Speaker
Description
Lesson Learned from Security Culture at National Border Management Agencies: A Case study in Indonesia
Mr. Werdi Putra Daeng Beta1, Mr. Rustama2
1Indonesia Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN),
Assessment Centre for Regulatory System and Technology of Radiation Facilities and Radioactive Materials, Jl. Gajah Mada No. 8 Jakarta 10120, Indonesia
2National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), PUSPIPTEK Serpong, Indonesia
E-mail of the corresponding author : putradaeng29@gmail.com
Indonesia Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (BAPETEN) is a national government regulatory institution for nuclear energy utilization in Indonesia. BAPETEN controls nuclear energy utilization via regulation, licensing and inspection.
To prevent, detect and response to incidents involving the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are important for Indonesia. As a maritime country, Indonesia operates 9 international airports and 20 international seaports. It is necessary to ensure that we can effectively reduce the risk of the smuggling of nuclear materials and radioactive sources in these international gateways. Several terrorist bombings, and certainly it is unthinkable if the terrorist have had the access to such dangerous materials, such as nuclear material are other risks that should be considered carefully.
More importantly, Indonesia is also a part of the global community in combating nuclear terrorism. Indonesia fully supports international cooperation to enhance peaceful and security in the world, including nuclear security. BAPETEN and other relevan institutions, both government and non government, have the responsibility for combating illicit trafficking and the illegal movements of radioactive materials. National/State border Management Agency is one element of nuclear security for maintaining security culture for security of the country.
Objectives: To describe security culture profile in the state border agency to get the awareness of the probability of nuclear and/or radioactive illicit trafficking. Also, to gain security culture index and the information of the obstacles and challenges in implementing security culture into security action.
Methods:
Methods used in this research were literature study, interview with stakeholders, conduct survey and fill up the questioners related to nuclear security culture aspects and the function of radiation portal monitor (RPM) for vehicle and pedestrian.
Results:
(1) Security culture profile will be shown in pie charts and analyze the strengths and opportunities for some developments in the future. From the experience of this research, we have lessons learned that:
a. Legal framework is not fully understood clearly yet in more detailed regarding the RPM and in terms of export and imports.
b. It is necessary to analyze the exact position of the RPM, so that detection of radioactive-containing goods is effective.
c. There needs to be coordination between agencies at the leadership level to understand the importance of the nuclear security culture and the handling of nuclear security event.
d. It is necessary to socialize on how to work with radiation sources safely and securely in fostering national nuclear security culture, because sometimes the operators or users are less aware of the potential dangers.
(2) The Nuclear Security Culture (NSC) Index value as of December 14, 2016 was 3.16 in scale maximum of 4. If it is converted to decimal value will be 78.98 (seventy eight point ninety eight). So that the quality of NSC obtained for border control institutions is B which is categorised as good NSC quality.
Conclusions:
(1) The value of each element of nuclear security culture is not found to be of poor value (value of C). Some developments needed in area of nuclear security perception into security action/habits.
(2) The index value of nuclear security culture in stakeholders of border control institutions is 3.16 which is equivalent to the conversion value of 78.98 with quality of B.
(3) Awareness of the threat of nuclear security will improve awareness in work practice and would become a nuclear security culture, especially for Front Line Officers. It is recommended that NSC shall be measured in period of 3 (three) to 5 (five) years.
References
[1] Act Number 10 of 1997 on Nuclear Energy.
[2] Indonesia Government Regulation Number 33 of 2007 Safety of Ionising Radiation and Security of Radioactive Sources.
[3] IAEA Nuclear Security Series Number 7, Nuclear Security Culture, 2008.
[4] BAPETEN Chairman Regulation Number 6 of 2015, Security of Radioactive Sources.
[5] P2STPFRZR-BAPETEN, Technical Guidance of Self-Assessment for Enhancing National Nuclear Security Culture. Jakarta. 2015.
[6] Indonesia Government Regulation Number 54 of 2012 Safety and Security of Nuclear Installation.
[7] BAPETEN Chairman Regulation Number 4 of 2010, Facility Management System of Nuclear Energy Utilisation.
Keywords: security culture, state border agency, RPM, FLO
| State | Indonesia |
|---|---|
| Gender | Male |
