation will describe in greater detail the technical aspects of this project, such as the modifications required to make the glove boxes suitable for forensic examinations, and the training required for AFP forensic scientists to work in a radiation environment. It will also describe the lessons learned through this project and plans for on-going collaboration. 1. Colella, M., et al., The Recovery of Latent Fingermarks from Evidence Exposed to Ionizing Radiation. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2009. 54: pp. 583-90. 2. Colella, M., et al., The Effect of Ionizing Gamma Radiation on Natural and Synthetic Fibers and Its Implications for the Forensic Examination of Fiber Evidence. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2011. 56(3): pp. 591-605. 3. Parkinson, A., et al., The Development and Evaluation of Radiological Decontamination Procedures for Documents, Document Inks, and Latent Fingermarks on Porous Surfaces. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2010. 55(3): pp. 728-34.
        Speaker: Mr D. Hill (Australia)
    • Technical Session 2D: Data Compilation Tools for Supporting Nuclear Forensic Interpretation I
      Conveners: Mr A. Singh Gill (India) , Prof. D. Dimitrov (Bulgaria)
      • 30
        Overview of Canada’s National Nuclear Forensics Library Development Programme
        The Government of Canada has launched the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP) as a whole-of-Government initiative to augment Canada’s national capacity to respond to the threat of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. As part of this initiative, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) was charged with the task of developing a National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) cataloguing Canada’s nuclear and other radioactive material holdings. Canada’s NNFL consists of databases and an analytical component that consolidates information about our material holdings in a manner that allows for the potential origin attribution of a material (or sample thereof) that is intercepted or interdicted in the response to a radiological and/or nuclear (RN) threat or security event. This paper will provide an overview of the process that the CNSC and other government stakeholders undertook to define the objectives and scope of the NNFL development programme, including a discussion on the instruments that enable it. Furthermore, the paper will discuss the technology development component of the programme for addressing NNFL requirements related to data management and pattern recognition methods for comparative query. Lastly, the paper will provide a status update on the development of Canada’s NNFL, including preliminary performance metrics.
        Speaker: Dr A. El-Jaby (Canada)
      • 31
        Developing a Nuclear Forensics Library in Ukraine: The Pilot Project Stage
        Ukraine’s extensive handling of nuclear and other radioactive materials (NRM) necessitates an appropriate system of regulatory control and the timely prevention of its weakening or loss. In addition to large uranium ore reserves and the operation of uranium purification facilities, nuclear power generation facilities and research reactors, Ukraine also retains radioactive waste materials accumulated from significant Soviet-era uranium production and the Chornobyl catastrophe and has plans to develop infrastructure for the fabrication of low-enrichment nuclear fuel. Nuclear forensics is a powerful tool to further strengthen regulatory control within Ukraine and to help counteractions against nuclear smuggling. The Institute for Nuclear Research of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (INR) is designated by the Ukrainian Government as the main expert organization for the study and characterization of NRM seized from illicit trafficking in Ukraine. In support of Ukraine’s efforts, INR is working to apply its expertise in the handling of NRM as well as its expertise in database development to improve nuclear forensic capabilities in Ukraine. The value of nuclear forensic analysis is increased if the tools exist to both characterize NRM and to conduct comparative research of interdicted materials with known, previously documented NRM. Therefore, the STCU partner project P459, titled “Development of a Nuclear Forensics Database in Ukraine”, with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) under support from the USA Department of State and Department of Energy was developed and initiated in July of 2013. Careful consideration is being used to populate the Ukraine database with data. To avoid issues concerning the management of sensitive information, only open source information will be used for the population of the pilot database. As a result of discussions with potential users of the Ukraine database and the preliminary analysis of data from open sources, the following basic set of data has been selected for inclusion: data about uranium bearing materials that was obtained as a result of work from the partner STCU project P465; data describing the radionuclide content of soil samples from the nearest zone of Chornobyl NPP; and data about samples of fuel containing mass from the “Shelter” object. Database experts at INR have developed a structure for the database, which covers a wide range of objects and metadata (which can exchange roles), as well as relations between data in order to maximize the flexibility of the database for future forensic applications. To avoid significant changes of the database structure in the process of database utilization, our approach to introducing new objects or their attributes to the database is based on the conception of a relational database with a limited number of tables and the utilization of a comprehensive scheme of relationships. This proposed approach enables us to complete both present and future tasks without considerable modifications of the database structure and without corresponding significant efforts for implementation. The general scheme of the pilot version of database is based on a client - server architecture. The client part of system is based on standard Internet browsers and does not require any special software to be developed. The proposed architecture for the web server is similar to the common open source server architecture (LAMP) which comprises: Linux – the server’s operating system; Apache – the web server component; MySQL – a relational database; PHP – the application layer. The main principals of the pilot version are its easy transfer for different operating systems and utilization of the most general data types, commands and procedures. The project progress and lessons learned from the development of a nuclear forensics library in Ukraine will be presented and discussed.
        Speaker: Dr O. Gaidar (Ukraine)
      • 32
        Populating a National Nuclear Forensic Library – Lessons Learned
        This presentation will address a few of the myriad of issues that faced the US as we gathered data to populate the US’ NNFL. Identifying the specific data, which ultimately lead to a Data Dictionary, is summarized (a full discussion is presented in a companion paper). Focusing on plutonium, this presentation will describe our initial efforts to utilize existing accountancy information, fuel fabrication data, and other readily available data sets. The presentation will go on to address some of the logistics involved in identifying, gaining access to, and reviewing the historical archives at our two production sites, HEW and SRS, and the eventual expansion to include production records at Rocky Flats and other locations. Finally, it will discuss the inclusion of reactor modeling calculations, and the rationale for the use of calculated isotopic vectors in vetting to supplement data based on historic measurements. Given that the US had been producing and utilizing large quantities of nuclear materials for well over a half-century, many of the original records characterizing those materials are difficult to find. Many can only be found in long-term storage, at numerous locations, with a host of access restriction. Many exist in hard-copy only, as paper reports, computer output, laboratory notebooks, index cards, etc., while others exist on a variety of non-paper forms including microfiche, filmstrip, floppies, etc. Many have been destroyed. All were produced for purposes other than nuclear forensic characterization. Once historic data is acquired, it must be compiled, and often converted to electronic format. The data must be reviewed for applicability, vetted for accuracy and completeness. Often, combining data from disparate sources was required for a more complete characterization, and in some cases, supplementing historic data is necessary to fully characterize plutonium produced.
        Speaker: J. Wacker (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
      • 33
        The Uranium Sourcing Database Project: Practical Insights Into the Establishment and Application of a National Nuclear Forensics Library
        The Uranium Sourcing Database is a working nuclear forensics database containing data on thousands of samples of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) and related products. The database is part of a broader effort to characterize and document distinguishing properties of UOC for use in assessing the probable source of sample of material absent any packaging or identifying marks. While this project has focused on UOC, the lessons learned are equally relevant to a wide range of nuclear and radiological materials. We will present a number of practical insights, including nuclear forensics database development and population, user interface requirements, analytical laboratory to database interface, and database utilization. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. LLNL-ABS-646601
        Speaker: Mr M. Robel (United States of America)
    • 12:30 PM
      Lunch break
    • Poster Session I
      • 34
        Challenges in Identifying Radioactive Material in Scrap Metal
        Following a ministerial decision in 1999 portal monitors have been installed at the entrances of the three major steel industries in Greece in order to facilitate the detection of radioactive material in scrap metal and to address the illicit trafficking threat. In the case of portal monitor alarms the Greek Atomic Energy Commission and collaborating laboratories are charged with the responsibility of performing on-site inspections to identify the cause of the alarms, place the radioactive materials under regulatory control and perform the characterization of the material. The Department of Environmental Radioactivity Monitoring and collaborating laboratories are equipped with the following infrastructure in order to perform isotope identification and activity estimations of the detected items: two laboratory stationary gamma spectroscopic systems (HPGe), three portable HPGe spectroscopic systems and two NaI spectroscopic systems for in-situ gamma spectroscopy, portable detectors for gamma dose rate measurements and total α/β survey meters. Since the installation of the portal monitors several radioactively contaminated items and orphan sources have been detected in scrap metal. The scope of this work is to present five noteworthy cases that have occurred and the challenges encountered in identifying the isotope in the detected orphan sources and other radioactive material employing gamma spectroscopy, specifically regarding the interpretation of the spectra acquired with NaI and HPGe detectors. Case 1: A large industrial sealed shielding source was detected in an imported scrap metal shipment. Initial measurements performed with a NaI detector identified the isotope as Ra-226, while the HPGe detector revealed that it was in fact a Cs-137 source. The reason for the misinterpretation of the spectrum was the following: the shielding had a crack in the opposite direction to that of the detector and the source beam was reflected on a wall located on that side before reaching the detector. The activity was estimated at 5000 Ci, using the HPGe spectrum along with Monte Carlo calculations simulating the source geometry and shielding. Case 2: An industrial source with spherical shielding of a 15cm radius was detected with a maximum dose rate on the surface of the shielding of 500 μSv/h. Initially, the isotope could not be identified with the NaI detector because the obtained spectrum showed only the Compton effect of the scattering of the source beam due to the shielding. Further analysis with an HPGe detector identified the source as Cs-137. Case 3: An industrial source with small shielding and with a maximum dose rate on the surface of the shielding of 20 μSv/h was detected. Due to smaller source activity than in case 2, isotope identification as Cs-137 with a NaI detector was possible despite the pronounced superposition of the Compton continuum, due to scattering on the shielding. Case 4: A natural uranium ore with a mass of 146g and dose rate in contact in the range of 50 -75 μSv/h was detected. Primary gamma spectroscopy measurements with a NaI detector identified the isotope as Ra-226, due to the presence of the 186 and 1001 keV photopeaks. The spectrum obtained with the HPGe detector and after performing interference corrections showed that it was in fact U-238 of a specific activity of 5300 ± 160 Bq/g, 42.7% w/w. Case 5: A source was detected in a scrap metal load activating the portal alarm. After obtaining the source spectrum with a portable HPGe detector, the isotope was identified as Cs-137 with an estimated activity of 5μCi. However, the calculated activity did not correspond to the measured dose rates, which were considerably higher. Careful examination of the spectrum continuum showed the existence of another source within the container. A Sr-90 source was identified and the acitivity was estimated to be 10 mCi, according to the bremsstrahlung spectrum. The cases presented here show that isotope identification and activity determination of orphan sources and radioactive material located in scrap metal requires not only the conduction of measurements with gamma spectroscopy detectors, but also careful examination of the acquired spectra and awareness of equipment limitations.
        Speaker: Dr M. Nikolaki (Greek Atomic Energy Commission)
      • 35
        Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Jamaica’s Experience
        Developing sustainable approaches to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear and other radioactive materials in Jamaica was propelled by the successful bilateral “Megaports“ initiative of the US DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and their Second Line of Defence and the Government of Jamaica through the Jamaica Customs (2006). Through this initiative, since 2009, four (4) discoveries of source of radiation have been uncovered, all found in shipments for international transport. Jamaica was prompted by these discoveries to becoming the 118th Member State of the then International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) as of 2013, and subsequently now in the final stages of completing a Jamaican specific Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP); a non-binding instrument with the IAEA. These two nuclear security systems both have the potential of lowering the evolving threat of nuclear and radioactive material out of control in Jamaica as we develop a legislative and regulatory framework which supports nuclear safety and security issues with reference to international legal instruments and IAEA guidelines.
        Speaker: Mr C. Boyd (Jamaica)
      • 36
        Egyptian Framework for Implementing Nuclear Forensics Capabilities
        Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive materials or of evidence contaminated with radioactive material in the context of international or national law or nuclear security. The analysis of nuclear or other radioactive material seeks to identify what the materials are, how, when, and where the materials were made, and what were their intended uses. The Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority (NRRA) shall be competent with the implementation of all the works of Egyptian System for Accountability and Control (ESAC), to confine and control all nuclear materials within Egypt and at any place subject to its control and supervision and to meet the basic technical requirements, in pursuance of the safeguards application agreement. NRRA shall implement the provision of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability system based on the concept of Materials Balance Area (MBA). Towards such effect, NRRA may adopt necessary measures in each nuclear facility and in any site outside such facility which contains nuclear materials, abiding by the Egyptian rules and standards that will be discussed in this text.
        Speaker: Dr A. Ahmed Tawfik (Lecturer of Radiation Protection, Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority - Egypt)
      • 37
        Establishing of a Nuclear Forensics Capacity in Republic of Moldova
        In this article there are described the steps and results of Establishing of a Nuclear Forensics Capacity in Republic of Moldova in framework of implementation of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan in the Republic of Moldova. In the same way there are described the experiences of NARNRA - National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities gained from operation on attempt of illegal trafficking of nuclear materials. With the valorous contribution of other donors (US DoE, US NRC, SSM, CE, IAEA DTC) we have successfully launched and implemented the INSSP in Moldova. Among the main results we note the possibility to carry out the primary identification of nuclear materials, captured in actions of combating illicit trafficking in the summers of 2010 and 2011 years. In framework of realization INSSP in October 2012, June 2013 and October 2013 (Blind exercise) the parties have organized and deployed successfully the interagency field exercises on effective response to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials events with all necessary forensics procedures. In this Practical exercise, the interaction of the involved bodies and the new NARNRA response procedures with the Mobile Experts Support Team, were tested. Based on that field exercise, the local stakeholders has been working on a new and extended ConOps and Standard Operation Procedures.
        Speaker: Dr I. Balan (National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities, Republic of Moldova)
      • 38
        European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA)
        Located at the European Commission Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), the EUSECTRA training centre has been created in the framework of the EU chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) action plan adopted by the European Council in 2009. Based on the unique combination of scientific expertise, specific technical infrastructure and availability of a wide range of nuclear materials, EUSECTRA complements national training efforts by providing realistic scenarios with real special nuclear material. The training program offers a unique opportunity for trainees to see and experience actual materials and commodities. In particular, EUSECTRA is one of the few places in the world where a wide range of samples of plutonium and uranium of different isotopic compositions can be used for training in detection, categorization and characterization. The training centre provides courses for front-line officers, trainers and experts on how to detect and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. EUSECTRA offers hands-on training using a wide variety of radioactive and nuclear materials and a broad selection of equipment and measurement instruments. Indoor facilities include a training area to simulate airport conditions, equipped with pedestrian portal monitors and an x-ray conveyor. Outdoor facilities with different types of radiation portal monitors are available for border detection courses. EUSECTRA courses include border detection, train-the-trainers, mobile emergency response (MEST), reach-back, national response plans, nuclear forensics, radiological crime scene management and nuclear security awareness. In addition, EUSECTRA continues to cover safeguards training activities. Training materials have been developed in close collaboration with international experts (e.g., from IAEA, US-DoE, FBI, NFI, CEA) to integrate different available modules into a coherent and comprehensible set of training courses which ultimately aim to cover both detection and response. Additionally, EUSECTRA will enhance cross-border cooperation and experts' networking, and provide a centralised knowledge management tool.
        Speaker: Dr E. Hrnecek (European Commission, Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements)
      • 39
        Exercise Blue Beagle and Information Security
        On 7-9 January 2014, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the UK Home Office, the UK Ministry of Defence and the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) hosted a Nuclear Forensics workshop and Table Top exercise (Blue Beagle) under the aegis of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Nuclear Forensics Working Group. Over 80 representatives from 25 GICNT partner nations and three of the GICNT observers (IAEA, Interpol and European Union) attended the event. The event aimed to demonstrate the importance of maintaining continuity of evidence throughout nuclear forensics investigations and aid partner nations in making decisions about the type of national or regional capabilities they might want to create. Exercise Blue Beagle started with a short scene setting video showing an RDD attack in Accordia’s capital city; Centreville. We see a terrorist fabricating an RDD, placing it at a busy shopping centre and then detonating it. In the aftermath police with protective suits and detection equipment are seen near the attack site, the surrounding area is heavily contaminated. There is concern about possible further detonations, the police are under pressure to find the perpetrators and fast! Through a series of video enriched scenarios a UK panel of experts talked through how they would respond to the evolving incident. The exercise intended to provide extensive insight into the UK model, whilst also allowing the audience to provide international context. Each session was designed to focus on key areas; they deliberately did not cover exploitation of the post-detonation scene, but concentrated on the investigatory process as new leads emerged. The scenario had multiple crime scenes: a café where suspects are overheard talking, a lorry where devices are fabricated, a car used to transport the devices and then finally at the scene of the next attack where officers successfully find and neutralise the device before it is detonated. The exercise considered the recovery of RN contaminated evidence from associated material, partially fabricated devices and neutralised devices. Throughout experts described how they maintain the continuity of evidence. They explored the decision making likely to be faced with: down selecting between covert or overt operations, RPE selection, operational safety and the importance of evidence prioritisation. We then saw the recovered evidence safely transported to a “state of the art” laboratory designed to exploit RN contaminated evidence. The complexity of analysing evidence in specially designed RN glove boxes and within a compliant safety regime was explored. Finally, following a presentation from the UK Crown Prosecution Service, we explored how this complex evidence would be presented in court: the importance of decision making with respect to the offence, the subtle differences between witness of fact or expert witnesses, how to explain complex technical evidence in court, the need to retain evidence for appeals, implications of disposing of evidence because it is unsafe to store and decision making regarding the admissibility of evidence. To further promulgate the sharing of good practice, the material used for Exercise Blue Beagle and an exercise playbook have been packaged as an “exercise in a box” that was shared with GICNT members attending the conference. The exercise and the “exercise in a box” support the Dutch 2014 Nuclear Security Summit gift basket on nuclear forensics. Information security: as nuclear materials and technologies spread, the global community needs to be ever more vigilant to prevent their acquisition by those that have no legitimate reason to use them. States are responsible for their own nuclear security architecture, and for putting in place a nuclear security regime appropriate to their national context. Fundamental to any nuclear security regime is the need to effectively protect nuclear material and physical assets from non-state actors. Over recent years, however, the international community has increasingly recognised the need for States to also ensure the effective security of sensitive nuclear information, knowledge and know-how. The United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office has created a guide on Information Security that provides an overview of issues, and identifies sources of further guidance and advice. This guide supports activities in support of the UK Nuclear Security Summit gift basket on nuclear information security. It has been shared with GICNT partner states through the Global Initiative portal.
        Speaker: Mr I. Smith (United Kingdom)
      • 40
        Increasing Role of Nuclear Forensic to Support Nuclear Security Events Investigation in Indonesia
        The writing purpose are to identify the existing nuclear forensic capability and its role in nuclear security events investigation in Indonesia, compare them to IAEA recommendation and analyzing the gap for the improvement. The scope are currently national capabilities, traditional and nuclear forensic, and also recommendation for the improvement. The assessment of national capabilities in nuclear forensic is needed due to Indonesia is an archipelago country and located in the middle of the earth. So internationally, these made Indonesia to be one of the world trade lines, and nationally many of its trade is done by the sea line. We have a lot of access through the sea port, but not all sea ports have a real portal monitor. This could make possibility for the movement of illicit trafficking sources from one island to another, or could address Indonesia to be a transit point or even addressing Indonesia to be a target country for international illicit trafficking. Development of nuclear forensics also needed to enable international cooperation through nuclear forensics community, either through GICNT, nuclear forensics ITWG or through facilitation by the IAEA. The method assessment by identify national capabilities based on: existing plan and procedures, ISE (Integrated Safety Evaluation) reports 2012 to IAEA, and also from the evaluation of national field exercise then compare them to international requirements and recommendations. In order to achieve sustainable nuclear safety, nuclear security, which covered emergency preparedness aspect, Indonesia have made a national commitment to adhere to international treaty and convention. Since 2006 we established a national response organization related to nuclear events namely OTDNN. The stakeholder are from nuclear emergency preparedness and response, and also nuclear security. At the end of 2007, this organization established their joint procedure, which developed from stakeholder’s procedure, but give attention to the radiation protection as well as radioactive safety and nuclear security. We also have had a regular exercise and drill based on this joint procedure in order to evaluate the existing capabilities and get feedback for its improvement. Based on our field exercise and drill, we still have weakness for the awareness of radiation aspect among the first responder. Therefore we need to make an arrangement how to respond effectively without destroy any traditional or nuclear forensic evidence. Nuclear security is now become world issue and nuclear forensics is one component in an on-going national programme for nuclear security. In order to support our commitment, we are now in the beginning step to establish Indonesia Center of Excellence On Nuclear Security and Emergency Preparedness (ICONSEP). The primary role of ICONSEP is to facilitate the development of human resources and the provision of support services on several levels to ensure the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of nuclear security and nuclear emergency preparedness in Indonesia. For nuclear forensic development it also include the effort to combine the expertise of traditional forensic and nuclear forensic capability. Base on IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 2, there are several aspects need to be improve, they are: 1. Capability in incident response. The Police will coordinate with BAPETEN and BATAN as the radiological expert. Our weakness are in the arrangement for the evidence holding site, since we don’t have this arrangement yet and also the arrangement to transport the radioactive evidence. We also need to improve our capability in evidence collection, since collection of traditional forensic evidence might interfere with the collection of radioactive evidence. 2. Capability in nuclear forensic laboratory. So far only BATAN which has competent staff in handling radioactive contaminated evidence and also for current standard, but their instruments need to be reassessed according to the latest technology. BAPETEN is on-going process to establish their laboratory. We also need to establish our national nuclear forensics library so we can determine ownership of the material as soon as possible. 3. Capability in nuclear forensic analysis and traditional forensic analysis, we need to improve our attribution capability since we very rarely deal to this kind of investigation. 4. Capability in nuclear forensic interpretation. Expert who have both expertise in radioactive material and traditional forensic analysis is very lacking. Therefore we need to develop our human resources to meet this requirement. Based on these findings we need to make an action plan, the recommendation are:  year 1 to 2 are development for the incident response capabilities;  year 2 to 5 are development for national nuclear forensic library, resource development for competent staff and laboratory; and  year 5 to 10 are human resource development for nuclear forensic analysis and interpretation. Since the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with individual States, we need to develop our nuclear security system which cannot be separated from the nuclear forensic capabilities.
        Speaker: Ms D. Apriliani (BAPETEN - Indonesia)
        revised abstract
      • 41
        International Workshop on Basic Nuclear Forensic Methodologies for Practitioners
        The IAEA describes nuclear forensics as “…the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution…” with the goal of identifying forensic indicators in interdicted nuclear and radiological samples or the surrounding environment (e.g., the container or transport vehicle). These indicators provide important clues to the process history and ultimate origin of the material. While access to advanced nuclear forensic analysis is available globally through technical collaborations facilitated by the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group, every country should retain some basic capabilities for categorizing suspect nuclear and radioactive materials outside of regulatory control. To further that goal, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in cooperation with the National Nuclear Security Administration and hosted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, has developed a training course on basic nuclear forensic methodologies for practitioners. In all, 26 representatives from 10 countries including Algeria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam participated in the second-of-its-kind international workshop on nuclear forensics methodologies from October 28 - November 8, 2013. The workshop utilized the unique training and laboratory assets at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Volpentest HAzardous Materials Management and Emergency Response (HAMMER) Training and Education Center, both located in Richland, Washington state. A mix of hands-on and classroom education was used to teach basic nuclear forensic methodologies to practitioners from around the world. Course content was developed and taught by a cadre of internationally recognized experts in nuclear forensics from the United States0, United Kingdom, IAEA, European Commission, and Australia. The framework of the ten-day workshop was developed around a scenario based exercise of a seizure of special nuclear and radioactive materials detected at a fictitious border crossing. Participants were expected to apply specific skills they had been taught from a mix of both classroom and laboratory-based instruction during the scenario based exercise. Acting as nuclear forensics laboratory experts, teams of participants were asked to support law enforcement in their investigation, from inventorying contaminated evidence to conducting basic analyses to categorize materials to carrying out more advanced analyses and helping investigators interpret results. Nuclear forensics is a valuable tool for combatting nuclear smuggling and ensuring that nuclear material is used for only peaceful purposes. When illicit nuclear trafficking occurs, experts can use nuclear forensics to help identify the point that control of that material was lost, and then work with responsible officials to ensure the event is not repeated. This presentation describes the outcome of the second International Workshop on Nuclear Forensics Methodologies for Practitioners, summarizing the successes and recommending aspects of that could be improved in the future.
        Speaker: J.M. Schwantes (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, United States Department of Energy, Richland, WA, USA.)
      • 42
        Investigative Police of Chile: Implementation of an Action Plan to Confront of Radiological Threats.
        In the global world, the national safety is a priority preference for the State of Chile, remain terrorist threats of chemical, biological or radiological nature, the most harmful, due to the victim's potential high that they can be exposed to these types of harmful agents. For that reason this threats must be works with great caution, because to in some cases, the magnitude of the fact (incident) might overcome the capacity of response of the competent entities. In this context, Police Department, Fire Department and other governmental entities as Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission (CCHEN), generated various action plans to confront the threats to radioactive materials, applying protocols in order to act, already be as primary, secondary or tertiary inspectors. In case of radioactive threat, Investigative Police of Chile (PDI), it has been an active estate, giving collaboration by means of resources and competent personnel, where the Criminalistic Laboratory has a fundamental role post incidental, resting across the crime expert investigation, how likewise delivering reliable results to achieve the later determination of reasons, origin, responsibilities, suspect's identification between others. The present work discloses the action plans of Investigative Police of Chile, confront threats that involve the presence of radioactive materials.
        Speaker: Mr I. TROSTEL (Chile)
      • 43
        National Security System to Combat Nuclear and Radiation Threats in Georgia
        Georgia have received difficult heritage form Soviet related to nuclear security situation. The country already took some steps to combat nuclear and radiation threat. Developing of nuclear forensics capability is one of the important step to reach set goals to establish nuclear security regime.
        Speaker: Dr L. CHELIDZE (Georgia)
      • 44
        Nuclear Forensics Role and Capabilities in the Romanian Nuclear Security Infrastructure
        Nuclear security is now become an global issue and nuclear forensics is one of the very important part in an on-going national programme for nuclear security. Romania has the capacity to prevent and combat illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, including through cooperation with the IAEA, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization. Since the launch of the IAEA database, Romania only reported some minor incidents. In recent years, the frequency of recorded events was about 1 or 2 per year. They are, nevertheless, insignificant in what concerns their impact on the environment and for the population. The National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) is the competent authority responsible for regulation, licensing and control in the nuclear field in relation to safety, security and safeguards. CNCAN issues legally-binding regulations in all these areas and is responsible for review and assessment, authorization, inspection and enforcement activities. Nuclear forensics is one element of nuclear security regime that is viewed as the opportunity and challenge for Romania and CNCAN. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. Responsabilities to investigate nuclear security incidents belong thru NBC Team of the Directorate of Firearms, Explosives and Dangerous Substances (DAESP) of the General Inspectorate of Romanian Police (IGPR DAESP NBC Team). The IGPR DAESP NBC Team was founded in 2001 within the Organized Crime Countering Directorate and from 2009 has formed part of the Directorate of Firearms, Explosives and Dangerous Substances of the General Inspectorate of Romanian Police. This is the only unit within the Romanian Police with competences regarding crime scene investigation in cases of illegal use of Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) agents. Intelligence support for such a kind of event came from the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) which is the leading national authority in preventing and countering terrorism and from the Department for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For the most cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials happend in Romania, the nuclear forensics tasks were performed by the Institute for Nuclear Research – ICN and the Institute for Nuclear Research and the National Institute for R&D in Physics and Nuclear Engineering-Horia Hulubei . The cooperation among the all participants in intervention is coordinated by CNCAN follow-up the National Response Plan for Illicit Trafficking of the Nuclear and Radiological Materials. The IFIN-HH also ensure the training basic, advanced, theoretical and practical domain for participants involved in nuclear security field in a specialized Training Center in Nuclear Field.
        Speaker: S. Repanovici (National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, Romania)
      • 45
        Nuclear Forensics Activities in the Slovak Republic
        After political change in 1989 we have been facing a new type of criminal activity – smuggling of nuclear materials. The territory of Slovakia became one of possible routes for criminals, smuggling nuclear materials from former USSR countries to the western countries. Slovak Republic was established on 1st January 1993. By the Act Nr. 2/1993 the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) was grounded. Since 1993 all relevant ministries and regulatory bodies paid attention to the creation of an effective system to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. In nineties, when the most cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials occurred, the nuclear forensics tasks were performed by the Department of Nuclear Chemistry of Comenius University in Bratislava. Nuclear materials seized on Slovakian territory were analyzed by using alpha and gamma spectrometry. We also trained customs and police officers, installed portal monitors and all involved state bodies signed a common guideline on how to proceed and cooperate in the case of a seizure of nuclear or radioactive materials. Qualitative change occurred in 2001, when the chairmen of UJD and Joint Research Center – Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) signed an agreement of future cooperation in the field of combatting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. This agreement started new era of cooperation. Regular participation of Slovakian representatives in The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was supported by the ITU, and, according to the agreement, we used the capabilities of ITU for nuclear forensics analyses of seized nuclear materials. In November 2007 our Police Corps finished an undercover investigation by seizure of suspicious radioactive material. First analyses made by the Civil Protection laboratory and Department of Nuclear Chemistry showed, that suspicious material contains natural uranium. We asked the ITU to perform forensic analysis of that material. In March 2008 we sent a sample of the seizure to ITU. The forensic analysis confirmed the seized material was natural uranium. The results were used as evidence during the trial. One sample of this material was sent also to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA in 2011. Up to now we do not know the results of this analysis. Another example of cooperation between ITU and UJD represents the joint analysis of uranium pellets coming from the seizures in nineties. The UJD sent two sets each of tree pellets to ITU and in October 2008 two experts from Slovakia partially participated in analyses of those pellets in ITU headquarter in Karlsruhe, Germany. The results of the analyses were made available in April 2009. The outcomes showed that uranium pellets most probably came from the fuel assembly stolen in Lithuania in the beginning of nineties. Slovakian experts are fully aware of the importance of having, even limited, nuclear forensics capabilities. We are still trying to improve our laboratories with new devices and methodologies in order to be able to provide fundamental analyses of seized nuclear or radioactive materials. However, taking into account limited financial and personal sources, it seems to be more useful to continue the cooperation with ITU.
        Speaker: Mr J. Vaclav (Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic)
      • 46
        Nuclear Forensics in the Republic of Tajikistan: Condition and Perspectives
        During the Soviet era, Tajikistan reprocessed approximately 1 million tons of uranium ores annually in Chkalovsk. From the beginning of the uranium industry in Tajikistan, more than 55 million tons of total waste was generated within 10 uranium tailings covering an area of 170 hectares with a summary activity of more than 6,5 thousand curies. In complex №6 of Chkalovsk city different types of silicate and carbonate uranium ores from Uzbekistan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were reprocessed. The Taboshar (Tajikistan) and Min-Kush (Kyrgyzstan) deposits were carbonated. Carbonated ores were also delivered from Kazakhstan. Silicated uranium-baring ores were delivered from the Tashkent oblast (Uzbekistan) and Chiti’ (Russia). Different methods for ores reprocessing were applied taking into account the distinct ore compositions. Specialists of Chkalovsk complex, as far back as during the time of the Soviet Union, could determine the origin of U3O8 (yellow cake) based on the type of raw material used in manufacturing. Utilizing uranium contents as well as different uranium isotope ratios it is possible to differentiate uranium concentrates. Analysis of raw uranium materials is important in order to possibly determine the source of these materials and is an important element of nuclear forensics. Currently Tajikistan is developing a basis for nuclear forensics. In this regard, a training center is established for specialists with orientation to nuclear safety and nuclear security to include nuclear forensics. The development of a national nuclear forensic library has been initiated. A nuclear security infrastructure is being expanded to include analysis, interpretation, law enforcment and nuclear security elements to include the establishment of a nuclear materials illicit trafficking database. Tajikistan is preparing the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials for ratification. Tajikistan maintains a national system for accounting of nuclear and radioactive materials. Improvements to the system for nuclear materials transportation and their storage are underway. Tajikistan has boundaries with Afghanistan and the need for nuclear forensics experts is increasing every year. Due to continuing reports of narcotics transit cases, there is also the possibility for the unauthorized transit of nuclear materials from north to south within the region. Threats from the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials remains an urgent problem in Tajikistan and relies on a nuclear forensic capability as part of a national response plan. Tajikistan recognizes the technical strengths of nuclear forensics to address the international concern posed by illicit trafficking. In order to effectively combat the threat of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatiory control, it is necessary to have very close international cooperation. Tajikistan is committed to prompt reporting to the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) of all cases involving the illicit trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials. In this regard, Tajikistan recognizes that the ITDB in combination with a national nuclear forensics capability are essential tools for nuclear security.
        Speaker: Prof. U. Mirsaidov (Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency, Tajikistan)
      • 47
        Nuclear Forensics – An Integral Part of the Philippines' National Response Plan for a Nuclear Security Event
        Since the dropping of the first atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 1945, quoting the famous phrase, “the world has lived under the shadow of nuclear threat”. This was heightened by the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and magnified by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack of the World Trade Center in the USA. Although the attack (more popularly termed as 911 attack) was not nuclear or radiological in manner, it imparted a worldwide chilling effect that such an act that is nuclear or radiological armed can be a possibility causing major damage and massive disruption. While the threat is global, nuclear security is a national responsibility. It is in this light that the Philippine Nuclear Security Plan was formulated by the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) specifically to address nuclear security and terrorism with nuclear forensic as an integral part of the plan. Prior to the 911 attack, the Philippines was confronted by three (3) major internal security concerns: the local communist movement, the southern Philippines secessionist groups, and the home-grown and transnational kidnap for ransom groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and others. To deter and overcome these threats, a ‘Strategy of Holistic Approach’ focused on the theme “Winning the Peace” was adopted under the National Internal Security Plan. However, after the 911 attack, the word ‘terrorism’ drastically changed the course of global and national security. The Philippines created its own definition and perspective on terrorism with the passage of Republic Act No. 9372 on March 6, 2007, An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as “The Human Security Act of 2007”. Included in this law as an act of terrorism is the use of any biological and/or chemical agent, or radioactive material, or nuclear device, explosive, firearm or other weapon, with the intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause great damage to property. With this new law, the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences was developed. Unfortunately, this plan was designed to cover hostage taking, bombing, sabotage, hijacking and piracy, but did not cover bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, radiological and nuclear terrorism, and cyber terrorism. As such, the Philippine Nuclear Security Plan (PNSP) was developed covering the three (3) strategy components of prevention, detection and response. Under the response strategy, a program to establish a forensic and investigation unit is included, as well as the development of plan and procedures to respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including seizure of such material by law enforcement authorities. The Nuclear Materials Research Section (NMRS) of PNRI was thus given the added function to “develop nuclear forensic analysis capabilities in support of nuclear material protection process so that in the event of an interdiction by Philippine law enforcement agencies involving illegal use or movement of radioactive material this capability may be used to develop and build a legal case against the perpetrators”. To date, several NMRS staff has undergone training on nuclear forensics taking advantage of offers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations as part of the human resource development program of the PNSP. Meanwhile, in 2003, the Megaports Initiative was established by the United State Government through the United State’s Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration – Office of Second Line of Defense (USDOE/NNSA-SLD). The purpose of which is to screen container-cargoes for nuclear and other radiological materials being transported through the global maritime shipping network. In the Philippines, with financial and technical support from the USDOE/NNSA-SLD, radiation portal monitoring systems were installed at the Port of Manila, specifically at the South Harbor and Manila International Container Terminal. This will reduce the risk of illicit trafficking and thus preventing the acquisition and malevolent use of these nuclear and other radiological materials by terrorists. In late 2011, PNRI staffs were instructed to inspect a suspected radioactive material that was seized during an operation by a government investigative agency since there had been reported news of smuggling incidents involving uranium in the Philippines as early as 2007. It was unfortunate however, that the suspected material was brought to the room where the PNRI staffs were planning on how to go through with the inspection at the crime scene. Fortunately, the yellowish metallic box bearing a U235 marking registered very low radioactivity. Evidently, there is a need for strengthening and reorientation of persons that will be involved in radiological crime scene investigations on the unique characteristics and required safety measures in the handling of radioactive materials, and more importantly, by equipping the PNRI with the basic instrumentation and skills in building the nuclear forensics capabilities of the Country.
        Speaker: Mr R. REYES (Philippines)
      • 48
        Nuclear Security Capacity Building at the Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology (CARST)
        Introduction: Developing a PhD in Applied Radiation Science and Technology Curriculum (Specializing in Nuclear Security) The Centre for Applied Radiation Science and Technology (CARST) was founded as a pioneer in the Applied Radiation Studies. It is mandated to carry out research and build capacity for the Nuclear Industry in South Africa. To promote its Pillar of Applied Research, CARST is in the process of introducing a new PhD Programme in Applied Radiation Science and Technology (ARST), which should produce competent Nuclear Scientists trained in various fields including Nuclear Security. Therefore the Projects will involve development of the said PhD Programme, teaching material for MSc- and Certificate- in Nuclear Security for training Postgraduates and Faculty Members in order to produce nuclear security expert in the country. CARST will also liaise and work very closely with the IAEA on its Support for Nuclear Security Education Programme which was first rolled out in June 2012 and the MSc in Nuclear Security launched in March 2013. The Aim is to prepare for South Africa’ s Nuclear Build that has been hinted by the Government. As a Center for Applied Radiation Science and Technology we seek to achieve the following specific objectives: i. Development of teaching material for Professional Development of Faculty and promotion of nuclear security education ii. Contribute toward national efforts to achieve effective security with regards to use, storage and/or transport of any special nuclear or other radioactive material. iii. Be a Center with for capacity building, training and professional development of nuclear security experts iv. Collaboration with International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) as a member of its Working Group II: Faculty development and cooperation among universities Methodology: 1. Attending the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, will expose me to current technologies and developments in Nuclear Forensics Capacity Building 1.1. Awareness, training and exercises 1.2. Research and development 1.3. Education and development of expertise; As a sub-field of Nuclear Security, CARST seeks to be a training Center for the the three bulleted sub-topics above. 2. From the Conference, Professional time will be spent on: i. Developing the PhD Curricula mentioned at the Introduction and submitting to South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA), Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC) and the Institutional Committee for Academic Standards (ICAS). ii. The Building facilities will be used for Training Faculty members on Nuclear Security following the IAEA Nuclear Security Series No 12 Educational Programme in Nuclear Security Training identified border post personnel in the monitoring of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. 3. Contribution to Nuclear Security By attending the International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Forensics: Countering the Evolving Threat of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control , we hope to establish linkages with experts who can then visit our Center to train our Faculty Members on Nuclear Forensics –Research and Development. This will be pursued in parallel with efforts to attend the IAEA Pilot Professional Development Course for Faculty Members; Introduction of Nuclear Security;- scheduled for 6-10 January 2014 at King’s College London, UK. This will be a 2 x one week classroom training or Distance learning sessions, group work and individual assignments and technical visit. CARST faculty members will chose either distance or classroom sessions depending on available funds from the Nuclear Security Practices Grants (NSPG). To effectively contribute to nuclear security CARST use its membership to the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) to join the Working Group II: Faculty development and cooperation among universities. Expected Outcome and Sustainability Potential The following are the expected long term and short term Project outcomes: Short term: i. Faculty members trained under the faculty development programme who will then be able to effectively offer the MSc and Certificate Curricula in Nuclear Security as well as Certified Short courses in nuclear security. ii. Launch of MSc and Short courses: Once developed and approved by the Qualifications authorities, the Curricula will be launched and training offered to cover also nuclear security from Course level to PhD. Long Term: The proposed PhD Curricula will provide sustainable training to Postgraduate in nuclear security, nuclear forensics at the same time providing the exceptional skills needed by South Africa’s nuclear industry. Who will benefit: i. It is expected that about five to seven PhD’s in ARST (of which one to three PhD’s graduates specializing in Nuclear security) will be produced starting in January 2015. ii. At least ten MSc student should be produced as from end of 2014. Currently CARST has four MSc students who will complete in October 2014.
        Speaker: Prof. M. Mathuthu (South Africa)
      • 49
        Overview of the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project
        Ensuring the safety and security of Canadians requires a capability to respond to all credible threats. Canada’s current capability to respond to radiological and nuclear (RN) threats is focused on detection, prevention, interception and mitigation, as well as enabling the necessary resources for subsequent investigation, interdiction and prosecution. The absence of a coordinated national nuclear forensics (NF) capability has been identified as a gap in Canada’s current capacity to respond to RN threats. An NF capability would enhance the investigation of a RN threat and assist in the attribution of RN material that has been acquired with the intent to be used, or that has been used, in a RN security event. NF is the comprehensive scientific analysis of RN materials, or evidence contaminated with RN materials, that contributes to the broader investigation of a RN security event. In practice, NF is an iterative process that exploits regulatory and material inventory tracking identifiers, as well as inherent isotopic, chemical and physical signatures, in order to provide insights into the life cycle history and origins of RN materials, as well as to potentially link these materials to people, places and events. In order to address the current gap in Canada’s RN threat response capability, Defence Research and Development Canada’s Centre for Security Science (DRDC-CSS) initiated the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project (CNNFCP). The CNNFCP is a whole of Government initiative that is funded through the Canadian Safety and Security Programme (CSSP) and which involves eleven federal departments. The objective of the project is to enhance Canada’s RN threat response capability through the development of a coordinated and comprehensive national NF capability that includes: 1. a national dedicated laboratory network for comprehensive NF analysis, including the capability to perform traditional forensics analysis on evidence contaminated with RN material; and 2. a National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) cataloguing characteristics and signatures of all RN material holdings under regulatory control. This paper will provide an overview of the process the Government of Canada undertook to identify the gaps in its current capacity to respond to RN threats as they relate to NF, as well as that used to define the objectives and scope of the CNNFCP, including those of the two work streams listed above.
        Speaker: Ms E. Inrig (Defence Research and Development Canada, Ottawa Research Centre)
      • 50
        Role of Nuclear Forensics in Supporting National Organizations in Combating Against Smuggling of Nuclear Materials
        Due to the serious threats arising from smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials and the possibility of diverting these materials to produce nuclear weapons and dirty bombs, the responsibility of undertaking the necessary measures to prevent any nuclear security violations, discovering and responding to it, if it occurred, rests with the state. In the present work, the national and international efforts, reinforced by nuclear forensics, for detecting and intercepting smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials are treated. The role of nuclear forensics in supporting the investigations and giving answers to questions raised by the investigating authorities through examination of the physical, biological and documentary evidence in order to reveal, how, when and where the nuclear materials were produced and their planned use and also to reveal the relationship between personnel, places and materials involved. The role of nuclear forensics in reducing or preventing the occurance of smuggling events as a result of the existence of some unnoticed deficiencies in the nuclear security system was very helpful in attracting the attention of the administration to improve the components of the nuclear security systems. Nuclear forensics plays an important role in deterring persons or groups from attacking nuclear or radioactive materials knowing that the investigating authorities can discover them and condemn them according to the provisions of the law. The state should establish nuclear forensic infrastructure at first by reviewing suitable candidates existing in the state for selection. The state should annex a nuclear forensic plan to the national response plan to nuclear security events such as smuggling .etc. Moreover, the state should provide the necessary tools for inspecting collected evidences and for analysis and preparing a safe place for preserving them. International support in capacity building of human resources in nuclear forensics is very helpful through know- how transfer, training and expert missions. In combating against smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials, nuclear forensics plays a complementary role to the role of other state organizations responsible for detecting and preventing smuggling of these materials such as the national customs organization and the state police department. International support to national nuclear forensics plans through the International Customs Organization and the INTERPOL is greatly recommended The IAEA also plays an important role in supporting nuclear forensics through rapid information exchange in case of nuclear security events or accidents. IAEA assists member states in developing their legislations and also improving the control systems on nuclear and radioactive materials. IAEA prepared a draft document on "Nuclear Forensics in support of criminal investigations" that includes a model plan of nuclear forensics and indicated the most important steps that should be taken in consideration by the member states IAEA supported the efforts of member states in combating against nuclear smuggling by supporting the national customs and police organizations in cooperation with the ICO and INTERPOL as will be explained in the present work. In Egypt the Nuclear and Radiological Control Authority regularly organizes training courses and workshops oriented to members from state police and the state customs organizations for improving their awareness and their understanding in decreasing and preventing nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling. In the future it is planned to improve the ability of nuclear forensics personnel on examining the physical, biological and documentary evidence for identifying the time, place of production of the nuclear and radioactive materials and their planned use.
        Speaker: Prof. M. Elbarody (Egypt)
      • 51
        Search and Investigation of Orphan Sources in Lithuania
        One of the most important tasks in each country is to ensure that nuclear or radioactive materials or other sources of ionizing radiation be not used unauthorized, traveling without control, have free access or used for malevolent purposes. In case of identification such not legal activities or orphan sources countries should have established system of response to such situations on the State level. One of very important parts is identification and investigation of discovered or apprehended nuclear or radioactive materials. Lithuania has created national system of response in case of identification of not legal and orphan sources as well as search of such sources. Radiation Protection Centre has established laboratory, equipped with necessary technique for search, identification and further measurements of orphan sources including training on search and secure. In last years Radiation Protection Centre was launched programme for search of orphan sources in former facilities or territories used sources of ionizing radiation as well as participated in investigation of discovered orphan sources or apprehended with radioactive materials contaminated consumer products. The largest part of investigated contaminated materials was discovered in metal scrap yards usually contaminated with radium or thorium as NORM. Some of sources discovered by peoples as high activity cesium source and lost smoke detectors with plutonium. During the search at soviet army military airport at place where remediation measures have been carried out 20 years ago the contamination by the radium 226 was detected. It shows that the remediation measures were not sufficient and the contamination due to migration and other factors appeared at the surface of the ground. Search of orphan sources and contaminated sites are performed on the asking of people as well. Inhabitants due to different reasons are asking to measure radiation at living environment. No orphan sources and radioactive contamination was found during that cases but nevertheless the search performed works for the secure life.
        Speaker: Mr J. ZILIUKAS (Lithuania)
      • 52
        Sri Lankan Experience on Control of Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Sources
        Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) which functions under the Ministry of Technology & Research of Government of Sri Lanka is the regulatory authority and responsible for controlling the utilization and ensuring safety and security of radiation sources and protection of general public in the country from unwarranted exposure to ionizing radiation. The AEA was established in 1970 under the Atomic Energy Authority Act No. 19 of 1969, and is empowered for licensing and inspection, authorization for transport, safe disposal and import / export of radioactive sources. The control of radiation sources used in the country is achieved by annual licensing and inspection as per procedures established in the regulations titled “Regulations on Ionizing Radiation Protection of the Atomic Energy Safety Regulations No. 1 of 1999” promulgated in the year 2000 which conforms to Basic Safety Standards - 115. As an activity of regulatory control of radiation sources, (Import & export control of radioactive materials) a portal monitoring detecting system (Mega port screening system) has been installed at the Colombo port for detection of unauthorized radioactive materials (illicit trafficking). This detecting system is operated & managed by the Customs Department of Sri Lanka with the technical assistance of National Security Administration of Department of Energy of the U.S.A. government. The radioactive materials or contaminated items which emit gamma or neutron radiation can be detected by this system. The objective of installation of such a system is to ensure the safety of people & the environment from exposure to radiation by detecting unauthorized movement of radioactive materials. Portal monitors are installed in 11 gates at the Colombo port and all in coming, outgoing & transshipment containers are screened. Required procedures were prepared and responsibilities of each organization involved were laid down. The organizations involved are Department of Customs, Sri Lanka Ports Authority, Sri Lanka Navy, AEA and Central Environmental Authority. The AEA is responsible for analysis and advice on remedial measures if unauthorized radioactivity is detected by scans. Two incidents have been reported of detecting the items contaminated with the radioactive materials by the portal monitors. Location of the both incidents is Colombo Port. One is a transshipment container filled with scrap metal bound for India (by a ship from Benin) was detected radioactive while transporting through portal monitors on 10th January 2008. The Department of Customs detained the container and informed the AEA. The AEA carried out an inspection and radiation levels were measured outside the container without opening it. The nuclide analyzer (Na/Tl) indicated neutron and gamma radiation and confirmed presence of Cs-137. Further measurements with portable pure germanium nuclide analyzer confirmed the presence of Am-241 & Cs-137. The maximum radiation level measured outside the container was 23µSv/h. It is assumed that the instrument could be a moisture gauge containing Am / Be and a Cs-137 source. The other incident is a container of copper bonded grounding rods bound for U.S.A. (by a ship from Kolkata, India) was screened by portal monitors and found that content of the consignment is radioactive on 19th January 2007.The AEA was informed for further inspection. AEA carried out a detailed analysis and confirmed that the items are contaminated with Co-60 radioactive material. Few of those copper bonded earth rods were highly contaminated. The activity concentration is 203468 ± 6258 Bq/kg. The rest were slightly contaminated. The activity concentration is 10.12 ± 1.37 Bq/kg. Highest radiation level of the surface of a highly contaminated rod was measured as 285 µSv/h. After confirming the items are contaminated with the radioactive materials, steps have been taken to send back the relevant transshipment containers to the original suppliers according to IAEA transport regulations [Safety Standard Series No.TS-R-1 (ST-1 Revised)]. The incidents were communicated to the IAEA through the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) program. At present all the scanning portal monitors are satisfactorily functioning and control of unauthorized movements & contaminated items of radioactive materials are guaranteed within the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
        Speaker: Mr U.W.K.H. DE SILVA (Sri Lanka)
      • 53
        Strengthening Nuclear Forensic Capabilities and Partnership through Collaborative Science in Ukraine
        Globally, the production, transport and storage of nuclear materials, and interdiction of illicit materials, have led to serious concerns over illegal trafficking and the potential use of such materials in a nuclear terrorism event. Ukraine stands at one of the geographical crossroads of such activities and contains the largest uranium ore reserves in Europe. Moreover, Ukraine retains significant waste from Soviet-era uranium production and enrichment activities, as well as radioactive materials accumulated from the Chernobyl catastrophe, and maintains a significant nuclear energy production infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has initiated multiple cooperative projects within Ukraine with support from the Department of Energy NA-242 GIPP (Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention) and CBM (Confidence Building Measures) programs, and the Department of State. These projects engage expert Ukrainian scientists and institutions in collaborative nuclear forensic research and training in order to strengthen nuclear forensic capabilities and partnerships. The Ukrainian and United States-based technical collaborations derive from existing capabilities, current needs, and scientific interests of both parties. Ongoing projects include: (1) analytical and capacity building for nuclear forensics through nuclear forensic research; (2) participation, leadership, and training through regional nuclear forensic workshops including engagement with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Armenia; (3) analytical quality assurance and cooperation through the development and co-analysis of relevant standard reference materials; and (4) development of the architecture, as well as open-source population of a Ukrainian database of nuclear materials. Collectively, these projects have strengthened Ukraine as a regional leader in combatting nuclear smuggling and have enhanced regional nuclear forensics capabilities and security. This strong commitment to regional nuclear security is complemented by separate but synergistic support through the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. We will discuss the process, current status and successes of these collaborations including new research developments, infrastructure improvements, the development of country-specific and regional training, and progress in development of a nuclear materials database and library. We will also present insights gained in the course of forging these relationships and discuss how such engagements can positively impact nuclear security not only within a country, but also beyond borders. LLNL-ABS-646607
        Speaker: Dr K. Knight (United States of America)
      • 54
        The Contribution of International Initiatives on Non Proliferation to the Enhancement of the Nuclear Forensics as a Fundamental Component of the International Nuclear Architecture
        During the last decade, several international initiatives in the field of Nuclear Security have emerged in the context of the G8 meetings, which represented an opportunity to announce the establishment of voluntary coalitions, in light of 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. These ‘plurilateral’ initiatives are intended to strengthen international cooperation and devise, inter alia, a number forensics guidance documents and outreach materials, in order to fill gaps left out by operational deficiencies in International nuclear instruments. Such initiatives include, namely, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Nuclear Security Summits process (NSS) This array of initiatives identified by States to contribute to the enhancement of nuclear forensics are functionally interdependent and complement one another in terms of providing various forms of assistance, including enhancement of awareness, guidance and training in the field of nuclear forensics. In this regard, needless to remind that these contributions recognizes explicitly the role of nuclear forensics as a real support tool in the field of response and mitigation to nuclear and radiological malicious act. The present research paper will attempt to provide answers to the following questions: • To what extent theses international initiatives have been successful so far in contributing to enhancing nuclear forensics and reducing the threat of Nuclear Terrorism? • What kind of new strategic orientation should these internationals initiatives follow to efficiently meet countries’ expectations in terms of implementing relevant IAEA’s nuclear forensics recommendations by undertaking more action- oriented activities? • To what extent does the implementation of the upcoming IAEA Nuclear security 2014-2017 action plan and the nuclear forensics GICNT Woking group (NFWG) guidance document could contribute to strengthen the international nuclear security regime?
        Speaker: Dr A. Farhane (Morocco)
      • 55
        The Use of the Radioactive Isotops for a Cheating in Gambling - An Interaction Between Different Authorities
        The investigation of use of radioactive isotope 125I as a radioactive marker for playing dice is presented in light of interaction between different government regulating bodies. During a routine check at the border cross at Chinggis Khan international airport, the detector was triggered, indicating the presence of a radioactive substance in the bag of an incoming passenger. Three gaming dice with elevated radioactivity were discovered and sent to the Radiation Control Laboratory for the further analysis. The laboratory analysis showed that the side with four points was painted with paint containing 125I. Spectral analysis showed characteristic X-ray and Gamma ray lines and decay half-life time, found by comparing the intensities of two measurements done two months apart, prove that the paint contains the 125I isotope. This investigation became possible thanks to the comprehensive array of radiation monitoring systems working in 15 check points around the Mongolian borders to check passengers, cars and trains crossing the international border. The monitors are capable detecting neutron and gamma radiation.
        Speaker: Dr O. Dorjkhaidav (Mongolia)
      • 56
        Threat of Radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control in Egypt; Orphan Sources
        An orphan source is a radioactive source that posses sufficient radiological hazard to warrant regulatory control, but which is not under regulatory control because it has never been so, or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or other wise transferred without proper authorization. A vulnerable source is one, but its level of control is weak. It can be regarded as a source that could easily become orphaned. In recent years, orphan sources have caused multiple fatalities or serious injuries when unperceived individuals have found them. Because of their small size, potency, availability, and “nuclear” nature, there is concern that a terrorist could use a radiation source to create a “radiological weapon,” or “dirty bomb.” The ruthlessness of the Sept. 11 attacks makes it clear that the risks of a nuclear terrorist act are higher than previously thought. Several accidents have occurred involving abandoned radioactive facilities, inappropriate disposed sources or sources use outside regulatory control. Lake of control is due to different reasons, but in all cases immediately before the accident no one was responsible of its safety and security control. In the spring of 2000, three people died in Egypt because of a sealed source that came into the possession of a farmer. As this incident illustrates there is possibility of death and injury to the public due to sealed sources. Mismanaged sealed sources can have a devastating effect on health and environment. Maliciously used sealed sources pose an even greater risk. Therefore a program is needed in Egypt, which leads to the safe and secure management and use of sealed sources. Integrated Management Program for radioactive sealed sources (IMPRSS) Project started in 2003 and it is a cooperative development between the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (EAEA), Egyptian Ministry of Health (MOH), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), New Mexico Tech University (NMT), and Agriculture Cooperative Development International (ACDI/VOCA). SNL coordinated the work scope between the participant organizations. The EAEA, MOH, SNL, ACDI/VOCA and NMT are worked to develop an integrated program for managing RS in Egypt. The IMPRSS Project will enable Egypt to safe manage all aspects of RS, from an education awareness program to recovery, storage, and ultimate disposal of unwanted sources.
        Speaker: Prof. M. Abdel Geleel (Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority, Egypt)
    • Technical Session 2E: Experiences in Laboratory Analyses and Data Interpretation
      Conveners: Mr E. Van Zalen (Netherlands) , Mr R. Chiappini (France)
      • 57
        Identification of Unknown Nuclear Material
        The identification of unknown nuclear material found undeclared away from designated locations in the nuclear fuel cycle, is an important task in the frame of nuclear forensics. Nuclear forensics is concerned with the timely interception of illicit nuclear material and the determination of its trafficking route from diversion to interception. This could then lead to measures taken in order to combating future diversions of nuclear material away from its designated areas. This work demonstrates an isotopic fingerprinting method to determine the origin of ‘unknown’ nuclear material with forensic importance, for example from spent nuclear fuel activities. The origin is determined from the characterisation of the material in terms of its initial enrichment, reactor type and burnup. The characterisation is based on the fact that the composition of spent nuclear fuel in individual nuclides is inherently consistent. A given composition of spent nuclear fuel, being the outcome of its initial composition, reactor type and irradiation history, should characterise uniquely the fuel and hence identify its origin. The methodology is based on the multivariate statistical technique of factor analysis, complemented by spent fuel isotopic composition information, either simulated using the zero-dimensional depletion computer code ORIGEN or from PIEs such as the databank SFCOMPO. A major source of error in the calculation of the evolution of the fuel in a reactor is the burnup dependence of the cross-sections used. The cross-section libraries should accurately represent a given reactor-fuel system. The sought characterisation of the unknown material is obtained from the comparison of its U, Pu composition with compositions simulating well known spent fuels from a range of commercial nuclear power stations. Then, the unknown fuel has the same origin as the commercial fuel with which it exhibits the highest similarity in U, Pu composition. The procedure groups together spent fuels from the same reactors, while resolving them well on the basis of burnup and enrichment. Furthermore, it predicts correctly the origin of the ‘unknowns'. Acknowledgements The International Atomic Energy Agency is gratefully recognized for supporting financially this work under a CRP contract.
        Speaker: Prof. G. Nikolaou (Greece)
      • 58
        Characterization of Nuclear Material Interdicted in South Africa
        As part of the effort to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear forensics and nuclear security, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s national laboratories at Livermore (LLNL) and Los Alamos (LANL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (Necsa) in 2011 to collaborate on establishing, maintaining and strengthening nuclear forensic capabilities in South Africa. As part of this on-going collaborative engagement, Necsa and LLNL are collaborating on the analysis of a uranium-rich sample recently seized in Durban, South Africa in a coordinated operation involving the South African Police Services, the National Prosecution Authority of South Africa and the South Africa Nuclear Energy Corporation. An aliquot of the seized material was transferred to LLNL by the Necsa’s Nuclear Obligations Management Services Department following protocols and procedures outlined in the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series No. 2 Model Action Plan. We will discuss the results of the forensic analyses including major and trace element composition, uranium assay, isotope abundances for O, U, Sr and Pb, near IR/VIS spectroscopy, morphology and grain size, molecular structure and ‘age’ (time since the last chemical purification). These data will be compared to information contained in the NNSA’s Uranium Sourcing Database and used to help constrain potential sites of origin of the material.
        Speaker: Dr I. Hutcheon (United States of America)
      • 59
        Informativeness of Microparticle Analysis for Nuclear Forensics
        Investigation of individual microparticles can be useful for nuclear forensics goals in several cases: • Determination of characteristics of nuclear material out of regulatory control, when material is not seized, but some trace amounts of material are found anywhere, including crime scene; • Determination of the transfer rout of material, which is or was found out of regulatory control, as well as possible sites of processing, people and items, which could be involved to illicit trafficking; • Indicating real manufacturer of the seized material, if the same materials could be produced by different manufacturers. Traces of other materials inherent to real manufacturer can indicate it in such cases; • Determination of characteristics of nuclear materials seized out of regulatory control in the form of mixture of different materials powders. Investigation of microparticles can provide prosecution with information about material characteristics, including age of material, as well as about mechanisms of particles formation. Elemental composition (including impurities) of particles, isotopic composition of uranium, plutonium, other radioactive elements, content of isotopes-chronographs should be determined for material characterization. Shapes, sizes and surface structures of individual microparticles should be investigated for determination of mechanisms of particles formation and kinds of operations with nuclear materials accordingly. One of the important characteristics of seized nuclear material is isotopic composition of uranium and/or plutonium. TIMS in combination with detection of particles by using fission track technology or SIMS are used for isotopic analysis. In the result of sputtering of reference material particle the ratios n(235U)/n(238U) = 0,00704 ± 0,00005 and n(234U)/n(238U) = 0,0000530 ± 0,0000042 were measured. Reference ratios are n(235U)/n(238U) = 0,0070439 ± 0,0000035 and n(234U)/n(238U) = 0,000049817 ± 0,000000048. Thus, approximately 7 fg of uranium-235 in that particle was measured with relative error less than 1%, and approximately 0.05 fg of uranium-234 – was measured with relative error less than 10%. Same results were obtained for analysis of plutonium particles. Typical particle morphologies, which can characterize the production processes, are investigated in the paper [1]. Scanning electron microscopy is used for morphology analysis. The determination of morphology details with sizes down to 0,1 µm on the surface and on the shape of microparticles is possible. Detection of particles with typical morphology allows to characterize the kind of facility, which can be concerned to the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Elemental composition of the particle can be determined by using energy dispersive or wavelength dispersive X-rays detectors practically together with morphology investigation. Detection limits of weight concentration for different chemical elements are (0,2 … 0.5)% for energy dispersive detectors. For wavelength dispersive detectors detection limits are approximately one order smaller. The age of nuclear and other radioactive materials can be determined by using both: bulk and particle analysis. But age determination by using bulk techniques can be correct only if one material is presented in analyzed sample and no isotope-chronograph presents in background particles. For particle analysis these restrictions are not valid. Practically one particle always characterizes only one material and does not contain background isotopes-chronographs. Mass-spectrometer Cameca IMS-4f allows to determine the age of HEU ~ 20 y with uncertainty ~ 3,5 y in particles with sizes ~ 8 µm. First determination of the age of uranium in particles by using LG-SIMS is implemented in work [2]. More modern techniques for new LG-SIMS are now in progress. REFERENCES 1. V. Stebelkov. Informativeness of Morfology Analysis of Uranium Microparticles from Industrial Dust at Nuclear Plants. Proceedings of International Conference GLOBAL 2005 "Nuclear Systems for Future Generation and Global Sustainability", October 9-13, 2005, Tsukuba, Japan. Paper No. 084 2. G. Tamborini. PhD Thesis, 1999
        Speaker: Dr V. Stebelkov (Laboratory for Microparticle Analysis, Russian Federation)
      • 60
        Characterization of U.S. Plutonium: Understanding Our Data
        Most of the US’s plutonium and highly enriched uranium was produced for our nuclear weapons program. The plutonium is nominally characterized as containing ~93% 239Pu and the HEU as containing ~93% 235U. However, these two isotopes alone are not sufficient to uniquely characterize either of these two elements. For both HEU and Pu, additional isotopes may be required, coupled with chemical data. This paper will discuss the approach we developed to characterizing US plutonium. US plutonium was produced in two different types of reactors, operated at two separate sites. A total of eight light-water cooled, graphite moderated reactors were operated at the Hanford Engineering Works (HEW). Five heavy-water cooled and moderated reactors were operated at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Plutonium produced by irradiation of natural uranium in these two reactors types can be distinguished by its isotopic vector (238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu, and 242Pu). However, when we compared the isotopic vector of plutonium in our current stockpile, it often “looked” quite different from what we originally produced. The paper presents information on “as produced” US plutonium and how that relates to “in inventory” plutonium.
        Speaker: J. Wacker (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
    • Technical Session 2F: Exercises and Cooperation
      Conveners: Ms H. Le Quang (Viet Nam) , Mr J. Vaclav (Slovakia)
      • 61
        Periodical Radiological Crime Scene Management exercises in Germany
        The role of the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) in the entire system for the defence against nuclear hazards in Germany has been described previously [1] and will be described only very briefly in this contribution. The BfS engages in many exercises and training courses on the topic of nuclear security measures of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control [2]. It also provides assistance at major public events at the request of the security authorities [3]. This contribution will describe ongoing periodical radiological crime scene management exercises between the BfS, the German Federal Criminal Police (BKA) and the German Federal Police (BPol) in the framework of the Central Federal Support Group in Response to Serious Nuclear Threats (ZUB). After the investigation of the Polonium-incident in Hamburg in 2006 [4], such exercises were established and carried out periodically. They are conducted at least once a year on a large scale to practise the cooperation and team work between BfS, BKA and Bpol. This paper will focus on the practical procedures at a contaminated crime scene depending on the main objectives of the exercise for example decontamination procedures, buried sources or data recovery from contaminated electronic devices but will also include certain aspects that are constantly being practised, like inter-office communication, medical emergencies in a contaminated environment or general health and safety issues. Additionally, examples of the equipment used by the BfS for radiological crime scene management will be discussed. This contribution will also point out the importance of having experienced personnel present and the importance of learning about the professional skills of the partners. The experience and best practice knowledge gained by the BfS over the years through organizing and participating in these exercises together with the German security authorities will be shared. Within the framework of the ZUB, BfS is responsible for all aspects of radiation protection, including the radiological safety and dosimetry of all personnel involved in the actual crime scene management. To fulfill these tasks, BfS is training its personnel to take over pre-defined roles and responsibilities, developed together with the police and defined by experience gathered in different exercises, including • On-scene commander for all BfS personnel • Detection / Search teams • Air lock operators • Glove box operators • Radiological advisors for the decontamination unit of the police • Documentation officers • Radiological advisors on questions of risk assessment, handling of and transportation of contaminated evidence Additionally BfS is training with the DVI unit of BKA to prepare for the possibility of a dirty bomb crime scene with casualties or a crime scene with contaminated corpses. There is also training to investigate contaminated evidence in a glove box and to pack and transport contaminated evidence to an external partner (ITU). The main lessons learned by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection will be presented at the conclusion of the contribution. These are based around the following general points: • Personnel and equipment resources needed for radiological crime scene management • Early coordination between police authorities and radiation protection authorities is essential; • Written procedures and measurement protocolls for the radiation protection staff must be developed and exercised on a regular basis • Surveilence of the exercise by video equipment is important to allow supervisors and observers to view the performance of the personnel while letting them perform their duties unrestrained • Necessity for experienced personnel who have worked together previously In conclusion, maintinig an annual radiological crime scene management exercise is the basis for BfS, BKA and BPol to be well prepared in case of a radiological emergency. The roles and responsibilities have been defined by experience and personnel is being trained specifically for these tasks. References [1] J.-T. Eisheh, Poster contribution, Edinburgh, IAEA International Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking, 2007, "Defence against Nuclear Hazards in Germany: the federal approach.” [2] E. A. Kroeger, oral presentation, Vienna, IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, 2009, "Joint Exercises and Training of Law Enforcers and Radiation Protection Advisors for the Defence against Nuclear Hazards in Germany - Experience Gathered on the Federal Level." [3] E. A. Kroeger, Vienna, IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, 2013, “Radiation Detection at Major Public Events from the Perspective of the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection.” [4] G. Kirchner, Vienna, IAEA, STI/PUB-1460, 2010, “The Litvinenko polonium-210 case - German experiences.”
        Speaker: Dr H. Kroeger (Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Germany)
      • 62
        The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG): The Evidence Working Group
        In a law enforcement investigation, evidence from the scene of a crime is critical in identifying suspects, developing tangential investigative leads, and linking individuals or groups to criminal actions. It is therefore imperative that evidence be collected, stored, and examined in a manner to best preserve those characteristics important to the investigation, the prosecution, and likewise to the defense. While the proper handling of evidence is well practiced on a daily basis worldwide, evidence from a nuclear security event, that is, the addition of radioactive/nuclear material to the event site and to the evidence, can present unique and very difficult challenges to both the forensic collector and the forensic service provider. The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is an informal collaboration among practitioners of nuclear forensics - laboratory scientists, law enforcement personnel, and regulatory officials - who share a common interest in preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. In 2012, the ITWG established the Evidence Working group to address common issues with the collection, transport, analysis, and reporting on evidence contaminated with or consisting of radioactive and nuclear materials. In 2013 at the annual ITWG meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, the following tasks were set before the assembled volunteers. • Proposed Task #1: Develop a document to discuss chain of custody/continuity of evidence. The chain of custody/continuity of evidence refers to those procedures and documents that account for the integrity of physical evidence by tracking its handling and storage from its point of collection to its final disposition. Such a document would aid laboratories not currently performing forensic work to understand the intricacies of chain of custody/continuity of evidence and how these may be implemented. • Proposed Task #2; Development of a series of topical papers on the conduct of traditional forensic examinations on evidence containing nuclear or other radioactive material. These traditional forensic examinations include fingerprints (also referred to as fingermarks), genetic markers such as nuclear DNA, and toolmarks. Procedures exist for conducting such examinations on evidence that is free of detectable nuclear or other radioactive material. But procedures for evidence containing nuclear or other radioactive material are less well-developed. This series of documents would be developed for both the radioactive/nuclear materials laboratory where these techniques may be applied and for law enforcement, who may be bringing these techniques into a radioactive/nuclear materials laboratory. • Proposed Task #3: Development of an evidence collection plan framework document. What information would forensic collectors need to ensure that they properly consider the packaging, storage, transport of items of evidence which may be radioactive or contaminated with radioactive materials. This includes balancing the needs of the investigator with the acceptance requirements of the receiving laboratory. This document would discuss the needs for a comprehensive, yet flexible plan describing the collection of evidence. • Proposed Task #4: Development of an Examination Plan Checklist. The Examination Plan is the master control of what happens to the evidence, who does what, which procedures are performed, etc. Eventhough examination plans are critical documents, they are often written in haste and with minimal forethought to other investigative and safety needs. An Examination Plan checklist would provide the nuclear forensic laboratory a step-wise path ensuring that important points (such as destructive vs. nondestructive analysis) are brought out and agreed upon by the examiners and the law enforcement officials. After discussion about the scope of this new working group and how the previous four (4) tasks are within this scope, the following points were agreed upon by the volunteers present. • The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group’s “Guidelines for Evidence Collection in a Radiological or Nuclear Contaminated Crime Scene”, published in 06 June 2011 is the basis for our work. • Several volunteers agreed to expand and develop Proposed Task #1 and Proposed Task #2. Volunteers for Task #1 will be using a draft version of a document begun in the ITWG Guidelines Working Group, while additional volunteers will be working on Proposed Task #2 drawing from published scientific works and personal experiences. • Proposed Task #3 and Proposed #4 require further discussions and were tabled until a future date. Overall, the first meeting of the ITWG Evidence Working Group was a success. It established a clear path forward for several new documents which will aid those who will handle, examine, and store radioactive/nuclear evidence. Emphasis will be placed on supporting the radioactive/nuclear materials laboratory, the nuclear forensics service provider, the traditional forensics service provider, and law enforcement organizations.
        Speaker: Dr J. Blankenship (United States of America)
      • 63
        Galaxy Serpent: A Web-Based Table-Top Exercise for National Nuclear Forensics Libraries
        Galaxy Serpent is a first-of-a-kind, virtual, web-based international table-top exercise, where teams of scientists from various countries 1) used provided public domain spent fuel compositions to formulate their own national nuclear forensics library (NNFL), and 2) determined if hypothetically seized spent nuclear fuel is or is not consistent with their national nuclear forensics library. This table-top exercise is conducted under the auspices of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) and involved approximately 24 teams of scientists. Galaxy Serpent aimed to promote “best practices” through providing a vehicle for participants to gather key technical expertise to create a NNFL using guidelines in IAEA documents and to illustrate the potential probative benefits offered by creating such a library. During the play of Galaxy Serpent, many teams quickly saw the need to involve other areas of expertise such as nuclear reactor engineers and fuel experts. The involvement of such additional experts helps to mature the expertise of the nuclear forensics international community. Teams also noted that different technical approaches yielded similar analytical conclusions. In addition, some of Galaxy Serpent teams have used this table-top exercise experience to inform their efforts at home to develop their own NNFLs.
        Speaker: Dr J. Borgardt (Juniata College, USA)
      • 64
        Tiger Reef: Cross-Disciplinary Training Workshop and Tabletop Exercise, 4-7 February 2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
        On 4-7 February 2014, the Government of Malaysia and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) hosted a regional workshop and exercise on nuclear forensics, Tiger Reef: Cross-Disciplinary Training and Tabletop Exercise. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand provided special support in organising the event in Kuala Lumpur. The event, comprised a one-day workshop and two-day tabletop exercise, focused on developing a common understanding on the issues involved in responding to a crime scene involving nuclear or other radioactive material, in a cooperative manner, which will ensure safe, effective and efficient operations. The workshop and exercise drew together more than 100 participants from 21 countries, primarily in Southeast Asia and two GICNT official observers, namely the EU and the INTERPOL. Participants included experts from the crime scene management and the emergency response, health, and safety communities who worked to identify cross-disciplinary training opportunities and gaps for those communities. The event clearly illustrated the importance of training crime scene managers and response experts in each other’s fields so that emergency response is not impeded and to minimise the potential for evidence to be compromised. Tiger Reef ultimately reinforced the concept that a well-trained and coordinated response will save lives and identify those responsible for perpetrating a nuclear security event. It identified key best practices of the participating partners in developing a national cross-disciplinary training program. Best Practices Tiger Reef effectively demonstrated that coordination and communication among groups of experts is not just possible, but ideal. Participants recognised that a nuclear security event will involve numerous stakeholders with complementary missions, but often conflicting goals. Participants came to the following conclusions: • Efforts to learn, coordinate, and collaborate across expert communities before an event occurs will enhance how these communities communicate and work together in a real world event. • Important and useful training resources are currently available through many sources, including the IAEA, INTERPOL, the European Union, various centres of excellence, private industry, and bilateral government arrangements. • Policy makers should focus on the following points of interaction between organisations or groups of experts when developing national response plans or training programmes for responding to a nuclear security event: o establishing radiation zones; o establishing access points; o handling perimeter and other security issues; o triage/rescue recovery/evacuation; o decontamination; o collecting and controlling evidence; o coordinating public messaging; and o responding to additional threats. • Available training resources should be adapted to encourage cross-disciplinary training, or training across organisational or agency lines, to enhance coordination and communication in a crisis environment. • Tabletop and field exercises are particularly valuable (even necessary) as part of a national cross-disciplinary training program. • Countries should incorporate a graded approach to training and exercises, in which the complexity and scale of the training and exercises is gradually increased over time. This systematic approach to training and exercises will allow organizations and personnel to first gain the required knowledge and skills before participating in larger, more complex training events with multiple stakeholders. Next Steps Tiger Reef’s participants and organisers agreed that these steps should be implemented: • Present analogies at future events: Tiger Reef included two presentations outside the nuclear sphere—one on cross-organisation communication and one on Malaysia’s national response to a biological incident. Each of these presentations allowed participants a chance to break down barriers and begin interacting openly with one another, while also providing an opportunity to think outside of their typical day-to-day work. Analogies also allow the nuclear security community to leverage lessons learned and best practices of other complex security issues. • Promote training programs and activities of partner organisations: the GICNT will work with other partner organisations such as the IAEA and INTERPOL to uplift their current activities and collaborate to enhance training opportunities. • Plan a follow-on event: the GICNT’s Response and Mitigation Working Group and the Nuclear Forensics Working Group will hold a follow-on exercise on cross-disciplinary training in another region to draw new perspectives and continue the important work started in Malaysia.
        Speaker: Mr M.S. Zulkipli (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Malaysia)
    • 3:20 PM
      Coffee break:
    • Technical Session 2G: Integration of Existing National Resources into Nuclear Forensic Capabilities

      followed by

      Panel Session 2H
      Discussion on Integration of Existing National Resources into Nuclear Forensics Capabilities

      Conveners: Mr D.M. Hill (Australia) , Ms M. Sinaga (Indonesia)
      • 65
        Establishing Canada’s National Nuclear Forensics Laboratory Network
        Subsequent to the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Canada concluded that its existing capability for nuclear forensics would best be augmented by establishing a national nuclear forensics laboratory network, which would include a capability to perform forensic analysis of evidence contaminated with radioactive material. At the same time, the need for a national nuclear forensics library of signatures of nuclear and radioactive materials was recognized. The Defence Research and Development Canada Centre for Security Science (DRDC CSS), a joint initiative of DRDC and Public Safety Canada, funds science and technology initiatives to enhance Canada’s preparedness for, prevention of, and response to potential threats. DRDC CSS, with assistance from Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), is leading the Canadian National Nuclear Forensics Capability Project to develop a coordinated, comprehensive, and timely national Nuclear Forensics capability. A robust nuclear forensics program requires a wide range of expertise found across several government agencies, making it necessary to formalize a network of these organizations, providing a framework for collaboration. Canada’s Nuclear Forensics Laboratory Network is envisioned to consist of several laboratories with complementary capabilities in the fields of radioactive measurements, analytical chemistry (both isotopic and elemental compositions), physical characterization, optical and electronic microscopy, and surface and particle analysis, as well as having radioactive/nuclear material handling facilities. In addition, law enforcement agencies and other federal departments are partners in the project providing advice and guidance on the overall direction of the development effort, in order to ensure that the project outputs are consistent with the requirements and expectations of the user community. In order to expand and strengthen Canadian capabilities, a strong collaboration is required among radiation scientists, forensic scientists, law enforcement, policy makers, and operational support teams, such as radiation protection and nuclear materials handling specialists. The process of building up this integrated laboratory network has commenced, with several tasks already underway, including, identification of requirements for laboratories within the network, cataloguing of current network laboratory capabilities, drawing up of action plans to address any identified capability gaps, and development and delivery of training plans for nuclear and classical forensic scientists. As the project progresses, it will undertake the planning and execution of both inter laboratory comparisons and an operational exercise geared towards lab network implementation. The paper presents Canada’s approach to establishing the laboratory network component of this national nuclear forensics capability, and discusses project tasks in detail, including challenges encountered during implementation of these tasks.
        Speaker: Dr F. Dimayuga (Canada)
      • 66
        The Network of Russian Analytical Laboratories for Support of Nuclear Forensics
        Russian Federation has a well developed system of forensics organizations in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Interior and Federal Security Service. This system is capable to implement the wide range of expert investigations of traditional (non-radioactive) material evidences such as fingerprints, biological traces, microparticles of natural and anthropogenic origin, etc. These organizations are staffed by the highly qualified experts. At the same time no laboratory of this system has the necessary experience in analysis of nuclear and radioactive materials and no specialized forensics laboratory is able to implement a study of conventional and radioactive material evidence simultaneously. Therefore cooperation of these organizations with laboratories which can provide appropriate analysis of nuclear and radioactive materials is necessary for the solution of nuclear forensics tasks. Decision of the following basic analytical tasks can be required in the process of nuclear forensic investigations for achieving the overall objective of criminal investigations: • Measurement of the content and isotopic composition of uranium, plutonium and other radioactive materials in samples – for identifying the materials and determination of the possible fields of their use; • Determination of the elemental composition of nuclear and other radioactive samples, including elemental composition of impurities – for identification of possible manufacturer of the materials; • Determination of morphological characteristics of nuclear material fragments – for identification of possible manufacturer of the materials; • Detection of the trace amounts of nuclear and other radioactive materials on the clothing, household items, in samples, collected at the crime scene and at the suspected crime scene – for determination of the route of illicit trafficking and the circle of involved persons; • Detection of the nuclear and other radioactive materials including their trace amounts on the body, in the organs and in the metabolism products – for determination of the circle of involved persons; • Measurement of isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium in microparticles – for identifying the materials and determination of the possible fields of their use; • Determination of elemental composition and morphological characteristics of microparticles of nuclear and other radioactive materials – for determination of mechanism of its formation and of possible manufacturer of the materials; • Measurement of the content of isotopes-chronographs in all types of specimens and samples, as well as in individual microparticles – for determination of the date of production of nuclear or other radioactive materials. Analytical capabilities of laboratories are the main component of country’s capability in the field of nuclear forensics. These analytical capabilities determine country's ability to implement comprehensive investigation of any incident with illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Capabilities of analytical laboratories are determined by: • Qualification of analysts; • Level of the used analytical equipment; • Methodological support. Four organizations cover analytical nuclear forensics needs in Russia. These are: Information and analytical center for identification of nuclear materials, founded on the base of analytical division of Rosatom’s Bochvar Institute, analytical subdivisions of Rosatom’s Khlopin Radium Institute and Federal Medical Biophysical Center, “Laboratory for Microparticle Analysis”. No one of these analytical subdivisions can decide all mentioned analytical tasks on the level of the best world standards. But each of them possesses some unique analytical techniques, which correspond to the world level, and these four analytical subdivisions together are able to solve all analytical tasks for nuclear forensics on the best possible quality.
        Speaker: G. Kochev (Russian Federation)
      • 67
        Development of Nuclear Forensics Capabilities in Japan
        According to the IAEA technical guidance for nuclear forensics (NF) starting from incident response and going to sampling, distribution, analysis and finally interpretation in illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials [1], NF laboratory has to enable the identification of unique characteristics in the seized materials, to provide investigative leads and support prosecution outcomes and then to enhance State security. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has started the development of analytical techniques for establishment of the NF laboratory with responsibilities to accomplish the analytical techniques such as isotope ratio measurement, impurity measurement, particle analysis, uranium age determination and development of a prototype national NF library against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. In the conference, capabilities of the NF technologies in Japan will be presented in order to share our experience with international NF community. Need to establish international cooperation regime on realistic NF approach will also be discussed in this paper. Reference [1] IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2, Nuclear Forensics Support, Technical Guidance, STI/PUB/1241, 2006.
        Speaker: Dr N. Shinohara (Japan)
      • 68
        Armenian Nuclear Forensic Lab
        After the disintegration of the USSR, a situation developed in Armenia where, at the enterprises using radioactive sources, control over sources had been extremely weakened for the following reasons: 1. The majority of the industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes of federal submission, including so-called "enterprises of the military department", from the end of the 1980s practically ceased to function. Further processes of manufacturing equipment renewal did not take into account radioactive sources of scientific and industrial purpose. 2. In connection with the shutdown of enterprises, there were few opportunities to properly take regulatory control over nuclear and radiological sources due to the lack of qualified personnel. There is a set of the facts confirming the above-stated information. In particular, there were many cases when highly active sources were found in possession of persons who knew nothing about the danger to which they and their environment were exposed. The situation is complicated further because radioactive sources can become a subject of illegal trade or can be used by people which are unaware of their danger, in other purposes. In 2005, eight sources of ionizing radiation were found (activity from 1 to 30 curie - the first category of danger). Many of these cases involved transportation of radioactive sources and radioactive materials across the border, when in the material was found in cargoes of scrap metal. Such situations represent real dangers for workers in industries that use radiological sources, as well as the general population and the environment. Some examples of illicit trafficking of radioactive sources follow: In January 2009, at the Megry customs point, on the border with Iran, a border radiation monitor recorded a dose rate exceeding the legal limits of a load of lead scrap. Further analysis showed that there was a neutron source, Am-241, in the lead scrap. Information about the incident was submitted to the IAEA. This incident is remarkable because the driver knew that the material in question was a radiological source and tried to hide it from customs officers, having carefully having packed it in layers of lead. Also in 2009, at the Institute of Physical Researches of Academy of Sciences RА, unknown criminals cracked open the door of a room in which a К-1200 device containing radioactive cobalt-60 was placed. The device was destroyed. At that moment its activity was 468,06 curie or 1,7321013 Becquerel. These sources are sources of the first category of danger and represent essential dangers (according to National Rules of Radiation Safety, Governmental order РА from August, 26th, 2006 № 1219-N and 1489Н). In May 2009, during routine radiation monitoring in the village of Noraduz it was revealed that the premises of a repair truck and territory adjoining to it (the area of 300 square meters) were polluted by radioactive isotope Cs-137. Gamma-radiation intensity on the premises ranged from 900 to 1200 μSv/h. Gamma-radiation intensity in the surrounding area was 600-800 μSv/h. Four persons (the owner of the repair truck, his son and two technicians) received radiation doses exceeding the normally established limits. The dose for owner’s son was 128 mSv/year, another person’s internal dose was estimated from 7 to 12 mSv/year. There have been 32 incidents related to radioactive materials in the period from 1999 to 2013 is equal 32. Fig. 1 shows the statistics of these incidents related to the illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and materials, which have been followed by court examinations.
        Speaker: Mr K. Pyuskyulyan (Armenia)
    • Panel Session 2H: Discussion on Integration of Existing National Resources into Nuclear Forensics Capabilities
      Conveners: Mr D. Hill (Australia) , Mrs M. Sinaga (Indonesia)
    • Technical Session 3A: Nuclear Forensic Science: Signatures of Nuclear Material II
      Conveners: Mr S. B. Butt (Pakistan) , Mr T. Fanghaenel (EU)
      • 69
        Nuclear Forensic Science: An Emerging Discipline
        In the early 1990’s there was a marked increase in the number of incidents where nuclear materials were found outside of regulatory control, including cases involving the illicit trafficking or possession of nuclear material. A new subdiscipline of nuclear science emerged out of the need to analyze these materials and use the characterization data to support both the prosecution of individuals involved with illegal activity and the investigation into where regulatory control of material was lost. The new discipline of nuclear forensic science was the result of these events. In many early nuclear forensics cases, the law enforcement officials handed the nuclear materials over to laboratories with expertise in the analysis of these materials without much, if any direction regarding what characterization information was necessary to support the investigation of a case or prosecution of individuals involved. As a result, the inclination of laboratory subject matter experts was to learn as much as possible about the material through a comprehensive characterization, data interpretation, and assessment process to identify the production history and evaluate possible origins for the material. This was not necessarily a bad approach, and ensured a thorough nuclear forensic analysis and assessment regardless of whether that data was ever used to support the investigative or evidentiary needs of law enforcement. It also reinforced the interdisciplinary expertise required to adequately support a nuclear forensic investigation by involving experts in law enforcement, forensic science, radiochemistry, analytical chemistry, geochemistry, nuclear engineering, reactor physics, uranium enrichment, and nuclear material production and processing. Gradually, the relationship between law enforcement and the technical nuclear forensics communities matured and became better coordinated. Measures were taken to ensure a more graded approach to the nuclear forensic analysis of interdicted materials and other materials found outside of regulatory control. This included adopting standardized protocols for law enforcement to communicate to the analysis laboratory what questions they were trying to answer about a material through a technical nuclear forensic examination, collaborative development of analysis plans designed to answer those questions, and adopting quality assurance standards to ensure forensic data is admissible in a court of law. For example, many nuclear forensics laboratories adopted the ISO 17025 standard used by traditional forensics analysis laboratories. The result of this evolution is that nuclear forensics is no longer simply an ad hoc material analysis exercise. Instead, it is a carefully coordinated effort between investigators, forensic examiners, and nuclear science experts to ensure defensible nuclear forensic evidence is available to support all aspects of a case where nuclear material is found outside of regulatory control.
        Speaker: S. LaMont (U.S. Department of Energy)
      • 70
        Identification of High Confidence Nuclear Forensic Signatures by Analysis of Spent Fuel Samples and Other Nuclear Materials
        Nowadays, nuclear forensics has an increasing role worldwide. Several informative parameters have been already found for full characterization of nuclear materials with unknown origin for nuclear forensic purposes. However, international Round Robin exercises in the field resulted in that it is difficult to find exact and responsible parameters (signatures) for indisputable identification. For determination of such reliable signatures, analysis of numerous samples from the same and also different confiscations and batches with different origin would be necessary. Another thing is that although fresh and reprocessed fuel have been mainly in the focus of nuclear forensics, analysis of spent fuel seems also interesting recently. In this work analytical and statistical results are shown for finding high confidence nuclear forensic signatures for origin assessment of spent fuel samples and other nuclear materials. In the case of spent fuel three different methods were found useful for identification: correlation of fission products (e.g. Cs-137), transuranium elements (e.g. total Pu) and the fissile content (U-235, 239,241Pu) versus burn-up (BU). These correlations were obtained by depletion calculation for VVER-440 assemblies. These parameters are specific for reactor types, therefore they are considered as a basis for finding relevant signatures and establish a database (library). Methods were tested during a Round Robin exercise in 2013 for origin assessment of spent fuel statistically. In the case of fresh and reprocessed fuel other analytical data (obtained by NDA and DA techniques) will be shown.
        Speaker: Dr É. Kovács-Széles (Hungary)
      • 71
        Detection and Distinguishing of Uranium Particles and Plutonium Particles by Using Alpha Autoradiography
        The purpose of work is the development of the analytical procedure for the detection of rare uranium and plutonium microparticles on the surfaces of different objects and for determination, is the detected particle uranium or plutonium. Detection of uranium and plutonium particles and determination of the particle component: uranium or plutonium, are based on the results of analysis of the orientation and the shape of tracks, which had been caused by alpha-particles in polycarbonate detector. Besides the number of tracks allows to estimate the amount of uranium or plutonium in particle. Clusters of tracks from uranium particles and from plutonium particles were investigated for experimental confirmation of validity of suggested approach. Both materials, original for microparticles: uranium and plutonium, were none monoisotopic. Uranium was HEU. Main alpha-emitter of that material is U-234. It emits alpha-particles with the energy about 4.8 MeV. The yield of alpha-particles from U-235 with the energy about 4.4 MeV could contain several percents. The yield of alpha-particles from U-238 could contain less than 1%. Main isotopes of the used plutonium were Pu-239 and Pu-240, these isotopes provided alpha-particles with energy about 5.15 MeV. Minor, but much more alpha-radioactive Pu-238 and Am-241 could provide no more than 20% of alpha-particles with energy about 5.5 MeV. Track-detectors TASTRAK CR-39 (Track Analysis Systems Limited, UK) were used for registration of alpha-particles in this work. Prolongation of the large axis R of the track reconstructs the trajectory of emitted alpha-particle from the surface of the uranium or plutonium particle. The crossing of the several tracks trajectories of the same cluster allows to localize microparticle on the surface of investigated subject. Implemented experiments demonstrate that binding accuracy for such technique is less than 10 µm. Shape and size characteristics of the track are the functions of the energy of the emitted alpha-particle in the case of optimal mode of etching of the detector [1, 2]. The study of the geometry parameters of alpha-tracks from thin modeling layers of U-235, Pu-239 and Am-241 [2] shown that diameter d of the curvature of cone top of the track is most dependent on the energy of the alpha-particle. Therefore main attention in this work was paid to investigation of this characteristic of the tracks. Comparison of histograms for uranium and plutonium particles allows to conclude, that alpha-autoradiography of suspicious objects can provide information not only about location of alpha-emitting microparticles on the surface of object, but about material: HEU or plutonium also. Smallest sizes of detectable particles can be estimated by vales: 2 µm for particles of HEU and 0.2 µm – for plutonium particles. Smallest sizes of particles of HEU and plutonium oxides are larger approximately on 10%. REFERENCES 1. A.M. Marenniy. Dielectric track detectors in radiation physics and radiobiological experiment. Moscow: Energoatomizdat, 1987, 181 p. 2. I.E. Vlasova. Microscope track analysis of U- and Pu-bearing microparticles in Environment. PhD Thesis, Moscow, 2010
        Speaker: Dr V. Stebelkov (Russian Federation)
      • 72
        Development of a SIMS Method for Measurement of Oxygen Isotope in Nuclear Forensic Applications
        Introduce: As a new branch of forensic science, nuclear forensics was developed with combination of nuclear radiochemistry and forensics. It aims to identify the origin, transfer path, process and purpose of the seized nuclear materials by analyzing their characteristic attributes. The main characteristic properties are dimensions, isotopic composition, impurities and microstructure, and so on. But sometimes these properties do not enable accurate identification of the origin of the sample, signatures need to be found and analyzed. The oxygen isotopic ratio 18O /16O varies ranging from 1% to 5% in nature[ , , , ], and the oxygen element are concomitant with uranium ores and uranium products in the nuclear fuel cycle. So, the oxygen composition is usually regarded as one of these signatures. The classical method for analyzing the oxygen isotopic ratio need more sample consuming, complex chemical process and long measuring time. It is necessary to develop a reliable, fast technique to determine accurately the oxygen ratio in the uranium oxides. SIMS is a convenient method for analyzing the oxygen isotope ratios in natural materials. The spatial resolution can reach 0.5-1 μm by the ion microprobe mode and the compositions, depth of tiny samples could be analyzed[ ]. So contaminated particles adhere to samples can be analyzed. Experiments: In the work, the sample was sputtered with magnetically filtered 133Cs+primary ions of 10 kV impact energy. The primary current was about 10 pA. The secondary accelerated volt was negative 5 kV. To reduce the background contribution from residual atmospheric oxygen, the source housing was flushed with N2 gas until the background counts could not be detected. Secondary ions 16O- and 18O- were detected by an electron multiplier (EM) with correction for dead time (25ns), the ion collection mode was peak jumping. Oxidated metal-uranium sample was stuck to the graphite disk by conductor glue. Result and discuss: The intensity of secondary ion was almost linear with the primary ion current until it reached the maximum counts of EM. The measuring RSD of n(18O-)/n(16O-) was about 9.5% and 1% when the intensity of 18O- was 50~100 and 100~3000 counts per second respectively. During sputtering, the intensity of secondary ion increased rapidly at the beginning of 300 seconds and the intensity became stable subsequently. According to the measurement result of n(18O-)/n(16O-) , there were no different between using focused primary ion and unfocused one. The results were same at the mass resolution of 300 and 2542, but the intensity of secondary ion at 2542 was only 20% of that at 300. Summary: These operational parameters of SIMS were studied for measuring the oxygen isotope ratio in metal-uranium and the method of SIMS was developed. The same sample was measured at different time, the value of n(18O-)/n(16O-) ratios were same. This proved that the method was reliable and suited to measure the oxygen isotope ratio for nuclear forensic science.
        Speaker: Dr T. Wang (China)
      • 73
        Probing Forensic Signatures of Nuclear Materials
        Processes conducted to extract uranium out of natural ore, recover uranium from leach solutions, and purify feed material for specific end uses are chemical in nature (1). These activities provide the opportunity for chemical reagents or reaction intermediates to carry over into uranium end-products. Measurements of chemical signatures provide information that is important to forensic analyses of process materials such as uranium oxides. However, chemical speciation may transform over time as a result of exposure to environmental conditions. To better understand detectable process signatures, we have initiated an effort to examine temporal changes in morphology and chemical speciation of high-purity uranium oxide powders subjected to environmental temperatures and relative humidities. The range of chemical compositions of uranium oxides is considerable and complicated, providing challenges to measurement and interpretation, particularly in non-crystalline materials. We have explored the use of X-ray diffraction analysis and synchrotron-based X-ray Absorption Spectroscopy to probe temporal changes in the valence states and chemical speciation of uranium oxide powders. These tools provide complementary means for characterizing subtle changes in amorphous samples. Results are compared with images collected by Scanning Electron Microscopy employed to evaluate morphology. We have prepared a series of high-purity, well characterized uranium oxide powders (UO2, U3O8, and UO3), which have been exposed to carefully controlled simulated environmental conditions for several years. Using the analytical tools described above, we have collected an extensive set of physicochemical data that can be used as a benchmark suite for both the development of scientific insight and for comparison with “real-world” process materials. Our ultimate goal is to exploit the rich, albeit complex, information from these complimentary diagnostic probes to support the reconstruction of a samples’ process history. Success in this effort will require expertise in analytical methods, chemistry, materials science, process engineering and theory. LA-UR 13-29048 References: 1. Grenthe, I.; Drożdżyński, J.; Fujino, T.; Buck, E. C.; Albrecht-Schmitt, T. E.; Wolf, S. F. Uranium. In The Chemistry of the Actinide and Transactinide Elements, 3rd ed.; Morrs, L. R., Edelstein, N. N., Fuger, J., Katz, J. J., Eds.; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2006; Chapter 5, pp 253-698. This work has been supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, under competitively awarded IAA HSHQDC-08-X-00805. This support does not constitute an express or implied endorsement on the part of the Government.
        Speaker: Dr M. Wilkerson (United States of America)
    • Technical Session 3B: Nuclear Forensic Science: Synergies with Other Disciplines I
      Conveners: I. Roger (INTERPOL) , Ms M. Nizamska (Bulgaria)
      • 74
        Analytical Capabilities of the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute in View of Nuclear Forensics Challenges
        The V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute is Russia's leading organization providing technical services in radiochemistry to the nuclear industry. Its activities include research and development, analytical laboratory services, environmental investigations, waste treatment engineering, accident response, and production of specialized nuclear materials such as radioisotopes, isotopic standards, labeled organic compounds, sources, and radiation detectors. The Radium Institute has, since its establishment in 1922, maintained the highest scientific standards. In 1974 the Institute joined IAEA Network of analytical laboratories and as such is qualified currently for analysis of nuclear material and environmental samples, provision of reference materials and QC functions. The main tasks in the industry • Development and application of high-sensitive and precision methods of NM analysis • Analysis of NM in any matrices and in all ranges of concentrations: • Determination of radionuclide composition of SNF • Determination of burnup of high- burn-up fuel • NM isotopic composition and content in the environmental samples and RAW • Manufacturing of and supply to the industry enterprises of the NM reference materials The tasks of the KRI in cooperation with the IAEA • Analysis of the inspectorate samples for IAEA safeguards • Development of high-sensitive and precision analytical methods for NM measurements • Development of and participation in the Quality Assurance Programs for analytical measurements • Manufacturing of and delivery to the IAEA NM Reference materials Analytical methods of NM measurements • Isotope dilution mass-spectrometry • Precision spectro-photometry • Titrimetric methods • Luminescence of uranium and neptunium • Chemical-spectral trace analysis • The alpha, beta, gamma radiometry • Neutron analytical methods The combination of the methods available at the KRI and the experience gained in analytical research and development makes it possible to be confident in getting analytical signatures of the investigated nuclear materials in view of nuclear forensics chalanges Table. Measurement parameters Method Uncertainty Detection limit Laser-luminescent of uranium 5-10 % in solutions - 10-11 g/ml; in soil and plant ash – 0,01 ppm Laser-luminescent of plutonium 5-10 % in solutions– 5 . 10-11 g/ml; in soil and plant ash – 0,05 ppm Isotope dilution mass-spectrometry of uranium, plutonium, americium, curium £ 0,1¸0,2 % 238U – 10-12 g Other isotopes – 10-14 g plutonium – 10-15 g americium – 10-15 g Isotope dilution alpha-spectrometry of plutonium £ 0,5¸0,6 % 10-12 g Potentiometric determination of uranium £ 0,1 % 10 mg Spectro-photometric determination of uranium and plutonium by self-absorption £ 0,1¸0,2 % 100 mg Spectro-photometric determination of uranium and plutonium and thorium with arsenazo III £ 0,1% 10 mkg NM gamma-spectrometric determination 5 % uranium ~ 50 mkg plutonium ~ 50 ng Alpha-spectrometric determination of plutonium, uranium, neptunium, americium 5-8 % 5. 10 -4 Bq/g
        Speaker: Dr Y. Panteleev (Russian Federation)
      • 75
        i2®©: Investigative and Interpretive Radiochemistry - The Precursor to Nuclear Forensics
        In the early 1990’s when radioactive material began to feature in legal proceedings following its interception by Government Agencies there was a requirement for analysis of the material to support the judicial process. This requirement went on to grow into what is now commonly known as Nuclear Forensic Science. Since the discovery of radioactivity at the close of the 19th Century the science of radiochemistry has developed to address topics related to the uses of radioactivity. The techniques developed over the roughly 100 years between the discovery of radiochemistry and the early 1990s form the basis of Nuclear Forensic Science. This paper will highlight some of the achievements of the radiochemistry community in the century prior to 1990 which were available to be used and built upon as validated science to support the needs of the legal and judicial communities when required in the last two decades as part of the Nuclear Forensic Science Community. © British Crown Owned Copyright [2014]/AWE
        Speaker: Mr P. Thompson (United Kingdom)
      • 76
        Capabilities of Hybrid SIMS-SSAMS System for Nuclear Forensics Applications
        Mass spectrometry of particulate samples by Secondary Ion Mass Spectrometry (SIMS) is a very useful tool for nuclear forensics. However, there are limitations from interferences caused by molecular species, such as 238U1H while measuring 239Pu. These interferences (> 104 M/ΔM) can exceed the resolving power of SIMS. Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) is capable of eliminating such molecular ion interferences, but this technique does not provide spatial information and generally requires use of negative ions. This requirement limits its sensitivity, since actinide and lanthanide elements preferentially generate positive atomic ions (~104 : 1). The US Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) has just installed a hybrid SIMS-AMS system, using a Single Stage AMS (SSAMS) as a replacement for the normal electron multiplier detector for a Cameca IMS 4f SIMS. The NRL design enables analysis of either positive or negative ions. Thus, this system offers the potential to provide SIMS-like particle analysis, but without the forest of signals from molecular species, and while measuring positive atomic ions. This should improve the sensitivity and precision of measurements to determine isotopic distributions of actinides and lanthanides, as well as elemental abundances of trace species in particles or small features to be mass analyzed. Initial measurements show the concept to be solid, with optimal operating conditions to be determined. Issues such as the charge state distribution, molecular ion destruction efficiency, beam broadening, beam transmission, and detection efficiency need to be addressed for quantitative analysis. This presentation will describe the concept, its benefits and limitations, and consider how it may find broader use. Examples from initial measurements will be presented.
        Speaker: Dr K. Grabowski (United States of America)
      • 77
        Use of Micro-Raman Spectrometry for Nuclear Forensics
        Thanks to its ability to carry out structural identification of small-size objects [1-4], Micro-Raman spectrometry (MRS) is a potentially interesting tool for nuclear forensics. Moreover, although uranium compounds are difficult to analyze by MRS because of intense coloration and fluorescence, laser-induced sample heating, and complexity of the U–O system, specific Raman bands for the major uranium compounds relevant for the nuclear industry were identified by several authors. In this communication, application of Raman spectrometry to the fast and non-destructive determination of the chemical composition of various uranium compounds will be presented and discussed [5]. Analysis by MRS can be carried out to minute amounts of samples and to mixtures of various uranium species. Moreover, MRS can be coupled to a scanning electron microscope (SEM) thanks to a coupling device (“SEM–SCA”, Renishaw Ltd.) [6,7]. This interface was designed to obtain topographical information (by SEM imaging), elemental composition (by EDX), and chemical information (by MRS) from the same spot without sample transfer. Different examples of analysis by means of stand-alone MRS or by in-SEM MRS of relevant samples for nuclear forensics will be shown. References: [1] J. R. Schoonover, F. Weesner, G. J. Havrilla, M. Sparrow, P. Treado, Appl. Spectrosc. 1998, 52, 1505–1514. [2] S. S. Potgieter-Vermaak, R. Van Grieken, Appl. Spectrosc. 2006, 60, 39–47. [3] R. Kips, M. R. Houlton, A. Leenaers, O. Marie, A. J. Pidduck, F. Pointurier, E. Stefaniak, P. D. P. Taylor, S. Van den Bergue, P. Van Espen, R. Wellum, Spectrochim. Acta B 2009, 64, 199–207. [4] E. A. Stefaniak, A. Alsecz, I. E. Sajo, A. Worobiec, Z. Mathé, S. Török, R. Van Grieken, J. Nucl. Mat. 2008, 381, 278–283. [5] F. Pointurier, O. Marie, Spectrochim. Acta B 2010, 65, 797–804. [6] A. Worobiec, S. Potgieter-Vermaak, A. Brooker, L. Darchuk, E. Stefaniak, R. Van Grieken, Microchemical J. 2010, 94, 65–72. [7] F. Pointurier, O. Marie, J. Raman Spectrosc. 2013, DOI 10.1002/jrs.4392
        Speaker: Mr F. Pointurier (France)
      • 78
        Forensic Medical Aspects of Radiation Accidents Investigation
        Radiation accidents with fatal and non-fatal outcomes are hard to investigate. Results of forensic medical analyses are important and sometimes crucial to establish details of the accident. Based on them, the experts can substantially assist in the investigation: help to formulate possible versions and determine further investigative leads. In case of internal irradiation the following aspects should be taken into account within such forensic medical analyses. There are several pathways of intake of radionuclides: inhalation, ingestion or intake through intact or injured skin. In case of inhalation of radioisotopes degree and nature of lesions of respiratory organs depend primarily on absorbability of them across the air-blood barrier. Hardly soluble radioactive substances are partly removed from the airways with mucus. The rest is retained in pulmonary tissue and has mainly local effect. In cases of intake of radioactive substances through the gastrointestinal tract well-absorbed radioisotopes (15-20%) are transferred into the blood and then uniformly distributed throughout the body or selectively concentrated in organs and tissues of main deposition. In case of contact with intact skin radioactive substances might cause local injuries. The rate of their development and severity depends on the absorbed dose and the rate of absorption of radioactive material (e.g. 90% of the radioactive strontium is deposited in bones, causing even in the early days deep distortion and suppression of normal physiological bone formation, which does not occur in case of acute radiation syndrome due to external exposure). If external irradiation of victims in combination with intake of radioactive substances is suspected, it is important to confirm this information using spectrometric (radiometric) and radiochemical analyses in order to determine pattern of distribution of radionuclides through tissues and organs of corpse and level of radioactivity. In case of external exposure different conditions of irradiation have different effects on clinical history and anatomical characteristics of radiation injury. This is due either to a different degree of severity of pathologic changes or specific localization of the most pronounced effects. It is important to consider qualitative and quantitative characteristics of pathological processes in order to help assessing the full range of different conditions which could cause the prior fatal lesion. There are unlimited variants of non-uniform exposure with a primary direct effect of ionizing radiation on a particular part of the body. So, it is important to identify the basic scenarios where the absorbed dose to head, chest, abdomen or limbs is maximal. In cases of non-uniform external radiation exposure a pathologist should take into account that an isolated or predominant exposure of head to large dose leads to lesion of its skin, mucous membranes of mouth and nose, eyes and brain. Irradiation of chest results in lesion of lungs, heart muscle, spine (with peripheral spinal disorders), bone marrow of sternum and vertebras. Irradiation of abdomen and pelvis results in lesions of small intestine up to development of ulcero-necrotic changes and peritonitis. Sometimes it may result in lesion of colon and other internal organs, e.g. kidneys. Irradiation of limbs results in lesions of skin and skeletal muscles. Macroscopic and especially microscopic examination of hemopoietic organs of a deceased is of particular importance in order to establish presence / absence of significant differences in condition of bone marrow, taken from different parts of the body, as well as the discrepancy between severity of suppression of hematopoiesis and characteristics of peripheral blood. Period of time passed after radiation injury can be assessed on the basis of morphological characteristics of bone marrow. Under doses at which the hematopoietic form of radiation syndrome takes place, the stromal elements and plasma cells dominate in cellular composition in the first 2-3 weeks of the disease. Later, after 4 weeks, granular lymphocytes appear. Then morphological signs of early recovery can be observed: the number of hematopoietic stem cells and mitosis increase. Using immunomorphological methods of staining of bone marrow sections an expert can make a rough estimation of radiation injury severity. Under the doses within "marrow failure" range (1-10 Gy) the number of dying cells is low - an average of 4-5 in a field of view of a microscope. Under higher doses (“intestinal” and “cerebral” forms of radiation syndrome) - cell death exceeds 50%. Thus, a lot of questions traditionally asked experts by investigating authorities can be answered on the basis of the assessment of nature and severity of lesions observed on corpse or body of survivor including 1) diagnostics of radiation injures and making decision on possibility or impossibility of development of such lesions under conditions specified in a case files; 2) determination of period of time passed after radiation accident and mechanism of radiation injury development in order to reconstruct circumstances of a case; 3) determination of radiation characteristics; 4) assessment of dose and exposure duration.
        Speaker: Mrs E. Granovskaya (State Research Center – Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Center of the Federal Medical Biological Agency, Russian Federation)
    • 10:40 AM
      Coffee break
    • Technical Session 3C: Data Compilation Tools for Supporting Nuclear Forensic Interpretation II
      Conveners: Mr J. Salas Kurte (Chile) , Mr S. Biramontri (Thailand)
      • 79
        Strategies and Considerations for Developing a National Nuclear Forensics Library
        A national nuclear forensics library (NNFL) is an important resource for making rapid and credible material provenance assessments during the course of nuclear forensics investigations. While the concept of cataloging forensic characteristics needed to definitively identify materials used, produced, or stored within a state is gaining international acceptance, only general guidance is available to countries wishing to develop their own NNFL. One gap in the available guidance we have specifically identified and are working to address is how to consider the range and sophistication of nuclear and radiological activities within a state and how this correlates with the complexity of an NNFL. For example, a country that has substantial nuclear fuel cycle activities is likely going to require a more complex library than a country that only possesses industrial and medical radioactive sources. Over 200 IAEA member states only have uranium mining and milling, radiological sources, and research or power reactor operations. Developing a functional NNFL capable of identifying whether material found outside of regulatory control is consistent with known holdings should be a relatively small effort, largely drawing upon existing information, for example data from a national radioactive source registry. The set of material characteristics necessary to uniquely identify materials is not necessarily extensive, and very likely does not require any additional laboratory analysis to produce. There is also probably no extensive subject matter expertise or complex comparative analysis algorithms required to compare unknown materials with those in the NNFL during the course of an investigation. For the approximately 40 states with significant nuclear fuel cycle activities, the task of developing a NNFL is much tougher given the wide variety and changing characteristics of materials as they progress through the fuel cycle. In this case, a much more extensive set of material characteristics is necessary to uniquely identify materials from the state’s nuclear operations and may require extensive work on the part of nuclear fuel cycle, analytical chemistry, and comparative analysis experts to determine what should be captured in an NNFL. We are developing guidance for state’s considering development of a NNFL that takes this range of nuclear operations into account right from the start, and hopefully constrains the level of effort required to construct a functional NNFL early in the process. This approach incorporates a scoping study to identify the nuclear and radiological activities within a state, what data already exists that may be useful to the NNFL and where there are gaps, how to develop a strategy to fill those gaps, and an estimate of the level of effort that will be required to produce a functional NNFL. By doing so, many states should be able to establish operational NNFLs relatively quickly, and without significant cost. For more advanced fuel cycle states, the guidance should also prove useful, detailing an approach to engage a variety of subject matter experts early on to identify data necessary to the NNFL, where there are gaps, and where additional work including laboratory analysis or comparative analysis algorithm development may be required to produce a functional NNFL.
        Speaker: Dr S. LaMont (U.S. Department of Energy)
      • 80
        National Nuclear Forensics Library at Japan Atomic Energy Agency
        In 2010, the Japan Government issued the national statement at Nuclear Security Summit (Washington D.C., USA) to develop technologies related to measurement and detection of nuclear materials for nuclear forensics within approximate three-year timeframe, and to share them with the international community, in order to contribute to strengthening the nuclear security system. In response to this statement, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) that possesses sufficient analytical capabilities to fulfil this nuclear forensics mission has started R&D on nuclear forensics technology from JFY 2011. One of main topics of the R&D project is to develop national nuclear forensics library (NNFL) and evaluation methodology for interpretation of nuclear material attributions. Recently, the development of nuclear forensics library has been carried out in some countries and the concept of national nuclear forensics library with point-of-contact is the most popular in current international society [1]. The NNFL project at JAEA also follows this concept. JAEA has continued to develop a prototype system of NNFL based on data related to nuclear materials and other radioactive materials that JAEA has possessed in the past research activities. A concept building of prototype database on nuclear materials and related nuclear fuel cycle facilities was almost completed with its basic data handling system. As the next step of the NNFL project, it is planned to carry out the development items listed below; - prototype database on other radioactive materials, - image verification function for microscope images, - multivaliate analysis function for seizure analysis, - knowledge accumulation system for nuclear forensics analysis. Data gathering on nuclear materials in JAEA has been also continued and they will be populated into the prototype nuclear meterials database. It is expected that the NNFL development and its operation al methods will be transferred to the responsible authorities after the national framework of nuclear forensics in Japan will be constructed in the near future. References [1] IAEA, Development of a National Nuclear Forensics Library, IAEA Nuclear Security Series (Draft) (2013).
        Speaker: Dr Y. Kimura (Japan)
      • 81
        Resources and Forensics Signatures to Help Determine the Origin of Sealed Radiological Sources
        In the event of a terrorist obtaining and possibly detonating a device with radiological material, analysis of the material and source capsule could provide law enforcement with valuable clues to the origin of the material; this information could then provide further leads on where the source or material was obtained. Argonne and Idaho National Laboratories have for the past 11 years been working on understanding signatures that could be used to identify specific source manufacturers. These signatures include source materials of construction, dimensions, weld details, elemental composition, and isotopic abundances of the radioactive material. These signatures have been collected in a library that now contains more up-to-date information on radioactive source signatures than any other database/library in the world. Collection of material for our database has included open source information from vendor catalogs and web pages, discussions with source manufacturers (protected thru non-disclosure agreements), and government registries such as the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Sealed Source and Device Registry. Based on the information collected, profiles of source manufacturers and distributors haven been developed. Details of our database will be described. Although the shape and dimensions of sources may help identify the manufacturer, additional information would be helpful to better pinpoint the manufacturer or supplier of a particular source. The analysis of parent daughter decay pairs can provide the “time since purification” or time since the “end of irradiation”. This apparent age of the source can provide an estimated date when the source material/capsule was manufactured and can be used to exclude many manufacturers based on company manufacturing histories logged in the database. This “age dating” technique requires analysis of both radioactive and stable isotopes. For the analysis of stable isotopes mass spectrometry measurements are essential, however the parent daughter decay pairs used in age dating often have the same atomic mass and require chemical separations to eliminate isobaric interferences in the mass spectrometric measurement. For example the parent Cs-137 interferes with the determination of the radioactive decay daughter Ba-137; similarly Co-60 interferes with the determination of the daughter Ni-60. Separation procedures and age dating analysis have been completed for cesium-137 (Cs/Ba), strontium-90 (Sr/Zr), and cobalt-60 (Co/Ni) sources. Some representative data will be provided.
        Speaker: Mr D. Chamberlain (United States of America)
      • 82
        Mechanism of Identification of Seized Materials without Creation of Nuclear Forensics Library
        Identification of seized nuclear or other radioactive materials, determination of its origin and possible designation are the parts of any investigation, which can be associated with illicit trafficking of such materials. Such investigation includes comparison of characteristics of the seized materials or the detected trace amounts of unknown materials, which are determined in the result of its analysis, with the data about known materials. Creation of national nuclear forensics libraries is considered as a unique instrument for identification of seized materials at some international conferences, workshops and meetings, in corresponding documents. In the draft [1] national nuclear forensics libraries are posed even like main element of the infrastructure of the national nuclear security system. However the approach to identification of unknown nuclear or other radioactive materials by using national nuclear forensics libraries is characterized by a set of inherent imperfections: • Comparison of the results of analysis of seized material or trace amount of material with information from data bases. There is known that some very similar materials can be manufactured at the different facilities. At the same time analyses of the same material in different laboratories can provide not the same results. Moreover analyses of the same material in the same laboratory, but in different times and/or by using different techniques can provide not the same results. Therefore material cannot be undoubtedly identified on the result of such comparison, and some discomfiture can arise in the court. • Accumulation of a lot of information, including sensitive information, in additional point enlarges the circle of knowledgeable people. It increases the risk of unauthorized sharing of information; • List of characteristics, which should be measured for characterization of nuclear materials, is not determined until now. But right now it is clear ([2] for example), that databases, which are created for technological control, at best contain only small part of forensically significant information. On the other hand it is considered for instance the possibility of measuring of the contents of a lot of chemical elements (up to 64) for identification of UOC [3]. Therefore creation of comprehensive database is very labour intensive and resource process. And due to the absence of the epidemic of nuclear security events this creation may be unreasonable; • Discussed concept of national nuclear forensics libraries [1] reflects simplified understanding of forensic database. “Forensic database” means not only that it is used during criminal investigation. A set of specific requirements is inherent to forensic database. First requirement is periodic actualization of database on the whole range of materials, which are currently manufactured. Secondly, database should contain information about intermediate products of manufacturing, etc. These imperfections force to seek other approaches to identification of seized unknown nuclear or other radioactive materials. One of the alternative approaches based on the involvement of experienced experts to estimation and analysis of measured characteristics of seized materials or its trace amounts as well as on the subsequent implementation of comparative investigation of both: seized and suspected materials at the same time in one or several nuclear forensic laboratories. Involved experts should have knowledge and experience of handling with materials of corresponding type. They will be able to determine the possible type (types) of seized material, the group of materials, which can be suspected as the origin for seized material. Experts will be able also to choose materials for comparative investigations, to assess the significance of differences in measured characteristics of seized and suspected materials or seized material and information from suitable databases. Expert evaluation can be based on the knowledge of the details of manufacturing technologies, operational features, knowledge of the sources of raw materials for different manufacturing, etc. Such approach is realized, for example, in Russian Federation. Russian Federation has a large range of nuclear and radioactive materials and owns a lot of technological databases, which are not concentrated on one side. This approach in Russian Federation focuses on the Russian legislation and does not require additional management and centralization. By the way exercise “Galaxy Serpent” shows that assessment of the significance of differences between the results of analysis and information from database can require involvement of experts even if the comprehensive database is accessible [4]. REFERENCES 1. Draft of the NST018 “Development of a National Nuclear Forensics Library”. IAEA, 2013, 43 p. ( 2. Description of the invention to the patent RU 2 269 115 C2, 2006, 10 p. 3. Recommendations of Technical Meting on Analysis of Trace Elements in Uranium Samples, IAEA, 29-30 May, 2012 4. J. Borgardt. Galaxy Serpent Overview. Presentation at the ITWG-18 Meeting, St.-Petersburg, Russia, 8-10 October, 2013
        Speaker: G. Kochev (Russian Federation)
    • Technical Session 3D: Nuclear Forensic Science: Radiochronometry
      Conveners: Ms K. Peräjärvi (Finland) , Mrs M.B.L. Ong (Singapore)
      • 83
        Radiochronometry by Mass Spectrometry: Improving the Precision and Accuracy of Age-Dating for Nuclear Forensics
        The model-date of a nuclear material is a parameter established at the time it was last chemically purified. Assuming the material is homogeneous, this parameter is fixed and exact, but it may or may not be the same as the purification date. The decay of a radioactive parent to a radioactive or stable daughter is the basis of the radiochronometers that record this model-date. If upon purification, only the parent isotope is present in the material, then the model-date will be the same as the purification date. Otherwise, if any of the daughter isotope is present, then the model-date will be further in the past. Regardless, it is a fixed and characteristic signature of the material, and will not vary as long as the system remains closed, i.e., there is no post-purification fractionation of parent and daughter. Measurements of the parent-daughter pairs 234U-230Th, 235U-231Pa, 241Pu-241Am, 137Cs-137Ba and 90Sr-(90Y)-90Zr can be used to determine the model-dates of a variety of nuclear materials. All of these pairs are measured more precisely by mass spectrometric methods, because, for a given sample, more atoms can be measured by mass spectrometry than decays measured by radiometric methods. Also, some daughters, e.g. 137Ba and 90Zr, are stable isotopes and must be measured by means other than decay counting. The accuracy of the mass spectrometric analyses is determined by the reference materials used to calibrate the mass spectrometer and the spike materials used for isotope dilution analysis. The accuracy of the model-date is also dependent on the decay constants of the radionuclides. Improving the accuracy involves development of better-certified and new reference materials and spikes, and better measurements of relevant decay constants. Improving the measurement precision, in contrast, involves improvements to all aspects of the analyses to obtain greater signal/noise. These include improvements to the instrumental analytical methods (the way that samples are introduced or loaded, and the data collection schemes), the chemical purification methods (low blank, with high recovery and purity to eliminate isobaric interferences), and to the instruments themselves. State programs have recognized the importance of precise and accurate model-dates as a signature of a nuclear material, and efforts on all these fronts are being made internationally by national laboratories and institutions charged with developing standards and reference materials. Efforts within the United States include the production of new certified reference materials (U-Th and Cs-Ba radiochronometer standards) and spikes (229Th, 134Ba, 243Am, 236Np, 233U), and the development of guidance on the interpretation of radiometric data. Enhancement of radiochronometric methods and the development of tools needed to improve accuracy and precision are supported collaboratively by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of Energy at DOE National Laboratories and U.S. national metrology institutes. Prepared by LLNL under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.
        Speaker: Mr R. Williams (United States of America)
      • 84
        Advances in Nuclear Forensics Analysis at CEA/DIF: Radiochronology Studies
        Analytical laboratories at CEA/DIF are part of the NWAL (Network of Analytical Laboratories in support of IAEA's nuclear safeguards) for the analysis of environmental samples since 2001 for both bulk and particle analysis. Part of the expertise inherited from environmental analysis is now used to develop capabilities in nuclear forensics analysis. Two projects of analytical developments are currently under progress at CEA/DIF: age dating of uranium materials and the geolocation of uranium-ore concentrates. For the first one, we have established two procedures to date small quantities of uranium (from 1 µg up to 100 µg) with two radioactive couples (234U/230Th and 235U/231Pa). As our equipments are dedicated to trace analysis, only micro-quantities of nuclear materials can be handled in the laboratory in order to avoid contamination. We have then used micro-columns of chromatographic resins to separate thorium or protactinium from uranium. Measurements are performed on ICP-MS for Th and Pa and TIMS for U. The detection limit (DL) for 230Th and 231Pa determination is close to 1 fg. If this DL is extrapolated to particle matter, we would theoretically be able to date a 15 year-old natural uranium particle (UO2) for which diameter is 40 µm, and a 15 year-old highly enriched (93%) uranium particle of UO2 for which diameter is 8 µm.
        Speaker: Dr A. HUBERT (CEA, France)
      • 85
        Protactinium-231 (231Pa) Measurement for Isotope Chronometry in Nuclear Forensics
        Uranium series disequilibria measurements have been used for radiometric dating for many decades, mainly for elucidating geological and environmental processes. Recently, such measurements have been applied to the dating of nuclear materials (i.e., determination of the time since the material was last processed) for nuclear forensic applications. While 230Th/234U is the most widely employed uranium chronometric system, the 235U decay scheme also yields a highly valuable chronometric relationship, i.e., 231Pa/235U. Although this latter approach has been shown to represent a viable complementary chronometric system to 230Th/234U, in particular for highly enriched uranium materials (235U > 20%), it has largely remained underutilised in most investigations. The reason for this is the challenging chemistry required to separate protactinium and the need to produce an artificial spike isotope 233Pa for accurate mass spectrometry measurements. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) is currently developing the capability to measure 231Pa (t1/2 = 32,760 years) and then apply these measurements to various fields of research. The main area of application will be nuclear forensic investigations. This paper will describe the procedure developed at ANSTO to produce the 233Pa spike for 231Pa measurement by mass spectrometry. A brief outline of the chemistry of Pa will be presented and radiochemical procedures for separation of Pa from Th and U will also be described. ANSTO is well placed to develop a 231Pa measurement capability; the 233Pa spike required for 231Pa measurement by isotope dilution mass spectrometry can be produced by neutron irradiation of Th in our OPAL research reactor. Appropriate target preparation and irradiation conditions were determined: 232Th (100 ug in dilute nitric) was deposited on Al foil and irradiated for 9 hours at a neutron flux of approx. 7.5 x 1012 and allowed to cool for 4 days. The 233Pa activity in the cooled target was approx. 100 kBq (corresponding to approx. 0.14 ng 233Pa; specific activity of 233Pa = 7.687x1014 Bq/g) measured using gamma spectrometry. A procedure was developed to isolate Pa from Th via anion exchange chromatography. The irradiated Al foil target was dissolved in 9 M HCl and this solution was loaded onto a ~4 mL anion exchange (AG1-X8 resin) column preconditioned with ~ 12 mL 9 M HCl. Once loaded, the column was washed with ~3 column volumes (CV) of 9 M HCl to remove Th and Al. Pa was eluted using 9M HCl/0.1M HF. The Pa fraction required further purification; residual 232Th in the spike may interfere with 233Pa or 231Pa measurements using mass spectrometry. Treating the mixed HCl/HF ‘Pa fraction’ with boric acid successfully rendered Pa resorbable by anion exchange resin. A handheld radiation monitor was used as a quick check of 233Pa content in the wash solutions, Pa fraction and on the column. More precise measurements employed a gamma counter using the 311.9 keV peak. Gamma counter results for each column separation were used to determine the recovery of Pa during the separation/purification procedures. Pa possesses a very high tendency to undergo hydrolysis. When conducting ion exchange separations with Pa, it is essential to handle Pa in the monomeric form as hydrolysed polymeric compounds may lead to masking effects so that separation is incomplete. At trace levels of Pa, the formation of hydrolysis products can be avoided by the presence of the fluoride anion. Pa was similarly separated from U solutions using anion exchange column chromatography.
        Speaker: Ms E. Keegan (Australia)
      • 86
        Uranium Age Dating by Gamma Spectrometry
        A new method for uranium age dating was developed using gamma-spectrometry based on the daughter/parent 214Bi/234U by direct measurement. The daughter/parent ratio as a function of decay time is widely used for determining the age of radioactive samples. In the case of uranium, age dating is somewhat difficult because the relevant isotopes (234U, 235U, 238U) have very long half-lives, so only small amounts of daughter nuclides grow in. In contrast, the age of nuclear materials is, at most, merely a few decades, which is very short compared to the long half-lives of the parent isotopes. Therefore, one would expect that the daughter nuclides could only be quantified after destructive chemical separation, followed by mass-spectrometric or alpha-spectrometric techniques. However, it has been demonstrated that the daughter/parent activity ratio 214Bi/234U can be obtained by directly measuring the count rates of the relevant gamma peaks of 214Bi and 234U by low-background gamma spectrometry. The method is non-destructive and does not require the use of reference materials of known ages. The least enriched uranium sample dated by HRGS was a 5% enriched oxide material, the age of which was determined as 54 ± 7 yr. The youngest sample was a 6.7 ± 0.7 yr old metallic U of 90.8% enrichment. 234U decays through 230Th to 226Ra, which in turn decays to 214Bi through three short-lived nuclides. The time needed for secular equilibrium between 226Ra and 214Bi is about 2 weeks, so it can be assumed that the activities of 226Ra and 214Bi are equal at the time of the measurement. The activity ratio 214Bi/234U at time T after purification/enrichment of the material can be calculated with a good approximation. The activity ratio 214Bi/234U can be determined in several ways from the gamma spectra of a sample. A reliable method uses a reference material of approximately like age, enrichment, and form, as the investigated sample. Another approach does not require any reference materials but uses the absolute efficiency of the detector determined by “point-like” standard sources. In an alternate approach, a relative efficiency calibration is used to determine the activity ratio 214Bi/234U, without the use of any reference materials. Measurements of HEU metal lump and oxide powder, HEU and LEU reactor fuel rods, LEU pellet and powder were made in the enrichment range from 4.4 to 90%. For lower 235U abundances, the amount of 234U (and therefore of 214Bi) is lower as well, so the corresponding activity is more difficult to measure and the uncertainty caused by the variation of the natural background becomes greater. In addition, a Compton background caused by the peaks of 238U daughters is also present in the spectrum, disturbing the evaluation of the 214Bi peaks. A lower limit on the 235U abundance of the material exists that allows the age to be determined by gamma-spectrometry, depending on the amount and the age of the material, detector efficiency and background level. For example, the 609 keV peak of 214Bi (and the peaks of 238U) are measured by a 150 cm3 coaxial Ge detector in a low-background iron chamber with a wall thickness of 20 cm. Low energy peaks of 234U (and 235U) are recorded by applying planar Ge detectors under normal laboratory conditions. The “difficult” samples are the same as in the case of mass spectrometry: low-enriched and/or “young” uranium. According to our estimate, with our current equipment, 10 g of natural uranium can only be dated, if it is more than 35 years old, whereas the lower bound for age determination of 90 % enriched HEU was estimated to be around 2 years. The sensitivity and the range of applicability of the methods may be improved by using e. g. an average size well-type Ge detector, so that the lower bound for the applicability of the method would be approximately 1.5 year for 90% enriched uranium and 20 years for natural uranium, under the present background conditions. Gamma-spectrometric age dating of uranium is, within the described limits, a reliable tool for determining the age of uranium samples encountered in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and in nuclear safeguards. This work was supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the frame of the Coordinated Research Project “Application of Nuclear Forensics in Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material” under contract No. 13839, as well as by the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority.
        Speaker: Prof. L. Lakosi (Hungary)
    • 12:30 PM
      Lunch break
    • Poster Session II
      • 87
        230Th - 234U Thorium Radiochronometry Method Comparison: A Tri-Lateral Round-Robin Exercise
        Radiochronometry methods can provide valuable forensic information for determining the source and processing time frame of nuclear materials. One method used to determine the age of uranium materials is based on the 230Th and 234U radiochronometry pair. If two assumptions hold, 1) a complete Th/U separation during nuclear material processing and, 2) a closed isotope system between the time of material processing and sample analysis, the comparison of 230Th and 234U abundances in a material can provide the time elapsed since processing, or age of the material. The analytical methods used by the laboratories who participated in this round-robin exercise were based on isotope dilution mass spectrometry, which involves spiking the dissolved sample with a high purity Th and U isotope of known concentration that is of no interest analytically. Thorium and uranium were then separated, purified, and analyzed by mass spectrometry. Reliability and consistency of data generated using these methods is critical and often challenging due to the current lack of availability of appropriate isotope dilution standards that have been certified by mass, not activity. The collaborations currently underway between the US DOE laboratories (LANL and LLNL), CEA and JAEA are focused on developing consistency in standardization of both the 229Th and 233U isotope dilution standards used to quantify the 230Th and 234U isotopes for radiochronometry. The approaches and data associated with these standardization measurements will be presented. Additionally, a comparison of the analytical methods applied to determine uranium material ages along with results for the age dating of the uranium standard reference material NBS U050 will be included. LA-UR 13-29188
        Speaker: Dr R. Steiner (United States of America)
      • 88
        A Technical Nuclear Forensics Capability to Support the Analyses of Illicit Nuclear and Radioactive Materials
        The International Atomic Energy Agency Incident and Trafficking database records cases involving the unauthorised use, transport and possession of nuclear and other radioactive material [1]. Intercepted materials can be analysed using nuclear forensic techniques to provide information to law enforcement. In addition, an advanced nuclear forensics capability supports the analysis of the material, and associated evidence, resulting in the identification of forensic signatures. These signatures can be exploited to assess the materials history, for example, production processes, previous locations and intended use. In support of the UK nuclear forensic programme, a number of laboratories have undergone refurbishment [2]. This enables the total exploitation of nuclear and radioactive materials with associated contaminated items. Subsequent technical capability developments have further enhanced the advanced nuclear forensics capability at AWE. These include the purchase of new instrumentation, including a large geometry secondary ionisation mass spectrometer, and the adaptation and validation of current techniques to support nuclear forensic applications. In addition, work is ongoing to develop statistical techniques to support interpretation of data from nuclear forensics investigations. The data obtained from the analysis of materials can be varied and requires a broad knowledge base, including both statistical tools and technical experts, to interpret. A collaborative approach is demanded using a variety of technical experts, from materials science, analytical science, metallurgy, fuel cycle process chemistry and data analysis backgrounds. [1] International Atomic Energy Agency, Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB), IAEA, Vienna (2003) [2] C.M. Watt and D.W. Thomas (2013). Development of a technical nuclear forensics capability to support the analyses of illicit radiological and nuclear materials. In book of extended synopses, IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing global efforts (CN 203), IAEA-203/110, p221. © British Crown Owned Copyright [2013]/AWE
        Speaker: Dr C. Watt (United Kingdom)
      • 89
        Characterization of Strong 241Am Sources
        Gamma ray spectra of strong 241Am sources may reveal information on the composition of the sources. There may be other radioactive nuclides such as progeny and radioactive impurities present. Furthermore, broadened peaks in the spectrum indicate the presence of nuclear reactions on light elements within the source. These spectral features would be useful information in a national nuclear forensics library (NNFL) in cases when the visual information on the source, e.g. the source number, is destroyed. In this work the possibility to use inherent signatures in an 241Am source to differentiate sources from each other is investigated. The results show that these signatures of the source, i.e. the age and impurities, can be used as unique identifiers of the origin and the nature of a particular orphan source.
        Speaker: Ms A. Vesterlund (Sweden)
      • 90
        Contaminants of the Bismuth Phosphate Process as Signifiers of Nuclear Reprocessing History
        Reagents used in spent nuclear fuel recycling impart unique contaminant patterns into the product stream of the process. At the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory we have conducted research in the form of bench top and modeling experiments to characterize and understand the relationship between these patterns and the process that created them. A main challenge to this effort, resurrecting processes that were employed at the Hanford site from 1944-1989 have been retired for decades. This precludes direct measurements of the contaminant patterns that propagate within product streams of these facilities. In the absence of any operating recycling facilities at Hanford, we have taken a multipronged approach to cataloging contaminants of U.S. reprocessing activities using: (1) historical records summarizing contaminants within the final Pu metal button product of these facilities; (2) samples of opportunity that represent intermediate products of these processes; and (3) lab-scale experiments and model simulations designed to replicate contaminant patterns at each stage of nuclear fuel reprocessing. This paper summarizes our findings in this study.
        Speaker: Mr L.E. Sweet (United States of America)
        Form B
      • 91
        Determination of the Uranium Containing Particles from Swipe Samples by a Fission Track Method
        Analysing micrometer-size uranium containing particles is a powerful tool to verify the undeclared nuclear activity or undeclared facility, and is also applied in the nuclear forensic field. CAEP has developed this kind of analysis technique. Fission track is an effective method to identify the uranium containing particles from swipe sample. During the research, the particles were extracted from swipe cotton by muffle with 400℃ and deposited on the polycarbonate disk which was used to be detector. Then a small piece of polycarbonate was dissolved by 1,2-dichloroethanae. This liquid were dropped on the track-detector by pipette and formed a film with a few micrometer thickness covering all particles. The particles and detector became a whole. After thermal neutron irradiation, the track detector with particles was etched with KOH solution. Under the microscope the tracks from uranium have been observed clearly. The particles componding to tracks were identified to be uranium containing particles. Compared with the conditional FT method (e.g. collodion), this technique has some advantages such as sample manipulation, no separation between particles and FT detector and so on, Importantly, the uranium containing particles can be determined precisely without location.
        Speaker: X. Liu (China)
      • 92
        Gadolinium Isotopic Signatures in Nuclear Material
        Establishing geochemical and isotopic techniques that can uniquely identify and geolocate nuclear material is of great interest to the international nuclear forensics community. In this effort, isotopic systems such as uranium and plutonium can be used as indicators for the provenance of nuclear materials. However, additional systems are needed to uniquely and confidently identify signatures and sources of nuclear material across the fuel cycle. Two isotopes of gadolinium, 155Gd and 157Gd, have extraordinarily high thermal neutron capture cross-sections (the probability the nucleus will capture a thermal neutron at a given neutron energy). Consequently, the isotopic composition of Gd will be altered as a function of neutron fluence, and thus potentially act as an isotopic signature in samples that have experienced significant neutron exposure. Whereas the isotopic composition of Gd has been used for decades to investigate the neutron fluence on the Moon, Gd isotopes have yet to be widely applied in the nuclear forensic community. Because Gd is present at fairly high concentrations throughout various stages of the fuel cycle and the isotopic composition of Gd is significantly altered by the exposure to neutrons, Gd represents a prime candidate as an isotopic fingerprint in nuclear materials. Procedures for the chemical separation and high-precision measurement of Gd isotopes in various substrates have been recently developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Our current level of precision working with samples of ~100 ng total Gd allows the detection of deviations in Gd isotopes as small as 1 part in 10,000 from a terrestrial standard and potentially provides a very powerful isotopic signature for nuclear materials. Preliminary investigation of Gd isotope variations in nuclear material are underway. This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Document LLNL-CONF-646421.
        Speaker: Dr G. Brennecka (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, USA)
      • 93
        In-field Detection and Analysis of α Radiation
        Alpha-particle-emitting nuclides are very radiotoxic if inhaled or ingested. The short range of alpha particles in air (a few cm) makes the non-destructive screening of alpha emitters at a crime scene difficult and time consuming. The same limitation in range is also present in the alpha-particle screening of collected evidences in a forensic laboratory. The thermalization of alpha particles in air, and the subsequent excitation of air molecules, produces UV- light that can be detected over long distances. Therefore, compared to the current state-of-the-art screening methods, UV-imaging is a significant step forward for alpha-particle screening in forensics [1]. Further characterization of alpha particle emitting radionuclides causing the UV-light can be continued with a position-sensitive UV-gated gamma-spectrometry technique, jointly developed by STUK and the Technical University of Tampere, Finland [2, 3]. An additional advantage related to these new techniques is that the UV-light penetrates several materials, including many plastics. Therefore, these techniques allow, for example, the analysis of samples without removing them from their sealed plastic bags, i.e. without jeopardizing the integrity of the collected samples. In conclusion, UV-based methods for remote detection and analysis of alpha-particle emitting radionuclides have the potential to both speed up the crime scene investigation and increase the safety of the personnel. In UV imaging, the research emphasis lays on extending the image area and improving the tolerance to external lighting. Namely there are also other sources of UV light, which are often overwhelming. Our sun, for example, prevents the straightforward measurements in day light. Approach to reduce the sensitivity to the background lighting is based on restricting UV imaging to the wave lengths covering only the main peaks of nitrogen (310-390 nm). Another research line investigates the possibility to apply the so-called solar-blind part of the spectrum (240-280 nm) for imaging. Namely, atmospheric ozone absorbs radiation within this band, preventing it to reach the surface of the earth. Automated panorama imaging is studied for extending the image area. Earlier studies employing HPGe gamma-ray detectors have proved the superiority of the UV-gamma-coincidence technique for the analysis of low-activity samples [2, 3]. In the future, liquid nitrogen or electrically cooled HPGe detector will be replaced with a fast scintillator detector that is capable to operate in room temperature. This development will improve detection capability by reducing the random coincidence rate, and it makes the UV-gamma coincidence technique more user-friendly to operate in the field. The UV-based measurement techniques will be developed in Finland using standard calibration sources. Validation of the techniques will be made at the Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU) using nuclear-security relevant sources not available in Finland, such as plutonium and MOX fuel. The above described work will be carried in two EU funded projects (GIFT and MetroDECOM). References: [1] J. Sand, S. Ihantola, K. Peräjärvi, H. Toivonen, A. Nicholl, E. Hrnecek, J. Toivonen, EMCCD imaging of strongly ionizing radioactive materials for safety and security, CLEO Europe, 12-16 May 2013, Munich, Germany, poster. [2] S. Ihantola, J. Sand, K. Peräjärvi, H. Toivonen, J. Toivonen, Principles of UV-gamma coincidence spectrometry, Nuclear Inst. and Methods in Physics Research A 690 (2012) 79. [3] S. Ihantola, J. Sand, K. Peräjärvi, J. Toivonen, H. Toivonen, Fluorescence-assisted gamma spectrometry for surface contamination analysis, IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 60, Issue 1 (2013) 305.
        Speaker: Dr K. Peräjärvi (Finland)
      • 94
        Mass Spectrometry in Nuclear Forensics
        Mass Spectrometry in Nuclear Forensics Suresh K.Aggarwal Fuel Chemistry Division, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Mumbai 400 085, India Illicit trafficking/smuggling of nuclear materials is of great concern in the present day scenario. This involves measurements on interdicted nuclear materials to trace their origin and to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Uranium and plutonium of different isotopic abundances produced during isotopic enrichments, reactor irradiations and after fuel reprocessing need be determined in variety of samples including swipe samples. A variety of nuclear analytical techniques are being developed and used for their applications in nuclear forensics. These include different kinds of mass spectrometry, radiometry (alpha and gamma spectrometry), morphological investigations using SEM/TEM and other techniques like laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS), portable X-ray Fluorescence (XRF). Amongst these, inorganic mass spectrometry occupies a unique place for determination of isotopic composition and amount of U/Pu as well as other trace constituents present in the nuclear material. Different chronometers are being developed/tested worldwide to determine the age of the intercepted materials since its last purification. Natural variations in the isotopic composition of oxygen (O), sulphur (S), strontium (Sr) and lead (Pb) hold the potential to provide information about the geo-location of the material. Some of the examples available in the open literature on these studies will be presented during the talk. The availability of data base from different producers as well as confidence in determining these data accurately is of great concern. Demand on the higher accuracy of some of the half-lives of actinides isotopes will be highlighted. The need to develop and test different spikes e.g. Pa-233, Pa-231, U-234 etc. for use in isotope dilution mass spectrometry would be discussed. Brief summary of the novel methodology developed in our laboratory for accurate determination of Pu-238 by thermal ionisation mass spectrometry to overcome the ubiquitous isobaric interference from U-238 will be presented along with the results on some synthetic mixtures. These studies will be useful to enhance the confidence in the forensic data generated using 238Pu-234U chronometer, particularly in Pu samples of high burn-up.
        Speaker: Prof. S.K. Aggarwal (India)
      • 95
        Measurement of Organic Residues of Uranium Ore Concentrates (Yellow cakes) for Nuclear Forensic Investigations
        As a response to the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials starting from the 1990s a new scientific topic has emerged, commonly referred to now as nuclear forensics.1 The aim of the nuclear forensic investigations is to identify the hazard and origin of the confiscated or found nuclear materials and ultimately strengthen security measures and prevent nuclear terrorism thereafter. Over the last few years several signatures of nuclear materials have been investigated and developed to establish the links between the measurable parameters of the unknown material in question and the source of the nuclear materials. These measurable parameters or signatures include e.g. elemental or anionic impurities, isotopic composition, structural analysis, morphology and age determination.1 This complex dataset can give information about the source of uranium ore or feed materials, process and the production facility. Uranium ore concentrate (commonly known as yellow cake) has a special role among the investigated nuclear materials, as it is the first purified industrial product of nuclear fuel fabrication, and thus it is highly useful to identify the source and propagation of various applicable signatures. In the last years several signatures of the inorganic constituents have been investigated in details, such as the concentration of common metallic impurities (transitions metals or lanthanides) or their isotopic compositions.1 On the contrary, organic traces of nuclear materials have been rarely studied for nuclear forensic or safeguards purposes, probably due to the fact that traditionally inorganic analytical techniques are applied in this field. Though several intermediate products of the nuclear fuel cycle potentially contain high amount of organic materials, especially if organic solvents and reagents are present in the process flow, their systematic study and application have not been performed yet. Firstly, Kennedy et al. reported the possible use of gas chromatography mass spectrometry (GC-MS) for the measurement of non-volatile constituents in uranium ore concentrates.2 They applied Twister® stir bars to extract the organic traces qualitatively, and several organic constituents could be identified (e.g. dioctylamine and trioctylamine), which were assumed to be indicative of the used metallurgical processes. The study, however, used only selected samples and did not give details on the origin of the studied material. The aim of the present study is to evaluate the feasibility of GC-MS for the origin assessment of unknown uranium ore concentrates. The work comprises the method development for the extraction of trace-level organic constituents, followed by the high sensitivity GC-MS analysis. The first target analytes in our study are tri-n-octylamine, tri-n-octylphosphine oxide and tri-n-butyl phosphate, which are the most important extractants used for solvent extraction in uranium production. The developed method and the results of uranium ore concentrates of world-wide origin are presented. References 1. K. Mayer, M. Wallenius and Z. Varga, Chemical Reviews, 2013, 113, 884-900. 2. A. K. Kennedy, D. A. Bostick, C. R. Hexel, R. R. Smith and J. M. Giaquinto, Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, 2013, 296, 817-821.
        Speaker: Dr Z. Varga (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements)
      • 96
        Neutron-Dose Control of First Responders Under Sampling and Categorization
        Nuclear forensics are the technical means by which nuclear and other radioactive materials used in illegal activities are characterized as to composition, physical condition, age, provenance, and history(1),(2). Nuclear forensics process consists of 3 steps; sampling, categorization, and characterization. Sampling is to collect nuclear materials or post-explosion debris for a radiological and nuclear incident such as a dirty bomb or a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The samples are used for the characterization at laboratory measurements. The categorization of nuclear materials to a significant degree by measurements from portable instruments on-site are required. Nuclear materials and RDDs, which makes criticality field, emit neutrons whose energy range can vary from thermal to several MeV. In particular, the fast neutrons around over 1MeV have a strong damage for human body. Portable equipment and radiation protection for radiological emergency response team to achieve emergency tasks safely at the incident sites have been developed and evaluated in National Research Institute of Police Science (JAPAN). In this report, we introduce fast neutron shield with water under sampling and categorization. The thickness of water shield in developed prototype equipment is 10cm, which decrease to 1/3 fast neutrons and 1/2 gamma-rays (Co-60). The neutron shield is mounted on an electric cart with DC mortar, which maximum speed is 3km/h. A long tong is set to the center of shield, with which first responders can collect samples safely. Described next in this report are evaluation tests of real-time personal dosimeters using low-scatter room (neutron irradiation field) in Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. We evaluated them under fast neutron field and thermal neutron field. Tested were real-time personal neutron dosimeters of different types, PDM-313 (Hitachi Aloka Medical, Japan), ADM-353 (Hitachi Aloka Medical, Japan), EPD-N2 (Thermo Scientific, USA), DMC2000GN (MIRION Technologies, France), NRF31 (Fuji Electric, Japan), and NRG13 (Fuji Electric, Japan). These devices are all based on semiconductor detectors. They consist of a single or two Si diode with converters (Li-6 or B-10), makes use of the nuclear reaction. They have digital displays of dose, and a warning function using light, sound and/or vibration. The dosimeters were attached on a 40×40×15cm3 phantom and located at the distances of 30cm, 55cm and 100cm from the neutron sources (Am-Be, bare Cf-252, and moderated Cf-252), respectively. The dose rates were 0.866mSv/h, 3.41mSv/h and 3.68mSv/h, respectively. We decided irradiation time in which the accumulated doses were set to about 0.5mSv. We compared the response for each dosimeters under direct irradiation and irradiation with neutron shield (10cm thickness polyethylene corresponded to water). A 10cm-tickness shield was set 10cm in front of the dosimeters. The neutron spectrum with neutron shield was thermalized to lower energy, which intermediate neutrons increased. Under thermal neutron field (moderated Cf-252 source), responses of Aloka dosimeters were 2-4 times higher than those of other dosimeters. We can see same situation in the past results (at criticality field (3), around a spent fuel cask(4), EVIDOS Project (5)). However the significant difference of each dosimeter’s responses was not confirmed under moderated Cf-252 source with neutron shield. Under Cf-252 irradiation which mean energy is 2.3MeV, doses of Aloka and Thermo dosimeters are lower than those of Fuji and MIRION dosimeters, whereas the opposite tendency for Am-Be irradiation which mean energy is 4.4MeV. This is owe to the difference of calibration source (Cf-252 or Am-Be) for each dosimeters at factory setting. The difference is consistent with the past result(6), which we lead to the correct dose using the correction factor for neutron energy. Also we confirmed the effect of fast neutron shield and the large fluctuation of the response for each dosimeter owe to thermalized neutron field. (Reference) 1.IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.2 Nuclear Forensics Support 2.D.K.Smith et al. UCRL-CONF-223251, Methods and Applications of Radioanalytical Chemistry – Mark VII,Kona,HI,United States,April 2-7, 2006 3.K.Tsuchiya et al. IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium 2010, Knoxville, USA Conference Records pp506-507, 2010 4.S.Mayer et al. Radiation Measurements 47,pp.634-639, 2012 5.M. Luszik-Bhadra et al. Radiation Protection Dosimetry Vol.125,No.1-4,pp.293-299, 2007 6.K.Tsuchiya et al. Proceedings of SPIE Defense, Security, and Sensing 2010 Vol.7665,76651G, 2010
        Speaker: Dr K. TSUCHIYA (Japan)
      • 97
        Novel Method for Rapid Extract of Radionuclides Using Polymer Ligand Film for Nuclear Forensics Applications
        Accurate and fast determination of the activity of radionuclides in a sample is critical for nuclear forensics analysis. Radioanalytical techniques are well established for radionuclides measurement; however, they are slow and labor intensive, requiring extensive radiochemical separations and purification prior to analysis. With these limitations, there is great interest for a new technique to rapidly process samples. This paper presents a development of Polymer Ligand Film (PLF) for rapid extraction of plutonium and uranium. The PLF is a thin polymer medium with ligands incorporated onto its structure to enable selective extraction of analytes from a solution. The PLFs developed in this research were designed to facilitate fast isolation of radionuclides from solutions for screening samples. The main focus was to shorten and simplify the procedure for separating radionuclides from solutions onto a surface appropriate for radiometric counting. To achieve this goal, PLFs were synthesized to perform direct sorption of analytes onto its surface for direct counting using radiometric techniques. The new technique combined column chromatography and electrodeposition into a single step for samples. H2DEH[MDP] and polystyrene were used to synthesize the PLF used in this study. Polystyrene provided structure support and H2DEH[MDP] ligands provided active sites for analyte extraction on the film surface. The PLF composition is described as the ratio between ligand and the entire solid mass. For example stock solution with one part ligand and one part polystyrene was assigned 1:2 (w/w) ratio. The PLF system used in this study was consistently effective for plutonium and uranium extraction. The analyte recovery by PLFs has shown dependency on both solution acidity and PLF composition. PLF was capable of co-extracting or selectively extracting plutonium over uranium depending on the PLF composition. The overall analyte recovery was lower than the electrodeposited samples. 50% of plutonium was extracted using the PLF system compared to 80-90% for electrodeposition. However, PLF is designed to be a rapid field deployable screening technique and consistency is more important than recovery. H2DEH[MDP] PLFs had shown consistent plutonium recovery that are similar to the consistency seen in electrodeposition samples. The PLFs were further tested with environmental samples to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the PLF in relevant environments. The extraction system was very effective in extracting plutonium from environmental samples collected from Mortandad Canyon at Los Alamos National Laboratory with minimal sample processing. For the water sample, about 41% of plutonium was recovered by first acidifying the water sample with nitric acid then stippling onto PLF. For the soil samples, analytes were first leached from the soil matrices by placing it in nitric acid bath. Once analytes were in the solution, PLF was placed in a direct contact with the solution. Small quantity of plutonium was extracted from nitric solution using the PLF extraction system. The PLF technique simplified the procedure and offered considerably reduced sample analysis time. The entire sample preparation to analysis was done within one to two days. The classical method takes two days to a week in comparison. The technique also requires minimal chemicals and it is also field deployable. The reduction in time and simplified procedure make this technique ideal for the post-detonation nuclear forensics. This document had been reviewed and assigned publication number: LA-UR-13-29011
        Speaker: Prof. K. Unlu (United States of America)
      • 98
        Nuclear Forensics via Machine Learning Laser Based Spectral Analysis and Imaging
        The global nuclear renaissance, re-emergence of nuclear security threats and the limitations of classical nuclear forensics methods calls for innovative approaches for detecting the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material. A unique synergy for direct, rapid trace quantitative analysis and imaging is enabled by combining machine learning and laser based spectroscopy and imaging techniques. Imaging spectrometry is spectroscopy pursued in the image domain (especially where the sample material is limited and the maximum amount of information needs to be probed more rapidly in two and three dimensions). The methods are targeted for their versatility, high sensitivity, speed, simple operation and in situ capabilities. These techniques have capacity to investigate nuclear or radiological material for its isotopic and elemental composition, geometry, and microstructure (as each step in the fuel cycle creates and/or modifies these signatures). At Nairobi we are investigating the potential of exploiting laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) spectral/imaging and laser Raman spectromicroscopy techniques to noninvasively determine the trace elemental and isotopic composition of nuclear materials and in the assessment of isotopic signatures of nuclear and concomitant elements in the environment. The main attributes targeted are the uranium isotopics (234U, 235U, 236U, 238U) as well as to identify attribution indicators, age (chronometry), intended use, enrichment process used to create the material, method of production, and identity of the reactor in which it was used. We are using these techniques in responding to environmental releases of nuclear (NORM) materials and illicit trafficking activities in our region, which involve both radioactive ‘conflict’ minerals like coltan and counterfeit materials, and in responding to suspect trafficking activities. We use machine learning for mining (management, analysis and visualization) of the extensive data sets and for extracting relevant information from the complex spectral measurements as it affords multivariate data reduction in a graphical interface which permits visualization of relationships between samples characterized by multiple measured variables and also exploratory analyses. We report on the progress of this new research line at Nairobi. We have found that machine learning LIBS methodology represents a promising tool of nuclear forensics. We reconstructed the isotopic composition of high background radiation area (HBRA) derived uranium ores, analyzed and imaged uranium levels in uranium hexafluoride, and interpreted natural variability between isotopes in uranium ores using machine learning thus advancing towards understanding the mechanisms that cause the differences, and to source apportionment. We have developed advanced machine learning tools for spectral and image processing, which reduce the need for expensive signal to noise reduction in techniques. The prospect of direct analysis for REE determination using LIBS is particularly promising as discriminating characteristics like total actinide content, isotopics, metallic and non-trace elemental data are amenable to the method: origin of uranium deposits may be revealed. REE patterns are also very specific to each uranium deposit type and can thus directly reflect the conditions of its genesis and are therefore efficient tools for constraining the geological models of uranium deposits as well as for genetically discriminating new uranium discoveries, a starting point in the fight against nuclear trafficking. Microstructural features obtained from laser Raman spectromicroscopy are also proving informative: Because of its inherent characteristics, the small sample size and the nondestructive nature of the method, the Raman scattering technique represent a significant spectrometry in making stable isotope ratio measurements. This research line supports our educational efforts under INSEN since 2013 to develop courseware to be incorporated into the Nuclear Security education program to start at Nairobi in the near future. References [1] F. E. Stanley, A. M. Stalcup, H. B. Spitz, A brief introduction to analytical methods in nuclear forensics, J Radioanal Nucl Chem, DOI 10.1007/s10967-012-1927-3, 2012. [2] P. Ko, K. C. Hartig, J. P. M cNutt, R. B. D. Schur, T. W. Jacomb-Hood, I. Jovanovic, Adaptive femtosecond laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy of uranium, Review of Scientific Instruments 84, 13-20, 2013. [3] Q. Lin, G. Niu, Q.Wang, Q. Yu, Y. Duan, Combined laser-induced breakdown with Raman spectroscopy: historical technology development and recent applications, Applied Spectroscopy Review s, 48:487–508, 2013. [4] B. Zawisza, K. Pytlakowska, B. Feist, M. Polowniak, A. Kita, R. Sitko, Determination of rare earth elements by spectroscopic techniques: a review, J. Anal. At. Spectrom. 26, 23-73, 2011. [5] X. Hou, W. Chen, Y. He, T. B. Jones, Analytical atomic spectrometry for nuclear forensics, Applied Spectroscopy Reviews 40: 245 – 267, 2005.
        Speaker: Dr H.A. Kalambuka (Kenya)
      • 99
        Nuclear Material Families – An Extension to is it DU, NU, LEU or HEU?
        One of the simplest categorisations of nuclear material is to state that a uranium sample is depleted uranium (DU), natural uranium (NU), low enriched uranium (LEU) or high enriched uranium (HEU). Such categorisation is useful from an accounting, authorisation, or transport point of view, but of limited use in a Nuclear Forensic Science Investigation. A full isotopic characterisation of a sample will confirm which of the above four families the analysed material sits in – DU, NU, LEU or HEU – however the full analysis data will allow more specific comments to be made about the physical processes that the analysed material has previously been subjected to in terms of enrichment, or irradiation deduced from the laws of Physics, or, when related to the civil industry, economics. The paper will show examples of the sub-division of the four main categories of uranium into smaller families using examples drawn from the open literature. The materials used for illustration will include standard reference materials, data from previous nuclear forensic science cases, operating practices from the nuclear industry, and other scientific reports from the open literature. © British Crown Owned Copyright [2014]/AWE
        Speaker: Mr P. Thompson (United Kingdom)
      • 100
        Origins of 137Cs and 133Xe in Soils from two Campuses in University of Douala-Cameroon
        This paper presents an evaluation of 238U, 235U, 137Cs and 133Xe in soils from two campuses in university of Douala-Cameroon using gamma spectroscopy based Broad Energy Germanium Detector (BEGe6530). The mean activity of 238U, 235U, 137Cs and 133Xe in soils from two campuses in university of Douala-Cameroon were 40.16±8.98, 3.39±0.33, 0.46±0.33 and 0.14±0.16 Bq/kg for Campus 1; and 31.45±12.24, 3.02±1.00, 0.30±0.26 and 0.35±0.24 Bq/kg for Campus 2, respectively. In terms of health scrutiny, the absorbed dose rate in air at 1.0m above the ground was measured using an In situ survey meter and the annual effective dose was calculated. The mean values of the absorbed dose rate were 71.43 nGy/hr and 62.72 nGy/hr for Campus 1 and 2, respectively. The estimated average of the outdoor effective dose for Campus 1 and 2 were 87.60 µSv/y and 76.93 µSv/y, respectively. The results obtained in both sites were found to be relatively high than the save limit of 70 µSv/y by UNSCEAR. The observed traces of 137Cs and 133Xe in the studied samples call for future investigation to seek for the origin of these radionucleides. The National Radiation Protection Agency (NRPA) within the activities planned in the Cameroon INSSP: “Establish and maintain national capability to provide technical support to front line detection capabilities and to categorize and characterize suspected radioactive material” will carry out investigations, considering that the radioactivity from the fallout nuclear tests since 1986 in the Sahara reached as far as West Africa (Nigeria) and the Central African Republic to the south. More than 210 nuclear tests were carried out in North Africa between 1960 and 1996. However, no research has been carried out in Cameroon in this domain after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1886 and the Fukushima accident in 2011. Keywords: Radioactivity, radionuclide, soil, Broad Energy Germanium Detector, effective dose, nuclear Fallout
        Speaker: Mr M. NDONTCHUENG MOYO (Cameroon)
      • 101
        Potential and Limitations of ICP-QMS Technique for the Measurement of 230Th
        Nuclear forensics is a multidisciplinary science that combines methodologies of radiochemistry, materials science, nuclear physics and engineering, and environmental science, with the ultimate goal of providing evidence for nuclear attribution. The combination of these disciplines for the characterization of intercepted nuclear or radioactive materials supplies valuable information on the possible intended use of the material and on its history, possibly leading to a source attribution. The parent/daughter 230Th/234U ratio is a valuable signature for a nuclear forensic investigation when uranium bearing materials are involved. The quantification of this chronometer can be applied for the age measurement of uranium, establishing the possible time of manufacture. The determination of this parameter has generally been carried out by mass spectrometric techniques such as thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS). During the last decade, the ICP-MS technique has revealed as a relevant tool for nuclear forensics investigations, since it allows the detection and measurement at ultratrace concentration levels of isotopes of uranium (234U), thorium (230Th) and fission products. Its capacity of multielemental analysis (4.5 a.m.u to 242 a.m.u.) enables the study of others elemental signatures (minor and trace elements) of the material that may provide useful information on the history of the material: Er and Gd (burnable reactor fuel poisons), Ga (phase stabilizer for plutonium metal, also help define its origin) Ca, Mg or Cl (residues from a water-based cleaning process), rare-earth and other impurities patterns (uranium starting material, ore). Recent developments in ICP-MS and more specifically in quadrupole based instruments ICP-QMS (collision/reaction cells technology, improvements in optical transmission ion, more efficient detectors enhanced sensitivity) have led to considerable increase in sensitivity and precision, allowing performing the measurement of 230Th at environmental levels. Based on these premises, this work presents the analytical procedure developed for the detection and measurement of 230Th and 234U with an ICP-MS instrument equipped with a quadrupole analyzer system. This method could be applied to different matrices, including a uranium and thorium certified reference material. The obtained results could be compared with those achieved by high performance α-spectrometry analysis. The ICP-MS instrument used for this purpose was the iCap Q (Thermo Scientific) equipped with a high transmission interface, 90 degree ion optics and effective interference removal using the QCell working in kinetic energy discrimination (KED) mode with helium as collision gas. Alpha Analyst (CANBERRA Industries) integrated spectrometer was employed for high performance alpha spectrometry determinations, using passivated implanted planar silicon (PIPS) detectors. Previous treatment of samples, dissolution and separation and/or preconcentration of analites were carried out by microwave acid digestion and ionic plus extraction chromatography (AG1 x 8 and UTEVA resins) respectively. The Capacity of ICP-MS technique to determine minor and trace elements in complex matrices and its use as signature for nuclear forensic is also reported for the uranium bearing materials. - Williams, R.S.; Gaffney, A.M.; Kristo, M.J.; Hutcheon, I.D. INMM 50th Annual Meeting,Tucson, AZ, United States, July 2009. - Vivone, R.J; Godoy M.L.; Godoy J.M.; Santos, G.M. J. Braz. Chem. Soc. 1-8 (2012) - Ingle, C.P.; Sharp, B.L.; Horstwood, M.S.A.; Parrish, R.R; Lewis, D.J.; J. Anal. At. Spectrom. 18 (2003) 219.
        Speaker: Dr A. Álvarez García (CIEMAT)
      • 102
        REIMEP-22: Interlaboratory Comparison on U Age Dating
        Nuclear forensics is a key element of nuclear security aiming at the identification and characterisation of nuclear (seized) material, such as uranium or plutonium, to re-establish the history of the nuclear material of unknown origin. By applying advanced analytical techniques, the isotopic composition, the chemical impurities and the (macro or micro) structure of the nuclear material can be determined. More recently, the determination of the "age" of the material has been put forward [1,2]. The "age" of a nuclear material refers to its production date, i.e. the time elapsed since the last chemical separation of the daughter nuclides from the mother radionuclide (typically U and Pu). This specific signature allows one to narrow down the possible origins of the material in question and to provide valuable hints on its history. Confidence in the integrity and quality of measurement results and services is of great importance. In order to answer the emerging need of the nuclear forensic community, the European Commission - Joint Research Centre - Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (EC-JRC-IRMM) and the Institute for Transuranium Elements (EC-JRC-ITU) joined efforts to develop a unique uranium reference material (IRMM-1000) certified for the date of the last chemical separation. Certified reference materials, such as the new IRMM-1000 are a prerequisite for proper validation of measurement procedures when determining the "age" of uranium samples, establishing traceability to the SI of the measurement result. The IRMM-1000 units were prepared at ITU from a low-enriched uranium solution after complete separation of thorium decay products (zeroing the initial daughter nuclide concentration) at a well-known time and allowing the ingrowth of the daughter nuclides [3]. IRMM-1000 has been produced in compliance with ISO Guide 34 and will be available beginning of 2015. Prior to the release of IRMM-1000, the EC-JRC-IRMM, in cooperation with the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) and laboratories in the field, launched a new Regular European Inter-laboratory Measurement Evaluation Programme (REIMEP-22) based on this material, called "U Age Dating - Determination of the production date of a uranium certified test sample". REIMEP-22 participating laboratories received a 20 mg or 50 mg uranium certified test sample, depending whether they applied a mass spectrometric or radiometric technique, with an undisclosed value for the production date [4]. They were asked to analyse and report on the two parent/daughter pairs: 234U/230Th (compulsory) and 235U/231Pa (optional) to determine the "age", using their routine laboratory procedures. The challenge in REIMEP-22 was to separate 234U/230Th and optionally 235U/231Pa with a high chemical recovery in order to determine the date of the last purification of the daughter radionuclide from the parent nuclide. The individual reported results of the participants are evaluated against the independent external certified reference value (i.e. the certified production date) with demonstrated traceability and uncertainty, as evaluated according to international guidelines. In addition participants' results are presented according to analytical approaches and instrumental techniques applied by the participants for the analysis of the REIMEP-22 samples. IRMM-1000 and REIMEP-22 are valuable tools for assessing measurement performance, validating methods and establishing quality control in the field of nuclear forensics and nuclear security and are at the same time very beneficial for laboratories from geochemistry. References [1] M. Wallenius, A. Morgenstern, C. Apostolidis and K. Mayer (2002). Determination of the Age of Highly Enriched Uranium. Anal. Bioanal. Chem. 374, 379-384. [2] K. Mayer, M. Wallenius et al. (2011). Nuclear Forensics: A method applicable to Nuclear Security and to Non-Proliferation. INPC2010, Journal of Physics: Conference Series 312 doi:10.1088/1742-6596/312/6/062003. [3] Z. Varga, A. Nicholl, M. Wallenius and K. Mayer (2012). Development and validation of a methodology for uranium radiochronometry reference material preparation. Analytica Chimica Acta 718, 25– 31. [4]
        Speaker: Mrs C. VENCHIARUTTI (EU)
      • 103
        The Feasibility Analysis of the Materials of the Nuclear Explosion with the Fission Product Xenon
        The identification of the fissile material of a nuclear explosion is a quite important part of the post-explosion nuclear forensics investigation, and it is also very important in nuclear non-proliferation field. The fissile materials used in nuclear weapons are usually Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu). It is possible to distinguish U-235 and Pu-239 by analyzing the isotopic components of the fissile fragments due to the slight difference of the fissile products between U-235 and Pu-239 in the same neutron energy. One series of these characteristic isotopes are the Xenon isotopes, including Xe-131m, Xe-133m, Xe-133, and Xe-135, which are easy-spreading, stable and easy-detectable. By analyzing the ratio of Xenon isotopes, HEU and Pu may be distinguished. In this paper, with the demonstration of the difference of the ratio of Xenon isotopes between U-235 and Pu-239, the feasibility to identify the fissile material of a nuclear explosion is analyzed. Besides, by numerically simulating other fissile fragments, the fissile materials may be further confirmed. For the fissile fragment, its activity composes of the fissile contribution, and the decay contribution both from the father nuclides and the daughter nuclides. Taking Xe-135 for example, and ignoring the short-half-life intermediate products, we can get the nucleon densities of I-135 and Xe-135. For the nuclear explosion, the original nucleon densities of I-135 and Xe-135 are both 0. So we solve the equations above with the assumption that the nuclear explosion begins at t=0 and the neutron flux density reaches the maximum and then fall back to 0 immediately. Thus the nucleon densities of I-135 and Xe-135 can be shown. For U-235 and Pu-239, the cumulative yield of Xe-135 is almost the same, so it is extremely difficult to distinguish U-235 and Pu-239 from each other after the peak point. Thus the time zone which can be used to derive the fissile material is limited, and the sampling work should be done as soon and near as possible to get an accurate estimation. In a nuclear explosion, the bomb requires higher neutron flux to get higher nuclear loading efficiency. And for fissile products as Xe-135, which has a relatively high neutron-absorption cross-section, the higher the neutron flux is, the higher the probability of neutron-absorption reaction is. So it will affect the ratio of Xenon isotopes, for example, Xe-135/Xe-133. But by the result of the numerical simulation, we know that in the low nuclear loading efficiency area, the ratio Xe-135/Xe-133 doesn’t change much with the nuclear loading efficiency. What’s more, after a few hours, the ratio Xe-135/Xe-133 nearly doesn’t change with nuclear loading efficiency, and goes consistently. In the real situation, the loading efficiency of a nuclear explosion usually stays low, so the influence of the nuclear loading efficiency can be ignored in the numerical simulation. With all that discussed above, we can do numerical simulations about same-yield nuclear bombs with pure U-235 or pure Pu-239. The activities of the Xenon isotopes changing with time can be shown in the attached file 6. It is easy to see that the Xe-133 curves coincide soon, so it is difficult to get the difference from these curves. But Xe-133 can be used as a reference isotope, and we can get the ratios of other isotopes with Xe-133. It is possible to distinguish U-235 and Pu-239 with activity ratio in theory if one could detect the isotopes quickly enough. And the theoretical distinguishability can be decided by the relative ratio of Xenon isotopes between U-235 and Pu-239, which is shown in the attached file 8. So there is indeed possibility to identify the fissile material by the ratio of Xenon isotopes, but it requires quick response ability and high-accuracy instruments. And its real degree of confidence should be decided by the sampling method and detection accuracy. What’s more, there are some other nuclides that can be used to distinguish U-235 and Pu-239, including Kr, Ba, Ru, and so on. And their isotopic ratios can be used to further confirm the result or even be used to distinguish U-235 and Pu-239 alone. But there are still some limits and the operabilities of these nuclides are different depending on these limits. And this requires further discussion.
        Speaker: Mr J. Su (China)
      • 104
        The US Nuclear Material Characteristics Data Dictionary – History and Development
        The US has established a National Nuclear Forensic Library (NNFL) under the auspices of the Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP). NMIP was established by Presidential Directive in 2006 and includes as one of its major objectives to catalog available information on the characteristics of nuclear materials. To create the electronic database that comprises the US NNFL, NMIP developed a comprehensive data dictionary of nuclear material characteristics. The data dictionary lays the foundation for defining the specific data that needs to be acquired for the US NNFL. The data dictionary was designed to comprehensive, hence is rather lengthy, so as to capture materials information from the wide variety of nuclear (and radioactive) materials that reside in and are used by the civilian and military nuclear industries. The intent was to create a data dictionary that will allow the US NNFL to handle any type of nuclear material. The presentation will describe the origin of the US data dictionary and delve into the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle the led to the development of the data dictionary. Examples will be given of specific types of materials of interest.
        Speaker: J. Wacker (United States of America)
    • Technical Session 3E: Confidence in Nuclear Forensics Findings
      Conveners: Mr P. Chakrov (Kazakhstan) , Mr P. R. Mogafe (South Africa)
      • 105
        Challenges in Bulk Nuclear Forensics Sample Analysis
        Analytical chemistry operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) support technical nuclear forensics by providing chemical and physical measurements of bulk special nuclear material for a consortium of key US government agencies. Capabilities to support the nuclear forensic mission continue to evolve from the basic analytical method set developed half a century ago to support reactor operations and U. S. defense programs. Evolution of analytical chemistry capability includes new certified reference materials for quality assurance and quality control to maintain historical measurement surety but with improved fidelity and defensibility. A lack of traceable, matrix-matched standards with certified uncertainties representative of modern analytical techniques has been recognized as impacting confidence in the measurement results on important nuclear materials. Drawing guidance from the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) and New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL), the U.S. nuclear forensic community is working to define and develop the well characterized reference materials necessary to ensure the integrity of critical forensic measurements. In this presentation, we will present a case for using available pedigreed materials that are commonly used to provide quality assurance on relevant nuclear materials for nuclear forensic certified reference materials. A discussion of challenges associated with transitioning from a regular analytical laboratory to an ISO 17025 accredited laboratory entity will also be presented.
        Speaker: Dr L. Tandon (Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA)
      • 106
        Preparation and Validation of an Uranium Age Dating Reference Material
        If nuclear materials are diverted and afterwards interdicted, detailed investigation is required to identify the possible origin, intended use and hazard related to the material. Such analysis, which is now commonly referred to as nuclear forensics, involve the comprehensive physical, chemical and isotopic measurements (e.g. physical dimensions, crystal structure, radioactive and stable chemical impurities, classical forensic analysis) as well as the interpretation of these measured parameters [1-3]. Based on this complex information, the assumed origin of the material can be verified or for an unknown material the provenance can be identified with high reliability. Numerous characteristics (so-called signatures) of the material can be used for such purpose, such as the isotopic composition of U, Pb or Sr, elemental impurities, trace-level radionuclide content, crystal structure or anionic residues. Besides these parameters the elapsed time (commonly referred to as the "age" of the material) since the last chemical purification of the material can also be measured for radioactive (nuclear) materials. This unique possibility is based on exploiting the presence and decay of the long-lived radionuclide (usually uranium or plutonium as major component in case of nuclear materials): in the course of the production the radionuclide is chemically purified from the impurities, including also its radioactive decay products. After production, the radioactive progenies start to grow-in again in the material. Assuming that the parent-daughter separation was complete, the elapsed time since the last separation, thus the production date, can be calculated according to the decay equations after the measurement of the parent-daughter ratio in the sample. This age value enables either to identify the origin of the unknown sample or to verify the source of the feed material. In contrast to most other characteristics used in nuclear forensics, the production date of the material is a predictive signature, thus it does not require comparison samples for origin assessment. This feature makes the production date one of the most prominent signatures for attribution. However, in order to put the obtained results on a more solid scientific or legally defensible foundation, dedicated reference materials are required. In consequence, an emerging need for such materials has been recently expressed by the community involved in national or international nuclear security programs. Our major objective was the preparation and validation of a uranium-based reference material, which can be applied for the validation of age measurements based on the 230Th/234U chronometer. The material was prepared from high-purity uranium solutions with various uranium enrichments by completely separating the thorium decay product [4]. By this means, the production date is very precisely known (with an uncertainty of less than about 5 hours). In contrast to other methods of producing age dating reference materials , this approach does not require measuring the age of the final material and thus deriving a certified production date, because, if all conditions are fulfilled (completeness of separation, long-term stability, closed system), the 230Th present in the material will solely depend on the radioactive decay laws. Therefore, the material prepared can be used as a primary standard for age dating of uranium materials. The aim of the present collaboration is to prove the applicability of this methodology for the preparation of a uranium age dating reference material by the independent measurement of expert laboratories. Since the validation requires the measurement of the 230Th decay product at very low level from the freshly separated material, state-of-the-art instruments and well-established techniques are required. Though the primary objective of this joint collaboration is to prove that the concept of preparing such age dating material is feasible, it also enables identification of the best methodologies for age dating. The availability of age dating reference materials will help validate current and future age dating protocols, leading to a more robust source of nuclear forensic signatures and a legally defensible basis for the use of age dating results in nuclear forensics investigations. Validation of these methods will increase their relevance and applicability as part of the tool-kit available for nuclear forensics investigations. References [1] K. Mayer, M. Wallenius, and Z. Varga, Chemical Reviews 113, 884 (2013). [2] M. J. Kristo and S. J. Tumey, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms 294, 656 (2013). [3] L. Tandon et al., Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry 276, 467 (2008). [4] Z. Varga, A. Nicholl, M. Wallenius, and K. Mayer, Analytica Chimica Acta 718, 25 (2012).
        Speaker: Dr Z. Varga (EU)
      • 107
        First Primary Reference Material for Uranium Age Dating in Nuclear Forensics
        Nuclear forensics is a relatively young science, which develops and applies thorough, interpretative and comparative (radio-) analytical methodologies to investigate the origin and intended use of nuclear or other radioactive material intercepted from illicit trafficking. The parameters to be investigated are inherent to the material and range from isotopic composition, microstructure, chemical impurities to decay products [1]. Among these parameters, the elapsed time since the production of the material (commonly referred to as the "age" of the material) is measured for nuclear materials. This age - i.e. the time elapsed since the last chemical separation of the daughter nuclides from the mother radionuclide (typically U and Pu) - supports the identification of the origin of unknown material. To establish the accurate age of a nuclear material validated mass spectrometric or radiometric methods are indispensable. Therefore reference materials certified for production date or last chemical separation date of nuclear material are indispensable. In this paper, the preparation and certification of a uranium reference material certified for the production date based on the 230Th/234U radiochronometer is described. The project is jointly implemented by the European Commission - Joint Research Centre Institute for Transuranium Elements (preparation of the material) and the EC JRC Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (certification and distribution of the CRM as IRMM-1000). The CRM was prepared from a low-enriched uranium solution after complete separation of thorium decay products (zeroing the initial daughter nuclide concentration) at a well-known time and allowing the ingrowth of the daughter nuclides [2]. The complete elimination of thorium from the initial material, which is the key parameter to determine the age of the material, was verified by gamma spectrometry after each separation step and by mass spectrometry adding 232Th as tracer. The reference value was confirmed on 6 randomly selected units using mass spectrometry and comparing the calculated age of the material based on the measured 230Th/234U ratio and given half-lives with the known age of IRMM-1000. The homogeneity of the batch was assessed in the same way using 10 randomly selected items. Two unit sizes were produced containing 20 mg and 50 mg uranium. IRMM-1000 has been produced in compliance with ISO Guide 34 and will be available beginning of 2015. However, prior to its release, the EC-JRC-IRMM launched REIMEP-22 inter-laboratory comparison "U Age Dating - Determination of the production date of a uranium certified test sample" within the framework of the IRMM Regular European Inter-laboratory Measurement Evaluation Programme using the same material. References [1] K. Mayer, M. Wallenius et al. (2011). Nuclear Forensics: A method applicable to Nuclear Security and to Non-Proliferation. INPC2010, Journal of Physics: Conference Series 312 doi:10.1088/1742-6596/312/6/062003. [2] Z. Varga, A. Nicholl, M. Wallenius and K. Mayer (2012). Development and validation of a methodology for uranium radiochronometry reference material preparation. Analytica Chimica Acta 718, 25– 31.
        Speaker: Mrs C. VENCHIARUTTI (EU)
      • 108
        Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Prepares for Nuclear Forensic Analyses
        Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has focused on developing peaceful and innovative applications from nuclear technology for over 60 years through its expertise in S&T and its more than 50 unique facilities and laboratories, including fuel development, hot cells, gloveboxes, x-ray diffraction, neutron beam, surface science and analytical chemistry laboratories. AECL is leading a national collaboration with other federal government laboratories to establish a Canadian nuclear forensics laboratory network. In preparation for AECL becoming part of this lab network, the Analytical Chemistry Branch (ACB) identified three opportunities for improvement to ensure analytical results could be used as evidence in a court of law. These were accreditation to the international standard ISO/IEC 17025:2005, procurement of a modern Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS), and qualification as part of the IAEA’s network of analytical laboratories (NWAL) for nuclear materials. Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025 started with a gap analysis between the existing quality management system and the requirements of the standard. The ACB quality assurance plan was restructured to align with the requirements of the standard, and several procedures covering a range of analyses were selected for the initial accreditation. An internal audit provided an opportunity to refine our documentation and records management prior to an accreditation assessment from the Canadian Association for Laboratory Accreditation (CALA), leading to successful accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2005. The on-going internal and CALA assessments to maintain accreditation will provide continued opportunities for improvement. The ACB currently uses a quality assurance database developed in-house to track samples, quality control materials, records and equipment. Many features of this system became difficult to use as the database grew, necessitating a reassessment. A decision was made to utilize a commercially available LIMS, thus capitalizing on industry expertise in this area. Based on the client requirements document, a commercial LIMS was procured from Perkin Elmer. Configuration of the Perkin Elmer Labworks LIMS is underway, and experience gained is shared in this paper. As the third component of AECL’s laboratory capability improvement initiative, becoming qualified as part of the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) for Destructive Analysis of Nuclear Materials represents the advantage of AECL maintaining relevant equipment, procedures, and expertise. This is not only of direct value to the IAEA program of non-proliferation and safeguards, but also of strategic importance to maintain the capability in a ready state in the event it is required for a nuclear forensics incident. As part of the qualification process, AECL participated in a round robin exercise and subsequent technical meeting for isotopic determination of U and Pu. Highlights from the exercise, including major lessons learned, are discussed in the paper.
        Speaker: Dr M. Totland (Canada)
    • Technical Session 3F: Nuclear Forensic Science: Synergies with Other Disciplines II
      Conveners: Mr A. Álvarez García (Spain) , Mr I. Mirsaidov (Tajikistan)
      • 109
        High Precision Isotopic Analysis of Actinide Bearing Materials: Performance of a New Generation of Purpose Built Actinide Multi-Collector ICPMS Instruments
        Forensic trace analysis is advanced through the sensitive and precise measurement of isotope ratios. Such information has always been a critical component in nuclear forensic analysis, and mass spectrometry - traditionally TIMS - is the instrument of choice for low-level and precise isotope abundance measurements. A new class of inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometers (ICPMS) has recently become commercially available that incorporate new features to enhance the analysis of actinides, most notably, a detector array specifically designed for the isotopic abundances encountered in uranium analyses. The array/instrument can also be usefully employed for the analysis of other actinides and most of the periodic table. The authors contributed to the realization of one of these purpose-built actinide MS instruments, the NeptunePlusTM (ThermoFisher, Bremen, Germany). This instrument also included a new, all dry pumped vacuum system, most notably in the high speed pump used in the vacuum interface between the atmospheric pressure ICP and the mass analyzer. The authors are most familiar with instruments from ThermoFisher, however other such instruments exist, notably from Nu Instruments (Wrexham, England). Prior to the introduction of these instruments, nearly all MC-ICPMS instruments had a single ion pulse counting detection channel, surrounded by an array of Faraday Cup detectors. These prior instruments had been developed largely for the geology and geochemistry communities where very high precision measurements are the norm and samples sizes are adequately large to enable high precision measurement. The new instruments retain most of the Periodic Table coverage of the earlier generation instruments, but with the addition of these new detector arrays, precise measurement of very low abundance isotopes, e.g., 234U and 236U, becomes possible even where very little analyte is available. The features of these instruments will be described, along with analytical performance figures of merit, selected applications and recent innovations. The latter will include the authors’ research on femtosecond laser ablation (fs-LA) as a sample introduction method for MC-ICPMS as a new way to measure the isotopic composition of surfaces and particles with high spatial resolution. Comparison of the fs-LA method with more established methods such as SIMS will be provided. Conventional, solution introduction is also of interest in these instruments as are novel sample introduction methods. An example of the latter that will be described is the use of electrochemically modulated separations to effect chemical separation of interfering species like 238U1H+ from 239Pu+, 241Am+ from 241Pu+ , online, as part of the sample introduction to the ICP. Other performance figures of merit of interest include isotope ratio uncertainty as a function of analyte amount and isotopic composition, sample utilization efficiency (ion counts/atom in sample), and spectral interferences for the least abundant actinide isotopes of interest.
        Speaker: Mr G.C. Eiden (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA)
      • 110
        Announcing the 4th Collaborative Materials Exercise (CMX-4) of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
        The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) is a forum for informal technical collaboration among official nuclear forensics practitioners who share a common interest in preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials out of regulatory control. Together, this community of scientists, law enforcement personnel, and regulators work to advance the best practices of nuclear forensics largely through the participation in a series of Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMX), formerly known as Round Robin exercises. The ITWG Exercise Task Group (ETG) is responsible for facilitating Collaborative Materials Exercises (CMXs). These exercises are designed as learning experiences rather than performance tests for the scientific community by following several basic principles. First, each CMX is executed using well-characterized materials of a known history and origin and are taken from specific process locations within the nuclear fuel cycle. These “real world” materials are used as the basis of exercise materials, as opposed to laboratory-generated pure phase certified reference materials, in order to fully consider the potential significance of process-derived heterogeneities and characteristics suggestive of the material history. Second, the ITWG ETG also assumes participating laboratories maintain their own analytical procedures and quality assurance and control programs. And finally, while it is the goal of the ITWG ETG to produce a publically available summary of the major outcomes from each exercise, explicit results reported by individual laboratories are held in confidence and only revealed at the discretion of each laboratory. To date, the ITWG has carried out three Collaborative Materials Exercises with the fourth (CMX-4) scheduled to begin on 15 September 2014 and end on 14 November 2014. This exercise will be the second in a series of paired-comparison exercises in which two or more material samples are distributed to each participating laboratory for analyses and subsequent comparison. In addition to categorizing these samples, and in order to support law enforcement investigation, participating laboratories will be asked to include or exclude individual samples from one another based upon sample characteristics. Distinguishing characteristics of these materials may include isotopic abundance, chemical form, trace element content, morphological characteristics, or other measureable features. Conventional forensic analysis (e.g., fingerprints, DNA, or tool marks) of evidence contaminated with nuclear and/or radioactive materials, while an important consideration during the investigation of radiological crime scenes, will be excluded from this particular exercise in order to focus on the development of robust nuclear forensic techniques and methods designed to characterize nuclear or radioactive materials. The primary goal of CMX-4 is to improve international technical capabilities, cooperation, and communication in the event of a nuclear material security incident through identifying and sharing best practices concerning nuclear forensic protocols, procedures, analytical techniques, and interpretational methods. Five objectives have been identified for the laboratories participating in CMX-4. These include: 1. Assess the ability for rapid nuclear detection techniques to adequately categorize low-enriched uranium (LEU) 2. Explore the capabilities and limitations of Bulk Analysis 3. Exploit material characteristics other than isotopic abundances 4. Apply nuclear forensic evidence to identify a facility of origin 5. Utilize the Graded Decision Framework (GDF) to comprehensively report findings A summary of the CMX-4 scenario will be provided along with important information for representatives of laboratories interested in participating in the materials exercise.
        Speaker: J.M. Schwantes (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA)
      • 111
        Studies on the Measurement of Impurities in Uranium Sample with ICP-MS
        Introduction: The impurities of nuclear material vary slightly according to the produced method employed and local environment. By comparing the measured data to database information ,this characterisic information can be used to trace to the source of nuclear material together with other clues. Because of the complexity of emission spectrum, uranium will have a serious interferes on the measurement of impurities. Therefore, impurities have to be separated from uranium matrix before measurement. This work aims to separate impurities from uranium sample using TBP , UTEVA or TEVA extraction chromatography,and the recovery of impurities was obtained by the determination of separated fraction of sample by ICP-MS. Methods: Marinated in Mili-Q water for 24h after washing several times, the resin was packed in a quartz column. Conditioning of the column was carried out passing Mili-Q water, 0.5 mol L-1 HNO3 and Mili-Q water in sequence to convert the resin to be neutral. Finally 20 ml volume of 3M HNO3 was passed through the column to balance the resin. Sample was passed through the resin , and the elution was collected and converted to 2%HNO3(v/v)-solution that can be measurement directly by ICP-MS. A blank test was carried out using the same procedure as the uranium sample. Results: The content of impurities in separated fraction has been determined by standard curve method, and the measurement result showed that :(1) the decontamination factor for U is more than 104; (2) the recovery of 90℅ to 110℅ was achieved for most of the impurities(such as Cr, Mn, Ni, Cu, Cd etc); (3) the content of the impurities in uranium sample is in good accordance with the reference value which confirms the feasibility of the method .
        Speaker: Mr L-C. Zhu (China Institute of Atomic Energy)
      • 112
        IAEA Coordinated Research Project: Application of Nuclear Forensics in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material
        Tegan Bull, David Kenneth Smith Division of Nuclear Security, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, AUSTRIA Nuclear forensics, as a sub discipline of forensic science, utilizes measurements of physical characteristics, chemical and elemental composition, and isotopic ratios of nuclear and other radioactive material, together with associated traditional evidence to provide information about material origin and history. By analyzing inherent signatures that are intrinsic or imparted during manufacturing and use, materials may be linked to people, places, and events important to a law enforcement investigation, a criminal prosecution and nuclear security vulnerability assessments. The challenges posed by illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials demands scientific innovation to ensure state of practice methods and techniques are being developed and implemented as a component of response. Because nuclear forensic examinations may involve analysis and interpretation of a range of nuclear and other radioactive material, appropriate methodologies together with high confidence measurements are essential. In addition, the ability to examine traditional evidence (e.g., DNA, fingermarks, hair, and fibers) contaminated with radionuclides may be required as part of an investigation of a nuclear security event. The strength of nuclear forensic findings relies upon existing, proven analytical techniques together with the development and validation of novel techniques and applications for nuclear forensic methodologies. Research and development is a means to foster innovation applicable to nuclear forensic examinations as well as demonstrate the validity of nuclear forensic methodologies. The IAEA promotes research and development to support effective nuclear security through coordinated research projects (CRPs) that involve a broad range of experts and institutions of a broad range of States. In this regard the IAEA has organized two CRPs in nuclear forensics. The first CRP ran from 2008 to 2012 and focused on the requirements of state of practice measurements of seized materials, techniques to collect and preserve evidence, and improvements to interpretative capacities for law enforcement and nuclear security purposes. Conclusions of the first CRP focused on the areas of 1) instrumentation and field collections, 2) laboratory methods and techniques and 3) modeling and interpretation and demonstrated that the CRP provided a forum for sharing improved techniques and procedures (to include radiation detection and mass spectrometry techniques), the importance of a staged nuclear forensics analytical plan with nondestructive analysis proceeding destructive analysis, the value of predictive signatures in the analysis of irradiated materials, the considerations to preserve evidence contaminated with radionuclides, and the necessity for research activities to be commensurate with State’s requirements for nuclear forensics. The second CRP entitled ‘Identification of high confidence nuclear forensic signatures for the development of a national nuclear forensics library’ commenced in 2013. This project recognizes a national nuclear forensics library as one possible tool for interpretation through enabling the comparison of material characteristics and signatures with materials used, produced or stored within a State. The project also recognizes that the comparison of material characteristics and signatures would benefit from the identification of peer reviewed and validated signatures across the nuclear fuel cycle and the manufacture of radioactive sources. The objectives of this CRP seek to address the data requirements of a national nuclear forensics library for stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and for the manufacture of radioactive sources, as well as promote research into novel signatures that are indicative of nuclear processing and important to high confidence interpretation and nuclear forensics findings. Of interest, for example are resolving intrinsic signatures of natural uranium from those that are introduced as a result of production and manufacturing processes during milling, isotopic enrichment, fuel manufacture and reactor operations. A fundamental question to be considered by this CRP is how signatures are imparted and how they persist. The outcomes of this project will be used to provide technical guidance to States for the development of a national nuclear forensics library and the measurement of material characteristics and signatures. The premise of IAEA coordinated research projects, to include those in nuclear forensics, is to promote improvements in current technology, encourage international best practice, stimulate confidence building via peer-to-peer networking and increase competence among nuclear security practitioners.
        Speaker: Ms Tegan Bull (Division of Nuclear Security, International Atomic Energy Agency)
    • 3:20 PM
      Coffee break
    • Panel Session 3H: Nuclear Forensic Science: The Next 5 Years
      Conveners: Ms S. Clark (USA) , Mr W. Huang (China)
      • 113
        Nuclear Forensic Science: The Next 5 Years’
        Speakers: Mr D.K. Smith (IAEA) , Mr J.E. de Souza Sarkis (Brazil) , Mr K. Smith (Australia) , Mr P. Thompson (AWE) , Mr R. Mogafe (South Africa) , Mr T. Fanghaenel (EU) , Mr V. Stebelkov (Russian Federation)
    • Technical Session 3G: Nuclear Forensics Awareness and Education
      Conveners: Mr A. Farhane (Morocco) , Mr F. Dimayuga (Canada)
      • 114
        Building a Nuclear Forensic Analysis Capability in South Africa
        The threat of nuclear proliferation requires international co-operation and the development of improved measures for the prevention, detection and response to incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear and/or radiological materials. No single country or nation-state can address this critical 21st century problem in isolation, even on a local scale, without global engagement. To meet this need, the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) Program within NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security promotes international engagement efforts to assist partner countries develop and strengthen indigenous capabilities in nuclear forensics. South Africa provides an excellent example of the ways in which CBM activities promote and expand nuclear forensic analysis capabilities. Beginning with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in 2010, the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (Necsa), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory initiated an ambitious collaborative effort featuring scientist-to-scientist engagement to develop South Africa as a regional center of excellence in nuclear forensics. Over the past three years this partnership has held several meetings of nuclear forensic experts, carried out extensive hands-on training of Necsa scientists in nuclear forensic analysis techniques and established a dedicated cleanroom facility at Necsa, including a state-of-the-art ICP-MS, for the forensic processing and analysis of nuclear materials. Next steps include advanced training in ICP-MS analysis of U-rich materials and in nuclear forensic database development and a joint exercise featuring analyses at all three partner laboratories of uranium ore concentrate. We will discuss the current status of the nuclear forensic analysis capability at Necsa and describe how our approach has enabled Necsa to build and enhance South Africa’s nuclear forensics capacity through the establishment of collaborations with national and international agencies with regard to the handling, characterization and analysis of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
        Speaker: Dr I. D. Hutcheon (United States of America)
      • 115
        Educating Policy Students in Nuclear Forensics
        Nuclear forensics has received a significant amount of attention and funding in a number of States and in the international arena. Accompanying this attention has been an increased level of activity in awareness training that has targeted decision makers, the scientific community, and the diplomatic, security and law enforcement communities that are the potential users of the nuclear forensics process. However, to date there has been little effort to develop curricula on nuclear forensics. Scattered coursework tends to focus on the technical aspects of nuclear forensics and the available printed materials (by IAEA and the book Nuclear Forensics by Moody, et. al.) focus on the technical community. Based on the author’s experience in teaching nuclear forensics and other technical topics to non-technical students in a Master’s degree program, the paper and presentation will focus on providing education for future policy and decision makers. In addition, a proposed exemplar curriculum will be presented and the challenges of presenting nuclear forensics materials to a non-technical group of students will be discussed.
        Speaker: Dr G. Moore (United States of America)
      • 116
        Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development: Transferring Knowledge to the Next Generation
        “Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development: Transferring Knowledge to the Next Generation” will directly support the objectives of Conference Topic #6, Nuclear Forensics Capacity Building, Sub-topic 6.3, Education and Development of Expertise. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) has served as the comprehensive U.S. Government effort to grow and sustain the uniquely qualified technical expertise required to execute the nation’s nuclear forensics mission. The NNFEDP has created a vibrant academic pathway over the past five years from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical sciences directly relevant to nuclear forensics, supporting over 250 students and faculty in partnership with 11 U.S. national laboratories and 23 universities. Through its fellowship, scholarship, junior faculty, and education development initiatives, the program links next generation scientists with technical experts at the labs for practical research experiences and individual mentoring to facilitate critical knowledge transfer and to establish a seamless pipeline from academia into an attractive career in nuclear forensics. The NNFEDP provides an active and practical example of how to transfer and sustain nuclear forensics knowledge and expertise to the next generation of scientists – a major challenge facing the international nuclear security community today.
        Speaker: Ms S.K. Connelly (U.S. Department of Homeland Security)
      • 117
        Australia’s Experience in the ITWG Galaxy Serpent NNFL Table Top Exercise
        Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) National Security Research Program staff participated in the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Forensics (ITWG) Galaxy Serpent National Nuclear Forensics Library (NNFL) Table Top Exercise. We established a “Virgo Galaxy” NNFL using three isotopic datasets (named Anthea-PWR, Atlas-BWR and Enceladus-BWR), compared an unknown (Clio) with the NNFL (using Microsoft Excel and Multivariate Analysis) and determined that the Clio material was unlikely to have originated from our Galaxy. The exercise provided valuable lessons in the process of establishing an NNFL. In summary we found the following. • An NNFL can be readily generated using common software (such as Microsoft Excel). (e.g. excel) • If available, multivariate analysis (MVA) techniques can provide additional insight to Excel analysis. • Use of common units (SI) would aid communication and conversations between stakeholders (e.g. between different professional groups such as nuclear engineers and the forensics community; and between trusted partner countries). • In this study we were advised that the data set for each sample at a given time was the average smeared set of values for an entire reactor core. We compared these reference data sets with data sets for discrete pellets. In a real scenario, the data in an NNFL would be data from discrete pellets but would include positional and operational information. Consequently it may be more difficult to make definitive findings in the real world. • The experimental results from this study showed that the “unknown” was unlikely to have come from any of the reactors included in the Virgo Galaxy NNFL.
        Speaker: Dr K.L. Smith (Australia)
    • Technical Session 4A: International and Regional Cooperation in Nuclear Forensics
      Conveners: Ms E. Kovacs-Szeles (Hungary) , Mr S.C. Kim (Korea, Republic of)
      • 118
        Nuclear Forensics Activities supported by the EU CBRN Action Plan and EU CBRN Mitigation Centres of Excellence
        Even though, the responsibility for nuclear security is with the EU MS, as this is a matter of national security, European institutions have been involved in activities related to nuclear security for decades. In accordance with provisions of Chapter 7 of the EURATOM Treaty (1957), the European Commission has the responsibility to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users. Based on the work on nuclear safeguards, the European Commission in particular through its Joint Research Centre has acquired expertise in nuclear material analysis, which is also applied in Nuclear Forensics to provide evidence on history or even the origin of nuclear material. In the field of nuclear and radiological security, the EC/JRC activities are well defined and aim at contribution to efficient and effective safeguarding; enhanced proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel systems; and support the EU and its Member States policies in enhancing internal and external security by combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials, in the areas of prevention, detection and response including Nuclear Forensics. Naturally, the EC has attributed to the JRC the implementation of several projects and actions inside and outside Europe. In 2009, the EU Council adopted the EU CBRN Action Plan with the aim to strengthen CBRN security throughout the EU. Based on an all-hazard approach, the Action Plan's overall goal is to reduce the threat of, and damage from CBRN incidents of accidental, natural and intentional origin, including terrorist acts. The European Commission Directorate General HOME AFFAIRS is in charge of the follow up of this action plan. A total of 124 actions are to be implemented by the EU Member States and the EU Institutions. In addition to 25 actions relating to radiological and nuclear security, there are 32 actions covering biological or chemical security. A further 67 actions are horizontal actions in the sense that they apply to all the areas. The implementation of the AP is guided by consultation with national authorities and other relevant stakeholders. The IAEA, Interpol, and Europol are closely associated to the implementation of the AP. Several actions, directly or indirectly, address also issue of Nuclear Forensics as for example Horizontal Action H.45, which states the following: "The Member States together with the Commission should enhance and support cooperation between Forensic laboratories, reference and specialised laboratories, including those equipped for measurement/analysis of CBRN materials. " In the area of Nuclear Forensics, JRC implemented/implements 2 projects. Under the project "Development of a mechanism for enhanced operational support to Member States in the area of nuclear forensics (RN. 25 and H. 21)" (2013-2014) and based on a questionnaire on current Nuclear Forensics capabilities of the EU MS, syllabus for a training course on core capabilities in Nuclear Forensics is being prepared and appropriate Member States are invited to a training course. This aims at establishing core capabilities in Nuclear Forensics in all EU Member States, recognizing that few Member States do have capabilities which go beyond that. As investigations on illicit trafficking of nuclear materials may require analytical information that cannot be acquired by core capabilities, legal basis for operational Nuclear Forensic support (i.e. analysing the samples at the JRC laboratories) needs to be in place. Therefore, it is intended to offer concluding a collaboration agreement (or equivalent) with interested Member States. This whole procedure, including transport of "unknown" nuclear material and its analysis will be exercised in so-called joint analysis exercise. Because of increasing concerns of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Joint Research Centre was tasked to set up a dedicated 'Security Training Centre for the Law Enforcement Community (EUSECTRA) (Action RN. 20 and Action RN 24)' with the aim of developing a security training programme applicable to the law enforcement staff, and in particular front line officers. The Centre serves as platform for knowledge transfer and for networking of experts and offers hands-on training on detection of radioactive/nuclear materials and response to incidents with radioactive/nuclear materials including Nuclear Forensic analysis. Reference and standardised training materials have been and are presently being developed in close collaboration with international experts (e.g., from IAEA, US-DoE, FBI, Netherlands Forensic Institute) and under the Border Monitoring Working Group. Moreover, the EU through its FP7 Security Research finances CBRN projects in the area of Prevention, Preparedness, Protection; Detection; Response, Crisis Management and Recovery to be implemented by the research institutes in the EU MS. As for example, project "GIFT – CBRN (Forensics)" submitted at the end of 2012 and currently under implementation by 21 organisations from Netherlands, UK, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, France, Spain, Belgium, Turkey and also by the JRC, aims at development of common guidelines, practices and procedures for CBRN Forensic investigations at a European level as part of a CBRN Forensic Toolbox and testing and validation of the CBRN Forensic Toolbox in the field with end users. The work of JRC within this project focuses on development of methods for collection of fingerprints and DNA samples from contaminated evidence. The EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative, launched in 2010 under the Instrument for Stability aims at strengthening national CBRN policies and capacities in currently 43 CoE partner countries and to promote national, regional and international cooperation in the CBRN risk mitigation area through implementation of a methodology and tailored projects. Technical scope of projects varies from awareness raising, strengthening legislative framework and regulatory infrastructure, sharing best practice, development of response plans, provision of training, and detection equipment to Nuclear Forensics. The JRC provides technical and expert support for the implementation of the initiative. In order to facilitate the assessment of current national CBRN risk mitigation capacities, a specific questionnaire called "Needs Assessment Questionnaire (NAQ)" was designed for a self-assessment of partner countries coupled with support from the JRC. The questionnaire covers all main CBRN risk mitigation areas including Nuclear Forensic capabilities. Moreover, two projects in the area of Nuclear Forensics were/are implemented by JRC in the Framework of the initiative. The main objective of the "Pilot regional project in South East Asia for capacity building in countering illicit nuclear trafficking" (2010-2012) was to contribute to a capacity building in selected countries in the South East Asia region. The project comprised activities such as: assessment of national capabilities for responding to nuclear security incidents and awareness rising on related needs with particular attention to Nuclear Forensic capabilities; promoting development and implementation of a national response plan for nuclear security incidents including establishment of a framework for mutual support in Nuclear Forensics; and basic training in Nuclear Forensics. Based on the results of the pilot project, project no. 30 under the CoE initiative entitled "Network of Excellence for Nuclear Forensics in South East Asia Region" (2013-2014) aims to reinforce regional public security by upgrading Nuclear Forensics capabilities, technologies and methodologies to assess radioactive and nuclear materials. Project no. 30 foresees activities as: to establish a regional forum for Nuclear Forensics experts to share best practices; to provide equipment for the laboratory of the Office of Atoms for Peace in Thailand, which will serve as a hub laboratory within the regional network as well as to provide a specific technical and training on radiological crime scene management. Moreover, support for development of National Nuclear Forensics Libraries will be provided. In both projects, due consideration was/is being given to related activities funded or implemented by other donors. The implementation of the pilot project was coordinated with the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) who is also engaged in activities in the same technical area and the IAEA in order to ensure coherence of the respective training activities. Activities under the project no. 30 are being implemented in close coordination with the US DOE's NNSA and the US Department of State. In addition to these two projects, several projects are currently under implementation, in the framework of the CoE initiative, targeting the development of appropriate response capabilities, thus indirectly addressing also Nuclear Forensics capabilities in the CoE partner countries.
        Speaker: Z. Pajalova (European Union)
      • 119
        International Cooperation to Advance Global Nuclear Forensics Capabilities
        The Confidence Building Measures (CBM) program of the National Nuclear Security Administration advances a global security system in which authorities are able to use technical nuclear forensics to prevent, identify, and deter nuclear security breaches. In coordination with the US interagency and international partners, CBM leverages U.S. national laboratory nuclear forensics expertise to build international forensics capacity. CBM works to build a global security regime in which nuclear forensics provides critical capabilities that assist governments in identifying the source of illicit material and preventing future security breaches. CBM assists states in each of these areas through direct capacity building activities. To produce the most immediate increase in the confidence of foreign forensics capabilities, CBM focuses its exchange activities on states that: possess adequate laboratory infrastructure; are willing to cooperate on forensics projects; and are the most important to the regime because of the size of their nuclear materials holdings or their importance as international leaders. At the global level the CBM program works closely with the IAEA to provide training and support to IAEA activities including the development of guidance documents, consultancies, workshops and coordinated research projects. At the regional level CBM cooperates with the JRC/ITU and ASEAN to develop forensics capacities and linkages within the ARF region. Working with individual partners the CBM program provides support to build capacity, develop National Nuclear Forensic Libraries, and conduct joint research. CBM has a small but important role in funding such basic R&D. CBM currently is focusing international attention on a single topic that is of wide international concern: uranium chronometry. CBM is working with its partners to increase precision and accuracy in uranium age dating to better identify the origins and process history of uranium found out of regulatory control. Focusing on the same topic maximizes the impact of INFC’s investment, since the results of a single research project can be shared with several different countries. This supports IAEA Conference Goals 4, 5, and 6.
        Speaker: Dr H. Dion (National Nuclear Security Administration, USA)
      • 120
        Capacity Building in Nuclear Forensics in South East Asia
        Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials is an international concern. Whenever illicit nuclear or other radioactive material is detected, an appropriate response process needs to be initiated. An important element of the response process is the nuclear forensic investigation of the intercepted material. Obviously, we need to define what composes an "appropriate" response, what authorities are in charge and what technical capabilities are required. Sustainable success in the fight against illicit nuclear trafficking can only be achieved if the origin of the material can be identified and, in consequence, if the protection of the material at the place of theft or diversion will be improved. Information on the nature and on the history of nuclear material can be obtained through nuclear forensic analysis. Whenever nuclear material is intercepted from illicit trafficking, the investigating authorities request rapid and reliable information on the seized material. To this end, a number measures have to be implemented in order to ensure that the appropriate legal and administrative instruments are in place, that the technical infrastructure supporting the investigations is available and that the scientific skills and instrumentation are provided. In a joint undertaking, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) implemented a project in South East Asia for raising awareness on the phenomenon of illicit nuclear trafficking, for sharing experience in responding to nuclear security incidents and for paving the way for establishing nuclear forensics capabilities in that region. The paper describes the strategy developed for implementing the project in partnership between JRC and NNSA. Workshops and seminars were held in cooperation with and hosted by partners from the region; the IAEA was associated to these events and the ASEAN Regional Forum provided the regional platform. A series of three workshops offered nuclear forensics awareness, introduction to concepts of a national response plan, fundamentals of nuclear forensic investigations, and opportunities for regional and international cooperation. Seminars included presentations, table-top exercises and discussions, addressing regulatory authorities, law enforcement and nuclear measurement experts. Two hands-on training sessions were provided at the European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA). Firstly, a one week training on core capabilities in nuclear forensics was provided to some 15 technical experts from various ASEAN countries. The training areas ranged from basic radiation measurement techniques to scenario based exercises for resolving typical nuclear security incidents. A second training session (again one week duration) addressed the specific issue of radiological crime scene management. Two experts per country, one from law enforcement and a nuclear measurement expert, participated in this session. Training participants will share the skills acquired during these sessions with other experts in their respective countries and contribute to establish nuclear forensics capabilities in their respective countries. JRC –ITU and NNSA will continue to work with ASEAN and ARF countries supporting the development and implementation of nuclear forensic capabilities through regional experts meetings and technical trainings. The on-going cooperative efforts on capacity building in nuclear forensics are significantly contributing to improved preparedness and enhanced deterrence.
        Speaker: Dr K. Mayer (EU)
      • 121
        Developing a Nuclear Forensies library in Ukraine: Legislation, Interaction and Regional Cooperation
        The threat of terrorist activities involving nuclear materials has now become a matter of international community concern. Ukraine has been actively involved into the international activities related to combating illicit trafficking of NRM and communicates with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) since 1997. Much can be learned from analysis of reported cases: Where did material originate? Where a regulatory control was lost or weakens? What is the route the interdicted material took? These and other questions can be answered through detailed technical characterization of the stolen/lost material. The scientific methods used for this purpose are normally referred to as nuclear forensics now became a powerful tool to further strengthening of regulatory control. In June 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Decree N 813 which determines the interaction state and local authorities in case of detection radioactive materials out of regulatory control (illicit trafficking). Nuclear forensics analysis is more than the characterization of the material, which is simply a determination of the physical nature of the sample. For the final attribution and interpretation of the evidences and material properties, it also requires an involvement of knowledge and expertise from the broad scientific, forensic and nuclear technology related areas. The authorized main expert nuclear forensic laboratory was established in the Institute for Nuclear Research (INR) of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine based on the core technical capabilities and expertise available in the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Now, in the frame of STCU’s Partner project P459, in INR the pilot project of database for nuclear forensics in Ukraine is developing. However, it should be noted that the development of nuclear forensics capabilities at national level not excludes the development of international networks of experts involved into the nuclear forensics investigations, especial at the regional level. The co-operation and information exchange in the nuclear forensics field the establishing of a regional nuclear forensic network encompassing national expert laboratories in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan with central regional nuclear forensic expert laboratory in Ukraine would be powerful tools for improvement regional and international nuclear security regime. This activity should include development both technical and methodological capabilities and include the development of protocols and signing of an agreement for samples and data exchange, joint trainings and experts investigations, development of general information platform for cooperation. For this purpose, it is planed to create communication-informational portals on the base of Ukrainian laboratory, that providing technical means for the quick information and data exchange, efficient co-ordination of joint nuclear forensic studies, trainings, consultations etc.
        Speaker: Mr V. Kushka (Ukraine)
    • 10:20 AM
      Coffee break
    • Technical Session 4b: Nuclear Forensics: Where Science Meets Policy Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      IAEA HQ

      Vienna International Centre, 1400 Vienna, Austria
      Convener: Mr K. Mrabit (IAEA - Director NSNS)
      • 122
        ‘Nuclear Forensics: Where Science Meets Policy’
        Speakers: Ms A. Harrington (United States of America) , Mr G. Berdennikov (Russian Federation - Ambassador) , Mr J.M. Palma López (AMERIPOL) , Mr W. Huang (China) , Mr de Salazar Serantes G. (Spain)
    • Closing Session
      Conveners: Mr D. SMITH (IAEA, Scientific Secretary) , Mr S. J. LE JEUNE D'ALLEGEERSHECQUE (United Kingdom, Ambassador)
      • 123
        President's Findings
      • 124
        Closing Remarks
        Speaker: Mr D. K. Smith (IAEA, Scientific Secretary)