Background

Ensuring the security of radioactive material in use, storage and transport and of associated facilities, as well as the detection of and response to an international criminal or malicious act involving such material, are issues of concern for Member States and such stakeholders as regulatory bodies, law enforcement authorities, facility operators, and technical and scientific support organizations (TSOs. Consistent with the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20), Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14), and Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control (IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15), as well as with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has assisted Member States, upon request, in establishing national nuclear security regimes as they relate to the security of  radioactive material and associated facilities, and for material outside of regulatory control.

The most recent IAEA General Conference resolution on nuclear security (GC(61)/RES/9) calls upon all Member States, within their responsibility, “to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including physical protection, of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle”. Resolution GC(61)/RES/9 also calls upon all States “to improve and sustain, based on national security threat assessments, their national capabilities to prevent, detect, deter and respond to illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material”. The resolution further calls upon States “to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard” and encourages States to continue efforts “to recover and secure nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control”.

The Nuclear Security Plan 2018–2021, approved by the Board of Governors and endorsed by the General Conference in 2017, commits the IAEA to continue its work to assist Member States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes for the security of radioactive material and associated facilities, and to establish national nuclear security infrastructures related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The plan also instructs the IAEA to facilitate international coordination on nuclear security between States and relevant organizations with a view to reducing duplication of efforts, promote information exchange on nuclear security and strengthen the international legal framework by, inter alia, convening nuclear security conferences, working groups, and other information and technical exchanges.

Further, technical discussions conducted at events organized by the IAEA, including meetings of the Working Group on Radioactive Source Security and the Border Monitoring Working Group, and the International Coordination Meetings for Front Line Officers, as well as within the framework of other international organizations, initiatives and non-governmental organizations have emphasized the need to share experiences and good practices, as well as lessons learned in the establishment of effective regulatory control over radioactive material, and nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The IAEA will convene an international conference during the week of 3 to 7 December 2018 to provide a forum for Member States to share their experiences, including difficulties encountered, lessons learned and good practices adopted, in the implementation of the above-mentioned IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications (NSS-20, NSS-14 and NSS-15) and related international instruments, such as the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The conference will also provide an opportunity to outline the way forward.

Purpose and Objectives

The purpose of the conference is to foster the exchange of practices and experiences related to the security of radioactive material under regulatory control in use, transport and storage, and to the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The conference will provide a forum to:

  • Exchange information related to the use of a threat-based, risk-informed approach for the protection of radioactive material in use, transport and storage and for the establishment of a nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control;
  • Share experiences in the development of regulatory frameworks, requirements for radioactive material and associated facilities, and nuclear security detection architecture for nuclear and other material out of regulatory control;
  • Exchange information and experiences regarding the planning, establishment, maintenance and sustaining of nuclear security measures and systems;
  • Exchange information and experiences regarding interfaces between competent authorities when radioactive material is lost, stolen, or involved in illicit trafficking.
  • Exchange information on methodologies and techniques to assess the effectiveness of nuclear security measures and systems;
  • Review technological developments in nuclear security;
  • Review the current status of nuclear security efforts and existing approaches, emerging trends and areas that may still need to be addressed;
  • Raise awareness of nuclear security amongst all competent authorities and other stakeholders and identify how each can contribute to the sustainability of national nuclear security regimes;
  • Facilitate cooperation among all competent authorities and other stakeholders at the national or international levels, as applicable; and
  • Promote international nuclear security guidance and its use by States.

The conference will address neither subjects related to the security of nuclear material under regulatory control in use, transport and storage, nor the response to nuclear security events. Further, the conference will not discuss any sensitive nuclear security information and issues of a political nature.

Key Dates and Deadlines

Opening of synopsis submission through IAEA-INDICO

 1 February 2018

Deadline for submission of synopses through IAEA-INDICO

 30 April 2018

Deadline for submission of Paper Submission Form (Form B) (together with Form A) through the competent national authority or through InTouch+

 30 April 2018

Deadline for submission of Grant Application Form C (together with Form A) through the competent national authority or through InTouch+

 30 April 2018

Notification of acceptance of synopsis

 30 June 2018

Deadline for submission of full papers (10 pages maximum)

 15 October 2018

Deadline for submission of oral presentations, interactive content presentations and posters

 15 November 2018

Registration only (no paper submission, no grant request)

 No deadline

Starts
Ends
Europe/Vienna
IAEA HQ

Scientific Secretaries:

Ms Alessia M. Rodriguez y Baena

Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities Section

Division of Nuclear Security

Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

Tel.: +43 1 2600 26633

 

Mr Thierry Pelletier

Nuclear Security of Materials outside of Regulatory Control Section

Division of Nuclear Security

Department of Nuclear Safety and Security

Tel.: +43 1 2600 21366

 

Scientific Secretariat email address: CN269@iaea.org

 

Administration and organization:

Ms Martina Khaelss

Conference Services Section

Division of Conference and Document Services

Department of Management

CN-269; EVT1704843

Tel.: +43 1 2600 21315

Email: M.Khaelss@iaea.org

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