Speaker
Description
The global transport of nuclear and other radioactive material is an essential activity that underpins peaceful applications in energy, medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. With more than 20 million shipments annually, maintaining both safety and security during transport is critical to ensuring the uninterrupted use of radioactive materials worldwide. However, the emergence of counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSI) within supply chains represents a growing and underexplored risk to transport safety, security, and reliability. CFSIs—ranging from falsified certificates and unauthorized spare parts to compromised packaging and detection equipment—pose significant threats by undermining regulatory compliance, compromising package integrity, and creating potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited for malicious purposes.
This paper examines the multifaceted risks associated with CFSIs in the context of radioactive material transport. It provides an overview of the typologies of CFSIs relevant to transport systems, including counterfeit transport packages, falsified or incomplete documentation, fraudulent conveyance equipment, and suspect components within radiation detection and monitoring systems. Drawing on lessons learned from nuclear and non-nuclear industries, the paper highlights how such items can infiltrate supply chains due to globalized trade, complex vendor networks, insufficient verification mechanisms, and limited awareness at the operational level.
A structured risk assessment framework is proposed, focusing on the likelihood of CFSI infiltration and its consequences on transport safety and security. Particular emphasis is given to the safety-security interface, where the introduction of counterfeit or fraudulent items could simultaneously compromise physical protection and safety compliance. Case examples are presented to illustrate how vulnerabilities in packaging certification, transport container validation, and equipment calibration may result in regulatory non-compliance, operational failures, or heightened exposure to security risks.
To address these challenges, the paper explores a range of detection and mitigation strategies. Technological approaches include the deployment of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, and blockchain-enabled traceability to monitor package integrity and authenticate consignments throughout transport. Optimization algorithms for RFID reader placement are discussed to ensure robust coverage in complex transport environments. In parallel, organizational strategies such as supplier vetting, enhanced procurement protocols, and strengthened regulatory oversight are examined. The role of competent authorities in certifying and validating package designs, monitoring compliance, and coordinating with customs and transport regulators is emphasized as a cornerstone of effective mitigation.
Furthermore, the paper proposes a set of mitigation guidelines for Member States, aligned with IAEA recommendations, to enhance resilience against CFSIs in transport systems. These include capacity building for inspectors, training for operators on CFSI identification, cross-sectoral information sharing, and the development of regulatory frameworks that explicitly address counterfeit and fraudulent risks. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning are also considered for their potential to enhance anomaly detection in supply chain monitoring.
By systematically addressing the risks posed by counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items in the transport of radioactive material, this work contributes to ongoing international efforts to ensure safe, secure, and reliable nuclear transport. The findings support the objectives of the IAEA in harmonizing legal and regulatory frameworks, promoting innovative solutions, and strengthening cooperation among stakeholders. Ultimately, mitigating the risks of CFSIs enhances both the safety of operations and the trust of Member States and the public in the secure movement of radioactive material worldwide.
This abstract is an output from previous CRP J2019
