Speaker
Mr
K. Pyuskyulyan
(Armenia)
Description
After the disintegration of the USSR, a situation developed in Armenia where, at the enterprises using radioactive sources, control over sources had been extremely weakened for the following reasons:
1. The majority of the industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes of federal submission, including so-called "enterprises of the military department", from the end of the 1980s practically ceased to function. Further processes of manufacturing equipment renewal did not take into account radioactive sources of scientific and industrial purpose.
2. In connection with the shutdown of enterprises, there were few opportunities to properly take regulatory control over nuclear and radiological sources due to the lack of qualified personnel.
There is a set of the facts confirming the above-stated information. In particular, there were many cases when highly active sources were found in possession of persons who knew nothing about the danger to which they and their environment were exposed. The situation is complicated further because radioactive sources can become a subject of illegal trade or can be used by people which are unaware of their danger, in other purposes. In 2005, eight sources of ionizing radiation were found (activity from 1 to 30 curie - the first category of danger). Many of these cases involved transportation of radioactive sources and radioactive materials across the border, when in the material was found in cargoes of scrap metal. Such situations represent real dangers for workers in industries that use radiological sources, as well as the general population and the environment.
Some examples of illicit trafficking of radioactive sources follow:
In January 2009, at the Megry customs point, on the border with Iran, a border radiation monitor recorded a dose rate exceeding the legal limits of a load of lead scrap. Further analysis showed that there was a neutron source, Am-241, in the lead scrap. Information about the incident was submitted to the IAEA. This incident is remarkable because the driver knew that the material in question was a radiological source and tried to hide it from customs officers, having carefully having packed it in layers of lead.
Also in 2009, at the Institute of Physical Researches of Academy of Sciences RА, unknown criminals cracked open the door of a room in which a К-1200 device containing radioactive cobalt-60 was placed. The device was destroyed. At that moment its activity was 468,06 curie or 1,7321013 Becquerel.
These sources are sources of the first category of danger and represent essential dangers (according to National Rules of Radiation Safety, Governmental order РА from August, 26th, 2006 № 1219-N and 1489Н).
In May 2009, during routine radiation monitoring in the village of Noraduz it was revealed that the premises of a repair truck and territory adjoining to it (the area of 300 square meters) were polluted by radioactive isotope Cs-137. Gamma-radiation intensity on the premises ranged from 900 to 1200 μSv/h. Gamma-radiation intensity in the surrounding area was 600-800 μSv/h. Four persons (the owner of the repair truck, his son and two technicians) received radiation doses exceeding the normally established limits. The dose for owner’s son was 128 mSv/year, another person’s internal dose was estimated from 7 to 12 mSv/year.
There have been 32 incidents related to radioactive materials in the period from 1999 to 2013 is equal 32. Fig. 1 shows the statistics of these incidents related to the illicit trafficking of radioactive sources and materials, which have been followed by court examinations.
Primary author
Mr
K. Pyuskyulyan
(Armenia)
Co-author
Dr
V. Atoyan
(Armenian Nuclear Power Plant CJSC)
