

Nuclear Forensics – An Integral Part of the Philippines' National Response Plan for a Nuclear Security Event

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Since the dropping of the first atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 1945, quoting the famous phrase, “the world has lived under the shadow of nuclear threat”. This was heightened by the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986 and magnified by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack of the World Trade Center in the USA. Although the attack (more popularly termed as 9/11 attack) was not nuclear or radiological in manner, it imparted a worldwide chilling effect that such an act that is nuclear or radiological armed can be a possibility causing major damage and massive disruption. While the threat is global, nuclear security is a national responsibility. It is in this light that the Philippine Nuclear Security Plan was formulated by the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) specifically to address nuclear security and terrorism with nuclear forensic as an integral part of the plan.

Prior to the 9/11 attack, the Philippines was confronted by three (3) major internal security concerns: the local communist movement, the southern Philippines secessionist groups, and the home-grown and transnational kidnap for ransom groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group. To deter and overcome these threats, a ‘Strategy of Holistic Approach’ focusing on “Winning the Peace” theme was adopted under the National Internal Security Plan. However, after the 9/11 attack, the word ‘terrorism’ drastically changed the course of global and national security. The Philippines created its own definition and perspective on terrorism with the passage of Republic Act No. 9372 on March 6, 2007, An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as “The Human Security Act of 2007”. Included in this law as an act of terrorism is the use of any biological and/or chemical agent, radioactive or nuclear material, explosives, firearm or other weapons, with the intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause great damage to property. With this new law, the National Plan to Address Terrorism and its Consequences was developed. Unfortunately, this plan was designed to cover



hostage taking, bombing, sabotage, hijacking and piracy, but did not cover biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear & cyber terrorism.

PHILIPPINE NUCLEAR SECURITY PLAN				
Strategy 1 PREVENTION (1 st Line of Defense)				
PROGRAMS	ACTIONS	TIME LINE	Participating Organization	Lead Organization
1.1 NATIONAL THREAT ASSESSMENT	1.1.1 Initial Security Survey inspection	2007-2016	PNRI/DOH, NICA, NSC, PNP, NBI	NICA
	1.1.2 Initial SSI	Q1-2008	PNRI, NICA, NSC, PNP, NBI, Laseanos	NICA
	1.1.3 Periodic SSI	Annually	PNRI, NICA, PNP, NBI	NICA
1.2 NATIONAL INVENTORY	1.2.1 Design Basis Threat	2011-2016	PNRI/DOH, OTS, NICA, NSC, PNP, NBI	NICA, PNRI, PNP
	1.2.2 National Inventory	Quarterly	PNRI/DOH, OTS, NICA, NSC, PNP, NBI	NICA, PNRI, PNP
	1.2.3 National Registry (NARS) using RAS	2007-2016	PNRI	PNRI
	1.2.4 State System for nuclear material accountability and control	In-place	PNRI	PNRI
1.3 ACCOUNTING AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION	1.3.2 Acquisition, Movement, Storage, Use and Disposal	In-place	PNRI	PNRI
	1.3.3 Physical Protection System based on IAEA guidelines	In-place	PNRI	PNRI
	1.3.4 Security Survey inspection (SSI)	Annually	PNRI, NICA, PNP	PNRI, NICA
	1.3.5 Identity training, mediator/interceptor, formulae training programs	2007-2016	PNRI, PNP, OTS, NICA	PNRI, NICA
1.4 SECURITY TRAINING AND EDUCATION	1.4.2 Formulate National Nuclear Security Training (NSTP) Program	2007-2016	PNRI, PNP, NICA, OTS	PNRI
	1.4.3 Implement NSTP	2007-2016	PNRI	PNRI
	1.4.4 Identify and disseminate information	2007-2016	PNRI, NALCO, OSEC	PNRI
	1.4.5 Design Advisory Program	2007-2016	PNRI, NALCO, OSEC	PNRI
1.5 ADVOCACY	1.5.1 Implement Advocacy Program	2008-2016	PNRI, NALCO, OSEC	PNRI
	1.5.2 Review and Assess Program	Annually	PNRI, NALCO, OSEC	PNRI
	1.5.3 Create working group to review laws & amendments	In-place	PNRI, DOJ, PNP, NBI	PNRI, DOJ
	1.5.4 Amend laws	2008-2016	PNRI, DOJ, NBI, PNP, AFP, NICA	PNRI, DOJ
1.6 LEGISLATION	1.6.1 Create working group to review laws & amendments	In-place	PNRI, DOJ, PNP, NBI	PNRI, DOJ
	1.6.2 Amend laws	2008-2016	PNRI, DOJ, NBI, PNP, AFP, NICA	PNRI, DOJ
1.7 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	1.7.1 Strengthen and foster international cooperation	2007-2016	DFA, PNRI, UND	DFA, PNRI

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY PLAN (2010–2016)				
A. Legislative and Regulatory Framework				
Program	Action	Timeline	Responsible Entity	
1. Proposal to create an independent regulatory body	a. Create a technical working group to draft the comprehensive nuclear law	2010	PNRI	
	b. Submit the bill on the proposed "Comprehensive Nuclear and Radiation Regulatory Act"	2011	PNRI	
	c. Amend or develop additional regulations in areas relevant to nuclear security	2011-2016	PNRI	
	d. Request urgent assistance in reviewing of Nuclear Material Security Regulations	In-force	DFA, PNRI & other relevant organizations	
2. Development of regulations relating to regulations relating to	a. Additional protocol to Safeguards Agreement	Feb. 1987	PNRI	
	b. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)	1979	PNRI	
	c. Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreement	2000	PNRI	
	d. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	26 Feb. 2000	PNRI	
B. PREVENTION	1. Defining Order on Basis Threat (OBT)	2011-2012	PNRI, NICA, PNP	
	2. Review level of security arrangements for category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with relevant facilities	Completed 2013	PNRI	
	3. PHS system for nuclear material accountability & control	In-place	PNRI	
	4. Establishment of national registry of radioactive sources	2010-2011	PNRI	
C. DETECTION	1. Development of national detection strategy for detection of illicit trafficking in nuclear/radioactive sources	14 Q 2011 On-going	PNRI/Territorial operators (ATI & MICT)	
	2. Reporting/Notification System	On-going	PNRI, BSC & PPA	
	3. Maintenance of radiation detection equipment	On-going	PNRI	
	4. Identification of training needs	2010-2016	PNRI	
D. RESPONSE	1. Development of plan and procedure to respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material including seizure of such material by law enforcement agencies	2010-2016	PNRI, PNP & other relevant organizations	
	2. Establish forensic and investigation unit	2011-2016	PNRI, PNP, PNP	
	3. Establishment of reporting and notification system	In-place	PNRI	
	4. Human Resource Development	In-place	PNRI	
E. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT	1. Implementation of a National Nuclear Security Training Programme	2010-2016	PNRI	
	2. Identify necessary resources to implement the training programme	2010-2016	PNRI	
	3. Identify personnel to be trained and classification of required training	2010-2016	PNRI	
	4. Front-line officers on measures related to detection of radiation	2010-2016	PNRI	

As such, the Philippine Nuclear Security Plan (PNSP) was developed covering three (3) strategy components of prevention, detection and response. Under response strategy, a program to establish a forensic and investigation unit is included, as well as the development of plan and procedures to respond to incidents involving nuclear and radioactive material, including seizure of such material by law enforcement authorities. The Nuclear Materials Research Section (NMRS) of PNRI was thus given the added function to “develop nuclear forensic analysis capabilities in support of nuclear material protection process so that in the event of an interdiction by Philippine law enforcement agencies involving illegal use or movement of radioactive material this capability may be used to develop and build a legal case against the perpetrators”. To date, several NMRS staff has undergone training on nuclear forensics taking advantage of offers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international organizations as part of the human resource development program of PNSP.

Meanwhile, in 2003, the Megaports Initiative was established by the United State Government through the United State's Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration – Office of Second Line of Defense (USDOE/NNSA-SLD). The purpose of which is to screen container-cargoes for nuclear and other radiological materials being transported through the global maritime shipping network. In the Philippines, with financial and technical support from the USDOE/NNSA-SLD, radiation portal monitoring systems were installed at the Port of Manila, specifically at the South Harbor and Manila International Container Terminal. This will reduce the risk of illicit trafficking and thus preventing the acquisition and malevolent use of these nuclear and other radiological materials by terrorists.

Megaports Initiative Projects

Under a Memorandum of Intent signed by U.S. (Dept. of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration) and Philippines, PNRI in coordination with Bureau of Customs & Phil. Ports Authority continued their active participation in the Megaports Initiative Project. The project involved the detection of illicit shipment of nuclear and radioactive materials through Radiation Portal Monitors installed at the Port of Manila.

11 RPM lanes in operation at the Manila International Container Terminal

Network Camera

12 Central Alarm Station Workstation in operation

Radiation Portal Monitor

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WikiLeaks bares uranium smuggling in PH

By Jerry E. Esplanada
 Philippine Daily Inquirer
 First Posted 08:08:00 02/03/2011

Quoting an unidentified source, the unclassified embassy memo said the uranium formerly belonged to the U.S.?

The same embassy source had allegedly worked with divers in the Philippines previously and was recently contacted by them with information that they had found five to six uranium bricks at an underwater wreck?

In the Nov. 21, 2007 cable to the US State Department, then US Ambassador to the United Kingdom Robert H. Tuttle did not disclose the location of the wreck.

But Tuttle said the informant's contacts had expressed a desire to sell the bricks for profit?

The same embassy source had earlier informed the US Central Intelligence Agency about the possible nuclear smuggling incident. Was yet had not received a response, said Tuttle.

In the cable, the envoy described as unknown? the supplier, transport status and the intended destination of the alleged nuclear materials.

On the mission's assessment of the likelihood that appropriate authorities would secure the materials, Tuttle said "UK and Philippine authorities have not yet been notified."

Tuttle attached "nine photos of the substance in question?" to the embassy cable.



In late 2011, PNRI staffs were instructed to inspect a suspected radioactive material that was seized during an operation by a government investigative agency since there had been reported news of smuggling incidents involving uranium in the Philippines as early as 2007. It was unfortunate however, that the suspected material was brought to the room where the PNRI staffs were planning on how to go through with the inspection at the crime scene. Fortunately, the yellowish metallic box bearing a U235 marking registered very low radioactivity. Evidently, there is a need for strengthening and reorientation of persons that will be involved in

radiological crime scene investigations on the unique characteristics and required safety measures in handling radioactive materials, and more importantly, by equipping PNRI with basic instrumentation and skills in building the nuclear forensics capabilities of the Country.