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10-14 February 2020
Europe/Vienna timezone

NUCLEAR SECURITY AS PART OF THE SECURITY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTs

Not scheduled
15m
Paper MORC: Nuclear security as part of the security of major public events

Speaker

Ajmal Zafar (Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan)

Description

Background
State’s nuclear security regime provides institutional framework to protect persons, property, society and the environment from harmful consequences of a nuclear security event. Nuclear security to Major Public Events (MPEs) is a challenging task as it is relatively a new domain for the safety and security professionals. Securing MPEs against nuclear security threats requires effective utilization of available nuclear security systems and measures. Seamless interface between law enforcement agencies, public safety organizations, military and technical / scientific expertise is imperative to prevent, detect and respond to any criminal or unauthorized act involving MORC.

Pakistan’s Experience
Nuclear Emergency Management System (NEMS) is in place in Pakistan to deal with any nuclear security event and MPEs are covered under NEMS Implementation Plan. The model is based on IAEA and GICNT guidelines. Competent authorities and relevant organizations are nominated to support MPE with requisite capabilities.
During the last 10 years, Pakistan has gained significant experience to support MPEs i.e. visits of Chinese Premier (2013), Chinese President (2015) and Saudi Crown Prince (2019), Change of Army Command Ceremony (2013) and Pakistan Day Parade on 23 Mar 2019.
To support MPEs, necessary organizational structures, appropriate technical capabilities & resources and nuclear security plans have been developed and tested. Organizational structures and technical / scientific capabilities of Pakistan include:-

  • Radiation Portal Monitors for scanning of vehicles and pedestrians at key entry points of venue.
  • Radiation Assistance Groups equipped with Mobile Radiation Monitoring Lab, Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) and handheld detection / identification equipment.
  • Aerial Survey and Support Team having fixed and rotary wing aircrafts with aerial radiation detection equipment.
  • Radiation Monitoring Teams equipped with detection equipment to monitor transport routes / pathways as part of outer perimeter security.
  • Radiation Medical Assistance Teams for rescue, triage and emergency medical response.
  • Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Support Centre acts as nerve centre for planning and coordination to support MPE, besides capacity building of stakeholders.
  • Incident Command Centre having necessary command, control and communication capabilities for situational awareness and response to any threat.
  • Public Announcement and Media Handling having preplanned protocols and procedures.

Despite necessary organizational structures, technical capabilities and plans to support MPEs, challenges faced during operations have provided insight to further strengthen nuclear security systems and measures in the light of following:-

  • Threat and Risk Assessment. Conducting realistic threat and risk assessment and timely sharing of information with all stakeholders is vital for mission success.
  • Transport Routes and Pathways. Deployment of Radiation Monitoring Teams away from the venue on the main entry and exit points as part of outer perimeter security is an important defense in depth practice for deterrence.
  • Technical Capabilities and Resources. Selection of different types of detection equipment to be employed during MPE (as per area, spectators, vehicles, routes and lanes) is critical to the success of event. The major challenge is speedy screening of large number of people and vehicles.
  • Multiple Organizations with Diverse Roles / Responsibilities Planning and coordination among multiple organizations with different roles and responsibilities is a challenging task. It requires implementation of plans, SOPs, protocols, specialized training and seamless interface between response organizations.
  • Public Awareness and Media Handling. A unified authority to provide credible information to reduce panic and anxiety among public in case of NSE.

Conclusion. Pakistan’s experience of providing nuclear security during various MPEs will be shared with participants of conference.

References

  • IAEA Nuclear Security Series No - 18, “Implementing Guide, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for MPE” 2012.
  • IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 34 - T, “Technical Guidance, Planning and Organizing Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control” 2019.
  • Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Guidelines for Detection within a State’s Interior: Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture Series Volume IV, 2014.
Gender Male
State Pakistan

Primary author

Ajmal Zafar (Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan)

Presentation Materials