

WiN Global Meet Atoms for Peace
23rd WiN Global Annual Conference
Session 8: Safeguards and Non-proliferation
26 August 2015


The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
What it Means to the Non-proliferation Regime

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Introduction

- Iran's nuclear programme has been in focus when the IAEA's investigation started in 2003 revealing undeclared material, activities and facilities
- Referral to UN Security Council in 2006
- Since then 7 UNSC resolutions on Iran, requiring Iran to suspend all enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water related projects
- Iran consequently limited certain cooperation with the IAEA
 - Stopped voluntary implementation of Additional Protocol
 - Stopped implementation of Modified Code 3.1
- Iran continued developing capabilities of concern
 - Enrichment, up to 20% U-235, stockpile of ~200 kg by late 2013
 - Construction of Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak

Agreements and Timelines



Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

- JCPOA imposes certain time-limited restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief
- 5 Annexes
 - **Annex I: Nuclear-related measures**
 - Annex II: Sanctions-related commitments
 - Annex II: Civil nuclear cooperation
 - Annex IV: Joint Commission
 - Annex V: Implementation plan


JCPOA (Cont'd)

- Implementation based on safeguards agreement/Additional Protocol, additional transparency measures and other specific provisions
 - Arak Heavy Water Reactor
 - Disabling of existing calandria and reactor redesign
 - Enrichment
 - Maximum enrichment level (3.67% U-235) and limit on number of centrifuges
 - No uranium enrichment or nuclear material at Fordow
 - Limited R&D on advanced centrifuges and IAEA monitoring of centrifuge component manufacturing

JCPOA (Cont'd)

- Uranium stocks and fuels and source material
 - Max. LEU stockpile: a total of 300 kg in all forms
 - IAEA verification of production and inventory of uranium ore concentrate
- Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1
 - Provisional implementation of AP on Implementation Day until ratification and entry into force
 - Full implementation of Modified Code 3.1

JCPOA - Summary



The JCPOA...

- Is a negotiated solution
- Sets well-defined limits on Iran's nuclear programme for different periods of time
- Provides IAEA access under the AP and transparency measures
- Includes supply-side monitoring
- Contains a dispute resolution mechanism
- Establishes a multi-layered system to monitor all major aspects of Iran's nuclear programme

→ In conclusion: the JCPOA is a PLUS for the international non-proliferation regime