Speaker
Description
The global nuclear sector is experiencing a wave of innovation driven by the development of emerging technologies such as advanced small modular reactors (SMRs), microreactors, floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), many of them using novel fuels such as high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) or TRI-structural ISO-tropic fuel (TRISO), and autonomous and AI-driven systems for transport and logistics. These advancements offer potential for more flexible and distributed nuclear power deployment, but they also present new challenges for the secure transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.
As novel fuels and transportable reactor units are designed for greater mobility and wider geographic reach, security requirements must adapt to account for previously unconsidered operational, technological, and human vulnerabilities. These include, e.g., increased transport of sensitive material across international boundaries and waters, new modes of conveyance with embedded digital control systems, and more frequent interaction between public-private operators in diverse security environments.
The increased complexity of multi-modal and international transport operations, often involving temporary personnel and subcontractors, heightens the risk of insider compromise. Furthermore, emerging technologies themselves (e.g., AI-enabled tracking, mobile reactor controls, integrated sensors) create new digital dependencies that could be exploited by adversaries, including insiders with privileged access.
While much attention is given to the technical security measures necessary for these innovations, this paper argues that secure transport planning must also integrate human-factor considerations, such as personnel trustworthiness, human reliability, and nuclear security culture. Specifically, regulations should require assessments and improvements of nuclear security culture, procedures to ensure personnel and contractor trustworthiness and to detect behavioral anomalies, and training programs tailored to the unique operational realities of emerging nuclear technologies. Design Basis Threat (DBT) development must also be updated to reflect insider risks associated with digitally augmented transport systems.
The paper will propose practical steps for regulators and other competent authorities to include the incorporation of insider threat scenarios into licensing and certification of transporting novel reactors and fuels; cultural maturity assessments for operators involved in emerging technology transport chains; and international cooperation to harmonize expectations, particularly in regions where digital infrastructure or personnel reliability frameworks are underdeveloped.
