Conveners
New Trends in the Application of Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards
- Tom Burr (USA)
New Trends in the Application of Statistical Methodologies for Safeguards
- Tom Burr (USA)
Claude NORMAN
(IAEA, SGIM-IFC)
22/10/2014, 09:10
oral
Statistical and probabilistic methodologies have always played a fundamental role in the field of safeguards. In-field inspection approaches are based on sampling algorithms and random verification schemes designed to achieve a designed detection probability for defects of interest (e.g. missing material, indicators of tampering with containment and other equipment, changes of design). In...
Jan Wuester
(IAEA/SGIM-IFC)
22/10/2014, 09:30
oral
In response to its specific need to assess the statistical significance of declared and observed nuclear material accounting differences shipper-receiver difference (SRD), material unaccounted for (MUF), operator-inspector difference (D), inspector’s estimate of MUF (IMUF), the safeguards community in the 1970s and 1980s developed a methodology to estimate measurement error variances. This has...
Klaus Martin
(Consultant)
22/10/2014, 09:50
oral
We compare the definitions and propagation of measurement errors as outlined in GUM (Guide to the expression of Uncertainty in Measurement) and in the IAEA statistical methodologies for safeguards. Measurement errors are not observable. Based on a correct mode of error propagation, we can estimate the variances of measurement errors. In order to do so, we have to first define a mathematical...
Thomas Krieger
(IAEA, SGIM-IFC)
22/10/2014, 10:10
oral
When inspections in nuclear plants are planned over time it has to be decided if the time points of all inspections are fixed at the beginning of the reference time interval, e.g., one year, or if they are fixed sequentially. In the latter case the time point for the second inspection is fixed only after the first one has been performed, the third after the second one, and so on. For that...
Tomooki SHIBA
(Subatech)
22/10/2014, 11:00
oral
To tackle nuclear material proliferation, we conducted several proliferation scenarios using the MURE (MCNP Utility for Reactor Evolution) code. The MURE code, developed by CNRS laboratories, is a precision, open-source code written in C++ that automates the preparation and computation of successive MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle) calculations and solves the Bateman equations in between, for...
Christophe Portaix
(IAEA)
22/10/2014, 11:20
oral
SimMOX is a computer programme that simulates container histories as they pass through a MOX facility. It performs two parallel calculations:
• the first quantifies the actual movements of material that might be expected to occur, given certain assumptions about, for instance, the accumulation of material and waste, and of their subsequent treatment;
• the second quantifies the same...
Sebastien Richet
(IAEA)
22/10/2014, 11:40
oral
The JNC-1 site in Japan includes four large Pu/MOX bulk handling facilities for which standard plutonium accountancy would not be sufficient to give high confidence in the timely detection of diversion. Other safeguards measures are needed to strengthen the ability for early detection, and Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA) provides the capability of performing a short-term evaluation of...
