Speaker
Description
Strengthening global nuclear security through counterterrorism training, equipment enhancement, and best practices
S. REPANOVICI,
National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, Safeguard, Physical Protection, Mining Section, 14 Libertatii Blvd., District 5, Bucharest, Romania
Email: sorin.repanovici@cncan.ro
J. CZAP
U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation, 1000 Independence Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20585, United States of America
Email: Jared.czap@nnsa.doe.gov
J. JONES
Independent Consultant, UK
Email: john@jejones.co.uk
Abstract
The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Romanian National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control, Safeguard, Physical Protection, Mining Section, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), worked together to build a training program to strengthen the capabilities and capacities of the radiological and nuclear response teams. These enhancements were implemented by conducting training on best practices for major public event security and performing new equipment upgrades and subsequent training on the best practices to utilize these new capabilities within the overall security plan of a major public event. This culminated with the very successful use of these enhanced capabilities during the informal European Council Summit on May 9, 2019. This paper will outline the steps taken to develop this enhanced capability and will discuss future steps to ensure the responder community continues to learn and grow from experiences in nuclear security.
Introduction
Nuclear security is a nebulous and extremely complex security concern during operations like a Major Public Events (MPEs). On the one hand the likelihood of a radiological or nuclear event happening are very unlikely but the consequences can be extremely catastrophic. The consequences are not limited to loss of life or physical damage to property or infrastructure but also include the psychological effects on a population that is affected. Many security practitioners still deem many other threats that are more likely but less catastrophic risks or threats to be a higher priority on the training and resource scale. This results in challenges for the nuclear security practitioners to be able to justify training time, money and other resources to continue to evolve with the ever expanding threat. The mutual understanding of this complex threat environment allowed us to develop a training plan, equipment delivery timeline and execute these events prior to the informal European Council Summit in May 2019.
National Workshop on Nuclear Security Measures for Major Public Events
Romania hosted an expert team from the DOE/NNSA and IAEA for a training on best practices and nuclear security concepts for MPEs. The trainees came from across the security spectrum and were experts in security operations, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats as well as emergency management. This training focused on the roles of the responders within the nuclear security context and how this radiological and nuclear specific security effort fits into an overall security plan during major public events. This training also contributed to the development of the national nuclear response plan being drafted by the Romanian National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control.
Spectral Advanced Radiological Computer System (SPARCS) equipment delivery and training
Romania hosted an expert team from the DOE/NNSA that delivered the SPARCS equipment, conducted training on the equipment, and shared best practices for the operation and application of this detection equipment. These mobile detection systems were an enhancement to the overall security posture of the Romanian government. This training focused on the Romanian technical experts who would be managing and analyzing the complicated data that would be streaming in real time during a security operation. These experts were radiological and nuclear scientist and other technical experts that would operate and analysis the data from the SPARCS equipment.
Informal EU Council Summit
As stated in the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals, the responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State. Romania has a strong and sustainable nuclear security regime assuring the protection of persons, property, society and the environment from a criminal or unauthorized act with nuclear security implications involving nuclear and other radioactive material.
Romania hosted the Informal European Council on May 9, 2019, in Sibiu, Romania. For the first time in Romania, the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) was invited to implement Nuclear Security Measures for the Summit. As the nuclear regulatory authority, CNCAN assumed the role of coordinator of all activities related to nuclear security.
CNCAN became part of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security “ROMANIA – EU 2019”. CNCAN coordinated the nuclear security plan with the Protection and Guard Service (SPP), the organization with overall responsibility for coordinating security at the event. With the support of the SPP, the nuclear security plan was an integral part of the overall security plan. Between May 31 to June 2, 2019, Pope Francis will travel to Romania for an Apostolic Visit and lessoned learned during the EU Summit will be implemented during the Pope’s visit.
Summary
The U.S. DOE/NNSA and the Romanian National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control jointly worked together to develop a training plan that took into account the best practices from both countries experience in nuclear security as well as the training planned in conjunction with the delivery of enhanced equipment. This training plan culminated with the successful completion of the informal European Council Summit with no radiological or nuclear incidents.
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