

Supporting carriers to develop their security culture

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Proposed agenda

- 1. Developing a threat analysis “watch cell”**
- 2. Developing carriers’ security oriented mind set**
- 3. Broadening the range of security inspections**
- 4. Widening the “unpredictability program” on transports**
- 5. Higher security standards for transport licence renewal**

I – DEVELOPPING A THREAT ANALYSIS “WATCH CELL”

❑ Three men part time / double hated team:



❑ Missions :



Watch over terrorist type events / actions

Analyse their modes of actions


Apply to Nuclear facilities / transports



❑ Confront with respective security functions



Transport protection functions



NICE - FRANCE

Ram vehicle attack – July 14th, 2016



Objective : Massive killing in a public area

الإسلام

Experience feedback

Sabotage A 321 Daallo Airlines (02 02 2016)

Objective : Cause aircraft fall with succession of actions and attacks

Explosion → depressurization → fuel tank ignition → dislocation



Failure

Sabotage with explosives

Failure

No detection

No alert



Success

Deception of access control
Insider aid

Success

Planification

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II – DEVELOPPING carriers' security oriented mindset



- Providing TNM carriers “threat presentations”

- Inspections

- Carriers' dedicated security meeting / actions :

- 2017 seminar

- 2019 TTX

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III – BROADENING the range of inspections ⁽¹⁾



☐ Focussing on stops

☐ Night stops

☐ Change or mode areas

☐ Railways marshalling yards / rail switching/staging yards

III – BROADENING the range of inspections (2)



- ☐ Widening the spectrum of inspections in process
 - ☐ Change or mode areas
 - ☐ Entering / outing a facility
 - ☐ When organised with subcontractors
 - ☐ When organized with private security & caretaking companies

III – BROADENING the range of inspections ⁽³⁾



☐ Inspections at carrier's HQ

- ☐ Crisis management organization
- ☐ General security policy & transport security management organisation

IV – STRENGTHENING the “unpredictability program” on transports



☐ Cat 1 & 2 efforts “Confidential”

- ☐ Initiated in 2011
- ☐ Formalized in 2015

☐ Cat 3 efforts “restricted”

- ☐ Formalized in 2016

☐ All Cat 2018 improved program up to 2019

- ☐ Experimental Setting criterias (Days, hours, stops, itineraries, ..)
- ☐ Systematic 2019-2020
- ☐ Automatic control & and go no go transport plan request
GESSTRANC system.

V – HIGHER SECURITY STANDARDS for carrier's licence renewals

☐ Limiting licences life expectancies

- ☐ Initiated in 2011 5 / 3 / 1 year(s)



☐ Explaining regulation security requirements

- ☐ Regulation + technical guidance
- ☐ 6 months security analysis required time
 - ☐ up to obtain a comprehensive SECURITY file
 - ☐ down to a thorough technical security analysis

☐ Elaboration on the security authority expectations

- ☐ Security demonstration (fitting the DBT)
- ☐ Operational and effective
- ☐ Self-sufficient / self-sustaining

Thank you

For you attention



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PPAS preparatory meeting - 2017-09-13

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