WiN Global Meet Atoms for Peace
23rd WiN Global Annual Conference
Session 8: Safeguards and Non-proliferation
26 August 2015

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
What it Means to the Non-proliferation Regime

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Introduction

- Iran’s nuclear programme has been in focus when the IAEA’s investigation started in 2003 revealing undeclared material, activities and facilities
- Referral to UN Security Council in 2006
- Since then 7 UNSC resolutions on Iran, requiring Iran to suspend all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related projects
- Iran consequently limited certain cooperation with the IAEA
  - Stopped voluntary implementation of Additional Protocol
  - Stopped implementation of Modified Code 3.1
- Iran continued developing capabilities of concern
  - Enrichment, up to 20% U-235, stockpile of ~200 kg by late 2013
  - Construction of Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

• JCPOA imposes certain time-limited restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief

• 5 Annexes
  • Annex I: Nuclear-related measures
  • Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments
  • Annex II: Civil nuclear cooperation
  • Annex IV: Joint Commission
  • Annex V: Implementation plan
- Implementation based on safeguards agreement/Additional Protocol, additional transparency measures and other specific provisions
  - Arak Heavy Water Reactor
    - Disabling of existing calandria and reactor redesign
  - Enrichment
    - Maximum enrichment level (3.67% U-235) and limit on number of centrifuges
    - No uranium enrichment or nuclear material at Fordow
    - Limited R&D on advanced centrifuges and IAEA monitoring of centrifuge component manufacturing
JCPOA (Cont’d)

• Uranium stocks and fuels and source material
  • Max. LEU stockpile: a total of 300 kg in all forms
  • IAEA verification of production and inventory of uranium ore concentrate

• Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1
  • Provisional implementation of AP on Implementation Day until ratification and entry into force
  • Full implementation of Modified Code 3.1
JCPOA - Summary

No advanced centrifuges
Limited centrifuge R&D
Limited centrifuges at Natanz

No LEU above 3.67%
LEU stocks limited to 300kg
No U-enrichment at Fordow
No new enrichment facilities
No new heavy water reactors
Excess heavy water exported

Surveillance of centrifuge manufacture

Access to uranium mines and mills

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, Modified Code 3.1

2016  2021  2026  2031  2036  2041
The JCPOA…

• Is a negotiated solution
• Sets well-defined limits on Iran’s nuclear programme for different periods of time
• Provides IAEA access under the AP and transparency measures
• Includes supply-side monitoring
• Contains a dispute resolution mechanism
• Establishes a multi-layered system to monitor all major aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme

→ In conclusion: the JCPOA is a PLUS for the international non-proliferation regime