Speaker
Description
The global deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) presents unprecedented transport security challenges that existing regulatory frameworks are inadequately equipped to address. Unlike conventional radioactive material shipments, SMR modules constitute high-value strategic nuclear assets requiring extended multi-modal transport through vulnerable maritime, rail, and road networks, creating significant security exposure periods that can span weeks or months.
This study identifies critical security vulnerabilities unique to SMR transport operations. Physical security threats include targeted hijacking, sabotage, and theft by state and non-state actors seeking to acquire advanced nuclear technology or disrupt critical energy infrastructure. Cyber-physical attack vectors target transport monitoring systems, GPS tracking, and communication networks, potentially enabling real-time location compromise or route manipulation. Insider threats within the extended transport chain pose risks through personnel with privileged access to transport schedules, routes, and security protocols across multiple jurisdictions and organizations.
Current international transport security regulations—including IAEA transport safety standards, IMO maritime security codes, and national road transport security requirements—fail to adequately address SMR-specific risks. Key regulatory gaps include: absence of standardized security classifications for reactor modules versus traditional radioactive cargo; inadequate security escort and monitoring protocols for oversized nuclear components; insufficient coordination mechanisms between transport modes and national security authorities; and lack of harmonized information security standards for protecting sensitive transport logistics data.
Critical operational vulnerabilities emerge at modal transfer points, during extended port storage periods, and through predictable transport corridors that enable adversary surveillance and targeting. The multi-jurisdictional nature of SMR transport creates accountability gaps where security responsibility transfers between manufacturers, transport operators, port authorities, and national security agencies remain unclear or inadequately coordinated.
Physical Protection System (PPS) challenges for SMR transport include the adaptation of detection, delay, and response capabilities to mobile, multi-modal environments. Critical security implementation gaps include: inadequate real-time monitoring and tracking systems for oversized cargo; insufficient tamper-evident packaging and sealing technologies for reactor modules; limited deployment of mobile security escorts with appropriate detection and response capabilities; and absence of standardized secure communication protocols between transport operators and security authorities.
Recommended security measures encompass layered protection strategies that extend beyond current IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance, including: enhanced pre-transport security assessments and route planning with threat-based analysis following IAEA NSS No. 46-T principles; implementation of GPS-based tracking systems with encrypted communications and backup redundancy exceeding SSR-6 monitoring requirements; deployment of mobile physical protection teams trained specifically for nuclear transport operations; establishment of secure staging areas with appropriate physical barriers and surveillance systems; development of rapid response protocols coordinated between law enforcement, military, and nuclear security agencies across transit jurisdictions; and integration of cyber-physical security measures addressing both IAEA safety-security interfaces and emerging digital threats to transport infrastructure.
This analysis demonstrates that effective SMR transport security requires integrating traditional PPS concepts with innovative mobile protection technologies and coordinated multi-jurisdictional response capabilities. The development of comprehensive SMR transport security standards, including specific PPS requirements and implementation guidelines, is essential to prevent the compromise of these critical energy infrastructure components and ensure the secure global deployment of advanced nuclear technology.
Keywords: SMR transport security, nuclear material protection, multi-modal transport threats, regulatory harmonization, critical infrastructure protection
