Symposium on International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and People - IAEA CN-220

Session

Equipment Security and Considerations for Joint Use

22 EQS

23 Oct 2014, 09:00

M Building

Conveners

Equipment Security and Considerations for Joint Use

• Heidi Smartt (USA)
• Peter Gutmann (New Zealand)

Equipment Security and Considerations for Joint Use

• Heidi Smartt (USA)
• Peter Gutmann (New Zealand)

153. Security and Risk Analysis of Nuclear Safeguards Instruments Using Attack Trees

Ingo Naumann (IAEA)

23/10/2014, 09:10

oral

The IAEA’s nuclear safeguards instruments must be frequently evaluated against attack vectors, which are extremely varied and, at first approximation, may seem inconsequential, but are not. To accurately analyse the impact of attacks on a multi-component system requires a highly structured and well-documented assessment. Tree structures, such as fault trees, have long been used to assess the...

294. Authentication Approaches for Standoff Video Surveillance

George Baldwin (Sandia National Laboratories)

23/10/2014, 09:30

oral

Video surveillance for international nuclear safeguards applications requires authentication, which confirms to an inspector reviewing the surveillance images that both the source and the integrity of those images can be trusted. To date, all such authentication approaches originate at the camera. Camera authentication would not suffice for a “standoff video” application, where the...

204. Key Management Strategies for Safeguards Authentication and Encryption

Michael Coram (Sandia National Laboratories)

23/10/2014, 09:50

oral

Management of cryptographic keys for the authentication and encryption of safeguards data can be the critical weak link in the practical implementation of information security. Within the safeguards community, there is the need to validate that data has not been modified at any point since generation and that it was generated by the monitoring node and not an imposter. In addition, there is...

229. Use of Specialized Security Techniques to Enhance the Authenticity of Surveillance Data

Simone Rocchi (International Atomic Energy Agency)

23/10/2014, 10:10

oral

In 2013, the IAEA started testing a commercial application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) from LiveWire technology for its ability to monitor changes in wiring systems in real time. This technology is useful in specific situations where digital video signal authentication cannot be used due to analog cameras used in high radiation level (e.g. hot cells, reading spent fuel identification...

151. The IAEA’s Universal Instrument Token

Andreas Schwier (CardContact, Germany)

23/10/2014, 11:00

oral

The IAEA currently seeks to improve the harmonization of security approaches across safeguards equipment. The protection of digital safeguards data is based on several principles: a) the signing of data in measurement devices using standard public/private-key-based signature generation, b) the storage of secret keys on certified, tamper-protected cryptographic devices, and c) well-established...

180. The Security Plan for the joint EURATOM/IAEA Remote Monitoring Network

Johan Stronkhorst (European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)

23/10/2014, 11:20

oral

The European Commission and the IAEA have installed surveillance systems in all larger civil European nuclear facilities. The monitoring data is gathered by optical surveillance systems, electronic sealing systems and numerous measuring devices. The on-site joint EURATOM/IAEA monitoring networks operate in general completely isolated from the operator's IT systems. To largely improve data...

65. JAEA’s Contribution to Development of J-MOX Safeguards System

Taketeru Nagatani (Japan Atomic Energy Agency)

23/10/2014, 11:40

oral

Safeguards systems are under development for a large scale LWR MOX fuel fabrication plant (J-MOX) being constructed by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited. Development of the systems is shared by Secretariat of Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). NRA has developed NDA systems including Advanced Fuel Assembly System (AFAS) and Advanced Verification for...