

Safety and Security Interface: The Implementation on the Transport of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources in Indonesia



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


Outline

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- Map of Nuclear Energy Utilization
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- Security Function in Transport Activity
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- Experiences on the Transport of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources
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- Coordination with Other Authorities
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- Transport Schedule Arrangement
- Route Arrangement
- Conclusion

- Act No. 10 year 1997 on Nuclear Energy → BAPETEN (1998)
- Main task : to conduct governmental activities in regulatory control of nuclear energy as mandated by applicable laws and regulations.




Subdirectorate of Licensing for Non Nuclear Reactor Installation

Licensing of waste management center, fuel production facility for RR, spent fuel storage facility, installation for fuel experiment, radioisotop production facilities, TENORM storage.




Map of nuclear energy utilization in Indonesia





Regulatory Framework



GR No. 33/2007 on the Safety of Ionizing Radiation and the Security of Radioactive Sources

GR No. 54/2012 on the Safety and the Security of Nuclear Installation

GR 58/2015 on Radiation Safety and the Security on the Transport of Radioactive Materials

BR No. 6 Year 2015 on the Security of Radioactive Sources

BR No. 1 Year 2009 on the Physical Protection System Requirement of Nuclear Installation and Materials



Structure of GR 58/2015

Chapter	Content	
Chapter I. General Clause	Definition and Scope	
Chapter II. Types of Radioactive Material	Low Specific Activity Material (I, II, III), Special Form Radioactive Material, Surface Contaminated Object (I, II), Low Dispersible Radioactive Material, Fissile Material, Uranium Hexafluoride (UF ₆)	
Chapter III. Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material		
	Radioactive Material in Transport	
	Requirement for Packagings and Packages	
	Radiation Protection and Safety Program	
	Requirement for placement of packagings during transport and storage in transit	
Chapter IV. Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material		
	Special Form Radioactive Material, Low Dispersible Radioactive Material	Categorization of radioactive sources, classification of security level, security plan
	Fissile Material, Uranium Hexafluoride (UF ₆)	Classification of nuclear material, physical protection plan
Chapter V. Management of Safety and Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material		
	Responsibility of consignor, consignee, and carrier. Management System	
Chapter VI. The System of Emergency Preparedness and Response		
Chapter VII. Administration Requirement		Approval, notification, and validation
Chapter VIII. Administrative Sanction	Chapter IX. Transition Clause	Chapter X. Closing Clause



Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material

Radioactive Material in Transport

Low specific activity material (LSA-I, LSA-II, LSA-III)

Surface contaminated object (SCO-I, SCO-II)

Special form radioactive material

Low dispersible radioactive material

Fissile material

Uranium hexafluoride (UF_6)



Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material (cont.)

Requirement for Packagings and Packages

The use of package (IP-I, IP-II, IP-III, type A, B(U), B(M), C)

Determination of package category (I-White, II-Yellow, III-Yellow)

Marking (identity of consignor/consignee, UN number, package type, mass info, identification code, design serial number, radiation sign)

Labeling (radiation sign, 'RADIOACTIVE', package category, content, radionuclide activity, Transport Index, class 7 for dangerous material)

Placarding for container/tank (radiation sign, 'RADIOACTIVE', class 7 for dangerous material, UN number)

Determination of Criticality Safety Index for fissile material / UF₆ transport

Package checking for custom purpose



Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material (cont.)

Radiation Protection and Safety Program

- Scope
- Responsibility of consignee, consignor, carrier
- Dose assessment result
- Personal and Occupational dose monitoring
- Radiation exposure and surface contamination measurement, Transport Index or Criticality Safety Index
- Package arrangement and other protection measures
- Procedures of loading, placement, transporting, handling, and unloading
- Emergency preparednes procedure
- Trainings
- Management system in transport



Safety in the Transport of Radioactive Material (cont.)

Placement of package during transport

- Transportation mode (air, land, sea)
- Vehicle type
- Radiation exposure on the vehicle surface
- Transport index
- Criticality safety index

Placement of package during transit

- Not easily reached by public
- Transport index, Criticality safety index



Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material

Special form radioactive material & low dispersible radioactive material

- Determination of radioactive source category
- Determination of security level
- Transport index
- Security Plan

Fissile material, uranium hexafluoride (UF_6)

- Classification of nuclear material,
- Physical Protection Plan



Security Function in Transport Activity

	Basic Security Level	Enhanced Security Level	Enhanced Security Level with Additional Measures	Physical Protection Measures
Catagorization of RA Sources/Nuclear Materials	Cat. 3 Source	Cat. 2 Source	Cat.1 Source	Cat. I, II, III, and IV NM
Prevention Function				
Early notification to consignee	√	√	√	√
Early notification to BAPETEN	-	√	√	√
Identification of personnel of transport company	√	√	√	√
Choice of transportation mode	√	√	√	√
Determination of route	-	√	√	√
Determination of the area for transit or parking	√	√	√	√
Detection Function				
Checking the vehicles	√	√	√	√
Using secure communication system	-	√	√	√
Using tracking system	-	√	√	√
Delay Function				
Using key and seal	√	√	√	√
Process of handing over sources/nuclear materials	-	√	√	√
Respond Function				
Security and transport emergency response plan	√	√	√	√
Reporting in routine and emergency condition	√	√	√	√
Determination of radioactive source security officer	-	√	√	√
Coordination with police or military force	-	-	√	√



Experiences on the Transport of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources

- Repatriation of spent fuel to Savannah River Site from Radioactive Waste Management Center in Serpong through Ciwandan-Cilegon seaport, 160 km (July 2009)
- Transport of Co-60 of teletherapy unit from Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital in Central Jakarta to Radioactive Waste Management Center in Serpong, 40 km (March 2016)
- Transport of LEU from Jakarta International Airport to RR Fuel Fabrication Facility in Serpong, 50 km (April 2018)



Good Practices from Experiences

- Coordination with other organizations
- Marking and labeling
- Transport schedule arrangement
- Route arrangement




Coordination with Other Authorities

- Authorities involved: BATAN, BAPETEN, US-DOE, Shipping/Transport Company, Police, Navy, Intelligence Agency, National Seaport Company, Custom.
- Coordination to explain transport plan as well as its safety & security aspect.
- Conduct simulation that include simulated problems during transport (vehicle problem, terrorist attack).



Marking and Labeling





Transport Schedule Arrangement

- Time of transport is carefully arranged so that not contribute unnecessary exposure to public (at night, or before dawn).
- Case transport from hospital to RWM Center was conducted at 03:15 – 04:30, with truck speed 40 km/hour.
- Case Repatriation was conducted at 23:00 – 03:00, with truck speed 40 km/hour.





Route Arrangement

- Route is carefully arranged so that not contribute unnecessary exposure to public.
- Conduct simulation before transport.



Time	Activity
09:45	Formation Team leaving
10:30	Formation entering cargo terminal
13:06	LEU removed from the cargo, checking for 1 palet, 1 tool box
13:10	Leaving airport area, traveling to Serpong, speed 30 km/hour via toll road
13:23	Formation passing through Kayu Besar toll road, speed 50 km/hour, exposure 0.018 μ Sv/hour
13:34	Formation passing through Karang Tengah toll road, speed 50 km/hour, exposure 0.028 μ Sv/hour
13:40	Formation leaving Kunciran Alam Sutera toll road, speed 30 km/hour, exposure 0.019 μ Sv/hour
13:57	Formation passing through BSD, speed 40 km/hour, exposure 0.019 μ Sv/hour
14:01	Formation passing German Center, speed 40 km/hour, exposure 0.020 μ Sv/hour
14:07	Formation passing Rawa Buntu, speed 40 km/hour, exposure 0.018 μ Sv/hour
14:13	Formation entering Techno Park, speed 40 km/hour, exposure 0.018 μ Sv/hour
14:15	Formation passing Kademangan, speed 40 km/hour, exposure 0.018 μ Sv/hour
14:17	Formation passing through Muncul intersection, speed 35 km/hour, exposure 0.016 μ Sv/hour
14:18	Formation entering Puspitek, speed 10 km/hour, exposure 0.016 μ Sv/hour



Conclusion

Regulations are sufficient.

Implementation of regulation should result safety & security not compromise one another.

Coordination is important so that authorities involved understand their responsibilities.

Each case is different that need different approach for safety and security.

Thank YOU



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