Nuclear Power Plant in a Box
Asherah

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[4] Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
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- Introduction
- Why to simulate an NPP in the first place?
- Structure of NPPs from a Computer Scientists Point of View
- Simulating …
  - The Physical Process
  - The Operational Technology
  - The Main Control Room HMI
  - The Information Technology
- Binding everything together
- Use in …
  - Training
  - Research

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- A NPP is highly complex
  - Operators require training to increase safety
  - Research into better safety measures might also increase safety
- NPP have also become targets of cyber-attackers (=attacks performed by using the computing technology inside NPPs)
  - Cyber-Security training is also required
  - Research into better protection against cyber-attacks might also increase security, and therefore safety

- Training is performed using Mockups or simulators
  - Mockups are expensive
  - Simulators are geared towards showing the physical process, not the computing units (and are hence bad to train against cyber-attacks)
- Need for a simulator which includes realistic behavior of the computing technology

- A NPP is …
  - A physical process
  - Controlled by computing units (operational technology, OT)
  - Operated by operators using Human-machine-interfaces (HMI)
  - Attached to a business system (information technology, IT)
- This is known as an Industrial Control System

Enterprise Zone	Enterprise Network	PERA Level 5
	Site Business Planning and Logistics Network	PERA Level 4

Manufactoring Zone		Site Manufacturing Operations and Control	PERA Level 3
	Cell/ Area Zone	Area Supervisory Control	PERA Level 2
		Basic Control	PERA Level 1
		Process	PERA Level 0

Control Hierarchy of ICS according to WILLIAMS, T. J., " The Purdue enterprise reference architecture: a technical guide for CIM planning and implementation", Research Triangle Park, NC: Instrument Society of America, 1992 – taken from Altschaffel et al, "Nuclear Power Plant in a Box", ICONS 2020

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- The physical process in the NPP is the foundation for all other components
  - controlled by the OT, operated via HMI, informs IT
- Requirements:
  - Needs to provide information about the physical process to other components
  - React on control inputs
  - Must be modular to swap out parts

- Forms the core of Asherah => Asherah Nuclear Simulator (ANS)

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- We use a Matlab model for the simulation of the physical process
  - 2,772 MWt pressurized water reactor
  - includes main plant subsystems & some equipment important for safety or security of the primary, secondary and tertiary cycle
    - Reactor Core with Control Rods
    - Pressurizer with proportional and Backup Heaters and Sprays
    - Reactor Coolant Pumps
    - Auxiliary Fluid Tank
    - U-tube Steam Generator (Primary and Secondary sides)
    - Turbines
    - Electric Generator Condenser
    - Condensate Extraction System
    - Condenser Cooling Pumps
    - Feedwater System
    - Reheaters

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- Operational Technology controls the physical process by performing Instrumentation and Control (I&C) and consists of:
  - Sensors   collecting information about the physical process
  - Computing units   computing the sensor input (and control signals)
  - Actors   influencing the physical process
  - Communication   to tie everything together
- All these components could be the target of cyber-attacks and need to be included in a simulator aimed at researching and training for cyber-attacks

- Our approach is to swap out parts of the ANS model for real hardware

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- To include physical subsystems like …

Physical Demonstrator

- Real physical process
- Real Sensors
- Real Computing Units
- Real Actors
- Local HMI
- Communicates with ANS and Main
  Control Room HMI

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- Or completely virtualized subsystems like …

- (Co-)Simulation of physical process
- Virtual Sensors
- Real Computing Unit Firmware
        running in Virtual PLCs
- Virtual Actors
- Local HMI
- Communicates with ANS and Main
        Control Room HMI

Virtualized Subsystem, taken from Altschaffel, R., Hildebrandt, M., Dittmann, J., "A Simulated
        Steam Turbine Geneator Subsystem for Research and Training", ICONS 2020

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
- In the Main Control Room operators supervise the physical process
- Requirements:
  - Show information about the physical process
  - Give commands to control the physical process

- Done with SCADA BR
- Includes detail views for various subsystems

HMI View taken from Altschaffel et al, "Nuclear Power Plant in a Box", ICONS 2020

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IT Network taken from Altschaffel et al, "Nuclear Power Plant in a Box", ICONS 2020

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- An NPP also contains a business and management network
- This network might be used as an attack venue (or as an attack target) during cyber-attacks

- Simulation using ANSIBLE and virtualized machines
  - Script for various IT components (Servers, Clients, Infrastructure)
  - Easy to deploy a complete network with functioning components
  - Historians, Work Management systems, Email, etc …

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- Communication between these components is done using realistic communication protocols and architectures based on NST047

Overall Communication Architecture taken from Altschaffel et al, "Nuclear Power Plant in a Box", ICONS 2020

NST047
IAEA, Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1527_web.pdf

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- Asherah have been used for training in the ITC in Korea
- We used Asherah for a complex attack scenario
  - Involving attacks on IT and OT
- Trainees were able to …
  - see the impact of the attack
  - Investigate the attack based on realistic captures from IT and OT
  - React on the attack by giving guidance to the operators and decision makers

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- Asherah is used in Research

- New approaches for anomaly detection
  - Requires realistic data to learn "normal behavior"
  - Requires the possibility to test the models
- Research into ICS forensics
  - Asherah helps to create realistic data from attacks/errors
  - Allows for the an understanding of additional required measures

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- Asherah is an easy to deploy simulator which focuses on a realistic behavior of plant computing components, including
  - Physical process
  - Operational Technology
  - Control Room HMI
  - Information Technology
- Can be used for Research and Training concerning cyber attacks

- Open points:
  - Increase performance
  - Increase variety of subsystems, computing units, protocols
  - Reduce dependency to commercial software

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