Speaker
Description
The deployment of floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs) at seaports raises novel questions about the adequacy and sufficiency of existing nuclear and maritime security guidance because of the long-standing history of seaports as transit locations for nuclear material compared to long-term associated facilities, now considered with FNPP deployment. Many ports will have existing infrastructure that will play a role in the security of an FNPP; however, the adequacy of these measures and how they meet both international maritime security requirements and international nuclear security requirements and recommendations is largely unknown and likely lacking. Possible misalignment between nuclear and maritime security regimes is due to the focus of the nuclear security regime compared to maritime security, namely, the protection of nuclear material compared with protection of vessels, port facilities, and personnel, respectively. Traditionally, ports are concerned with nuclear security because nuclear material is transiting through, whereas with FNPP deployments, the seaport itself is now considered part of the nuclear facility. In both nuclear security and maritime security guidance, there is limited insight about the prolonged deployment of nuclear material at seaports and how the proper level of security is maintained. This paper aims to bridge maritime and nuclear security recommendations, specifically within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Security Series No. 13 and the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Code by assessing high-level recommendations and how they translate into physical protection systems for FNPPs operating at seaports. First, this paper assesses relevant International Atomic Energy Agency and International Maritime Organization instruments for nuclear security and maritime security. For maritime security especially, existing requirements do not directly address the security of nuclear material, creating ambiguities about how these apply to nuclear security principles, if at all. Next, the paper describes how nuclear security principles, including threat assessments, may be integrated into maritime security to adequately protect an FNPP based on standard port infrastructure. Finally, the analysis will provide recommendations for generic integrated security measures to be considered for FNPP deployments in seaports.
