Member States with an Additional Protocol (AP) agreement in force with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must annually submit declarations detailing relevant nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) activity pursuant to Article 2. The IAEA Department of Safeguards is charged with comparing each Member State’s declarations with all available information in order to verify their correctness and...
At some locations, such as the critical facility Hyacinth [1] (JIPNR-Sosny, Belarus), the operator imposes some limitations on the availability of individual fuel cassettes for partial defect test verification. Due to the nuclear safety considerations the cassettes may not be extracted and the fissile material within the critical assembly shall be verified “as a whole”.
To overcome the...
The paper describes in detail the impact of using the new input system for Additional Protocol (AP) Declarations, Protocol Reporter 3 (PR3). By providing examples under selected AP Articles, the authors explain the benefits regarding quality, consistency and workflow to the users and the impact on the further data analysis.
Nuclear Material Accountancy is a key pillar of the Safeguards system. The information provided by the State through Nuclear Material Accountancy is used for material balance evaluations as part of the tools used by Safeguards in the detection of the diversion of declared nuclear material. Material balance evaluations can be enhanced by performing network analysis in order to identify various...
