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10–14 Feb 2020
Europe/Vienna timezone

The integrated Safety-Security training of inspector in Switzerland

Not scheduled
15m
Paper CC: National nuclear security inspections: training of inspectors, development of procedures and managing findings

Speaker

Mr Hans Mattli (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI)

Description

Inspections is an important tool of the regulator or supervisory authority to verify that a licensee complies with the applicable laws and regulations. In inspections, the actual state is recorded in a systematic manner and compared with the nominal state. It is therefore obvious that the training of inspectors should also takes place systematically.

Inspectors in the field of nuclear security can benefit from the experience of nuclear safety. In Switzerland, the training of inspectors in the nuclear field happens in an integrated manned, namely nuclear safety and nuclear security together. It takes place on-the-job and lasts typically one year.

The inspection process of the supervisory authority has a recognized accreditation. The training of the future inspectors includes the following steps:

  • Training of the legal bases
  • Training of the inspection process (planning, preparation, execution, reporting)
  • Professional training
  • Training of safety culture in the nuclear field (integrated safety and security culture)
  • Organization of a nuclear facility
  • Radiation protection for self-protection
  • Negotiation and interviewing techniques
  • Technology of nuclear power plants
  • Plant tours and visits of the safety-relevant systems
  • Participation in inspections as a silent observer
  • Supervised leading of inspections
  • Examination inspections

The training concludes after the successful examination inspection with the appointment as an inspector by the director.

Importance for nuclear security
From the point of view of nuclear security, the training together with the future nuclear safety inspectors has many advantages. It has also advantage for nuclear safety – from the scratch, the interfaces, similarities, and differences between nuclear safety and nuclear security are made clear and are addressed. For example, the well-known issue of the confidentiality of infor-mation, which always exists in the area of nuclear security, is addressed at an early stage and ways are shown of how to comply with both transparency and confidentiality.

The nuclear security inspectors also gain through integrated training a good and comprehensive understanding of the systems important to safety in a nuclear installation. These systems are the ones that nuclear security is protecting against sabotage, but to which even the nuclear security inspectors rarely have access. This knowledge is important not only for inspections, but also for all other supervisory activities, in particular for assessments and the issuing of permits for plant modifications.

An important aspect is the training of the integrated safety and security culture. It is also im-portant for the supervising authority to consider the sometimes conflicting requirements in the areas of nuclear safety and nuclear security when assessing inspection items.

The other advantages of the joint integrated training are:

  • Team inspections with nuclear safety and nuclear security inspectors
    are possible at any time.
  • The training of the negotiation and interview technique promotes the more precise data.
  • The different disciplines learn from the scratch to work together. Not only during inspections, but also during the daily business.
  • The quality assurance of the inspection reports is carried out according to the same standards.
  • The enforcement of deviations also follows the same rules.

Future improvements
Inspectors for cyber security (who are normally assigned to nuclear security) particularly have to talk to people whos daily business are nuclear safety (eg. ICS engineers of staff functions). In doing so, they communicate with persons who are not familiar with the mindset of nuclear secu-rity, e.g. a malicious act. During training, this problem should be dealt with in more detail.

State Switzerland
Gender Male

Primary authors

Mr Hans Mattli (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI) Mr Andreas Braunbarth (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI) Mr Bernard Stauffer (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI)

Presentation materials