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IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards

CET
M Building (Vienna International Centre)

M Building

Vienna International Centre

Description

The purpose of the symposium is to engage with the safeguards community and key experts on specific strategic issues likely to impact safeguards implementation in the coming decade. In particular, the 2018 symposium seeks to

1) innovate: by generating new ideas on methods and technologies to substantially improve the IAEA’s technical capabilities and achieve efficiencies in the way it works;

2) partner: by mobilizing partnerships to further explore new ideas, bring innovation into the Department’s work and support safeguards long term research and development needs; and

3) improve: by engaging safeguards practitioners in sharing experiences, building capabilities, and finding ways to streamline, simplify and improve the implementation of safeguards in the field and at headquarters.

To achieve these objectives, the symposium will focus on four thematic tracks. Abstracts are invited to respond to Topics within these four Themes. Key Questions have been provided to further elaborate on the particular issues of interest within each Theme. Click on Scientific Programme to learn more

The Symposium website can be found here:

https://www.iaea.org/events/international-safeguards-symposium-2018

Participants
  • Adrian Mendez Torres
  • Alessandro Borella
  • Alois Tichy
  • AMINA AGBAB UTHMAN
  • Amira Elabd
  • Andreas Smejkal
  • Andrey Stepashko
  • Angelo Alessandrello
  • Anita Gerenyi
  • Antero Keskinen
  • Arden Dougan
  • AREERAK RUEANNGOEN
  • Armen Tadevosyan
  • Arnold Rezniczek
  • Ashley Finan
  • AUGUSTIN SIMO
  • BASIM ALMAYYAHI
  • Benjamin McDonald
  • Caroline CHABAL
  • Catherine Dill
  • Chris Pickett
  • Christiane Vieh
  • Christopher Manda
  • Christopher Ramos
  • Cindy Vestergaard
  • Cisar Vladimir
  • Cristina Versino
  • Dagmar Weinberg
  • Darius Ancius
  • David Hanks
  • David Sullivan
  • deepak kumar suthar
  • Dmytro Cherkashyn
  • Dmytro Cherkashyn
  • Duaa AlJilani
  • Elena Marinova
  • Emmanuel Ampomah-Amoako
  • Evelyn Zuleger
  • Fatima Taha
  • Filippo Sevini
  • Gabriela Acosta
  • Galitskikh Vladimir
  • Garima Sharma
  • Grecia Cosio Flores
  • Grigol Basilia
  • Guangliang Yang
  • Haneol Lee
  • Haruetai Kasiwattanawut
  • ian stewart
  • Ivan Elantyev
  • J. Stephen Adams
  • Jan Olsansky
  • JIN YOUNG LEE
  • Jorge Luis Paredes Gilisman
  • Juha Pekkarinen
  • Justin Hastings
  • Kamel Abbas
  • KHIN PA PA TUN
  • Krishna Prasad Gaihre
  • Lars Hildingsson
  • Liliya Sharuba
  • LIMING WANG
  • LYU Xuesheng
  • Maren Disney
  • Margot HUMBERT-BRUN
  • Marielle Crozet
  • Mariia Chauzova
  • Mark Goodman
  • Masahiko Yamamoto
  • Masato Hori
  • Matt Ferguson
  • Matthias Auer
  • Megumi Sekine
  • Michal Merxbauer
  • Miodrag Milenović
  • Moustafa Ahmed
  • Nadezhda Salnikova
  • Nafaa Reguigui
  • Nasiru-Deen Adebayo BELLO
  • Nasiru-Deen Bello
  • Nugroho Tino Sawaldi Adi
  • Ondrej Stastny
  • Osamu Arugga
  • Paolo Checchia
  • peter Elhamy Ishak Tawfick
  • Qasim Rawashdeh
  • RABAH ZAGHOUANE
  • Ralf Kaiser
  • Robert Finch
  • Sameh Shaban
  • Sameh Shaban
  • Sardorbek Yakubekov
  • satoshi suzuki
  • Satoshi Watanabe
  • Shinichi Kumakura
  • Shinji Hara
  • SMAIN KORICHI
  • Stefan Nonneman
  • Stephane BAUDE
  • Stéphane PUYDARRIEUX
  • Sylvester Attakorah-Birikorang
  • TALL MOUSTAPHA SADIBOU
  • TARIQ RAUF
  • Tebogo Mokgobi Leshilo
  • Telman Aliev
  • Timothy Warner
  • Tuan Khai Nguyen
  • Valeriia Lozova
  • VICTOR IGNATIEV
  • Viorel Fugaru
  • Vladimir Stebelkov
  • Yen-Fu Chen
  • Yimei Cheng
  • Yoshiyasu Kato
  • Yousry Abushady
  • Zdenka Palajova
  • Zhou Dongmei
    • 10:00 13:00
      Opening Plenary M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 13:00 14:15
      Sponsored Women Luncheon 1h 15m TBD ()

      TBD

    • 14:30 15:30
      Women's Panel: Policy, Law and Regulatory Careers in Safeguards M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 14:30 15:30
      Women's Panel: STEM Careers in Safeguards M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [CHA] Keeping Pace with IT Security - Threat Intelligence for the IAEA/Nuclear Regulatory World M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

      • 16:00
        IAEA Scene Setter 10m
        Speaker: Mr John Coyne (IAEA)
      • 16:10
        Quantum Computers and Preparing Future-Proof Encryption 5m
        After making computer chips with the smallest possible transistors, researchers and technologists are pursuing new technologies including qubits - the beginnings of practical quantum computers. In this talk I’ll do an introduction to what advantages that quantum computers have over today's classical computing, how internet and email security would be impacted, and how we could start securing our systems and servers with post-quantum encryption (PQE). From following and meeting with a few startups in this space, I plan to present an overview of expected developments in the next few years (mainly in chemistry and other research problems), and why Google and Akamai are already evaluating present-day solutions to the future post-quantum encryption problem. NIST is currently evaluating multiple proposals for a PQE standard, especially lattice-based encryption. As a software engineer I have previously worked on two related open source libraries: jsQuil (for JavaScript programming of remote quantum computers) and CodeCrypt (a drop-in replacement for GPG).
        Speaker: Mr Nicholas Doiron (McKinsey & Company)
      • 16:15
        Industrial cyber security standard - IEC 62443 5m
        At the beginning I will discuss the implementation of the European NIS Directive in Germany, as well as Austria. Operators of critical infrastructure are required to implement appropriate organizational and technical arrangements according to the "state of the art". In determining the state of the art, particular reference must be made to relevant international, European and national norms and standards, but also to comparable procedures, facilities and modes of operation that have been successfully tested in practice. I have been working on IT security and IT standards for the last 20 years and have now extended my education to the topics of cyber security and OT standards (Operational Technology). As a Cyber ​​Security Practitioner (CSP), I perform Cyber ​​Security Checks to BSI using ISO / IEC 27001. As an IEC expert of the OVE Austrian Electrotechnical Committee, I work on the IEC 62443 (TSK-MR65) series of standards. Additional I have for the test procedure according to § 8a (3) BSI law, an additional training for the execution of IT security audits with operators critical infrastructure (KRITIS). As a standard for IT risk assessment and state-of-the-art IT risk treatment, ISO / IEC 27001 is recommended as an information security management system (ISMS). However, this can not be applied 1: 1 for critical infrastructure operators (KRITIS). The assessment of the appropriateness and appropriateness of the risk treatment or measures for KRITIS must not have any impact or disruption on society's security of supply. In-depth industry-specific industry safety standards are available, with international emphasis on IEC 62443. This standard defines the roles of manufacturers, integrators and plant operators, as well as technology for the design of zones and transitions, ie security design. I focus on the OVE drafts "Life cycle requirements for safe product development (OVE EN 62443-4-1) and" Requirements for components of industrial automation systems (OVE EN 62443-4-2) and the international standard ISA / IEC 62443 -3-3. I show afterwards as a practical example of our networksecurity implementation according to IEC 62443 in the pilot factory 4.0 of the Vienna University of Technology.
        Speaker: Mr Erich Kronfuss (PHOENIX CONTACT GmbH)
      • 16:20
        Building Safeguards Technologies using Open Source Software and Hardware - Learning from the Maker Movement 5m
        Safeguards technologies are typically developed by the agency and national support programs. More and more, they rely on extensive software and information technology usage. Especially in these fields, recent years showed the advance of new approaches to foster innovation. There is increased use and development of open source software, where not only a software package is shared freely, but also the underlying source code. It is now a widespread way of developing and distributing new software. Similar to the software engineering process, hardware designs can be shared under open hardware standards. This, together with the maker movement created very efficient innovation environments for people to develop new tools and projects. In this paper, it will be analyzed how lessons learned from these areas could be applied to the development of new safeguards technologies. Open source approaches could potentially increase the number of participants helping developing tools. At the same time, they would allow to put verification and monitoring tools under external scrutiny, thus increasing trust and transparency. Lastly, they could increase the actual user community by lowering costs and access barriers to tools, helping capacity building as well as the daily operation. The paper will introduce the open source approaches and the maker community and discuss how safeguards technologies would benefit from integrating those ideas. As an actual example, a prototype gamma spectrometry information barrier, which was build using open source software and open hardware, will be introduced. In the end, the paper will lay out ways to implement the discussed approaches.
        Speaker: Mr Moritz Kuett (Princeton University)
      • 16:25
        A proactive approach: Stopping insiders’ threats with machine-learning technology 5m
        Abstract – Insiders’ threats initiated covertly or overtly are foremost challenges for nuclear safeguards and security. In safeguards, covert insiders’ activities include theft and diversion of special nuclear materials; misuse of process and equipment; deliberately tempering with IAEA surveillance equipment; or systematic concealment of malicious activities for nuclear weapons development. With the advance in digital and cyber technologies, malicious insiders’ activities become ever more sophisticated and difficult to uncover, hampering efforts by the international safeguards regime. A “game changer” involving the recent malware attack against the TRICONEX safety system at an industrial complex in the Middle East serves as a wakeup call for the cyber defense of malicious attacks initiated externally or by insiders. The attack was the first to target an engineering system dedicated to protecting people and the environment. Though not successful, the implications cast a long shadow over the doubt on the adequacy of a defense based on cyber analysts adopting information technology (IT). A defensive approach with IT based on lessons-learned (after an attack) is problematic, and hence inadequate as insiders are always steps ahead of defenders. In a long run, an artificial intelligent (AI) approach based on machine learning would be proactive and preferred. Such defensive approach is now possible due to the advances in AI technologies, aided by the exponential increase in the ability to collect big data and to perform massive computations. With a machine learning approach, it would trace the attack vectors and identify defensive tasks, and show how many of these tasks can be automated, and even deployed in real time to catch the insiders/intruders before any damage is done. For example, machine learning would be able to identify unusual traffic on the network, and shut down these connections as they occur. It can identify abnormal standard operating procedures requested by insiders attempting to steal sensitive information or materials, and sound an alarm to alert the plant responders to prevent the theft. Also, machine learning implemented for containment and surveillance would recognize patterns of concealment by insiders, and alert the IAEA inspection to stop the malicious activities.
        Speaker: Dr Jor-Shan Choi (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired))
      • 16:30
        Safeguards Information Security in Practice at Nuclear Regulatory Authority 5m
        The security of information related to safeguards has been carefully ensured at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Ghana. An integrated management system is currently under development at the Authority which is integrating the various procedures and strategies for ensuring effective implementation of the regulatory mandate. The classification of correspondence is carefully undertaken to ensure that safeguards-related data does not get into wrong hands. The measures taken to secure the safeguards information in the conduct of the conversion of Ghana Research Reactor-1 from high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel is presented. The improvements in securing safeguards information envisaged from the implementation of the integrated management system is presented as well.
        Speaker: Dr Emmanuel Ampomah-Amoako (Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Ghana)
      • 16:35
        National Infrastructure Security in EU 5m
        Speaker: Dr Stephan Lechner
      • 16:40
        Cyber Security - Facility and Authority Perspectives 5m
        Speaker: Mr Timo Vjander
      • 16:45
        UNODC Perspective 5m
        Speaker: Mr Neil Walsh
      • 16:50
        Cyber Threat Expert 5m
        Speaker: Mr Bojan Simetic
      • 16:55
        IAEA Perspective 5m
        Speakers: Bernard Wishard (iaea), Ingo Naumann (IAEA)
    • 16:00 17:00
      [REC] Launching Session: Working for the IAEA Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [TEC] Recent Examples of Innovation in Safeguards M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

      • 16:05
        Soft Robotics for Safeguards Applications in Radiations Environments 5m
        To improve inspection capabilities, limit radiation exposition to inspectors, and minimize the number of repetitive tasks that are done by hand in a growing number of facilities the IAEA has welcomed the investigation of robotics for safeguards applications. Traditional hard robotics have long been employed in the nuclear field, however electronic failure in high radiation environments can severely limit operating time. The developing field of advanced soft robotics, which employs soft materials, such as silicone polymers, and soft actuators, such as liquid metals, has the potential to leverage the capabilities of remote technologies while minimizing the failure rate common to hard robotics. Idaho National Laboratory has partnered with Oregon State University’s (OSU) School of Nuclear Science and Engineering (NSE) and Oregon State Universities Robotics departments to develop and test a prototype soft robotic arm for international safeguards applications. The soft robotics manipulators under investigation offer significant dexterity and mechanical compliance with high degrees-of-freedom, allowing for large contact-area, multi-point gripping, which is particularly advantageous for grasping and emplacing objects.1 This technology has potential applicability in a range of safeguards inspection tasks, including tag and seal application, environmental sampling and spent fuel verification. The research currently underway at Oregon State University includes the design and construction of a prototype soft robotic arm that can operate under water with integrated touch and deformation sensors to enable closed-loop control of grasping and turning. Testing of the material includes examining the effects of high radiation environments on the system components including: impacts to system function, potential activation of the effector, material degradation with exposure to various radiation fields, and the potential for material reuse.
        Speaker: Ms Amanda Rynes (Idaho National Laboratory)
      • 16:10
        Robotics Challenges for Radiological and Nuclear Reconnaissance Applications 5m

        Natural disasters, industrial catastrophes and terror acts pose an unpredictable yet significant risk to the lives and prosperity of the world’s population.
        The ability of properly assessing these situations, especially in combination with radiological / nuclear (RN) threats, remains a significant challenge.
        Several incidents in the past decades (Fukushima, Chernobyl, Asse, Majak, Sellafield) have underlined the need for robotic platforms which can assist operations in scenarios which are hazardous for human personnel to enter.
        Since the late 1980s robotic solutions have been utilised in many of the response efforts to these incidents, demonstrating their potential to reduce the risk of loss of life, reduce response times and gather essential data.
        Robots can be employed in a wide array of relevant and otherwise potentially dangerous tasks including search and rescue, disrupted area mapping, radiation measurement, structural damage assessment, reconnaissance, and manipulation tasks.
        Although robotics research has produced impressive results in general, there is still significant room for improvement with respect to the use of robotics in radiological and nuclear related applications.
        One major problem with R&D; in this very specialised field of robotics is the lack of testing possibilities, especially with regards to radiation sources.
        Another challenge is to compare various unmanned systems in the field of outdoor robotics. Robotic competitions have become a common means of evaluating the performance of robotic techniques as well as a tool for trend-setting.
        ELROB and EnRicH are two successful examples of such outdoor robotics competitions aiming to assess the capabilities of robotic systems in realistic disaster response scenarios.
        A newcomer to the scene is the IAEA robotics challenge, held in 2017 for the first time. The event has a slightly different emphasis, however, and focuses mainly on indoor and structured scenarios.
        The paper will give detailed insight into these three robotics events that include applications in the RN field.
        Keywords: Field Robotics (FR); Radiological and Nuclear (RN); disaster response; robotics competitions; unmanned ground vehicle (UGV); robotics challenges

        Speaker: Dr Frank Schneider (Fraunhofer)
      • 16:15
        Analysis of Select Unmanned Aerial Systems Application for International Safeguards 5m

        Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are becoming increasingly prevalent and have experienced rapid growth due to advancements in navigation and control technology. This has resulted in cost reductions that have seen small, agile UASs emerge as a multi-billion-dollar commercial market. Novel UAS applications for industries and government agencies are created almost on a daily basis. Based on expert assessment, UASs could be used as a platform for the deployment of a variety of monitoring and inspection technologies for IAEA safeguards activities. This project focuses on analyzing the potential of applying UAS technology for safeguards use. This includes an investigation of the current state of readiness and commercial availability of UAS technology with associated detection and monitoring systems mounted on board, potential implications of the introduction of UAS technology on safeguards operational effectiveness and efficiency, and the impact on operations of nuclear facilities. Four applications were selected for in-depth analysis based on the investigators’ consideration of these characteristics, a previous prioritization survey given to safeguards experts, and optimal technical and safeguards application variety. The four applications were collection of detailed site information (site evaluation), survey of mining and concentration activities, verification of container inventory (nuclear material accountancy), and tag/seal verification (containment and surveillance).

        Speaker: Mr Steven Horowitz (Sandia National Laboratories)
        Poster
      • 16:20
        Autonomous Mobile Directionally and Spectrally Sensitive Neutron Detectors 5m

        IAEA managed access inspections are limited in time and inspector hours, and by the needs (1) to avoid exposure of sensitive information, (2) to minimize impacts on facility operations, and (3) to conserve inspectorate resources. We are developing autonomous, mobile, directionally sensitive neutron sensors ("inspector bots") to support inspectors in detecting undeclared enriched UF6 through (alpha, n) reactions. Applications of interest for IAEA safeguards include support for Limited Frequency Unannounced Access inspections at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants and use as Unattended Monitoring Systems at UF6 feed stations. Based on previous work of ours that demonstrated significant directional sensitivity of rows of moderated neutron counters, we are constructing a simple, robust one-foot diameter, two-foot high cylinder of polyethylene moderator, containing three one-inch diameter, 50 cm long, boron-coated-straw neutron counters located 120 degrees apart, half-way between the center-line and the surface of the cylinder. This detector system will be mounted on a robotic transport mechanism to form a prototype inspector bot. MCNP studies show that this system provides high sensitivity and remarkable directionality: 0.37 cps per ng of bare Cf-252 at 2 m and 6:1 signal ratio between a counter directly facing the neutron source and each of the two counters at the back. The bot's search algorithm will adjust its heading to maximize the signal in its most active counter and to balance the signals in the two less active counters, thus facilitating smart mapping of neutron fields. A swarm of cooperative inspector bots could efficiently detect undeclared withdrawal stations in very large centrifuge halls. Strategically located individual bots could rapidly detect undeclared enriched UF6 in feed stations.

        This work supported by US Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Key Verification Assets Fund.

        Speaker: Prof. Robert Goldston (Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory)
        Posters
      • 16:25
        Robotics for Safeguards Inspection - Drum store inspection 5m

        All over the world stores of waste are kept in steel drums that are crammed in sheds multiples high and deep, often preventing a thorough inspection of the contents of the drums or the use of containment measures like seals. This paper aims to explore robotic systems that can provide a comprehensive and autonomous coverage of such hazardous environments keeping human inspectors out of harm’s way. This is achieved by firstly 3D scanning the entire area in order to create a 3D map that allows 3D positions to be tracked and then using the robotic system to inspect the drums. In this paper, the Data 61 innovation network of Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) proposes two robotic systems, (a) one for the top of the drums to be inspected and (b) the other for an in-layer inspection through pallets.
        The Through pallet inspection robot is a small robot that is able to move through the pallets where a forklift’s tines sit in order to gather information. This robot would have to be very narrow (<100mm) and long in order to bridge gaps, and navigate through misaligned pallet sections. Tracked wheels would provide sufficient traction and distributed loading even in the case of slippery and uneven surfaces.

        In both of these cases the robots would be tethered so that a reliable communication and data transfer is maintained, and the robots could be pulled back via the tether if anything goes wrong. These systems would have a 3D Lidar to map, localize themselves and gather data, cameras to gather visual information on the pallets and barrels, as well as radiation dosimeters or spectrometers for determining levels of radioactivity and identifying the presence of specific radionuclides. This data would all be stored/viewed from within the 3D point-cloud so that the location information is correctly associated.

        These systems of robots will give access to an area that was inaccessible in the past with the potential to assist in both inventory verification inspections and complementary access activities under the additional protocol.

        Speaker: Mr Paul Flick (CSIRO AS)
      • 16:30
        The "BigLock" Smart Locking System 5m
        At of 2013, the specialists of JSC IPK STRAZH (Russia) developed the BigLock smart locking system (hereinafter referred to as the System), based on the GLONASS/GPS technology. This System consists of a central database server, mobile workplace, software, communication systems (a GSM cellular communication channel using 3 mobile operators, a satellite communication link and an electronic locking/sealing device (ELSD). The ELSD itself is made up of two components – the Sirius reusable electronic unit and a Sprut-777 standard disposable seal, combined into a single locking/sealing module during seal installation. The mobile workplace makes it possible to simplify the process of seal installation: the user only has to read the electronic unit and seal bar codes and enter the item ID number by hand or by voice. The system operates in real time, which enables the user to monitor the ELSD condition through the transit, and, if the seal is tampered, an alarm signal will immediately pop up in the personal cabinet, showing the location coordinates and time of the alarming event. Also, additional remote sensors (humidity, temperature gas and other transmitters) can be used to monitor the parameters of the item sealed. Furthermore, the System may benefit to continuity of knowledge, including by following of routes and timing of item transfers. The System has been commercially operated for more than three years; from April 2016 it is successfully used to track more than 14 000 items within domestic and international transfers.
        Speaker: Mr Victor KRYLOV (Russian Federation)
      • 16:35
        Radar Imaging for Reliable Safeguard in Harsh Environment 5m
        Optical Sensors have established as an excellent source of information for environment detection and safeguard applications. However, relying on optics make surveillance systems susceptible for visibility restrictions caused by external light sources, dust, smoke or strong radioactive radiation. Radar imaging can obtain 3D images of the environment not being affected by the visibility as proven for automotive sensing. Additionally, an effective shielding of radar sensors can protect them from external radiation making them a promising option for surveillance in nuclear sites. Integrated radar technology can provide 3D imaging with modules which can be easily implemented on robotic systems. Such imaging MIMO-radar technology was developed in the Horizon2020 project SmokeBot. A radar module with 24 transmitter and 24 receiver elements was developed for 3D imaging with less than 1 degree angular resolution. However, radar can provide more than images. Tracking the phase of each voxel in the image movement tracking allows to detect vibrations down to the micrometer range. Characteristic movements of persons can be detected as well as vital parameters such as heartbeat or breath. The radar vision system can therefore not only see shapes, but also characterize movement patterns which makes it perfect for security surveillance. The presentation will introduce radar imaging from comparing the features with optical technology. The multi-channel radar imaging technology (MIMO) is presented in detail including imaging results from the SmokeBot project. The talk will provide perspectives for radar technology for safeguard applications to give an impression of the perspectives of that technology.
        Speaker: Dr Reinhold Herschel (Fraunhofer-Institut für Hochfrequenzphysik und Radartechnik FHR)
      • 16:40
        Impact of UCMS on Safeguards effectiveness and efficiency 5m
        In 2014, the European Commission designed and implemented a composite detection system to verify operating records relative to the shipment of PuO2 packages from the production facility to the storage area of the Magnox reprocessing plant in Sellafield. The Unattended Combined Measurement System (UCMS) was developed in cooperation with plant operator, did not require the presence of inspectors on site, and it was successfully operated for the last 4 years to validate the declarations over remote data connectivity with Euratom head quarter. Comparing the implementation of safeguards before and after the UCMS active commissioning, this paper analyses its impact in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, safeguards confidence, and resources allocation. The authors conclude discussing the lesson learned in terms of technological implementation and outline how future safeguards approaches might benefit from remote detection systems integrated with machine learning algorithms and remote data connectivity.
        Speaker: Dr Raffaele Bencardino (European Commission, EURATOM Safeguards)
        Poster
      • 16:45
        Safeguards at Post Accident Facility - Case of Fukushima Dai-Ichi Site 5m
        The accident at Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Station, triggered by the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent Tsunami in March 2011, had a major impact on safeguards at its site. JSGO and the IAEA, together with the Nuclear Material Control Center, Tokyo Electric Power Company and Japan Atomic Energy Agency, have been tackling the challenges posed by the accident, such as difficulty in accessing the nuclear material at the site. From the day of the earthquake, JSGO and the IAEA started discussing how to deal with the challenges, and in May 2012, jointly formulated the Fukushima Task Force, in order to develop a holistic approach to safeguards implementation measures, to monitor the recovery of safeguards, to facilitate discussion of relevant issues, and to consider possible approaches to tackle longer-term safeguards challenges. As a result of close collaboration, all the fuels stored in the Units 4, 5 and 6, the Common Spent Fuel Storage and the Cask Custody Building have been successfully re-verified. A special arrangement called Short Notice Operational Support Activities, and radiation monitor and surveillance cameras outside the reactors have been introduced to confirm non-diversion of inaccessible material at the site. Fuels in the spent fuel ponds in Units 1, 2 and 3 are supposed to be removed starting from 2018, and necessary safeguards measures will be applied accordingly. The damaged core material in Units 1, 2 and 3 poses difficulties in longer-term. A special sub-group has been established under the Task Force to address the difficulties. Close coordination with the IAEA and technical support from competent institutions in Japan, are essential to cope with the difficulties. This paper analyzes the discussion between Japan and the IAEA on safeguards implementation at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi after the accident, and summarizes main lessons learned for safeguards implementation at post accident facilities.
        Speaker: Dr Osamu Aruga (Japan Safeguards Office)
      • 16:50
        Laser-Based Measurement Tools for Future Enrichment Plant Safeguards 5m
        The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a long history of testing and using laser-based technologies for a variety of safeguards applications. Notable laser-based on-site applications include, 3-dimensional laser range (3DLR) instruments used for facility design information and verification (DIV), laser measurements to verify unique labels and detect signs of tampering, and laser spectroscopy for non-contact process monitoring. IAEA is also evaluating analytical laboratory instruments, such as laser ablation, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) for interrogating individual particles to determine uranium isotopic ratios in collected environment samples. Recent laser technology advancements will likely continue to fuel future IAEA adoption of new and novel laser-based safeguards tools. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratoy (PNNL) is currently developing one such tool, called laser ablation, absorption ratio spectrometry (LAARS), for quantitative measurements of uranium material. LAARS uses three tunable diode lasers to simultaneously measure atomic 235U and 238U absorption in an ablation plume created by a forth pulsed laser. Commercial availability of compact pulsed ablation lasers and the extreme wavelength accuracy and stability of PNNL’s tunable diode laser architecture play a pivotal role in achieving high fidelity LAARS assay measurements. The LAARS method is ultimately targeted for either on-site or laboratory-based 235U relative abundance measurements of destructive assay (DA) samples in support of uranium enrichment plant safeguards. DA is currently collected on-site, and then shipped to an analytical laboratory for mass spectrometry (MS) assay, because the measurement uncertainty requirements for this application are quite challenging. This paper will present the key elements of the LAARS laser system design, recent assay results on collected uranium hexafluoride (UF6) DA samples, and future operational configurations that may provide immediate on-site DA inspection results or rapid laboratory DA sample screening to prioritize further analysis by MS.
        Speaker: Mr Norm Anheier (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
      • 16:50
        Tamper-Indicating Enclosures with Visually Obvious Tamper Response 5m
        We are developing “bleeding” materials (analog of visually obvious bruised skin that doesn’t heal) that provide inspectors the ability to readily recognize using simple visual observation that penetration into a material used as a tamper-indicating enclosure has been attempted without providing adversaries the ability to repair damage. Such material can significantly enhance the current capability for tamper-indicating enclosures (TIEs), used to support treaty verification regimes. Current approaches rely on time-consuming and subjective visual assessment by an inspector, external equipment such as eddy current or cameras, or active approaches that may be limited due to application environment. The complexity of securing whole volumes includes (1) enclosures that are non-standard in size/shape, (2) enclosures that may be inspectorate or facility owned, (3) tamper attempts that are detectable and not difficult or timely for an inspector to locate, (4) solutions that are robust regarding reliability and environment (including facility handling), and (5) solutions that prevent adversaries from repairing penetrations. Our approach is based on a sensor compound within a microcapsule that changes color irreversibly when the microcapsule is ruptured. We are investigating 3D printing of the microcapsules as well as a spray coating formulation. The anticipated benefits of this work are passive, flexible, scalable, cost-effective TIEs with obvious and robust responses to tamper attempts. This results in more efficient and effective monitoring as inspectors will require little or no additional equipment, and will be able to detect tamper without extensive time-consuming visual examination. Note that if desired, an autonomous system with a spectrometer could also detect the color change. Applications can include custom TIEs (cabinets or equipment enclosures), spray-coating onto facility-owned items, spray-coating of walls or structures, spray-coatings of circuit boards, and 3D printed seal bodies.
        Speaker: Dr Heidi Smartt (Sandia National Laboratories)
        Posters
      • 16:55
        Development of a new confocal-macro X-ray fluorescence spectrometer built on 3D printer 5m
        For 3D analysis of elementary composition on surface and depth layers of objects with non-regular spatial shape a new type of confocal macro XRF (CM-XRF) spectrometer was designed and built. A simply constructed 3D printer was applied as the moving system for the basic devices of the XRF spectrometer. The SD detector and the low-power air-cooled X-ray tube (4W) mounted on a vertically moving console and the sample is fixed on x-y stage of the 3D printer that translates it in horizontal directions within 20 cm lengths. For both excitation and secondary X-ray beams were planned a new collimator system on the basis of Monte Carlo simulation, performed by MCNP6 software package, in order to create a macro confocal measuring set-up. The minimum step-size is 100 μm and the spatial precision of the positioning of each mechanical stages (x-y-z) of the 3D mechanical structure is about 5 μm. The minimum of the achieved diameter of the focal spot of the confocal measuring arrangement was found as 480 μm using aluminum tubes as collimator. The measuring confocal spot at the cross junction of the excitation and secondary fluorescence X-ray beams is positioned on the sample surface by application two laser beams and a built-in digital microscope. The positioning optical system together with the MC-XRF spectrometer are fixed on the horizontal arm of the 3D printer that is moved in vertical direction. The elements of XRF and optical positioning systems are mounted on additional mechanical moving stages for fine manual setting the confocal geometrical set-up. The analytical capability and geometrical resolution of the MC-XRF spectrometer were determined in x-y-z directions and the MC-XRF spectrometer was tested with some analytical application. Acknowledgments This work has been carried out in the frame of OAH-ABA-23/15-M, OAH-ABA-14/16-M projects supported by Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority and VKSZ-14-1-2015-0021 Hungarian project supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Found.
        Speaker: Dr Imre Szalóki (Institute of Nuclear Techniques, Budapest University of Technology and Economics)
      • 17:00
        Nuclear Inspections in the Matrix: Virtual Reality for the Development of Inspection Approaches in New Facility Types 5m

        Virtual environments have been successfully used to support a variety of applications relevant to nuclear safeguards, safety, and security, including IAEA inspector training, dose estimates for personnel, and facility evacuation planning. There are two particularly relevant challenges for VR: first, simulating the functionalities of the radiation detection equipment that an inspector might use, ideally in real-time; and, second, enabling interactions with this virtual equipment so that the experience becomes truly immersive and meaningful. In this paper, we report results from a simple inspection exercise in VR that involved two players (host and inspector) that includes modelling real-time radiation fields. We use a hybrid approach combining precomputed radiation signatures and detector response functions based on MCNP Monte Carlo simulations combined with deterministic methods to handle shielding and attenuation effects allowing the movements of sources, detectors, and shielding materials during the exercise.

        We make a case for exploring the further potential of VR environments to support innovations in developing facility architectures, nuclear safeguards and verification protocols for treaties that do not yet exist (such as an FMCT) and for future tasks such as establishing verification measures related to weapon-origin fissile materials (as envisaged for material declared excess for weapon purposes) and the application of safeguards to former weapons-related facilities or materials. Virtual environments in particular could make critical contributions to the development of effective inspection protocols without running the risk of exposing proliferation-sensitive or classified information, which would be a plausible concern in inspection trials in physical facilities. Virtual environments can also offer levels of accessibility and flexibility typically much more difficult to achieve in actual facilities, and they can allow for more substantial collaboration amongst research groups and governments working to find solutions to existing verification challenges.

        Speaker: Mr Moritz Kuett
      • 17:05
        iDROP, a Promising Virtual Reality Tool to Assist Operations in Nuclear Facilities 5m
        Virtual Reality (VR) is increasingly being used in industry to optimize design processes and procedures. It is therefore very obvious for these technologies to be used as a support for nuclear operations, to solve scenario design, operational safety and operator training issues. For the past 10 years, the CEA has been developing a tool, called iDROP which includes VR technologies. This program is a unique tool that combines in a single piece of software coupled with immersive technologies, all the features required to simulate interventions (remote handling or with direct contact) in ionizing environments, and in particular, to account for teleoperation during remote interventions, and access for human interventions, while evaluating the doses associated with these operations. iDROP provides several modules: first, it offers a dose calculation module, based on MERCURE 6.4, which has been optimized for real-time calculations and calculates the dose received by a point in space using the linear attenuation method. Since the calculations are performed in real time, the dose rate and cumulated dose vary instantaneously depending on movements and changes in the environment. The second feature remains in physical simulations and kinematic chains. This module solves classical mechanics problems in real time, preventing interpenetration between 3D objects. This module also simulates the robots’ kinematic chains and rapidly helps to check the work area’s accessibility for these devices. iDROP comes with a module for simulating human movements and verifying the accessibility of worksites and workstation ergonomics for operations carried out by humans. Finally, the main value of this software is the fact that it can be used with VR devices (stereoscopic system, motion capture system and force feedback interfaces), offering a full-scale 3D user experience. This paper first describes the features of the iDROP platform and then lists the benefits of using this tool to prepare nuclear operations.
        Speaker: Mrs Caroline CHABAL (CEA)
      • 17:10
        Virtual Reality - ISCN's Effective Capacity Building Tool 5m

        Capacity building is an important area to be continually reinforced in order to maintain the successful operation of an entity or organization. The depletion of capable human resources due to retirement, health and other unavoidable conditions should be addressed. The valuable knowledge and experience could be shared in a certain way with ease of comprehension and information retention. Virtual reality (VR) is one of those tools that can be used in response to the urgent need of capturing the knowledge and experience from relevant resources. In 2016, the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) invested to equip its Center of Excellence with knowledge transfer technology through virtual reality. The ISCN has developed a VR system that provides a three-dimensional computer generated training environment which can be explored and interacted with by a person or individual. Through this VR system, that person becomes part of this virtual world or is immersed within this environment; while being there, the person is able to manipulate objects or perform a series of actions. This paper describes how virtual reality is being used by the ISCN as an effective capacity building tool. It will also describe the approach of how the knowledge and experience for a specific subject matter are conveyed through the use of virtual reality. The effectiveness of the tool had been introduced and used in several occasions during the training course for the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), with the benefit from zero exposure to radiation and in a virtually suitable environment for the participants, while learning the safeguards concept and its associated nuclear material verification measures.

        Speaker: Ms Perpetua Rodriguez (JAEA/ISCN)
        Posters
      • 17:15
        Augmented Reality off-the-shelf technologies for enhancement of on-site and post-inspection processes 5m
        Visualization of data is almost last step for long process of sensing data by humans before data indication. Most important and complex data are processed by human eyes that are why last several decades the different concepts of delivering data directly to eyes overplayed real world view were introduced. Mainly, those were military projects, so it is hard to estimate payoff/cost ratio and they were never widely presented to public, but today such technologies appears from IT giants as well as innovative middle size companies, more that, it is even possible to buy a first generation consumer products. Safeguards inspector activity is always a target to thorough preparation, budget and time constraints to conduct inspection, high responsibility to make measurements and collect samples and pickup necessary data from containment and surveillance equipment, relatively few opportunities to observe and save visual information that could be interesting to analyst, especially in the time, when number of facilities under safeguards is raising and new type of facilities are waiting for licensing and safeguards, while Safeguards Division has no additional resources yet. As an example, Microsoft HoloLens augmented reality glasses could be used to enhance effectiveness of inspector’s onsite work, save a time and give analyst important data, those were not reachable for them before.Wearables give opportunity to work with equipment and receive necessary information without interruption of work, just on top or inline of real environment. Nuclear materials measurements, calculations, digital containment devices access, barcode information could be received without additional external displays and related time to build it up. Built-in cameras, depth sensors and other optical electronics could built 3D models of surroundings and send this data for later processing or to real-time comparison of changes in design. Voice recognition could help find and visualized necessary data. Since IAEA modernized legacy containment and surveillance systems information communication, it could be possible to use such secured communication channels for future real-time highly visualized communication of inspectors with headquarter. All these improvements would make decisions about result more reliable and inspection processes faster and effective.
        Speaker: Mr Dmytro Cherkashyn (Institute for Security and Safety at the Brandenburg University of Applied Studies)
      • 17:20
        3D Mapping and Visualization of Radioactive Sources for Nuclear Safeguards Applications 5m
        At Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, we have developed the nuclear Scene Data Fusion (SDF) capability, which enables visualization of radioactivity in indoor and outdoor environments. By generating a 3D map of a scene using the compact, lightweight system, Localization and Mapping Platform (LAMP), SDF detects and characterizes gamma-ray radiation sources (compact or distributed). LAMP and SDG have been integrated with two commercial gamma-ray imagers to enable demonstration of this advanced capability in safeguards scenarios. The 3D model, produced onboard using contextual sensors (e.g., LiDAR) and Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) algorithms, will enable IAEA inspectors to easily orient their location relative to the location of radioactive sources within a given environment. For example, characterization and change detection (i.e., establishing a baseline radioactivity map on an initial inspection, then in subsequent inspections determining whether there are any differences) of waste pits, design information verification (DIV), mapping and detecting anomalies in storage vaults, locating voids in UF6 cylinders, characterization of waste drums, and materials accountancy are all likely applications where SDF will provide significant advanced capability. We have successfully demonstrated this mapping and visualization concept in various environments, including UF6 cylinders in a fuel fabrication facility, mapping contamination in evacuated Fukushima Prefecture communities and within the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. In addition, SDF has been demonstrated with a number of gamma-ray imagers and detectors deployed on a range of platforms including hand carried, and unmanned ground and unmanned aerial vehicles. Our current integration of SDF/LAMP with commercial gamma-ray imaging systems demonstrates the flexibility of this technology and will enable the advanced mapping and visualization approach for international nuclear safeguards applications to be explored.
        Speaker: Andrew Haefner (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)
        poster
      • 17:25
        3S integration to support efficient and effective implementation of key Safeguard requirements: an overview of emerging state practices 5m
        This paper will argue that integrated approaches to nuclear safety, security and safeguards (3S) are important to support effective implementation and efficient investment of resources in developing countries. The paper will also identify a series of key legislative and regulatory steps countries can take in this direction as they set out to establish or overhaul their regulatory frameworks. Many successful case studies of 3S integration focus on states with large nuclear industries and regulatory bodies, aiming to solve problems of coordination and duplication of work. By contrast, developing countries often concentrate responsibility for these policy areas within the same bodies because of constraints on the availability of economic resources and expert staff. However, most of the international assistance currently on offer to these countries maintains the separation between safety, security and safeguards, and does relatively little to explore the potential synergies. VERTIC has a long-established expertise in providing legislative and regulatory support to countries on the implementation of requirements arising from nuclear safeguards and nuclear security. Drawing on our knowledge, and on the experiences of some of the countries we have worked with, we aim to provide an overview of emerging state practices, supplemented and organised through our own analytical work. Looking at the role of national legislation and regulatory bodies, the paper will identify common requirements and recommendations across safety, security and safeguards, based on international agreements, best practices and guidance issued by the IAEA and other bodies. The paper will then identify implementation “building blocks” such as legal provisions, organisational principles, and regulatory practices that states can put in place to fulfil key obligations across the three areas. This could help countries with limited resources to minimize waste and duplication of work, and improve the effectiveness of their regulatory framework. These “building blocks” do not represent a complete model of legislation or regulatory system, but rather a starting point for countries to build on. Given the scope of the Symposium, the paper will focus specifically on functions and “building blocks” of particular importance for Safeguards implement
        Speaker: Mr Alberto Luigi Muti (VERTIC)
      • 17:25
        Human Performance Testing for Cognitive Science-Informed Information Provision for International Nuclear Safeguards Inspectors 5m
        International nuclear safeguards inspectors have access to more potentially-relevant safeguards information than ever before. Traditional safeguards data sources including state declarations, previous inspection results, and inspector observations are complemented with myriad open sources including news media, overhead satellite imagery, trade data, scientific publications, and even social media information. However, cognitive science and anecdotal evidence agree that the mere availability of more information is not necessarily useful and can result in confusion, errors, frustration, or other symptoms of information overload. The presentation of safeguards information for inspectors working in the field should enable, rather than distract or overwhelm. If successful, the presentation of information for inspectors working in the field should facilitate more timely, accurate, and situationally aware inspection activities. In this paper, we describe human performance studies conducted at Sandia National Laboratories which were informed by research in the domains of cognitive science and international nuclear safeguards. We have targeted initial human performance experiments in three areas: visual inspection, wayfinding, and knowledge transfer for safeguards. We will describe the motivation, methods, and results of our initial human performance experiments, and outline proposed follow-on human performance experiments that will allow us to make broader recommendations for information provision for in-field international nuclear safeguards inspections.
        Speaker: Ms Zoe Gastelum (Sandia National Laboratories)
        Poster
      • 17:25
        Plutonium Diversion Detection Training (PDDT) for IAEA inspectors at the Idaho National Laboratory 5m
        Detecting diversion of nuclear material from nuclear fuel cycle facilities is one of the main objectives of safeguards under a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Effective detection approaches rest on three essential components. First, a well-reasoned verification plan which is based on a perceptive analysis of the facility’s operating and accounting documents and includes both an efficient sampling plan as well as a judicious distribution of resources that takes into consideration the available time and working constraints (e.g. security, safety and plant schedules). Second, a sound knowledge of the physical properties of the nuclear material to be verified combined with an in-depth technical understanding of the measurement systems (e.g. neutron and gamma detectors) used for the verification activities including hands-on experience with the factors that affect the measurement results in terms of biases and uncertainties. Third, a practical experience of the statistical tools that can be used for the consolidation and evaluation of the verification data. Due to time constraints and other limitations, the stratification and sampling approach implemented at a facility is usually designed beforehand by senior inspectors and the detailed evaluation of inspection data, including potentially challenging measurement data, is performed at headquarters by senior inspectors and/or specialized analysts. Safeguards inspectors therefore have few occasions to deploy the full range of competences that they are expected to acquire, maintain, and upgrade throughout their professional life. While a wide variety of theoretical and practical training courses allow them to strengthen and refresh their knowledge of specific topics, the Plutonium Diversion Detection Training course (PDDT) offers the participants a unique occasion to put their multidisciplinary training into practice through the simulation of all aspects of a practical inspection at a plutonium plant. The extensive and versatile inventory of the Idaho National Laboratory facilities makes it possible to create a number of inventive diversion and falsification scenarios which the IAEA trainees are challenged to detect and foil, while complying with the strict safety, security and access constraints that are enforced at facilities holding sensitive nuclear material.
        Speaker: Ms Claude NORMAN (International Atomic Energy Agency)
      • 17:25
        UAE Safeguards: A Frontline in Nuclear Non-Proliferation 5m
        ABSTRACT **UAE Safeguards: A Frontline in Nuclear Non-Proliferation** By Luay Qassim, Ali Al Suwaidi, Khaled Al Shehhi and Stephen Brion - *Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates* The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a nuclear newcomer state that actively supports the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and has acceded to and ratified key international treaties and agreements – including an Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The responsibility for satisfying these obligations inevitably resulted in challenges for FANR as the UAE made AP declarations and transitioned from safeguards based on a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to today’s full-scope CSA implementation. Overcoming these challenges to keep pace with a rapidly developing nuclear energy program required a well-managed approach. The approach included early recruitment of experienced staff with safeguards and export control competencies. Development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) involved regular engagement with the IAEA, contracting software venders to develop information management systems, and identifying declarable AP activities and holders of nuclear material. Collaboration with the IAEA included technical meetings to develop and monitor an implementation roadmap, making subsidiary arrangements, delivering national workshops, and employing state-of-the-art containment and surveillance systems at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant. The UAE’s success in establishing a peaceful nuclear energy program with a strong safeguards function also benefitted from adopting the IAEA milestones approach. Engagement with national and international partners, in conjunction with specialised Emirati development programs, provided important contributions to sustainable capacity building. Establishing arrangements with national competent authorities for short-notice access of safeguards inspectors was essential to ensuring that IAEA verification activities proceeded without delay. Implementing a nuclear non-proliferation program that meets a state’s international obligations requires significant resources, forward planning and a commitment from Government. By meeting these requirements, developing a close partnership with the IAEA and embracing a policy of transparency, the effectiveness and efficiency of the UAE safeguards system was ultimately confirmed by the IAEA International SSAC Advisory Service (ISSAS).
        Speaker: Mr Luay Qassim (FANR)
    • 17:00 17:30
      Networking with IAEA Staff Outside Boardroom A

      Outside Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 17:30 19:00
      Reception 1h 30m Outside Press-room

      Outside Press-room

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 17:30
      ESPACE (Tuesday) M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [CHA] Human Resources for Safeguards: Taking the Initiative M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

      • 09:00
        Department of Safeguards HR Challenges 5m
        Speakers: Ms Marie Monteith (IAEA), Mr Nevest Perovic (IAEA)
      • 09:05
        Advancing Safeguards One Person at a Time: Developing "Safeguards Champions" 5m

        Success in nuclear safeguards implementation depends on many factors, from trained staff to an effective regulatory framework to availability of necessary equipment and many other typical infrastructure-related aspects. Often, however, that success depends on long-term commitment and advocacy by a dedicated individual, or a ‘champion.’ While there exists ample literature and technical guidance on safeguards infrastructure, much less has been written on a role of safeguards champions. Who are they? What does it mean to be a safeguards champion? What are the circumstances that lead to the emergence of such champions? What is their impact on building and sustaining effective safeguards in an organization, or even country?
        As such individuals retire or pursue other assignments, they leave a void not only in technical knowledge, but also in their unique ability to keep safeguards on the radar of their respective organizations and governments. The constrained resources of most training providers limit their ability to maintain frequent and long-term engagement in countries and necessitate increased reliance on trusted individuals within an organization. These “champions” are equipped not only with technical knowledge but also political and management savvy as well as personal buy-in to promote and sustain safeguards. Rather than relying on luck and chance, a concerted effort to recognize and then develop safeguards champions would help the global community address a critical gap in succession planning and sustainability.
        In the past several years, the concept of “organizational champions” has been getting popularized by the organizational development experts and embraced by industries seeking innovative leadership models to advance their causes in an environment of competing priorities and rapid change.

        This collaborative paper will explore the leadership concept of a “safeguards champion” and how it can be applied in safeguards-focused teams or organizations globally. The authors will examine existing government and industry practices and gather practical information from influential safeguards leaders in the Asian region. The information in this paper could serve as the basis for future training by national and international training providers, including the IAEA, who aim to address the succession planning and sustainability in partner countries.

        Speaker: Ms Oksana Elkhamri (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
      • 09:10
        APSN Surveys for the coordination of training efforts in Asia: results and challenges 5m

        This paper considers the efforts of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (hereafter ISCN) in support of the Asia Pacific Safeguards Network (hereafter APSN) in supporting the safeguards development in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, this paper describes ISCN’s activities on behalf of APSN to perform training needs and training provider’s surveys with the objective of facilitating needs analysis, identify potential gaps in the provision of training and assist training providers to optimize their use of existing training capabilities to meet those needs. The baseline training needs and training providers survey conducted by the U.S. DOE/NNSA International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) in 2011 is described and then the follow up survey of 2015, performed by ISCN, and its results is succinctly explained. In 2017 a new survey aimed to countries with Small Quantities Protocols in their safeguards agreements was conducted. The results of this survey and the follow up actions mandated by the APSN are also included in the paper.

        Speakers: Dr Kalman Robertson, Ms Noriko Sumino (Japan Atomic Energy Agency), Mrs Perpetua Rodriguez
      • 09:15
        Enhancing SSAC’s capabilities - The Nuclear Regulatory Authority experience 5m

        The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) is the national governmental organization in charge of the regulation of nuclear activities in Argentina and is independent of any entity dedicated to the use or the promotion of nuclear energy in any of its forms. ARN was created in 1997 by the National Nuclear Activity Act (Law No. 24.804), which establishes its mission and responsibilities. This autarchic entity within the jurisdiction of the Argentine Presidency has competence on radiological and nuclear safety, physical protection, safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation.

        As the authority responsible for safeguards implementation, the ARN attaches great importance to assuring efficient and effective safeguards through robust capabilities of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) and a strong connection with external relevant institutions. To fulfill its mission, ARN is committed to continuously develop its own human capacity and outreach to licensees and relevant stakeholders, assuring a clear understanding of safeguards obligations and responsibilities.

        From an international perspective, ARN maintains interaction with several organizations through mechanisms as the Cooperation Protocol with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials; the Agreement with the United States Department of Energy concerning research and development in nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards application; the Argentine Support Programme to the International Atomic Energy Agency. These partnerships foster collaboration in safeguards implementation through tailored training and activities on safeguards approaches, measurement techniques, containment and surveillance, the conduct of domestic/regional inspections and the role of a SSAC in implementing international safeguards, among others.

        The paper focuses on ARN’s interfaces in safeguards capacity building activities conducted during the past four years. It describes the experience gained through in-house training, facility operator engagement and collaborative actions within the above-mentioned frameworks, while sharing the lessons learned.

        Speaker: Ms Agostina Serrano Bentancour (Nuclear Regulatory Authority)
        Slides
      • 09:20
        Canada’s Experience with Building and Maintaining Safeguards Capability 5m
        Maintaining a competent and capable workforce for the purpose of safeguards implementation in a state with a broad and diverse nuclear fuel cycle presents unique challenges. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has turned to a combination of strategies to address safeguards human resources challenges. This paper explores a number of these strategies, including: safeguards inspector training and certification; safeguards knowledge management through the post-retirement engagement of experienced professionals; a commitment to new graduate development; cross-training between nuclear material accountancy and safeguards field operations roles; temporary staff assignments; and outreach to universities and licensees to build capacity beyond the CNSC. The paper relates the CNSC’s experience with these strategies to build and maintain safeguards capability in Canada.
        Speaker: Mr Omer Elahi (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission)
      • 09:25
        Outreach Education and Training in Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation of the European Commission, Joint Research Centre 5m
        The Nuclear Security Unit of the Department of Nuclear Security and Safeguards of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in close collaboration with the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) is providing yearly a one-week well-established specialized course on Safeguards and Non-Proliferation. Over the last almost two decades, this course takes place in Ispra (Italy) and is open to audiences of an average of 50 students, in particular nuclear engineering students, but also to young professionals in nuclear regulations or operations and International Relations. The course is known best as the ’’ESARDA Course’’ and aims at complementing not only nuclear engineering studies by including nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation in the academic curriculum in Europe but also to contribute to efforts of international organization such as IAEA, JAEA, etc to enhance and harmonize safeguards and non-proliferation approaches. It combines lectures from experts with group exercises and offers also an exam and essay compilation to the students seeking for academic recognition. Due to its success, ESARDA Course has been out-reached, with financial support of DG DEVCO under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Collaboration, over several worldwide regions. This paper reports especially also on the feedback of the one week course, which was organized in Pretoria (South Africa) in February 2018 for the south African region (13 participating countries). The way the course was tailored with respect to original content to best fit the needs of the region and the intention to make it a sustainable initiative in the region is included. The follow-up activities in this region and transfer of this course to other regions (Northern Africa and Caucasus e.g.) will also be discussed.
        Speaker: Mr Willem Alfons Marc Janssens (European Commission, Joint Research Centre, DIR G, Nuclear Security and Safeguards Department)
      • 09:30
        Integrating Nonproliferation and Safeguards into the Mandatory Curricula of Undergraduate STEM Programs 5m
        The majority of undergraduate science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) university programs worldwide lack recurring mandatory course content related to nonproliferation and safeguards. To address this educational gap, a set of Integral Nonproliferation Introductory Teaching and Learning (INITIAL) classroom and laboratory modules have been developed. The INITIAL modules are intended to introduce sustainable safeguards content into mandatory curricula of STEM undergraduate programs in order to highlight the fact that nonproliferation topics (e.g. international safeguards verification) directly rely on many of the fundamental and applied technical topics undergraduates are currently studying. The INITIAL class module is a one-lecture primer (slides and problem sets) that allows for simple integration into mandatory introductory undergraduate STEM courses. The INITIAL laboratory (neutron, gamma, and reactor) modules are a more technically advanced safeguards-based experimental addition that can be integrated into to upper–level undergraduate mandatory laboratory courses that utilize equipment or facilities commonly available to STEM university programs e.g. basic radiation sources, detector systems, or in some cases research reactors. Since 2015, over 30 INITIAL implementations by early career safeguards researchers (recently expanded to various US national laboratories) have occurred, providing sustainable academic course content for university programs that have no mandatory course content in this topical area. According to compiled surveys, many of the students that were exposed to INITIAL reported that they are more likely to pursue careers in safeguards post-INITIAL lecture or lab. The universities continue to deliver INITIAL content long after the first engagement, reaching over 1000 (otherwise unexposed) students. Thus, INITIAL module implementation is actively addressing the challenges of reaching and recruiting. Because the modules are fully customizable to the academic background of the audience, the INITIAL framework can be tailored for implementation abroad. This creates an effective knowledge transfer framework that is designed to continue long after the first engagement.
        Speaker: Dr Rian Bahran (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
        Slides
      • 09:35
        Principles and attributes for positive safeguards culture within the State 5m
        The international safeguards community has not established yet an official definition for safeguards culture. So, some experts have proposed definitions and the task of safeguards culture to the attention of national and international safeguards communities. The safeguards culture has aimed to raising awareness of safeguards requirements and functions and strengthening technical capacity of staff to meet those requirements to improve safeguards implementation in the State. The paper is introduced the challenges facing safeguards culture which must be recognized, understood and overcome for nuclear newcomers States, especially developing countries, to maintain and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation in the State. These challenges such as: Management systems; Leadership behaviors; Guidance or a code of conduct should be available to all staff concerning the safeguards culture; Assessment methodologies; Continuous improvement and learning; and National culture’s influence on the safeguards culture. Also, it is introduced the proposed principles and attributes for positive safeguards culture within the State, including: First principle is Leadership behaviors (Leaders significantly affect safeguards culture through the priorities they establish, the behaviors and values they model, the reward systems they administer, the trust they create, and the context and expectations they establish for interpersonal relationships, communication and accountability); Attributes are Policy statement; Leaders define individual roles, responsibilities and authority; Work environment; Resources; Recognition of the complexity of safeguards issues; and Promotion of safeguards and associated knowledge. Second principle is Personal accountability (It reflects the fact that individual staff members accept responsibility and take ownership of their performance and decisions so that accountability becomes a fundamental part of the safeguards culture); Attributes are Personal commitment to and accountability for safeguards; Collaboration and co-ordination of activities; and Moral courage. Third principle is encouraged assessment and learning, at all levels in the organization to avoid “blind spots” and identify areas for improvement; Attributes are Qualitative evaluation; Learning from experience, fostering exchanges and increasing knowledge; Knowledge management programme. The challenges, principles and attributes are laid out in more details in the paper. The principles and attributes that could help turn these challenges into opportunities to further strengthen the safeguards culture.
        Speaker: Dr Amira Elabd (Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority (ENRRA),)
      • 09:40
        Insights from the IAEA Human Capital Development Conference 5m
        Speakers: Mr Matthew VAN SICKLE, Shahid Mallick (IAEA)
      • 09:45
        IAEA Perspective 5m
        Speaker: Ms Maria Anguelova Naydenova (IAEA)
    • 09:00 10:30
      [NEW] The Safeguards Challenges of New and Advanced Reactors Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [SGI] Enhancements and Innovation in Sample Collection and Analysis Press-room

      Press-room

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [NEW] The Safeguards Challenges of New and Advanced Reactors Press Room

      Press Room

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [SGI] Establishing and Strengthening State and Regional Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (S/RSACs) M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [TEC] Automating and Optimizing Data Collection and Processing at HQ Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

      • 11:00
        Big Data Analysis for Non-proliferation Purposes 7m

        This submission will present the findings of more than 1 year of work at King’s College London to develop a big data platform for non-proliferation analysis. The presentation will present findings around the use of natural language processing, machine translation and other automatic tools for information extraction; advanced visualisation and search techniques for data discovery. The presentation will conclude with recommendations on how such capabilities can complement existing IAEA activities.

        Speaker: Mr Ian Stewart (King's College London)
      • 11:07
        Analysts versus Algorithms? Exploring the design of effective information analysis systems in the age of ‘Big Data’ 7m
        In the age of ‘Big Data’, the potential value of open-source information for international security-related purposes is widely recognised. Of late, progress in this space has increasingly become associated with software that can expand our ability to gather, filter, interrelate and manipulate data through automated processes. The trend towards automation is both innovative and necessary. Yet for the foreseeable future at least, the effort to harness open source information for safeguards purposes will remain highly dependent on the nuanced judgement and expertise of human analysts. This paper will consider, at a conceptual level, the design of information analysis systems that exploit the strengths, and mitigate the weaknesses of both human analysts and software solutions, obtaining the best contribution from both.
        Speaker: Dr Matthew Moran (King's College London)
      • 11:14
        Using machine learning and natural language processing to enhance uranium mining and milling safeguards 7m
        The recently developed IAEA Content Reification Engine (ICORE) is used to examine open source reporting and utilise machine learning algorithms to help identify indications of undeclared nuclear fuel cycle activities. At present, when observing mining and milling processes, ICORE does not have a discreet discriminator between uranium mining, and other mining processes apart from the obvious terms ‘uranium’ or ‘nuclear’. Therefore, in a in an Australian Safeguards Support Programme project, machine learning can be used to evolve safeguards technologies within the uranium mining and milling fields. This will be through the identification of unique discreet terms that differentiate uranium processes from other mining processes. The intent is to support ICORE through natural language processing rules for mining and milling in support of detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Advanced analytics through machine learning can support current safeguard mechanisms by improving automation and thus increasing the size of the dataset analysed. However, this analysis is dependent on the quality of the training data sets developed to support the machine in its learning. Therefore, a thorough understanding the language used in the mining sector for uranium mining and milling processes and discriminating this language to the processing of other minerals is required to have the detail to build a natural language processing algorithm. Australia has approximately one third of the world’s recoverable uranium sources and also has a responsible mining sector. Therefore, in bringing together Australian academia, the mining industry, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) and the IAEA, an interrogation of literature, open source documentation and industry engagement can assist in building a solid natural language processing data set to employ within ICORE and support the enhancement of IAEA tools to strengthen safeguards and maintain the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies.
        Speaker: Ms Jasmin Diab (University of New South Wales and Women in Nuclear Australia)
        Slides
      • 11:21
        Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence and Safeguards 7m
        This study explores the mission space and key safeguards challenges confronting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) today and how autonomous technologies, e.g. technologies used by systems that are capable of learning and examining, then taking action based on what has been learned, may impact the status quo. Principle issues include the operational value of these systems to safeguards, risks and challenges of deployment (e.g., trustworthiness, security, transparency, explainability), and the likelihood of adoption in the near- to medium term (2-10 years)). We establish a set of criteria to identify autonomous systems and technologies that could impact IAEA safeguards verification activities in the next decade. The criteria are informed by specific safeguards outcomes the IAEA wants to achieve e.g., efficiency, maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) on nuclear materials, or identifying anomalies in large amounts of data. We develop and assess an inventory of existing and emerging commercial autonomous systems and their underlying technologies based on these criteria. In so doing, we leverage a Sandia-developed framework that considers four dimensions of autonomy: 1) levels of autonomy (e.g., the amount of human input or control in the system); 2) the operating environment (e.g., inspections, information analysis, sample collection); 3) autonomous technology functions (e.g., sensing, reasoning and learning, planning and controlling, acting and communicating); and 4) autonomous system technologies (e.g., systems for knowledge representation, storage, and retrieval; software for learning about and adapting to the environment; information collection for spatial/scene recognition and environmental sensing). Use cases identifying scenarios in which the selected technologies could be deployed inform the potential application space of the autonomous and AI systems, and serve as the foundation for analyzing impact. Finally, an evaluation of two specific technologies assess how they might benefit or challenge IAEA safeguards activities.
        Speaker: Risa Haddal (Sandia National Laboratories)
        Slides
      • 11:28
        Semantic Graphs for Safeguards Data Integration, Pattern Matching, and Event Classification 7m

        The data collected for analysis of safeguards relevant information is complex and heterogeneous in nature, ranging from in-field measurements, satellite imagery, reports, declarations, and other open sources related to a State’s nuclear activities. As part of ongoing IAEA verification activities for nuclear facilities and State evaluations, inspectors and analysts must correlate and analyze these data, which is often a highly manual and time-consuming process, especially with increasing data volume and varying data types, formats, and frequencies.

        To help the safeguards inspector and analyst more efficiently review data, we use semantic graphs to intuitively integrate these heterogeneous data, classify safeguards relevant events of interest, and identify anomalies. Low level data and their relationships are generalized and abstracted as graph nodes and edges, incorporating different data sources, all in a single data structure. Multifaceted graphs can be constructed that merge data from different domains, representing relationships that may be physical, temporal, administrative, or even social. For this paper, we use an exemplar of in-field C/S and NDA measurements for a safeguarded nuclear facility and created a model of the movement of nuclear materials in containers and casks. By converting in-field safeguards data into a semantic graph and ingesting into a graph database, we show how semantic queries are used to match our model against clusters of data to identify, segment, and classify patterns in the data that match the profile of a material movement, whether declared or not. That is, the spatiotemporal relationships inherent in safeguards data is analyzed to extract higher order meaning to find patterns in vast amounts of data. Our semantic graph methodology can be applied to ingest data and identify other safeguards relevant events inside nuclear facilities and the State evaluation level to help discover complex and subtle activities.

        Speaker: Mrs Zoe Gastelum (Sandia National Laboratories)
        Slides
      • 11:35
        Report back on International Workshop on the Applicability of New Tools and Technologies for Non-Proliferation 1m

        On 19th April, KIng’s College London in partnership with the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) will hold a workshop on new tools and technologies for non-proliferation verification at the Vienna Centre for Non-proliferation and Disarmament in Vienna. This symposium submission will present back the key findings of the seminar, which will focus on advances in remote sensing, collection and management of unstructured data, and multimedia information and data fusion. The presentation will conclude with recommendations on how such capabilities can complement existing IAEA activities.

        Speaker: Mr Ian Stewart (King's College London)
      • 11:36
        OSIS 2.0: Optimizing Analyst-Driven Automation of Open Source Information Collection and Processing 1m

        Collecting and processing open source (OS) information is an important aspect of the IAEA’s mandate to implement safeguards based on all relevant information related to States’ nuclear activities. Since the mid-1990s, the Division of Information Management (SGIM) has been collecting OS information into an internal database, the Open Source Information System (OSIS).

        In the early stages, the SGIM collection and review process was predominately manual with classic internet searching, PDF printing, and running scripts for uploading files to the OSIS database. Over time the process has undergone numerous improvements to include elements of automation in order to increase efficiency in an ever-growing stream of open source information. While automation has unarguably been welcome for many of the processing steps, it has been essential to keep the analyst involved at key decision-making points such as judging information for relevance, categorization, and further distribution.

        With the technological advancement of computing and machine learning during the past five years however, more options for additional automation of data processing have become available. In 2016, SGIM embarked on a project to integrate and further automate the continuous monitoring, collection, and processing of OS information.

        This paper describes the process that culminated in the launch in early 2018 of OSIS 2.0, an in-house developed tool that has provided numerous improvements, including: automation of manual steps of collecting and formatting files; creation of a centralized space for analysts to collaborate on information collection and processing; and, improvement of the categorization and distribution capability. Furthermore, automation has enabled analysts to focus efforts more on analysis than collection and processing. The paper will also discuss possible next steps in integrating additional information collection processes into OSIS 2.0 and how far automation can be taken before it starts to have a diminishing effect on reliable information collection and processing.

        Speaker: Mr Thomas Skoeld (IAEA)
      • 11:37
        Using iCore in Information Collection/Anlysis 5m
      • 11:42
        STEPS for the Modernization of Safeguards Information Analysis Tools 5m
    • 14:00 15:30
      [CHA] Globalization and the Changing Supply Chain for Knowledge, Expertise and Goods Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

      • 14:00
        Scene Setter 5m
        Speaker: Mr Willem Alfons Marc Janssens
      • 14:05
        Responding to verification challenges caused by increasing nuclear-related trade 7m

        Nuclear trade analysis has effectively strengthened international safeguards for more than a decade. Supported by the IAEA Member States, nuclear trade analysis was a departmental response to the revelation of proliferation networks in the early 2000s. The collection, analysis and synthesis of trade-related information with information from open and other sources has diversified and enhanced the verification of completeness of States’ declarations, thus improving assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

        The key trade analysis products in the context of safeguards State evaluation are assessments of nuclear-related trade flows, nuclear-related industrial infrastructure, IAEA Technical Cooperation, and ad hoc trade and procurement-related analysis. In 2017, ca 90 such reports were provided to safeguards State evaluation groups (SEGs), in addition to direct SEG trade updates.

        Proliferation risks show no sign of decreasing in the future. Recent nuclear energy production projections point to a continuous increase, where even a low case scenario is ca 8 % increase over the next decade. The growth in legitimate nuclear-related trade will also increase the concerns of misuse, illicit trade and proliferation. Resilient proliferation networks are constantly adapting to avoid strengthened export controls and pose a continuous challenge for global non-proliferation. The paper describes the role of IAEA trade analysis in support of safeguards State evaluation, in addition to its sources of information and partnerships in countering non-traditional proliferation risks – by further diversifying and improving departmental trade analysis competence.

        Speaker: Ms Malin Ardhammar (International Atomic Energy Agency)
      • 14:12
        Mapping technology and knowledge transfer networks 7m
        The scope and volume of transnational nuclear related trade and knowledge flows are expanding to new countries and regions with nascent nuclear related industries and research establishments, presenting new safeguards challenges. In this paper, we describe a method of using publicly available data to map the national and regional networks states use to trade in nuclear materials and technology, and to transfer nuclear related tacit knowledge. Analysing the structure of the networks themselves can determine crucial nodes and links within the networks, chokepoints and focal points for trade and knowledge flows, and the relative importance of different suppliers, knowledge and trade brokers, and buyers. In terms of safeguards analysis, this presents a low-cost way to identify initial areas of interest in nuclear knowledge aggregation, and in nuclear related trade flow and emerging roles in the nuclear supply chain. This is a particularly useful method to use with countries with nascent nuclear industries, and we provide examples of the analysis with reference to regional knowledge and trade networks in Southeast Asia. While the network analysis method is agnostic as to data sources, in this paper we use data from UNCOMTRADE, Web of Science, and several other public databases.
        Speaker: Dr Justin Hastings (University of Sydney)
      • 14:19
        The Changing Architecture of Nuclear Trade: Trends in Manufacturing Base Supply and Demand 7m
        Substantial counter-proliferation resources are spent trying to identify and prevent the diversion of dual-use goods to illicit nuclear programs. Since 2004, all countries have been required to have in place export controls on dual-use goods. Because not all trade flows can be followed, tracking the flow of nuclear dual-use items can be prioritized by focusing on so-called 'choke-point' goods: key items that proliferators seek, that are assumed to be particularly difficult to obtain. Demand and supply determines whether any item is a choke-point for a nominal illicit nuclear program. Proliferators, having chosen a pathway to nuclear weapons - say, uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge - need certain materials and goods to build that pathway. There is a worldwide supply base of commercial manufacturers which can make these materials and goods. When supply is significantly less than demand, a widget becomes a choke-point good. To date, no comprehensive study has so far established how widely these items are produced. This paper is based on research that attempts to fill this gap. The authors have researched and characterized the manufacturing bases for 26 proliferation-sensitive technologies. The research deliberately examines a diverse range of nuclear-related goods: from simple commodities to elaborately manufactured precision items, with supply chains ranging from the short and simple to the long and complex. From these technology reports, an aggregated picture of the global manufacturing base for proliferation-sensitive items has been built which is described in this article. Its objective is to be of use to non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and export control practitioners, and to add to research in the field.
        Speaker: Dr Andrea Viski (Project Alpha, King's College London)
      • 14:26
        Emerging dual-use technologies and global supply chain compliance 1m
        With the progress of technologies for telecommunication, synthetic biology, chemistry, additive manufacturing and nanoscale processes, many opportunities arise, allowing more effective and innovative production and the achievement of results with great potential both on the technical and commercial sides. At the same time however, rapid technological developments may create opportunities and vulnerabilities that can be exploited for illicit procurement activities seeking sensitive items for proliferation programmes. The strategic trade control framework should evolve with the same pace. Enforcement and traceability of intangible technology transfer controls may become much more challenging, while at the same time improved approaches to internal compliance must be developed by suppliers and technology holders.
        Speaker: Dr FILIPPO SEVINI (EUROPEAN COMMISSION JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE)
      • 14:27
        Additive Manufacturing: The Future for Safeguards 7m
        Additive manufacturing is described as a transformative technology that will allow objects with complex topologies and 21st Century materials to be produced locally. The impact on safeguards is not yet clear as the technology just beginning to impact industry. Exactly what the technology will be able to produce that nuclear-relevant in the near future is unclear; especially if it allows states to solve manufacturing challenges posed by technology controls. This paper addresses four key points: • Given how the additive manufacturing is developing, what it will be possible to produce with this technology by 2025; • If additive manufacturing provides developing nuclear states access to new capabilities; • How technology controls may be undermined by allowing states either to outsource production or produce traditionally manufactured items using additive techniques; • The policy responses that are available and appropriate to meet this challenge.
        Speaker: Dr Grant Christopher (Ridgeway Information)
      • 14:34
        The use of trade statistics to map States’ nuclear related industrial capabilities 7m

        IAEA co-authors: E. Marinova, S. Francis
        EC-JRC external main author and co-authors: C. Versino, S. Cagno, G. Cojazzi

        Abstract

        State Evaluation Groups in the Department of Safeguards analyse safeguards relevant open source information on States’ nuclear related industrial capabilities, including the nuclear related equipment and materials they can make use of either through indigenous manufacture or import. This analysis is performed in the state evaluation process for all States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force.
        Open source trade statistics can provide insights into the global trade flows of nuclear related equipment and materials and the underlying industrial capabilities of States as possible users or manufacturers of such goods. This paper describes preliminary results of the collaborative work between the IAEA and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission on the development and application of visualization tools to open source trade statistics to support the nuclear related industrial capability assessment in the state evaluation process. Methods for statistical trade data analysis, including the Revealed Comparative Advantage Index, were explored to determine the relative strength of States as exporters or importers of classes of commodities which are seen as indicative in the assessment of States’ nuclear related industrial infrastructure and capabilities.

        Speaker: Ms Elena Marinova (IAEA)
      • 14:41
        Potential Proliferation Indicators through Analysis of Trade in Non-Controlled Industrial Goods 7m
        Any State’s ability to carry out an indigenous, clandestine proliferation programme must be directly related to its industrial and technological capabilities. It is postulated that monitoring of trade data for non-controlled items can provide valuable insight into a State’s potential proliferation capabilities, and may also provide indirect indicators of a proliferation agenda. The paper describes the logic for the selection of carefully selected groups of commodities that require similar industrial and technological capabilities to those required for proliferation activities. There is also discussion of how changes in a State’s trade data profile could indicate potentially relevant step changes in its underlying capabilities that may be connected to proliferation activities or future proliferation pathways.
        Speaker: Mr Stephen Francis (IAEA, SGIM)
    • 14:00 15:30
      [NEW] Experience in Safeguards by Design for New Facility Types M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 14:00 15:30
      [SGI] Establishing and Strengthening State and Regional Systems M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [CHA] Non-proliferation and the Globalized Marketplace – Perspectives of International Organizations, National Authorities and Industry M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

      • 16:00
        UAE Nuclear Export Controls: a Success Story 5m

        Due to its strategic location between East and West, the large number of ports and free trade zones and a business-friendly environment, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is one of the world’s major trade hubs - and a target for illicit nuclear procurement networks.
        Since then, following the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, the UAE has successfully enhanced its nuclear export controls. The first step was the creation of a Committee for Goods and Materials Subject to Import and Export Control in 2007. In 2008 the UAE evaluated the potential benefits of nuclear power. A year later the UAE decided to embark on a peaceful nuclear programme by awarding a contract to Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) for the construction of four APR-1400 reactors at Barakah, implementing the “Gold Standard” of non-proliferation. The Nuclear Law was issued in 2009, establishing the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) as the UAE’s regulator. The UAE voluntarily committed to abide by the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines. FANR assumed the responsibility for nuclear-related export controls and issued the Regulation on the Export and Import Control of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Related Items and Nuclear Related Dual Use Items, which specifies FANR’s licensing, reporting and inspection requirements and forms the legal basis for controlling all nuclear-related imports, exports, re-exports, transits and transshipments in the UAE.
        FANR has established a methodology based on Harmonized System Codes to identify potentially regulated items and control their transfers. FANR also conducts regular outreach activities, organizes workshops with international attendance and collaborates with various countries in the area of nuclear export controls. Owing to FANR’s close cooperation with the UAE’s different customs authorities and State Security, several unlicensed trans-shipments of proliferation concern have successfully been intercepted and seized

        Speaker: Mrs Maryam Alsehaimy (United Arab Emirates)
      • 16:05
        Australian Counter-proliferation Architecture, Collaboration, Challenges and Opportunities 5m

        The Australian government's approach to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction involves coordination across multiple agencies with different portfolios and priorities. Through a series of reviews the structure of this whole-of-government approach has been modified to ensure an efficient and effective prosecution of the CP task. This paper will examine the evolution of Australia's CP efforts, global future CP challenges, and how Australia can work collaboratively with the IAEA's Department of Safeguards to advance our mutual interests.

        Speaker: Dr Matt Ferguson (Australian Government)
      • 16:10
        Trade networks and challenges for safeguards 5m
        Speaker: Mrs Maryam Alsehaimy
      • 16:15
        UNSCR/1540 Expert’s Outreach to Relevant Parties 5m
        Speaker: Mr Mark Hibbs
      • 16:20
        Nuclear suppliers group – addressing evolving supply chain 5m
        Speaker: Mr Diego CANDANO LARIS
      • 16:25
        Industry perspective on proliferation resistance 5m
        Speaker: Mr Ralf Wirtz
      • 16:30
        Responding to evolving proliferation challenges – the experience of the AP 5m
        Speaker: Laura Rockwood (Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs)
      • 16:35
        IAEA Contribution 5m
        Speaker: Mr John DRUCE (IAEA)
    • 16:00 17:30
      [SGI] Tools, Approaches and IT Systems for State Safeguards Reporting M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [TEC] Advancements in Instrumentation Data Processing and Analysis M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

      • 16:00
        Verification Data Pattern Recognition and Change Detection at the Neutron Instrument Level 7m
        As the pressure on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards resources increases, there is a drive to essentially “do more with less.” New ways of using current verification instrumentation and visualizing the collected data are needed, coupled with maintaining and sustaining the current safeguards instrumentation fleet. This paper explores how to innovate with current safeguards neutron instrumentation using data-driven algorithms at the instrument level. A concept is described for upgrading current neutron counting systems with modern electronics by leveraging electronics developments in other fields (e.g., high-energy physics) to facilitate full list mode data acquisition and, therefore, expand existing analyses to pattern recognition and change detection at the instrument level. The aim is to advance correlated neutron counting by improving the reliability of detecting nuclear material diversion and, at the same time, to improve the sustainability of those systems. It is likely that upgrading existing systems with new hardware and software is more cost-effective than replacing systems with other novel systems that might meet this need. A specific project example is highlighted in which a system was upgraded by retrofitting the standard uranium neutron collar detector with new electronics; as a result, verification data can be analyzed in new ways. A new neutron analysis method, the “List Mode Response Matrix,” has been developed to analyze every pulse train from the detector array and thus enable the verification of spatial information about the assay item for safeguards inspections. This project has improved the reliability of resolving individual fuel pin locations within a given fresh fuel assembly and the percentage of partial defects detected. Herein, the overall concept of upgrading current neutron counting systems is discussed with respect to the potential increase in analysis capabilities. In addition, the details and results of the list mode collar project are discussed.
        Speaker: Dr Louise Worrall (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
      • 16:07
        Developments in Fresh Fuel Collar Measurements with Fast Neutron Detection 7m

        The neutron coincidence counting (NCC) method has been applied for many years in nuclear safeguards. This method is beneficial in allowing large items, such as fuel assemblies, to be interrogated evenly, leading to precise and accurate non-destructive assay measurements of fissile materials. Traditionally NCC has been performed with helium-3 detectors with measurements of thermalized neutrons and has worked very successfully. Currently, however, it is common practise to add burnable neutron poisons into fuel matrices which adds an additional influence into the assay measurements which has to be considered and addressed with ultimate effects of large extensions of measurement times or by large correction factors.

        CAEN S.p.A and the IAEA are currently applying a novel approach to solve this problem of measuring fuels containing burnable poisons. The use of fast neutron detectors coupled with fast digitizing electronics and bespoke software and analysis algorithms allow NCC to be performed with fast neutrons. A series of optimised digital filters including time-coincidence, pulse-shape discrimination, pile-up and cross-talk rejection, are used on-the-fly to isolate coincident neutrons produced in the same fission with very high precision and at very high detection rates. The outcomes are that fuel assemblies can be assayed quickly, precisely and without large correction factors, thereby greatly improving the performance of fresh fuel collar measurements. The recent developments of the fast neutron coincidence collar (FNCL) and performance of the system are discussed.

        Speaker: Dr Massimo Morichi (CAEN SyS)
      • 16:14
        IRAP: a new system for integrated analysis and visualization of multi-source safeguards data. Challenges and techniques 7m
        Unattended monitoring, video surveillance and automated review have become more and more important for nuclear safeguards over the last 20 years. An increasing number of such systems, providing a huge amount of information to inspectors, combined with the need to optimize human resources in operational units, made it necessary to develop an automated data review platform, supporting inspectors in their daily work. The capacity to collect, store and transfer data has been growing rapidly, but the ability to analyse these huge quantities of data has developed at much lower speed. This has resulted in new challenges in the visualization and analysis process, as Nuclear Inspectors depend on information "available" in the data. IRAP the “Integrated Review and Analysis Package” is a software system for making unstructured raw data available to various data visualization and review tools. Raw data is collected from many different sources such as radiation monitors, electronic seals and surveillance systems. The system is designed to structure and perform an interpretation of massive amounts of data based on the inspectors' judgement using means of visual representations in combination with advanced scientific methods (SCALE-ORIGEN, VFIM, FRAM, INCC, …). A future approach combines data analysis techniques with image processing tools, the proposed method in combination with new reporting tools will enable extraction of the most relevant information from provided datasets. This paper aims at providing an overview of challenges and techniques of the IRAP development based on a partnership agreement between EURATOM and the IAEA initiated in 2013. It describes the state-of-the-art and points to the most likely future challenges and development directions in the coming years.
        Speaker: Dr Andreas Smejkal (Euratom)
        Presentation for TEC-S3
        Presentation for TEC-S8
      • 16:21
        Disparate Data Integration for Advanced Facility Monitoring 7m

        The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must ensure the peaceful use of all nuclear materials with a budget that has been compared in size to that of the police department in Vienna. This includes, for example, coverage of over 1,200 nuclear facilities spread around the globe and evaluation of over a million nuclear material reports annually. The amount of information the IAEA collects is on an upward trajectory, and data overload is poised to be an ever-increasing stress on the IAEA’s ability to perform its safeguards mission.

        Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been investing over the past several years in experimental studies within a number of its unique facilities to characterize activity patterns and operational modes using automated methods for disparate data integration. Building on the success of these preliminary studies, there is currently an effort funded by LANL’s Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program to develop a testbed at one of the Laboratory’s radiological facilities for advancing this work, specifically aimed at safeguards-relevant data streams such as unattended radiation monitoring systems, surveillance systems, and nuclear material inventory reports. The overarching goal of this work is to develop and experimentally validate methods to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards verification at nuclear facilities, which will allow the IAEA to better utilize the data it is already collecting. This paper describes work that has been done to date as well as implications for future areas of research.

        Speaker: Dr Karen Miller (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
        Slides
      • 16:28
        Improved Analysis of Verification Data Using List Mode Neutron Data Collection 1m
        Neutron timing information in the form of shift register data, which consists of total neutron counts and coincidences, has been utilized for safeguards verification measurements for decades. Mass determination of uranium and plutonium oxide is enabled by measurement of coincident neutron count rates, as this signature of fission can be used to determine fissile mass. While the shift register provides valuable information about neutron behavior in an item, that information is extremely limited. In typical systems, all detectors must be fed into the shift register as a combined signal, and the time domain of analysis must be pre-selected. Additionally, only multiplicity analysis and coincidence counting can be applied to shift register data. Advances in data collection and storage technology enable a transition from shift register to list mode neutron data collection for verification measurements. List mode neutron data is a record of the time of arrival of every neutron in every detector channel. While this is a data intensive shift, the possibilities for application of advanced data analytics methods are vast, as will be demonstrated. Rather than considering all channels together, each detector can be treated independently allowing for cross correlation analysis of fission neutrons and creation of coincidence matrices, providing useful geometric information. In addition, signatures from several different neutron timing distributions (i.e. multiplicity, Rossi-alpha, time interval, etc.) can be combined and analyzed for better characterization of challenging items (spent/fresh fuel, unknown geometries, loss of continuity of knowledge, etc.) where shift register analysis has proven ineffective in the past. Importantly for continuity and comparison to previous methods, obtaining list mode data still allows for all of the same analysis as shift register data; therefore, in transitioning from shift register to list mode, no information or analysis capabilities are lost. This paper will show advantages of using list mode data for verification measurements using fresh and spent fuel neutron list mode datasets.
        Speaker: Dr Alexis Trahan (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
      • 16:29
        Improved Cherenkov light prediction model for enhanced DCVD performance 1m
        The Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) is an instrument used to verify irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in wet storage based on the fuel’s Cherenkov light emissions. The DCVD is frequently used for gross defect verification, verifying that 50% or more of the assembly has not been diverted. The verification methodology is based on comparison of the measured Cherenkov light intensity to a predicted intensity, based on operator declarations. A new prediction method has been developed, considering more fuel assembly details to ensure more accurate predictions. With the new model, the irradiation history of an assembly, the assembly design and the contributions from gamma and beta decays are taken into account. The model has also been extended to account for the radiation from neighbouring fuel assemblies, which can enter the assembly being measured and create Cherenkov light. The performance of the prediction model and the neighbour intensity prediction model has been validated against fuel measurements by the IAEA at a PWR facility of short-cooled fuel. The results show that the new model offers an improved prediction capability, allowing the fuel inventory to be verified with no fuel assemblies being identified as outliers requiring additional investigation. The prediction model will be implemented in the next DCVD software version, making it available to IAEA inspectors. This development of the DCVD capabilities are in line with the fourth theme of the IAEA safeguards symposium, “Shaping the future of safeguards implementation”, by resolving challenges related to the DCVD and by extending the capabilities of the instrument.
        Speaker: Mr Erik Branger (Uppsala University)
      • 16:30
        Fast Neutron Collar Tests at Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant in Brazil 1m

        The new generation fresh fuels assemblies contain more burned poisons (gadolinium) to compensate the reactivity and the adjustment of the distribution of power in the reactor core. However, the presence of gadolinium hinders the measurement of the uranium quantity using the traditional Uranium Neutron Coincidence Collar (UNCL) in safeguards applications. This non-destructive system, based on passive and active measurements, is used to determine the linear mass of fissile isotope in fresh fuel assemblies and can operate in “fast” and “thermal” modes. In thermal mode, the presence of neutron poison affects the thermal neutrons since the thermal neutrons are captured and the measurement must be corrected using the Gd content declared by the operator, thus generating a possible diversion scenario. To solve this problem, the IAEA (International Agency of Nuclear Energy) has developed the Fast Neutron Collar (FNCL). This new equipment has low dependence to Gd, better accuracy and shorter measurement time compared to UNCL. As part of an IAEA project, the Safeguards Laboratory of the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission in collaboration with the Brazilian Nuclear Industry (INB), the Brazilian-Argentinean Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA had tested this new prototype using fresh fuel assemblies, under the Brazilian Support Program to the IAEA (BRZ SP). The FNCL prototype is composed of 12 cells of liquid scintillator detector, arranged on three detection panels. In this Project, twenty-three fresh fuel assemblies were measured. The aim of this work was to evaluate the performance of the Fast Neutron Coincidence Collar to measure the linear mass density of 235U in fresh PWR assemblies, independently of the presence of gadolinium, as part of the homologation of this equipment for safeguards use. This paper presents the main results of the tests. The preliminary results indicate that the FNCL can be used for safeguards measurement of U235 mass in fresh fuel assemblies containing burnable neutron poisons without requiring the declaration of the operator on the Gd content.

        Speaker: Mr Marcos Grund (Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear)
      • 16:31
        Estimation of Dead-Time Loss for High Neutron Count-Rates and associated Multiplicity Correction using Multi-Channel List-Mode Data 1m

        Neutron multiplicity counting is a technique widely used in safeguards for the determination of mass of fissile material. The multi-channel list-mode recording of neutron data provides a large amount of data, the analysis of which provides increased possibilities due to the exact time and channel information. Here a new method for dead-time correction in neutron multiplicity counting shall be presented. The enhanced analysis possibilities are used to calculate a second pulse train containing estimations of pulse losses at specific positions. The system calibrates itself by calculating the probabilities of dead-time loss using some basic properties of the Rossi-Alpha distribution. This is done with actual measurement data, provided the amount of data is large enough to result in a good statistics. The histograms of Reals plus Accidentals (R+A) and Accidentals (A) obtained by multiplicity counting are corrected using statistical methods; Singles, Doubles and Triples are calculated later from this corrected R+A and A histograms.

        Speaker: Dr Ludwig Holzleitner (Europ. Commission, Joint Research Centre)
    • 16:00 17:30
      [TEC] Integration and Evaluation of Verification Data M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 17:30
      ESPACE (Wednesday) M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [CHA] Engaging Non-Traditional Sectors in Safeguards M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

      • 09:00
        Scene Setter: IAEA experiences with engaging non-traditional sectors 5m
        Speaker: Mr Dimitri Finker
      • 09:05
        EC-JRC initiatives to sustain excellence and diversity in science 5m
        The EC-JRC introduced with its strategy 2030 new initiatives to provide staff with skills and competences sustaining and expanding scientific excellence, stimulating eagerness to learn and intellectual curiosity. This facilitates transferring and sharing of knowledge and skills across nuclear and non-nuclear research areas also with partner DGs, Member States and international organisations, such as the IAEA. The Exploratory Research Programme (ER) and the Centre for Advanced Studies (CAS) aim at injecting new ideas and transdisciplinary thinking into the organisation. The Collaborative Doctoral Partnership (CDP) brings young researchers into the JRC while the Visiting Researcher Programme (VRP) encourages staff mobility. JRC is in the Consortium for ENEN+ mobility grants for career opportunities in the nuclear fields. By granting open access to selected JRC Research Infrastructure the JRC reaches out for academia, research organisations, industry and the private sector. The JRC’s Art and Science programmes allow scientists to collaborate with artists. While each initiative meets its own target, it is the interactions between them that create a diverse pool of researchers in a multi-disciplinary, environment. Diversity and gender-balance is considered as an asset and the way forward. The EC has set a target of 40% women in management positions and fosters initiatives for 'Women and Girls in Science'. Only organisations that build on the collective intelligence of their staff will be able to meet the challenges of this century. While embedded in a well-defined legal framework, safeguards rely on scientific/technical support, innovation and highly skilled staff. Examples will be given on how the JRC initiatives are engaging people in topics that are growing safeguards challenges such as big data, machine learning, shared ledger, nano-technologies and others. We believe that these JRC initiatives set an exciting example to the benefit of the IAEA and Member States in building future safeguards capabilities.
        Speaker: Dr Yetunde AREGBE (EC-JRC-IRMM)
      • 09:10
        Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Engineering Design Courses 5m

        Engaging professionals across the breadth of the nuclear industry to educate them on international safeguards objectives and methodology is logistically challenging, especially in the United States, where individuals may not interact with the IAEA and are not as familiar with implementing international safeguards. However, incorporating international safeguards concepts into the mandatory curriculum of nuclear-related university degree programs around the world, complementary to nuclear safety and security concepts, could reach individuals who will go on to be professionals acting in a variety of roles across the nuclear industry (e.g., developing nuclear-related advanced technologies, designing or operating nuclear facilities, serving as State regulators). This would ultimately lead to more effective and efficient safeguards, including helping to move safeguards by design from a concept to a standard practice, as future designers, operators, and State regulators would be more familiar with international safeguards. This could also potentially address human resource challenges by creating a broader base of individuals knowledgeable about the IAEA mission from which to draw future inspectors and analysts. In order to implement this idea, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in conjunction with the Center for Nuclear Security Science & Policy Initiatives (a research institute associated with Texas A&M; University), targeted nuclear engineering undergraduate students taking the mandatory design course at Texas A&M; and the University of Tennessee. The project objective was to introduce safeguards by design concepts to individuals who are planning to work in a broad range of nuclear-related careers. This paper describes the project methodology, which included the project leads creating and presenting lectures on safeguards to the design class and mentoring teams working on design team projects that incorporated safeguards. The paper also identifies lessons learned while incorporating safeguards topics into nuclear engineering university degree programs.

        Speaker: Ms Jill Cooley (Y-12 National Security Complex)
      • 09:15
        Exploring Disruptive Technology for Safeguards Verification 5m
        The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Safeguards Technology Team (SG Tech) has established a forward leaning R&D program in anticipation of rapid technological advances in nuclear power and nuclear material production, and the consequent opportunities for and challenges to safeguards verification. Specifically, many new projects are based on technologies and discoveries from research sectors not traditionally associated with safeguards tools and methods, such as advances in lasers, data visualization, additive manufacturing for detector parts, and know-how from high energy physics. Other example efforts include 1) innovative detector materials such as stilbene and pulse-shape discriminating plastics, 2) battery-free, wireless tags for inventory monitoring and tracking in harsh environments, 3) non-invasive acoustics methodology under evaluation as an on-site inspection tool to verify D2O concentration, and 4) NuGoo, a method for acquiring environmental samples using a peelable gel to extract microscopic amounts of nuclear material from rough surfaces, such as wood or concrete. SG Tech establishes its projects and project teams from the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories and other U.S. agencies, U.S. academia and the U.S. private sector. It works closely with the IAEA Department of Safeguards managers and end users to align its program to meet pressing verification needs, and quality, performance and reliability standards. SG Tech also engages and invites willing partners through NNSA’s bilateral agreements to test and validate these concepts.
        Speaker: Dr Arden Dougan (DOE)
        Presentation
      • 09:20
        Nuclear Safeguards Communication in Thailand 5m
        The Kingdom of Thailand has NPT, CSA and AP inforce since 1972, 1974, and 2017 respectively. Safeguards implementation has been performed ever since mostly in the form of providing and receiving of information, i.e. NMA reports, Notification letters and Forms. Safeguards relevant communication between State authority responsible for safeguards implementation (SRA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is one of key elements for an effective safeguards implementation. Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP) acts on behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand or Thailand as SRA. In the past, OAP has provided any type of information through official channel, i.e. OAP to Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Mission in Vienna and to IAEA, and vice versa for information from IAEA to OAP. These involve paper base documentation and traditional logistics such as air mail and FAX. Unfortunate experiences were late submission and risks of expose of sensitive or confidential information. IAEA has developed Computerized Secure Communication (SC) as a platform to exchange information between States and IAEA for certain period of time. In 2017 IAEA has launch the State Declaration Portal (SDP) as a complementary platform to SC to exchange information between States and IAEA. OAP has just installed SC last year in November and has been granted access to SDP in July 2017. By utilizing SDP and SC, OAP is able to (a) shorten the information submission time to IAEA drastically and (b) receive information by IAEA almost instantly. The systems also allow restricted access by State parties to receive a copy or a notification of the copy of information at the time of the information is exchange. Advantages using this two systems include (a) reducing risk of unnecessary sharing sensitive and confidential information (b) significantly decreasing logistic time between OAP and IAEA which is preferable in submitting AP declarations that IAEA will acknowledge the submission by the IAEA “Receive” time and not “dispatch” time like NMA reports.
        Speaker: Dr Boonchawee Srimok (Office of Atoms for Peace)
      • 09:25
        Cross-sector Collaboration to Develop New Tools for Communication to Non-experts 5m
        The N Square Innovators Network (NSIN) was created in 2017 to build a cross-sector community of innovators with the collaborative spirit, ingenuity and commitment necessary to accelerate progress towards agreed nuclear non-proliferation, security, and disarmament, goals. At the center of the NSIN is a small group of partners with diverse expertise, spheres of influence, networks and constituencies - not limited to the nuclear sector. The NSIN comprises four cross-sector teams, each with a different focus. One team is focused on verification and consists of members from the Rhode Island School of Design, the Princeton Nuclear Futures Lab, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Veilos, N Square, Singularity University, and the Skoll Foundation. A key problem identified by the “verification” team is that there are people outside of the nuclear safeguards community who may have solutions, ideas, or frameworks to contribute to the various challenges inherent in the fuel cycle verification process. However, because they are unaware of the challenges, and may not understand verification or safeguards, they do not know how to contribute. In addition, the experts involved in international safeguards struggle with messaging to lay-audiences and other non-experts about the ins and outs of their verification mission. Utilizing proven innovation methods methods such as human-centered design, design-thinking, and systems-thinking, the Verification Team is working to better articulate problems and opportunities so that people without expertise understand the issues and feel empowered to contribute. The goal of the group is to create tools and messages necessary to communicate about verification in plain-speak, in order to highlight pathways for potential engagement that might lead to new approaches or methods. If selected our team plans to present a prototype of the tool (or tools) at the symposium. One successful outcome for this effort may be to help both public and non-expert decision-makers better understand the importance of credible verification regimes, the mission of the IAEA within those regimes, and the value of supporting the IAEA to carry out its mission.
        Speaker: Ms Morgan Matthews (N Square Collaborative)
      • 09:30
        The Role of Professional Societies in Effective Communications for International Safeguards: How the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Supports Existing and Emerging Nuclear Materials Stewardship Communities 5m
        The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is an international professional society dedicated to “the safe, secure and effective stewardship of nuclear materials and related technologies through the advancement of scientific knowledge, technical skills, policy dialogue, professional capabilities, and best practices.” The Institute executes its mission through six technical divisions, the largest of which is International Safeguards. While the contributions of the Institute’s members are high in impact and global in reach, a key aspect of INMM’s ability to promote the mission and identify the needs of the nuclear materials management community is its ability to effectively communicate. This is reflected in the Institute’s Strategic Plan, including by building and strengthening the relationship between “policy and technical communities” working in the field. In this paper, we will describe how INMM is working to broaden and enhance our communications platforms in service of strengthening international safeguards, developing effective messaging, and identifying methods to meet the evolving needs of the nuclear materials management community. We will describe our vision for INMM communications, and how that vision will impact the existing and emerging nuclear materials stewardship communities.
        Speaker: Ms Zoe Gastelum (Sandia National Laboratories)
      • 09:35
        The European Research and Development Association (ESARDA) - Communication, coordination and collaboration in safeguards 5m
        ESARDA, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, is comprised of European organisations actively involved in the research and development (R) of nuclear safeguards. The control of civil nuclear material is mandatory within the EU territory in line with the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (“Euratom Treaty”, 1958) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). ESARDA was formed in 1969 with the purpose of facilitating collaboration in R in the field of safeguards and in the application of such R to the safeguarding of source and special fissile materials. ESARDA includes regulatory authorities, facility operators, research centres and universities. The principal issues are co-ordination of research, frequent exchange of information and joint execution of R programmes. ESARDA also strives to fulfil an educational role and to reach the general public. To this end, the following activities take place: 1) Annual Meetings and Symposia, providing an opportunity for collaboration and information exchange. Alternating with open symposia, biennial internal meetings take place where all Working Groups (WGs) convene. 2) Dedicated WG activities. ESARDA consists of nine WGs, being the “backbone” of ESARDA, with active members and observers. 3) The one-week ESARDA Course, complementing nuclear engineering studies by including nuclear safeguards in the academic curriculum. 4) Technical publications. The ESARDA Bulletin contains scientific and technical articles relating to safeguards and verification. The ESARDA website features, inter alia, the latest issues of the Bulletin, the symposia proceedings, as well as information about WGs, symposia and other relevant events. Today, ESARDA is more active than ever, due to lively cooperation among its members and strong linkages to other safeguards-related organisations, such as the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), and the pro-active tackling of new emerging issues through its diverse WGs.
        Speaker: Dr Irmgard Niemeyer (Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH)
      • 09:40
        Strategic partnerships – Agency perspective 5m
        Speaker: Ms Constanze WESTERVOSS (IAEA)
      • 09:45
        Non-traditional sector R&D for safeguards in Australia 5m
        Speaker: Mr Robert Floyd
    • 09:00 10:30
      [NEW] Safeguards for New and Existing Facilities M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [SGI] Streamlining Information-related Workflows: Small Holders/LOFs and AP Declarations Press-room

      Press-room

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [TEC] Blockchain and Safeguards M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

      • 09:00
        Evaluation of a blockchain based nuclear materials accounting platform in Australia 5m

        To explore opportunities in nuclear materials accounting on a shared ledger platform, a blockchain based solution to reporting nuclear materials was developed, and compared to a materials reporting portal on a centralised platform. A blockchain is a type of shared ledger technology, which enables an immutable, objective electronic record to be established by and read by parties who do not necessarily have mutual trust. Detailed encryption key privileges control access to different types of information and simple automated judgements or pre-agreed transactions can be executed automatically through smart contracts. Two inherent features of a blockchain are consistency and immutability of electronic data held between multiple parties, which may improve trust and transparency between licensor/licensees participating in nuclear materials accounting. However, many perceived advantages may actually relate to associated benefits of transitioning paper, or email based reporting practices to electronic, online portal-based solutions, and not directly to the blockchain technology itself. The purpose of the present research was to perform a trial while separating this important confounding factor. Australia has recently transitioned its NUclear Material Balance Tracking System (NUMBAT) to a new database that allows permit holders to record nuclear material inventory and inventory changes through an online portal. As a centralised platform, NUMBAT provides a useful point of comparison for evaluating the potential of a shared ledger platform. The shared ledger system was built to hold materials-accounting data conforming to Code-10 XML on a permissioned blockchain and, besides the unique features arising from its blockchain file structure and permission control, to otherwise match user requirements of NUMBAT, the centralised solution. This presentation and article will share the results and conclusions of comparative evaluation of the two systems, performed during trials at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, by nuclear safeguards professionals and other nuclear experts.

        Speaker: Mr Edward Yu (UNSW Sydney)
      • 09:05
        IT security and consensus mechanisms in private blockchains 5m
        In 2017, a study by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory explored the potential of blockchain (distributed ledger) technology for safeguards applications. Starting from an analysis of the IAEA's requirements for new technologies, this study concluded so-called consortium systems (we shall use the more common term *private blockchains*) might improve on solutions currently used. This paper aims to highlight which issues need to be considered when evaluating the benefits and risks inherent in private blockchains. Special attention will be given to IT security matters.
        Since blockchain solutions store information in a distributed fashion, a process for ensuring consistency and validity of the data copies, called *consensus mechanism*, lies at their core. Whereas bitcoin's proof-of-work is often berated due to its energy consumption and limited throughput, the use of private blockchains allows for much more efficient procedures. It is crucial, however, to understand that these rely on certain assumptions about the underlying network and the participants involved in the blockchain. The most important of these assumptions concerns the fault-tolerance the procedures can ensure. While it is not hard to design a consensus mechanism that works well in propitious circumstances, making it resilient to faulty behaviour, which may stem from technical failures but also be deliberately induced by an attacker, is a much more challenging task.
        Fortunately, a number of research works has adressed just this question. This paper will provide a high-level overview of the available techniques and the security guarantees they offer. It will stress which matters need to be accurately modelled before choosing a blockchain solution. In a somewhat broader sense, it will also clarify certain popular misconceptions about blockchain technology in general.
        Speaker: Dr Christian Berghoff (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
      • 09:10
        Distributed Ledger Technology used in nuclear non-proliferation safeguards? 5m
        Blockchain and more in general distributed ledger technologies are getting a lot of visibility in the financial world these days, being considered as real game-changers. However their recent evolutions (multi-channel ledgers, smart-contracts etc.) are still not well known and understood. They may have a huge potential changing also the way we will deal tomorrow with whatever type of transactions and transaction validation. Before using the technology or exploring its applications, the transposition of financial oriented distributed ledger concepts towards safeguards concepts should take place and the efficiency impact should be understood. Once the potential in the safeguards context have well been understood, the safeguards business processes should be analysed in detail in order to find the optimal places for implementing the technology and maximising the efficiency gain. A market survey will lead to a choice of the best solution to be used for the development of a real testbed for end-to end testing. How to evolve from a testbed, mimicking a specific and concrete situation towards analysing and concluding the usefulness in more general and overarching cases will be presented and discussed. Special attention will be paid towards encryption, robustness and immunity for cyber threads, automation, the efficient use of the block chain and smart contracts and scalability. The paper will present the methodology developed and used at JRC together with the first results and findings.
        Speaker: Dr Stefan Nonneman (European Commission - Joint Research Centre)
      • 09:15
        Blockchains for Safeguards: Technical, Legal and Political Considerations 5m
        Blockchains constitute novel combinations of distributed databases, cryptography, and computer interaction protocols. The original Blockchain was developed to support the peer-to-peer digital currency Bitcoin, but the relevance of this technology is now being explored in a diverse range of information intensive industries and activities. This paper will consider how recent advances in blockchain technology might substantively contribute to effective safeguards. The paper will also consider some of the potential legal and political obstacles to the adoption of blockchain based safeguards systems.
        Speaker: Dr Matthew Moran (King's College London)
      • 09:25
        Identifying Safeguards Use Cases for Blockchain Technology 5m
        In 2016, the Office of International Nuclear Safeguards at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to explore the potential implications of the digital currency bitcoin and its underlying technologies on the safeguards system. The authors found that one category of technologies referred to as Shared Ledger Technology (SLT), also known as the blockchain, offers a spectrum of benefits to the safeguards system. The subsequent analysis suggested that both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States can use SLT to promote efficient, effective, accurate, and timely reporting, and increase transparency in the safeguards system without sacrificing confidentiality of safeguards data. This increased transparency and involvement of Member States in certain safeguards transactions could lead to increased trust and cooperation among States and the public further strengthening the international safeguards system. However, additional research was necessary to understand the precise safeguards problem that would most benefit from a blockchain solution. To that end, in 2018, PNNL initiated a follow-on study that examined specific safeguards use cases for blockchain applications. While the intent is to identify at least one safeguards problem that would benefit from a blockchain solution, findings may also suggest safeguards would not benefit from the technology. The proposed presentation will describe the methodology developed in 2016 and the findings from the follow-on study.
        Speaker: Mrs Sarah Frazar (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
      • 09:30
        The Conceptual Introduction of Internet of Things (IoT) and Blockchain Technology in Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities 5m
        The purpose of this study is to propose ideal applications of novel technology in nuclear safeguards, suggest possible scenarios of the application at the nuclear facilities and evaluate advantages and challenges when using the new concepts. Numerous nuclear material accounting reports are submitted to IAEA, supplemented by accounting records, supporting documents and source data prepared by the facilities. Due to the vastness of data, the Agency and state authority need a significant amount of resources to ensure the consistency and integrity within the data. In addition, accidental or intentional human factors can be involved in preparing the reports. The introduction of share-ledger (blockchain) technology combined with the Internet of Things (IoT) technology can provide possible solutions. The IoT application in producing data reduces the engagement of human factors and increases reliability and accuracy of the information. National accounting reports (ICR, MBR, PIL) mainly require the elemental weights of nuclear material and their measurement can be automatized using chemical sample analysis, weight measurement with scale, non-destructive assay (NDA) and barcode system in case using shipper values. Originally, the reliability of data can be ensured through the blockchain technique. Moreover, self-data checking function developed by the smart contract application greatly reduces the efforts of state authority and the Agency to accomplish consistency and integrity. The database becomes more reliable only when combined with IoT since input data should gain confidence. Based on these concepts, two possible scenarios are developed for an imaginary nuclear power plant and a fuel manufacturing plant. The efficiency and cyber security aspects of these novel technologies are thoroughly evaluated. The result shows that the application not only enhances efficiency of streaming preparation of reports but also improves quality of the data. However, considerable efforts are needed to prevent the cyber-attack against the blockchain database.
        Speaker: Jihye Jeon (Sejong University)
      • 09:35
        Blockchain and Safeguards Information Management: The potential for distributed ledger technology 5m
        The network ability of blockchain technology to manage and self-audit large volumes of data in a shared, secure and transparent manner has potentially far-reaching value for the way safeguards information is collected, processed, and analyzed. The Stimson Center, in partnership with the Stanley Foundation, held a series of workshops in 2018 from Vienna to the Silicon Valley to discuss this potential. The findings and recommendations in this paper consider the ecosystem of safeguards information management, specifically the landscape of factors determining how safeguards data is inputted, processed and accessed, and how distributed ledger technology (DLT) could be applied, if at all, to provide greater efficiency, data reconciliation, accuracy and trust. The paper also touches upon the potential for DLT to be applied to export controls and supply chain auditing.
        Speaker: Ms Cindy Vestergaard (Stimson Center)
    • 11:00 12:30
      [New] Safeguards Techniques for New Facilities and Campaigns M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [SGI] ISSAS Missions and SSAC Self-Assessment M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [TEC] Visualization for Information Integration Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

      • 11:00
        Interactive data visualization techniques in the statistical analysis of multi-source data 20m

        Interactive data visualization techniques in the statistical analysis of multi-source data

        Matthias Auer, Scott Fertig, Sidney Hellman, Oleksii Povkh, Oleksandr Sukhotski, and Serhiy Vasilyev, Instrumental Software Technologies, Inc., USA (m.auer@isti.com, s.fertig@isti.com, s.hellman@isti.com, o.povkh@isti.com, oleksandrsukhotskyi@isti.com, s.vasilyev@isti.com)

        Significant challenges present themselves to evaluators of bulk handling facilities under safeguards. Evaluations require the accurate matching of inspector and operator provided data, variation across time and space of the packaging of materials within a facility, multiple strata, and sophisticated statistical tests that often need to be applied in an investigative and iterative fashion. We present a number of data visualization techniques and charts integrated into an evaluator workbench. These techniques support the iterative and multi-actor collaborative evaluation process. In addition to the use of charts as visualization tools, charts that support “drag-and-drop” grouping, and then reflect those changes back into the dataset underlying an evaluation, will be demonstrated.

        Speaker: Dr Matthias Auer (Instrumental Software Technologies, Inc.)
      • 11:20
        Visualizing Safeguards Data in a Geographic Information System 7m
        Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are widely used to improve access to and comprehension of spatial-temporal information. The IAEA, through their MOSAIC project, developed the Geobased Data Integration (GDI) portal using the ESRI ArcGIS software platform. ESRI ArcGIS is widely used in the GIS community and it has the capacity to integrate and manage vastly different sets of data. Therefore, GDI has the capacity to add new features and grow in its utility to the safeguards inspectorate. This paper, in responding to the Symposium’s examination of how novel visualization techniques for different data sources can be applied to safeguards, proposes enhanced concepts for incorporating and integrating data sets available to the Agency in GDI. With a particular focus on visualizing the flow of nuclear material accountancy data in GIS, the paper will explore how GIS can improve information sharing across stakeholders in the Department of Safeguards, leading to more effective analyses, safeguards implementation, and maintenance of historical safeguards knowledge.
        Speaker: Justin Reed (Argonne National Laboratory)
      • 11:27
        3D technologies for Nuclear Safeguards applications: current and future developments 7m

        ----------
        "3D technologies have been used in nuclear safeguards verification for several years: applications include design information verification where laser scanners acquire 3D models of nuclear facilities with millimeter accuracy to verify the design information provided by the operators. Another example is container identification and authentication where high-precision 3D scanners are used to acquire the container geometry with micrometer accuracy.
        Several technological developments are currently changing the 3D landscape: 3D imaging systems are getting smaller, faster and cheaper; automated processing algorithms - including machine learning - significantly accelerate the processing pipeline; and related technologies such as augmented and virtual reality are getting mature and can be used with large amounts of 3D data. These developments will enable a wider use of 3D technologies in current applications and also open the way for new use cases in nuclear safeguards. Examples include: accurate 3D scanning can be applied at dry storage facilities to verify that the containers have been immobilized between inspections; continuous 3D imaging can complement or replace standard video surveillance, reducing the work load for video review and automatize the verification of material flow for example in encapsulation plants; automated 3D data acquisition and processing – potentially using autonomous platforms and drones – will increase the efficiency for design information and verification; mobile 3D mapping and localization enables location-based services and augmented-reality applications during on-site inspections; the acquisition of as-built 3D data and high-resolution imagery allows the use of virtual reality technologies for training and the preparation of on-site visits.
        The presentation will provide an overview of current advances in 3D and related technologies and illustrate how they might be applied to nuclear safeguards in the short and medium term.
        "

        Speaker: Dr Vitor Sequeira (European Commission)
      • 11:34
        Geographic Data Integration/Interface 7m
        Speaker: Michael Barletta (IAEA)
      • 11:41
        Developing a Tool for Acquisition Path Analysis and Strategy (TAPAS) 1m
        Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) is the key element in developing a State-level approach. Based on the State's nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities the APA generates a list of acquisition paths ranked by their attractiveness for the State. Based on this, the Agency establishes the technical objectives and identifies the safeguards measures for a State. A standardized, transparent and reproducible approach for conducting the APA will help ensure consistency and non-discrimination in safeguards implementation at the State level. Therefore, the authors proposed a formal approach, using a three step methodology: network modeling, network analysis and strategic assessment. First, the process starts with considering nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the State to obtain the edge weights of the network. Second, the network is analyzed by a enumerating all acquisition paths sorted in order of attractiveness for the State. Third, game theory is used to model the decisions made by the IAEA and the State. As a solution, a Nash-equilibrium can be found that provides an indicator on the effectiveness of the implemented safeguards system. While this approach was implemented as a prototype software, the given paper presents a concept as well as a first working draft for an improved software implementation, using the web framework Django. By means of database techniques, it is ensured that multiple users can access and modify data without loss of data integrity. Furthermore, a user concept will be presented which guarantees a fit to purpose identity and rights management. It will be shown that the software is capable of: 1. Data administration of all entities in the class diagram, 2. Modelling acquisition networks by assessing the attractiveness of each process step and 3. Calculation and visualization of all paths of an acquisition network.
        Speaker: Mr Clemens Listner (Consultant)
      • 11:42
        Examining Inspection Frequency under the State-Level Concept 1m

        Over the past two decades, the IAEA has been moving away from mechanistic, criteria-based and facility-centric safeguards in favor of a more holistic, state-level approach based on achieving technical objectives. The introduction of state-level approaches began under integrated safeguards for states with a Broader Conclusion; however, the IAEA is working to apply the principles of state-level safeguards more broadly.
        In the case of integrated safeguards, confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities can enable the IAEA to modify timeliness goals for verification at declared facilities, where those goals had previously been established under an assumption that undeclared facilities and activities could exist. If the timeliness goals can be relaxed, then the frequency of inspections at those facilities may be reduced. A tailored approach to relaxing timeliness goals includes an evaluation of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle and technical capabilities and must be considered in the broader context that couples timeliness (related to inspection frequency) with inspection intensity to achieve inspection goals. In this context, we focus on the development of an analytical basis for modifying timeliness goals under state-level approaches, accounting for both the time to acquire nuclear material of different types and forms and the time to acquire and employ the capability to weaponize the material. We apply our analytical basis to a set of case studies in the form of notional states for which the Broader Conclusion has been reached, because for these states, the IAEA has established a level of confidence in the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. Our case studies are intended to be representative of a range of scenarios of nuclear fuel cycle sophistication, from states with relatively low technical capability (e.g., having only a research reactor with production of medical and industrial isotopes) to states with a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Existing state-level approaches for similar states provide a benchmark against which to compare our analytical approach. A similar methodology could be adapted for more general application as the Agency progresses in implementing the State-Level Concept.

        Speaker: Dr Kenneth Jarman (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
      • 11:43
        Capabilities of the Acquisition Path Analysis Tool (APAT) for Integration of Multi-source Data 1m
        The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continually seeks to improve its safeguards implementation to better utilize the expertise of Agency staff. With the State Level Concept, there is a paradigm shift from a prescriptive approach to safeguards implementation to one that allows for more flexibility in optimizing IAEA resources. This evolution in safeguards improves the IAEA’s ability to consider the State as a whole through a more integrated evaluation process. The Acquisition Path Analysis Tool (APAT) has been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory as a prototype system to demonstrate the usefulness of this kind of tool to support implementation of the State Level Concept. APAT is analysis software that represents the nuclear fuel cycle as a directed graph based on the IAEA Physical Model and provides users with a mechanism for integrating all information compiled through the State evaluation process. It allows for the evaluation of plausible acquisition paths for fissile material in a State, prioritizes them based on safeguards relevant information, and provides users with a dynamic suite of tools for planning and implementation of verification activities. The goals of APAT are to improve resource allocation for more efficient and effective safeguards and contribute to increased consistency and transparency in assessments. This paper describes APAT’s key capabilities and its relevance to the State Level Concept.
        Speaker: Dr Karen Miller (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
    • 14:00 15:30
      [SGI] Improvements in the Field: Enhancements to Measurement Techniques Press-room

      Press-room

      Vienna International Centre

    • 14:00 15:30
      [SGI] Insights and Feedback from SSAC Discussions M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

    • 14:00 15:30
      [TEC] Improving Coordination of Safeguards R&D Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [NEW] Nuclear Newcomers – Strategies and Experiences with Enhancing Safeguards Infrastructure to Support the Introduction of Nuclear Power M2

      M2

      Vienna International Centre

    • 16:00 17:30
      [SGI] Performance Monitoring in Safeguards Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 17:45 18:45
      Sponsored Reception 1h tbd ()

      tbd

    • 09:00 17:30
      ESPACE (Thursday) ESPACE

      ESPACE

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [SGI] Partnerships, Networks and Regional Collaboration Boardroom A

      Boardroom A

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [TEC] Collection, Processing and Analysis of Satellite and Open Source Imagery Data: Collection, Processing and Analysis of Satellite and Open Source Imagery Data M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 09:00 10:30
      [TEC] Collection, Processing and Analysis of Surveillance Data M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 11:00 12:30
      [CHA] Capacity Building: National Initiatives M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

      • 11:00
        Scene Setter: Recap from CHA-S2 Session 5m
        Speaker: Therese Renis (IAEA)
      • 11:05
        ALGERIAN EXPERIENCE IN TRAINING PROGRAM OF SAFEGUARDS PERSONNEL 7m
        The purpose of this paper is to describe the Algerian experience in the safeguards training program. Qualification and training of nuclear facilities personnel is very important for the International and National safeguards implementation. To meet this need, COMENA has launched a training program dedicated to prepare nuclear facilities staff with relevant competence and skills in order to maintain a sustainable effective State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material. The first Algerian safeguards training program has been implemented by the COMENA in 2014. A group of trainees were selected, the candidates were master or engineer graduated, in physics, chemistry or engineering. The aim of this training program is to prepare and to strengthen the nuclear facilities personnel in building-up knowledge, skills and attitudes required to conduct successfully the safeguards related activities, in particular those relating to the management of the accounting for and control of the nuclear materials at the level of facilities. The training program has been developed according to the systematic training approach. This methodology is based on the following five steps: analysis, design, development, implementation and evaluation. This training consists of classroom lectures, practical and laboratory exercises, technical visits at nuclear facilities and evaluation of the trainees. Topics of the training program include basic courses on the nuclear fuel cycle and specific courses concerning the accounting for and control of nuclear material system. In order to familiarize the representatives of SSAC and operators with application of Non Destructive Assay methods for verification of nuclear materials, the participants have been trained to use NDA technics, instruments and equipment for verification of nuclear materials. As continuity of Nuclear Safeguards training Program to enhance technical skill, the trainees attended some short courses organized at Nuclear Research Center of Draria on the fundamentals of inspection. The objective was to provide participants with fundamental skills and practices to plan, conduct, and report on nuclear security and safeguards inspections. Respecting a systematic approach to continuing training, some trainees have also attended in the last two years the safeguards courses (Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material) organized by the IAEA.
        Speaker: Dr SMAIN KORICHI (CRND/COMENA)
      • 11:12
        Strategy for Strengthening Training and Qualification for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s International Safeguards Analysts 7m

        Challenges associated with strengthening international safeguards implementation in the United States of America (U.S.) are being addressed through a progressive training and qualification program at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The basis for this program utilizes a qualification plan specifically designed to ensure the U.S. NRC International Safeguards Analysts, Import and Export Analysts, and Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System Analysts are evaluated against a standard of knowledge outlined in a qualification plan. The knowledge standard is designed to qualify analysts to effectively represent NRC and U.S. interests in domestic and international meetings on nonproliferation issues, and to ensure the NRC and its commercial licensees comply with international treaties and agreements. Scope of the program plan include initial training on the NRC and its domestic regulatory responsibilities, then focuses on required core training for each analyst position. Course focus provides trainees an opportunity to understand how the U.S. State System of Accounting for and Control over nuclear material was established and how it is now being maintained. This paper will examine strategy used to develop and then satisfy requirements the training and qualification program.

        Speaker: David Hanks (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
      • 11:19
        Strengthening Safeguards Capabilities within Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia 7m

        Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia (hereinafter PC NFS) is the only nuclear operator in Serbia. It was founded in 2009 under the Law on Ionizing Radiation together with the Serbian Regulatory Body. Since its establishment, PC NFS has continued all nuclear activities previously managed by Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences; Two research reactors (RA-final shut down and RB- zero-power critical assembly, operational but currently not-licensed), RWM facilities- old Hangars H1 and H2 with legacy waste, new hangar H3 (for the storage of intermediate and low level radioactive waste) together with the secure storage for the high activity sealed radioactive sources, and closed uranium mine Kalna are the part of the Company. Paper will provide techniques for characterization of nuclear materials developed within Department for Development and Application of Nuclear Technologies for the purpose of strengthening NMAC capabilities within PC NFS. We will also provide results made in preparation of data for the inventory lists which were provided to our Regulatory Body. Training for the new staff in charge for NMAC was developed in a cooperation between Department for Development and Application of Nuclear Technologies and Department for Nuclear Security within PC NFS has made big contribution in strengthening our human capabilities in this area and the up to date results will also be provided in this paper.

        Speaker: Mr Miodrag Milenović (Public Company "Nuclear Facilities of Serbia")
      • 11:26
        Capacity Building in the UAE’s Young Nuclear Workforce 7m
        ABSTRACT **Capacity Building in the UAE’s Young Nuclear Workforce** By Huda Al Tamimi, Luay Qassim and Ali Al Suwaidi - *Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates* Staff turnover is a critical factor to consider in workforce planning, especially in the nuclear industry where specialist knowledge is costly, mission critical and difficult to replace. Mitigating the effects of staff turnover is essential for the efficient and effective functioning of a nuclear organization. The Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) recognized at an early stage that its unique composition required a special focus on creating a turnover-resistant organization that is able to sustainably support a long term nuclear energy program. In addition to creating a happy, stimulating and recognition-based working environment, FANR has adopted a two-pronged approach to mitigating the impact of staff turnover. Firstly, the organization has embraced “Emiratisation” - the strategic capacity building initiative of the UAE Government – and coupled this with expert foreign assistance to formulate a solid foundation for capacity building. Secondly, the rapid growth in Emirati nuclear knowledge is integrated with experience and knowledge from international sources utilizing knowledge management (KM) tools for knowledge capture, retention and transfer. The KM processes are integral to FANR’s Integrated Management System (IMS), which is aligned with FANR’s objectives. The Knowledge Resource Matrix contains comprehensive information about the processes in three major categories: Human Capital (Competences), Structural Capital (K-Products, documents, standards) and Relationship Capital (External knowledge). The approach helps to uncover knowledge contained in each FANR management process and establishes a solid base for knowledge transfer to newcomer staff. FANR continues to explore the concept of push strategy (codification approach) in creating a shared virtual platform between FANR, the IAEA and assisting third parties. This revolutionary concept demonstrates how an electronic KM system could link to an innovation management system. FANR strongly believes in the importance of KM and allocates significant resources to researching novel and effective means of institutionalising KM to support a sustainable nuclear regulatory program.
        Speaker: Ms Huda Al Tamimi (FANR)
      • 11:33
        The strengthening of the national safeguards system through an integrated 3S approach: a Cuban perspective. 7m
        The paper describes the nuclear infrastructure developed for more than 30 years in Cuba and how the implementation of IAEA´s safeguards took places since the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol were in force. The National Centre of Nuclear Safety is the national regulatory body with regulation, authorization and control responsibilities. A control regime has been established for the peaceful and secure use of radioactive materials, including the nuclear materials. Both system have its own mechanism, but avoiding duplicates they make uses of synergies on its control. Since 2010 an integrated nuclear security support plan has been implemented in Cuba. As part of the national security regimen it has been followed a preventive approach and multi-institutional cooperation. A proper combination of "defense in depth" and "graded approach" principles at developing the multiple layers security detection architecture has been developed with positive impact on security of the radioactive materials, including the nuclear materials. The mechanism for the import/ export control of materials and equipment relevant to safeguards has been enhanced. The paper also highlights potential good practices for States with Small Quantity Protocols when implementing its safeguards commitments. As a conclusion, the safeguards implementation in Cuba has been strengthened by advantage of synergies use of safety and security mechanisms developed.
        Speaker: Mr Jorge Luis Paredes Gilisman (Centro Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear)
      • 11:40
        OPTIMIZING SSAC HUMAN RESOURCES OF ARNR IN THE HYPOTHESIS OF A NUCLEAR PROGRAM 7m
        Uruguayan Regulatory Body (ARNR) has 14 technical staff. All staff has undergone Radioprotection formation provided by IAEA and others international organizations, each in several specific fields, but all knowledge gained is shared along ARNR staff. Even if Uruguay currently has no nuclear programme, nor uranium mines neither manufacture of materials or equipment comprised on Annex I and II of NPT Additional Protocol, the country deals with some safeguarded material, including 80 gr 239Pu and, mainly, depleted uranium used in shieldings. Uranium of other origin has also come to be safeguarded, for instance depleted uranium found along metallic scrap during routine controls. ARNR staff with specific formation in SSAC is some 3 people, but all technical staff is aware of key issues and activities, and in fact many of the staff have performed duties related to safeguards, some in preparation of Safeguards Reports to IAEA, some in duties of seizing or transporting orphan nuclear material. While future eventual needs of a Nuclear Power Plant have been discussed, to the moment these is no government plan referred to nuclear power. Even so, ARNR has participated in some international technical projects related to nuclear power, for instance one about competence building in nuclear reactors regulatory staff (FORO), which lead to IAEA TECDOC 1794. This Guidance included description of the basic staff required for nuclear reactors licensing, and is a major reference for ARNR should be needed. In the hypothesis of a Uruguayan nuclear power programme in the future, safeguards human resources would be a critical issue, so in this hypothesis, ARNR strategic view is optimizing use of its technical staff. This strategic view, crossed with current multi-purpose-person experience and guidance provided by TECDOC 1794, postulates giving SSAC and Safeguards competence (inside ARNR, by internal knowledge transfer) to some 3 -4 of the 28 staff dedicated to Nuclear Regulation. Their work would synergize with an hypothetical Safeguards Department including 3 or little more person, so, every regulatory duty would be addressed, optimizing the use of ARNR staff with certified Safeguards competence which is supposed to be scarce after 2020.-
        Speaker: Mr Enrique Fernando MORALES (Autoridad Reguladora Nacional en Radioprotección (ARNR) - URUGUAY)
        Slides
      • 11:47
        Development of Safeguards Infrastructure for Nuclear Power Programme in Ghana 1m
        The Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Ghana (NRA) is established to provide for the regulation and management of activities and practices for the peaceful use of nuclear material or energy, radioactive material or radiation; to provide for the protection of persons and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation hazards; to ensure the effective implementation of the country's international obligation and for related matters. A Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Department facilitates the implementation of Ghana's safeguards and Additional Protocol obligations. The NRA has collaborated with International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program of United States and United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the development of our Draft Safeguards Regulation which is currently undergoing review. The partnerships developed and the collaborations with Customs Division of Ghana Revenue Authority are discussed. The assistance received in training and human resource development in Safeguards are also presented.
        Speaker: Dr Emmanuel Ampomah-Amoako (Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Ghana)
      • 11:48
        The education and training offer in nuclear safeguards within the EURATOM Research and Training project “ANNETTE” 1m
        The ‘Advanced Networking for Nuclear Education, Training and Transfer of Expertise’ (ANNETTE) is a Horizon2020 project aiming at advanced networking for nuclear education, training and transfer of expertise. Four partners (the Belgian nuclear research centre SCK•CEN, the European Commission Joint Research Centre, Uppsala University, and Forschungszentrum Jülich) contribute to the ANNETTE project to provide education and training (E&T) in nuclear safeguards. The activities are supported by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), in particular within the Training and Knowledge Management (TKM) Working Group. The foreseen E&T offer in nuclear safeguards consists of a training course as part of the 60 ECTS ANNETTE European Master Programme for Continuous Professional Development, a contribution to the ANNETTE Summer School on Nuclear Technology, Nuclear Waste Management and Radiation Protection, and a Massive Open On-line Course (MOOC) on “Introduction to Safeguards”. In addition, four thematic workshops will be given by SCK•CEN and Forschungszentrum Jülich. The target audience for these activities are young professionals and young researchers, with all activities to be completed before December 2019. In this contribution we describe the overall E&T offer in nuclear safeguards within the ANNETTE project and present the preliminary outcomes from the activities carried out so far.
        Speaker: Dr Riccardo Rossa (SCK-CEN)
      • 11:49
        An integration of Nuclear Safeguards with Nuclear Security 1m
        In recent years, the need to achieve a better integration between two basic pillars of nuclear energy; safeguards and security (2S) has become widely recognized. This paper proposes an integration of 2S such that there are no overlap or omission of important responsibilities. An effective implementation of 2S assures the seriousness of a State for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and integrating the two can optimise the available resources, techniques and expertise within a State. Various examples of 2S integration is presented in this paper. Implementing integrated 2S by design, coordinated use of surveillance systems, nuclear material tracking systems in a nuclear facility ensures effective utilization of resources with shared responsibilities. The integration of 2S in the field of nuclear material accounting and control not only promotes the timely detection but also prevent diversion of nuclear material. An integration of export control with safeguards strengthen State’s non-proliferation objectives. The international cooperation plays a vital role in improving the effectiveness of integration between nuclear safeguards and security. This paper will highlight commonalities between the objectives of various international binding and non-binding instruments like CPPNM, UNSCR 1540, ICSANT, Code of Conduct on safety and security of radioactive sources etc. with safeguards. In addition, the coordination of the global centre of excellences (COE) with R & D initiatives of State would enhance state’s capabilities of containment and surveillance systems, physical protection systems, various verification mechanisms and nuclear forensics systems etc. Responsible sharing of information e.g. best practices, implementing experiences, security breach incidents, nuclear accidents, nuclear material theft etc. can provide a platform to develop response mechanisms to protect the human, environment from act of terrorism.
        Speaker: Dr Garima Sharma (Scientific Officer G)
      • 11:50
        The Role of the Russian Methodological and Training Center in SSAC of Russia 1m

        The Russian Methodological and Training Center (RMTC) was created at IPPE in the frame of international program of cooperation with the EC and the USA and is the basic organization of ROSATOM not only for providing the personnel training in the areas of nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A;), but improvement the SSAC infrastructure and nuclear facilities systems. RMTC performs training in all aspects of NMCA and conducts about 25 courses per year and one third of them is with nuclear materials and measurement instruments. Russian and foreign specialists and IAEA inspectors get the training at RMTC.
        RMTC methodological support includes:
        • Regulation and guide development for agencies and facilities,
        • Support for ROSATOM in control of NMCA facility systems,
        • Development, testing and implementation of non-destructive analysis of nuclear materials mass and content in accounting items, accumulation and hold-up,
        • Implementation of non-destructive analysis of solution level and density.
        RMTC has the labs for the practical exercises and research works with technical instruments used for NMCA:
        • NDA laboratory,
        • Bar-code laboratory.
        The laboratories have modern equipment, software and samples. NDA laboratory has a wide set of reference and working uranium and plutonium samples with different isotopic and mass.
        The report presents the main results of RMTC development and activity, the experience of cooperation with IAEA.

        Speaker: Mr Sergey Bogdanov (Alexandrovich)
      • 11:51
        SAFEGUARDS CAPACITY BUILDING – ARGENTINE EXPERIENCE 1m

        In 1994, the Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Signed a Cooperation Agreement for international safeguards research and development in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance devices.
        Over the past 25 years, this collaboration agreement has aided the Safeguards Control Division of ARN in safeguards staff development. The subjects of cooperation and training subjects included safeguards concepts applied to uranium enrichment technologies, containment and surveillance, statistics for safeguards applications, and non-destructive Assays, among others.
        Cooperation focused on human resource development improved the application of safeguards in the national context and also evolved into a joint activity like the planned, training other national safeguards personnel of the South American region.
        This paper will present a quick overview of the cooperation actions carried out, the resulting impact in the Argentinean safeguards community, and how this long-term endeavor strengthens safeguards application in the country and in the region.

        Speaker: Ms Stella Maris Bonet Duran (Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear)
      • 11:52
        Education and training activities of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy of the ROK 1m
        The objective of this article is to explain the education and training activities on safeguards area of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The importance of HRD activities on safeguards in international society increases more and more in that the possibility of nuclear crises in Iran and DPRK still exist. The paper would be developed in the following ways; Firstly, the short history of safeguards in the Republic of Korea(ROK) will be touched, which could show us why and how the ROK has put its step forward into the HRD efforts. Secondly, the detailed efforts of the ROK to build a COE in Korea in connection with the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) will be touched with a brief explanation on its main activities, direction and the perspective. Thirdly, the detailed activities of INSA will be touched; international training courses, domestic courses, and awareness courses. Finally, the outlook on HRD activities with respect to safeguards will be covered.
        Speaker: Mr JIN YOUNG LEE (Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control(KINAC))
    • 11:00 12:30
      [NEW] Finding Efficiencies without Compromising Effectiveness M Building

      M Building

      Vienna International Centre

    • 12:45 13:45
      Sponsored Innovation Luncheon 1h tbd ()

      tbd

    • 14:00 17:00
      Closing Plenary Boardroom B

      Boardroom B

      Vienna International Centre