Speaker
Mr
Stephen Francis
(IAEA, SGIM)
Description
Any State’s ability to carry out an indigenous, clandestine proliferation programme must be directly related to its industrial and technological capabilities. It is postulated that monitoring of trade data for non-controlled items can provide valuable insight into a State’s potential proliferation capabilities, and may also provide indirect indicators of a proliferation agenda. The paper describes the logic for the selection of carefully selected groups of commodities that require similar industrial and technological capabilities to those required for proliferation activities. There is also discussion of how changes in a State’s trade data profile could indicate potentially relevant step changes in its underlying capabilities that may be connected to proliferation activities or future proliferation pathways.
| Topics | CHA3 |
|---|---|
| Which "Key Question" does your Abstract address? | CHA3.1 |
| Which alternative "Key Question" does your Abstract address? (if any) | CHA3.4 |
Primary author
Mr
Stephen Francis
(IAEA, SGIM)
Co-author
Ms
Elena Marinova
(IAEA SGIM)
