CHALLENGES FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF INDONESIA EXPERIMENTAL POWER REACTOR



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
Contents

≻Introduction >IAEA Security Series ►Indonesia Regulatory Framework **≻**I-EPR ► Challenges for I-EPR ➤Conclusions





National Organizations



Regulatory Aspects

SAFETY

To prevent harmful effect of radiation to personnel, public and environment

SECURITY


To protect, detect and respons to any unlawful act and unauthorized removal and/or sabotage of nuclear material, radioactive substance and facilities

SAFEGUARDS

To prevent diversion use of nuclear material from peaceful purposes

REGULATORY ASPECTS

IAEA Security Series



IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 2011

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13 Recommendations Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)


The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance to States and their competent authority on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes to address the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in order to reduce the risk of malicious acts involving that material or those facilities. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), 2011

IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 27-G


Implementing Guide

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) The objective of this publication is to provide guidance and suggestions to assist States and their competent authorities in establishing, strengthening and sustaining their national physical protection regime and implementing the associated systems and measures, including operators' physical protection systems.





Regulatory Framework



Act No. 10 Year 1997 on Nuclear Energy


- GR No. 54/2012 on Nuclear Installation Safety and Security
- GR No. 2/2014 on Licensing of Nuclear Reactor and Utilization of Nuclear Material

President Regulation No. 46/2009 on the Ratification of Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material


 BCR No. 1/2009 on Provision for Physical Protection System of Nuclear Installation and Material

Working Instruction

Per – 12 February2020




Licensing Applications





I-EPR PROJECT

BATAN Research Locations



Pasar Jumat Nuclear Complex, Jakarta



Serpong Nuclear Complex, Banten





Uranium Exploration Area, Kalan, West Kalimantan



Yogyakarta Nuclear Complex

Bandung Nuclear Complex, West Java

Serpong Nuclear Complex








Other Nuclear Cycle Facilities:


- Research Reactor Fuel Element Fabrication Installation
- Experimental Fuel Element Installation
- Radiometallurgy Installation

Transfer Channel–Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility
Indonesia Experimental Power Reactor Site

I-EPR Design




Site Evaluation Approval Process



Site License Process



Construction Licensing



Challenges for I-EPR

20

Challenges for I-EPR

The fuel design of the reactor is pebble bed where the fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in small sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a pebble bed core that will contain a bulk load of spherical fuel elements.

The refuelling scheme will use continuous multi-pass cycle where each pebble fuel will go through operation cycles before taken out of the core as a spent fuel.

□Modularity and size of the reactor which will be a small modular type of reactor will also have impact on the implemented physical protection.

Conclusions

There is a need to consider a physical protection criteria and approach more suited specifically to accommodate fuel design and fuel cycle management of EPR.

Modularity and size of the EPR has its advantages and disadvantages compared to common type of NPP.

The implementation of Security-by-Design as the design progresses provides an approach to meets the security requirements needed.

Thank you

Thank you!

THANK YOU!

Thank you for your attention! E-mail : t.sawaldi@bapeten.go.id