Speaker
Description
The safe and secure transport of radioactive material represents one of the most critical interfaces in the broader framework of nuclear governance. The physical movement of such materials across national and international routes not only ensures their beneficial applications in medicine, industry, agriculture, and research, but also exposes them to unique risks related to both safety and security. This is equally relevant for the transport of disused sources, which often present heightened regulatory and operational challenges. The Code of Conduct, together with its supplementary guidance, has become a cornerstone in shaping national and international efforts to minimize risks associated with radioactive sources. Nevertheless, translating these principles into coherent and effective regulatory frameworks remains difficult, particularly when integrating safety and security requirements for transport. This concern was underscored by Member States during the Open-Ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts for Sharing Information on States’ Implementation of the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, held in Vienna on 9–13 June 2025.
From a safety perspective, the transport of radioactive material must comply with strict technical standards designed to protect workers,the public, and the environment from radiological exposure. Packaging requirements, dose limits, emergency preparedness, and competent authority oversight are well established through international instruments such as the IAEA Transport Regulations. In parallel,the security dimension focuses on preventing unauthorized access, theft, or sabotage during transport, particularly for high-activity sealed sources. Ensuring that transport routes, carriers, and interim storage points are adequately protected against malicious acts requires tailored regulatory provisions, training, and close coordination with law enforcement and other relevant authorities.
For many countries, one of the principal challenges lies in drafting national regulations that integrate safety and security in a balanced manner. Safety frameworks are often more mature, while security provisions may be considered as supplementary rather than fully embedded. Regulatory fragmentation, overlapping mandates of different authorities, and resource constraints further complicate the establishment of a comprehensive system. Aligning national legislation with the guidance of the Code of Conduct requires not only the adoption of regulations but also the coordination of technical regulators, security agencies, and customs authorities to ensure consistent implementation.
An additional area of concern is the transport of portable radioactive sources, which are frequently moved and used in field conditions. Their portability and widespread applications make them particularly vulnerable to loss, theft, or misuse, especially when transported outside controlled facilities. Addressing these vulnerabilities requires a strong emphasis on security culture. This involves fostering awareness among transport workers, operators, and users about the importance of vigilance, recognizing potential threats, and embedding a “safety and security first” mindset in daily practice. Security culture should complement technical measures by reinforcing responsibility and accountability across all organizational levels. In this regard, recent IAEA publications such as Technical Reports Series No. 1001 (2021), Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material, and Nuclear Security Series No. 46-T, Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport, provide valuable tools for national authorities and operators alike.
The paper will further address the interface between safety and security in the transport of radioactive material, highlighting the need for integrated regulatory approaches. It will examine why national authorities must not only adopt international standards but also adapt them to local realities, strengthening technical capacity and fostering inter-agency cooperation. It will also discuss how embedding security culture in routine practices, with particular attention to mobile sources, can enhance resilience against both accidental and intentional events. Finally, it will consider the importance of sustained capacity building, regional cooperation, and political commitment in ensuring that safety and security measures mutually reinforce each other.
