Speaker
Description
The transport of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in Brazil poses challenges related to the country’s continental dimensions, infrastructure limitations, and regulatory restrictions. In mining, metallurgy, and oil sectors, thousands of tonnes are generated annually and must be moved over long distances, often across deficient road networks with limited logistical support and emergency response.
These circumstances increase the complexity of applying the National Nuclear Safety Authority (ANSN) framework and related legislation, while also hindering the development of routes for research, treatment, and revalorization. The challenge is compounded by the use of industrial volumes (big-bags and drums), widely adopted for regulatory predictability but which make large-scale transport economically unfeasible and generate secondary waste. Bulk transport, while reducing packaging waste and supporting circular economy approaches, demands certified equipment and specialized operators — still lacking in Brazil.
International experience reinforces these dilemmas. Japan, Germany, and Finland built regulatory frameworks aligned with IAEA requirements (TS-R-1/SSR-6) and conventions, but continue to face conflicts between safety and security [1–4]. Australia and Canada highlight the importance of public acceptance and effective communication [5,6,11]. In all cases, feasibility depends on interinstitutional coordination, involving regulators, environmental agencies, transport authorities, and public security.
Recent experiences broaden these lessons: Argentina integrated safety and security with satellite tracking, national databases, and armed escorts [7]; Germany showed that complex shipments such as vitrified waste returns were challenged mainly by massive protests and sabotage risks [8]; the Global Acceptance program demonstrated that keeping routes open depends on transparent communication with coastal states and communities [9]; and the European Association of Competent Authorities (EACA) proved that regional cooperation improves confidence and increases carrier availability [10]. In Canada, cases involving large irradiated components (steam generators) confirmed that public perception can hinder operations, even when radiological risks are minimal [11].
Brazil must therefore advance in adopting technological solutions (digital tracking, real-time monitoring, integrated emergency response), as well as regulatory harmonization and carrier qualification.
It is concluded that consolidating a safe, efficient, and sustainable model for NORM transport in large volumes and long distances — enabling new routes for research, treatment, and revalorization — requires a holistic approach, aligned with international best practices and adapted to the country’s continental scale.
References
[1] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2018 Edition, IAEA Safety Standards Series SSR-6 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2018).
[2] A. Konnai, N. Shibasaki, Y. Ikoma, M. Kato, T. Yamauchi, T. Iwasa, Regulatory Framework for the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear Material in Japan, IAEA-CN-187/2A/4, Vienna (2011).
[3] U. Alter, Ch. Fasten, F. Nitsche, Regulatory Approach for Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Material in Germany and Experience from Shipments between France and Germany within the last 40 years, IAEA-CN-187/2B/1, Vienna (2011).
[4] P. Karhu, A. Lahkola, M. Markkanen, S. Hellstén, Example of a Single National Regulator Responsible for Both Transport Safety and Security, IAEA-CN-187/2B/2, Vienna (2011).
[5] M. Muneer, Experience in Australia: Transport Safety, Security and Denial of Shipment, IAEA-CN-187/2A/2, Vienna (2011).
[6] P.A. Gray, Journey of a Package: Category 1 Source (Co-60) Shipment with Several Border Crossings, Multiple Modes, IAEA-CN-187/1A/4, Vienna (2011).
[7] J. López Vietri, The Integrated Approach in Argentina for Safety and Security of Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA-CN-187/2B/3, Vienna (2011).
[8] W. Graf, German Experience with Return Shipments of Vitrified Waste from France to Germany, IAEA-CN-187/3A/3, Vienna (2011).
[9] B. Monot, Global Acceptance – Keeping the Routes Open, IAEA-CN-187/3C/1, Vienna (2011).
[10] S. Whittingham, The European Association of Competent Authorities (EACA), IAEA-CN-187/3C/2, Vienna (2011).
[11] K. Glenn, Canadian Experience in the Transport of Large Radioactive Components and Lessons Learned, IAEA-CN-187/5B/1, Vienna (2011).
