Speaker
Johan Stronkhorst
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
Description
The European Commission and the IAEA have installed surveillance systems in all larger civil European nuclear facilities. The monitoring data is gathered by optical surveillance systems, electronic sealing systems and numerous measuring devices. The on-site joint EURATOM/IAEA monitoring networks operate in general completely isolated from the operator's IT systems. To largely improve data security and reliability, remote data transmission (RDT) is installed on a growing number of sites, and the inspection data is daily transferred to the Data Collect Servers in Luxembourg and Vienna.
A growing number of RDT connections and a growing number of security threats require an IT security policy that is pro-active as well as reactive in an efficient way.
The risk based approach used in setting up the security plans assesses all elements of the monitoring network, from the implemented technical solution and the assessment of the security needs and threats, up to the incident handling and lessons learned. The results of the assessments are, for each individual RDT connection, described in the technical paragraphs and annexes, including system descriptions, network plans and contact information.
The principles of secure data handling as implemented in the shared EURATOM /IAEA monitoring network can apply to a broad range of industrial monitoring systems, where human interaction is in general the largest security risk.
| Country or International Organization | European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards |
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Primary author
Johan Stronkhorst
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
Co-authors
Jean Francois Levert
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
Kai Ruuska
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
Konrad Schoop
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
Sylvain Kurek
(European Commission, DG Energy, Nuclear Safeguards)
